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2Abstract
Chapter 1 introduces the main issues including those of definition, within a history of
ideas context, and explains how the argument will proceed in the succeeding chapters.
Chapter 2 considers a wide range of claims and counter-claims concerning the
teaching of philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum. The transcendental claim
that pre-philosophical and higher order thinking are de facto taught in all schools, is
combined with other strong claims to make the case for developing a philosophy and
pre-philosophical curriculum.
Chapter 3 argues the claim from transcendental realism, following Kant and Bhaskar,
that philosophical concerns are pervasively present in the curriculum, pedagogy and
organisation of schools. Chapter 4 shows how a philosophically-driven pedagogy
can be informed by philosophical theory concerning conditionals, counter-factual and
possible worlds thinking.
Chapter 5 demonstrates the importance of the claims for benefits from thinking and
phiosophising in relation to the intellectual and moral dispositions, and the virtues.
Chapter 6 examines discussion and practice of the canonical in philosophy and pre-
philosophy, through a series of comparative case studies. The extent to which the
National Curriculum for England and Wales might present a canonical form of the pre-
philosophical curriculum is examined. Chapter 7 recommends, in practical and
theoretical ways, how a strategy for a whole school or college approach to the
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum can be devised and implemented.
Chapter 8 considers particular issues of personal, professional and pedagogic ethics
which teachers will need to address. The importance of narrative and philosophical
auto-biography is argued. It is claimed that a teacher should be a transformative
professional and public intellectual.
A concluding over-view envisages prospects for further philosophical and scholarly
enquiry, and empirical and public policy research.
l'hirty-eight Appendices of reference and teaching materials, together with a
Bibliography of works referred to in the text and notes, illustrate the argument of the
thesis and provide teaching material for teacher education.
3Acknowledgement
I should like to thank my supervisor, Patricia White, Research Fellow in Philosophy
of Education, Philosophy Section, History and Philosophy Group, University of
London Institute of Education, for her support during the preparation of this thesis.
4Contents
page
Chapter 1
	 Introduction.	 12
Chapter 2
	 Claims and counter-claims for teaching a
philosophy and a e-phiosophical curriculum.	 36
Chapter 3
	 The transcendental realist claim: the pervasiveness 	 84
of philosophical matters.
Chapter 4	 Parallel, possible and plausible worlds. 	 113
Chapter 5	 Dispositional claims for teaching philosophy 	 160
and pre-philosophy.
Chapter 6
	 The curriculum canon: specialist philosophy and 	 194
the National Curriculum.
Chapter 7
	 Organising a whole school or college	 218
curriculum in philosophy and pre-philosophy.
Chapter 8
	 The teacher as a public, philosophical intellectuaL 	 251
Over-view and Prospects. 	 279
Bibliography	 284
Appendices	 340
5Contents
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Page
12.	 1. The main argument of the study
14. 2. Philosophy's relationship with critical thinking
and related areas
15. 3. Medieval origins from theology
17. 4. The question of who should teach philosophy
18. 5. Philosophy's emergence as a separate discipline
19. 6. The Humean tradition
21.	 7. A social movement with contested definitions
25.	 8. The debate re-configured
25.	 9. The structure of the thesis
28.	 10. Important questions to be be addressed
CHAPTER 2
Claims and counter claims for teaching philosophy and a pre-
philosophical curriculum.
Page
36.
37.
38.
39.
39.
42.
43.
1. Four main types of claim
2. The transcendental claim
3. The primacy claim
4. The canonical claim
5. The essentialist claim
6. The claim of intrinsic worthwhileness
7. The metaphysical and aesthetic claim from wonder and awe
645.	 8. The claim from ineffability and aporia
47. 9. The hermeneutic claim
48. 10. The conditional, counteifactual and possible worlds claim
50. 11. The linguistic clarification claim
51. 12. The claim which relates to 'being a person'
53.	 13. Claims of transfer
53.	 14. The claim of transferable liberal education
55. 15. Linguistic transferability
56. 16. The claim of transfer across subject areas
57. 17. The claim concerning transferable meta-competence
58. 18. The empirical claim for transfer
59. 19. The transfer through problem-solving claim
60. 20. The claim of cross-domain transfer
62.	 21. The claim to develop intellectual and ethical
dispositions and virtues
64.	 22. Hegemonic, elitist and democratic claims
69. 23. Personal and vocational hegemony
70. 24. Which claims have been most prominent or discernible?
72.	 25. A rights or curriculum entitlement claim.
CHAPTER 3
The transcendental realist claim: the pervasiveness of
philosophical matters.
Page
84.
85.
86.
88.
90.
93.
96.
97.
99.
1. The transcendental claim.
2. Kant and the transcendental
3. Bhaskar and the transitive realm
4. The case for teaching
5. Empirical evidence for the transcendental claim
6. The presence and prominence of ideology: the ideological objection
7. The case of English studies
8. Curriculum territoriality: the claimuits
9. The importance of narrative, the henneneutic perspective and
tradition
7102.	 10. Narratology, exposition and fiction
104.	 11. Speech acts, feeling and fiction
107.	 12. Can a pre-philosophical curriculum be distilled out?
CHAPTER 4
Parallel, possible and plausible worlds.
Page
113. 1. The context of counter-factual and possible worlds discourse
114. 2. Inter-disciplinary and cultural interest in counter-factuals
116.	 3. Philosophical discussion of conditional, possible worlds
118.	 4. Modal realism: the position of Lewis
121. 5. Possible worlds, cosmology and quantum physics
122. 6. Hawthorn and 'plausible historical worlds'.
124. 7. Counter-factual history: the approach of Ferguson
125. 8. Counter-intuitive, counter-factual thinking: the example of Fogel
126. 9. Psychology and counter-factual thinking
128. 10. Narrative, fiction, and possible worlds
129. 11. The place of imagination
131. 12. Intangible worlds
132. 13. The importance of metaphor
134. 14. Cross-domain thinking
135. 15. Connectionism and computing
136. 16. Stochastic thought
137. 17. Play
138. 18. Embodied thinking
139. 19. Multiple identity
141. 20. Memory as previous knowledge
142. 21. Ethical pitfalls
143. 22. Implications for the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum
146. 23. Curriculum resources
147. 24. Valued possibilities.
8CHAPTER 5
Dispositional claims for teaching philosophy and pre-
philosophy.
Page
160.	 1. Dispositions as causal possible worlds
162. 2. Dispositions in ethical life and education
163. 3. Dispositions in counter-factual thinking
165. 4. The case for cognitive emotions
166. 5. The caring disposition
167. 6. Is empathy a form of possible worlds creation?
169. 7. Dispositions as narrative, literary and embedded
171. 8. The proceduralist account
173.	 9. Doubts over persistence
175. 10. Dispositions gather strength
176. 11. Are dispositions traits?
178. 12. Thinking well as a duty
179. 13. The problem of inauthentic dispositions
181. 14. Paul and substantial, authentic dispositions
182. 15. A 'passion for critical thinking', values education,
and transferability
183. 16. flexibility and ready-wittedness
184. 17. Proceduralism also remains
185. 18. Democratic forms of life
CHAPTER 6
The canonical curriculum: specialist philosophy and the
National Curriculum.
Page
194.	 1. The question of a philosophical canon
198.	 2. A curriculum canon
9199. 3. Selection is inevitable
200. 4. The case of France
201. 5. Philosophy for Children in the US
202. 6. A level Philosophy in the UK
203. 7. The National Curriculum of England and Wales
205. 8. A cross-curricular entitlement
206. 9. The subject context
207. 10. The 'inferred' canon and the National Curriculum
208. 11. Results of the analysis
211. 12. The need for an explicit canon.
212. 13. Identifying sources for an explicit canon.
CHAPTER 7
Organising a whole school or college curriculum in philosophy
and pre-philosophy.
Page
218.
219.
220.
221.
223.
224.
225.
226.
229.
230.
232.
233.
234.
236.
1. The need for a whole school or college policy
2. Making an action plan for puuing a curriculum policy
into place (STEP 1)
3. Identifying philosophical leadership (STEP 2)
4. Establishing a shared notion of rationality (STEP 3)
5. Forming a community of enquiiy (STEP 4)
6. Reconciling ideological claims (STEP 5)
7. Deciding on the approach to values education (STEP 6)
8. Clarifying philosophical issues in pedagogy (STEP 7)
9. Identifying the general curriculum contribution (STEP 8)
10. Agreement on distinctive contributions of individual subjects
(STEP 9)
11. Deciding on a cross-curricular approach (STEP 10)
12. Selecting intervention programmes (STEP 11)
13. Formulating the approach to transferable thinking (STEP 12)
14. Codifying principles of entitlement and access (STEP 13)
10
237. 15. Reviewing the management philosophy (STEP 14)
238. 16. Selecting and organising curriculum resources (STEP 15)
239. 17. Providing for Staff Development, In service Education
and Training (STEP 16)
241. 18. Publishing and circulating a written school or college
policy (STEP 17)
242. 19. Undertaking 'reflective practitioner' evaluation and
review (STEP 18)
243. 20. What kind of person will a philosophically educated
student be?
CHAPTER 8
The teacher as a public, philosophical intellectual.
Page
251. 1.
252. 2.
254. 3.
255. 4.
256. 5.
258.	 6.
261.	 7.
The case for a strong version of the philosophy and
pre-philosophical curriculum
Professional autonomy and liberal individualism
Professional autonomy and cultural pluralism:
philosophical issues in pedagogy
Pedagogy and technical philosophy
The pastoral aspect of pedagogy.
Cognitive emotion and the case of Mill
The question of authenticity
263. 8. Accommodating reservations concerning 'ironism'
264. 9. Narrative, reflexivity and teachers' lives
267.	 10. The importance of philosophical autobiography
269. 11. The philosophy teacher as ethicist and counsellor
270. 12. Teachers as transformative public and philosophical
intellectuals
272.	 13. The individual teacher's approach to possibility
11
Page
279. Over-view and prospects
284.	 Bibliography of works mentioned in the text or notes
341.	 Appendices.
12
CHAPTER 1
Introduction.
1. The main argument of the study
An extended study of the curriculum which would appropriately precede the formal
teaching of philosophy in schools or colleges is undertaken in this thesis. The main
argument is that a pre-philosophical curriculum can be identified in the curricular,
pedagogic and managerial forms of practice that precede the academic teaching of
philosophy (which begins normally at sixteen years). Taken together, the two
components are characterised as the philosophy and pre -p hi losophical curriculum. It
is argued that the development of a capacity to think philosophically, and experience
'cognitive emotions' of a philosophical nature, can occur in the context of the general
curriculum and particularly within specific subject teaching. However, this process is
pre-philosophical in that it does not exhibit the features of sustained philosophical
intercourse. The concept of the pre-philosophical curriculum is preferred to other
formulations such as 'critical and creative thinking', 'higher order thinking' or
'metacognition,' because it conveys inclusively and accurately the cenirality of
philosophical content in any general curriculum.
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A central argument of the thesis is as follows. A pre-phiosophical curriculum and
pedagogy exists, transcendentally, and is therefore defacto already taught This
general transcendental claim stands irrespective of any individual interpretation of what
a particular version, or canon for the philosophy or pre-philosophical curriculum might
look like. Importance must be attached to the explicit articulation of the philosophy
and pre-philosophical curriculum one is already teaching. A state of affairs exists in
which little formal curriculum literature or philosophical guidance is available as to
how teachers might proceed. A range of claims and counter-claims for teaching
philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum can be identified. Claims which relate
to topics recently explored in mainstream philosophy, concerning a philosophical
canon, counterfactual and 'possible worlds' and neo-Aristotelian approaches to virtue-
ethics, are argued to be of particular importance. 1
It is argued that each school and college should identify its philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum. These foundations of philosophical thinking will give equal
emphasis to cognitive aspects and the education of the feelings or dispositions. A pre-
philosophical curriculum will pay particular attention to speculative, conditional and
counter-factual thought 2
 An integrated curriculum in pre-philosophy and
philosophy is seen as having an important contribution to make to 'whole school'
improvement and effectiveness, and to the strengthening of pedagogy within the
National Curriculum. 3
 Careful design and teaching of the pre-philosophical
curricuiwn is advocated; and a range of philosophical and curriculum resources is
identified, upon which teachers can draw in organising this as a common, entitlement
curriculum.
An original feature of the study consists in the drawing together of a multi-disciplinary
field of study of some complexity. 4
 Topics beyond the customary purview of
formal philosophy, such as informal logic, creative and critical thinking, higher order
thinking, problem solving, and argumentation theory require coverage in approaching
the question of a philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculwn. For instance, the
study draws selectively on the literature of curriculum theory in moving towards an
account of how the philosophy and pre-philosophy curriculum can be implemented in
a practical form in schools. Many philosophers see important links between general
philosophy and critical thinking, including Norris (1985, 1992a, 1992b), Siegel
(1987, 1988, 1993) and Weinstein (1993a, 1993b). Literary philosophers see their
subject as having a close relationship with philosophy for children (Matthews 1994,
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Nussbaum 1988). A range of terms which bear on philosophical questions recur,
shift, and overlap in the literature on teaching of critical thinking and philosophy, and
in the organisation of school, college and university curricula. 5 Not only the
episternological and ethical, but the metaphysical and aesthetic areas, these being the
four main, traditional areas of philosophical enquiry, require close attention by those
preparing a philosophical and pre-philosophical curriculum. This need is particularly
evident in chapter 4 where the curriculum and pedagogy of conjectural, stochastic
thought is brought into focus.
2. Philosophy's relationship with critical thinking and related
areas
Critical and creative thinking, higher order thinking, problem-solving, philosophy for
children, and thinking skills comprise a group of approaches which can be argued to
share a 'family resemblance' to philosophy, both in the way they are treated in the
literature and for purposes of study. 6 I deal with these developments as part of the
pre-philosophical curriculum, inasmuch as that they relate to philosophy in a manner
which is preparatory to its teaching as a specialist subject.
There are major implications for school and college life in relation to which particular
forms of philosophy teaching and critical thinking are adopted. Following scrutiny of
the claims for teaching philosophical and pre-phiosophical curriculum, it will be
argued that certain significant and persuasive claims require a 'strong' version of a
philosophy and a pre-philosophical curricuiwn to be taken up by educators in a whole
school or college approach. The 'strong' version of curriculum which is advocated
here has more wide-ranging pedagogic, curricular and even managerial implications
than would some other approaches. The 'contested' nature of some claims, and the
need for hermeneutically-located, 'ownership' of the curriculum by 'empowered'
teachers, schools or colleges (Fullan 1992), means that a local view must be taken as
to the curriculum to be adopted in a particular setting (Gallagher 1992). The argument
that there is no need to teach philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum is rebutted
by the tra,scendental claim, which is presented as the leading claim in chapter 3. This
study is, consequently, critical of the view which might be characterised as Austinian
minimalism: namely, that philosophers should confine themselves as journeymen to
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the low-level and unpretentious task of the linguistic clarification of problems. There
are considerable pitfalls, it is argued, in limiting the pre-phiosophical curriculum to the
study of informal logic, problem-solving, or modest critical thinking exercises.7
The different social and intellectual practices presented in the claims for teaching
philosophy and pre-philosophy, constitute a spectrum, and exhibit a set of family
resemblances, rather than a number of discrete, philosophical positions. They can be
brought together in various combinations. The philosophical perspective of
transcendental modal realism (see chapters 3 and 4), and the adoption of a canonical
and hermeneutic perspective (see chapter 6), are advocated as essential for a full
response, as is the role of the teacher as a philosophical person and transformative,
public intellectual (see chapter 8). The 'strong' version claims are sufficiently
important and general, it is argued, that they will necessarily involve notions of
'entitlement', rights and responsibilities in relation to educators making apre-
philosophical curriculum available (see chapter 7).
3. Medieval origins from theology
A foundational question in such a study as this concerns how far philosophy itself is
seen as a discrete, specialist, and 'metacognitive' discipline. Fairly frequent reference
is made in this study to the legacy of the Greek philosophers. However, it is usually
argued that Western philosophy emerged from scholasticism with a distinct subject
matter (Leff 1958, Price 1992, Rorty 1979). The notion of an autonomous discipline
called philosophy distinct from and sitting in judgement upon both religion and science
is of quite recent origin. Leff (1958: 19) argues that until the modern historical period
the primacy of theology preceded that of philosophy. 8
 For Duns Scotus and those
medieval, scholastic theologians who were also practising philosophers, the most
important features of their philosophy were worked out in the context of theological
questioning. The teaching of thinking, logic, and philosophy in the scholastic
tradition and in the early setting of the European and other universities were all carried
on simultaneously.
Price, Leff, Copleston (1950, 1953) and others have traced the intellectual history of
these developments. They argue that as soon as there was a desire to supplement
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belief by reasoning, personal judgement came into play and with it the search for
convincing arguments and concepts. 9
 Philosophy, including metaphysics, then
emerged as a discrete system of knowledge regulated by reason in contradistinction to
theology - a body of revealed truth held on faith (Leff 1958: 14, Hancock 1967). The
schoolmen did not confuse theology with philosophy, but in practice used philosophy
for the systematic defence or explication of the data of revelation. As Price (1992)
points out, the most influential vehicle for 'medieval intellectualisation' was
philosophical and metaphysical discussion carried out within the especially fertile
ground of religion. However, theologians began to assume that philosophy, as the
work of reason unaided by faith, played an autonomous role and had a competence of
its own - limited though it might be where questions of human nature and destiny were
at issue. The ensuing transition towards a discrete status for philosophy provoked
controversy among the school-men themselves. Consequent upon the appearance of
the new intellectual discipline, there arose a need for a systematic account of
philosophy and its place in the order of things. Thus Aquinas, for example, re-
worked the speculative and practical philosophies of his predecessors in coherent
reflection of his religious commitment. As a philosophical innovator, however, he
introduced new ways of reasoning about problems and handled the teaching of the
subject in a new way.
Modal thinking, reflected in theories of conditionals, counter-factual and possible
worlds, will be given considerable prominence in in the study. These essentially
ontological and metaphysical conceptions of philosophical thinking were revived
within Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition in medieval philosophy: and the present
study re-asserts their importance, in advocating increased attention to ontology,
aesthetics and metaphysics in the school or college curriculum. Their ascendancy
within the central medieval tradition is most marked in the idea of the Grew Chain of
Being (Lovejoy 1936), an influential and systematic conception of other 'possible
worlds'. It is reflected within the medieval theories of mind, knowledge, memory
(Yates 1966), the marvellous (Le Goff, 1985: 40), magic and the occult (Thomas
1971), and philosophical thinking concerning modalities (Knuutila 1993). 10 It
flourished in Victorian times in microscopic nanotechology, and Darwinian ideas of a
'missing link' in the chain (Spufford and Uglow 1996: 8-9). The metaphor, and
associated notions of perfection and plenitude, dominated ideas of 'cosmography',
natural, and inhabited worlds - and persists in modern cultural forms. One fmds the
question of a universal or perfect language - a central Great Chain of Being notion
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(Eco 1997) - being pursued in philosophy lessons for Australian primary children
(Cam 1994a, 1994b). 11
Described by Augustine as 'the stomach of the mind', as Schechtman (1996: 220)
reminds us, memory was given a significant place in medieval philosophy and will be
given prominence in the present study. Medieval memory systems, such as the
'theatre memory' of Fludd (Yates 1966: 310), were in effect systems of possible
propositional worlds of logic, spatially, geographically and architecturally conceived.
Contemporary accounts of memory picture it as crucial to 'good thinking' based on
narrative identity (Schechtman 1996), oral tradition and expertise (Neisser 1989), and
prior and previous knowledge in inferential thinking (Fincher-Kieffer 1992).
Memory is a key, essential ingredient when one is assembling a canon (Bloom 1994,
Brann 1993, Rorty et a! 1985), and its implicit importance is evident in the
Maclntyrian (1984) or hermeneutic emphasis on tradition and continuity, and in the
synaesthetic account of body-self in modal thinking (Clarke 1997, Dreyfus 1995).
4. The question of who should teach philosophy
The preceding discussion raises the question: who has the prior right to teach
philosophy? Philosophy was taught by the church before it was taught by the state in
public systems of education. Its role was to assist the aims of a theocratic polity: the
hegemonic teaching of philosophy, and therefore philosophical discussion itself, was
located within religion. In the analysis offered by Aithusser (1984), during the
Middle Ages, the Church (the religious State Ideological Apparatus) accumulated a
number of such functions. Althusser goes on to make the claim, which is important
for this study, that in the 'mature capitalist social formations' of today, these functions
have devolved upon several distinct Ideological State Apparatuses, the most dominant
of which is the 'educational ideological apparatus' (1984: 25). Not surprisingly, a
view persisted in denominational school systems, right up to the present day, that
philosophy teaching should be taught within the religious education curriculum which
is its natural home. The extent to which philosophy and religion are seen as
inextricably inter-connected in dealing with questions of metaphysics, ontology and
moral philosophy is emphasised. Conceived in this way, philosophy is not a separate
subject at all, and therefore should not be taught as such. Thus, for the thirty years
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prior to 1986, A level philosophy appeared only as an option within the A level
Religious Studies course.
The delayed introduction of philosophy as a specialist subject at the sixth form A level
system in British schools thus occurs within a broad historical context. Prior to 1986
in England and Wales, philosophical topics for secondary school students were either
treated within liberal arts or general studies courses; or covered, as in the case of the
Romantic movement philosophers, by specialist teachers of English, history or
modem languages. Evidence from empirical educational research of claims that this
was the best way to teach philosophy to the older student is notably absent by and
large, it seems there was no conscious, pedagogic rationale for the teaching of
philosophical thinking in the curriculum.'2
5. Philosophy's emergence as a separate discipline
How the teaching of philosophy gradually becomes a separate activity with a discrete
curriculum in the modern period is therefore relevant in setting a context. Descartes
and Hobbes can be seen as having begun modem philosophy, even if they thought of
their role as philosophers more in terms of a logomachy between science and theology.
13 The eventual demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible by the
notion that philosophy's core was the 'theory of knowledge', a theory distinct from
the sciences - because it was their foundation. It was not until after Kant that the
modern philosophy versus science distinction took hold; indeed as late as the 18th
century, science was still known as 'natural philosophy'. The history of the teaching
of philosophy as a specialist subject in fact varies significantly in the curriculum
traditions of different countries. Maclntyre (1981), Struever (1985) and Gadamer
(1965) see a sense in which one moves to take up a position in a historical, intellectual
tradition when teaching philosophy. That the history of philosophy as a subject, and
the history of how that subject has been taught to young people, are closely-linked
within the canon will be shown in chapter 6. However, many different justifications
for teaching the subject can be discerned, some contrasting markedly with others, as
for instance, in the contribution of philosophy teaching to the formation and education
of elites compared with its contribution to democratic forms of life (Griffiths 1979).
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Debate concerning the distinctiveness of philosophy as a specialist discipline has
remained active among contemporary philosophers. Popper (1959, 1960), for
example, took the view that philosophy is not sharply distinguishable from science in
its methods - of trial and error, conjecture and attempted refutation; and in its subject
matter, which is not only language but also the world to which language refers. There
could be no uniquely correct philosophical method. If philosophy was to be of any
general importance it would have to stand in a close relation to the work of other
disciplines. However, as some philosophers continue to complain, there has been
still a tendency to see 'philosophy as a self-contained eternal sector of intellectual
production' (Ree 1978: 32). When isolated, as a special autonomous craft, from the
general pursuit of knowledge philosophy can easily degenerate into the 'ironist'
pursuit of scholasticism and triviality.
6. The Humean tradition
The most influential philosopher of education in the early part of the century, John
Dewey (1916), took the view that the role of philosophy in civilisation was that it was
dependent on, but should attempt to transcend, the specific culture from which it
emerged. The educational imperative was clear. The function of philosophy was to
effect a conjunction of the new and old, to articulate the basic principles and values of
a culture, and to reconstruct these into more coherent and imaginative visions. 14
However, many philosophers after Hume have defined philosophy and its purposes in
another quite different way. In emphasising the application of language and logic
(and one could argue that the scholastics adumbrated this approach), they have taken a
view which sees philosophy as a second-order discipline. The philosopher is
presented as a journeyman', technician, or servicing agent, whose modest objective is
to help people think more critically or clearly - but no more than that (Austin 1962).
Philosophers cannot provide answers to larger questions, 'ironists' like Rorty (1989)
claim. The Humean model has had considerable influence upon the development of
informal logic, critical thinking, and philosophy for children in schools in the United
Kingdom and the USA (Scriven 1966, Toulmin 1958). 15
However, the insularity of Anglo-Saxon philosophy in its preoccupation with the
clarification of second order philosophical problems has been increasingly criticised by
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a significant cohort of philosophers (Lang 1990, Ree 1978). The need for philosophy
to relate to empirical work in other disciplines has been urged, for example, by Dennett
(1996) in relation to the philosophy of consciousness. He cites the Capgras delusion
of a sufferer's conviction that a close acquaintance has been iep1aced by an imposter.
This amazing phenomenon should send shock waves through philosophy. Philosophers
have made up many far-fetched cases of mistaken identity to illusirate their various
philosophical theories, and the literature of philosophy is crowded with fantastic thought
experiments about spies and murders travelling incognito, best friends dressed up in gorilla
suits, and long-lost identical twins, but the real-life cases of Capgras delusion have so far
escaped philosophers' attention. (Denneu 148).
Mainstream European philosophy has also taken up a formal role. While traditional
philosophical Marxism attempted reductively to focus all discussion of philosophical
issues on the economic foundations of society, post-Marxist critical theorists have
attempted to extend their philosophical purview to claims concerning the arts,
literature, curriculum and the economy (Aithusser 1984, Brent 1983, Bryan and
Assiter 1993, 1995; Han-is 1979, Wolff 1981). From its inception, one A level
course, for example, has featured a work from mainstream European philosophy,
Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism (1948), as a set text. These trends raise
questions concerning the nature of a philosophical canon (see chapter 6).
One stream of thinking within the modern period is represented by the Kantian system
and the school of Husserl, the existentialism of Sartre and Heidegger (1962), and the
herineneutic perspectives of Gadamer. It emphasises the importance of the
individual's attempt to live as a person, exploring the possibilities of personal, self-
constituted and narrative identity (Schechtman 1997), perceptions and experience
(Schmitt 1967), moral imagination (Johnson 1993), and living as a person (Woliheim
1980a, 1984). 16 The contemporary herrneneutic perspective, as in the philosophical
positions of Rorty or Maclntyre, can be seen as sympathetic to such views (Verges
1987). Gallagher (1992) offers educationists an analysis of the competing definitions
of hermeneutics, including his favoured adoption of a local ,noderate hermeneuzic
(Appendix 34).
Reformist philosophers have increasingly regarded the subject as one which should
and does provide clarification and answers to moral and other problems, such as
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animal rights (Singer 1993), or in science more generally (Powers 1985, Wagner
1982). There has been growth in applied philosophy in such areas as medical and
business ethics, values and rights education, and philosophical counselling (Rahav
1996).
This study shares that 'transcendental' view of applied philosophy. Dominant
philosophical perspectives from other subject disciplines will be argued as of great
importance, in fi-aming the educational climate and canon for a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum. Great emphasis will be placed on the fecundity of such
subjects as geography, history and physics in providing rich intellectual traditions, and
distinctive modes of thinking. Particular examples include the contributions of:
critical theory in English studies (Davies 1990, Eagleton 1983), phenomenology and
'mental maps' in geography (Downs and Stea 1973, Gould and White 1974, Huckle
1983), constructivism in science (Driver 1983, Blacker 1994), and phenomenography
in economics and science (Marton 1981, Marton et al 1984). A central argument
therefore will be that one must locate the teaching of philosophy and pre-phiosophical
curriculum within broad currents within the history of ideas; within political sociology,
hermeneutics, philosophy teaching, or critical thinking as a social movement. Some
of these currents can also be seen as an advancing counter-hegemony within the plate
tectonics of that social movement.
7. A social movement with contested definitions
The broad range of developments characterised in this study as the philosophy and
pre-philosophical curriculum do in fact exhibit the features of a variegated social
movement (Giddens 1993). They include such strands as philosophy teaching to
older students, philosophy with children, informal logic, argumentation, critical and
creative thinking, transferable thinking, problem-solving and study skills. 17
Social movements often develop in deliberate antagonism with other groups and have
interests or aims they arefor, and all have views and ideas they are against. 18 They
are often concerned with what Gallie (1956) identified for the philosophical
community as 'essentially contested concepts'. This feature is apparent, for example,
in the tension between philosophy teaching and critical thinking. Philosophy teaching
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in schools and colleges and the teaching of critical, creative and higher order thinking
are largely separate traditions. 19 High school philosophy in the U.S. has a much
less authoritative voice than fonnerly. 20
 It occupies a declining power base within
the curriculum arrangements having been unseated by critical thinking courses, a
phenomenon also observable in some UK universities. Paradoxically, the philosophy
A level has achieved an established position in the schools system of England and
Wales, and such critical mass that the pressing question has arisen: What is to be the
pre-philosophical curriculum that precedes it?
A social movement which is moving towards a more prescriptive canon, or canons, in
philosophy and pre 
-p hi losophy requires a complex examination in philosophical
terms, and for philosophical reasons. Much hinges on how one defines the purposes
of philosophy teaching, and preparation for its teaching in schools and colleges. 21
The contestedness of concepts and meanings in this field recurs frequently.
Where there is need for coherent philosophical positions to be estab1ihed questions of
definition become important. This is especially evident, for example, in the case of
critical thinking. In a series of influential definitions, (Ennis (1962, ff979, 1991)
defines critical thinking as 'reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding
what to do or believe' (see Appendix 7). He designates sixteen abilities and,
modifying his earlier definition, introduces twelve dLposirions of the ideal critical
thinker.	 As chapter 5 will demonstrate, many critical thinkers have moved
increasingly towards defmitions of good critical thinking which involve habit,
character trait, duty, and will in the disposition to persist in that thinking.
Similarly, in relation to higher order thinking, Dames (1987) argues it is important to
be able to explain what meta-cognition is, its relationship to 'philosophising', and the
extent to which it provides an epistemological foundation for the concept of higher
order thinking. A representative definition of higher order thinking offered by
Newmann and Wehiage (1993) contrasts it with lower order thinking (see also
chapters 3 and 4). 23 Similar distinctions are identified elsewhere within the study,
for instance in relation to transferable thinking and skills, vocational and values
education (Appendices 10,25 & 29).
Some philosophers of critical thinking like McPeck (1990) have claimed that thinking
is only possible in relation to particular subject specific content, although the argument
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that thinking can never be generalisable has also been strongly challenged (Quinn
1991, 1994, Weinstein 1993a).
	 This study will argue that thinldng is both:
usually subject specific in its originating forms;
	 often generalisable as meta-
discourse, including philosophical discourse (chapter 5). However, there may be a
distinctive account of 'thinking' to be given for each of the major areas of intelligence
and creativity, as Gardner argues (1993, 1997). Gardner's (1997) re-working of the
'separate abilities' psychometry of 1930's psychologists postulates nine intelligences
of which the latest, existential intelligence - ' curiosity about basic questions of
existence', might equally be termed philosophical intelligence.
	 If there are discrete
subject disciplines or areas of discourse, as Siegel, McPeck and Nussbaum wish to
claim, then each of those areas will need its own treatment. It may then be asked
whether thinking occurs differently within various intelligences and disciplines: within
different sensory modalities (Cytowic 1995, Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1997): or
within multiple literary identities or personality (Hacking 1995, Pessoa 1992, Ryan
1991); and whether, as Pinker (1994) argues, thinking without language may be
possible. 26 Each of these cases raises a major, central question in the study, of
whether 'thinking' can be seen monistically, as a unitary and generalisable process.
Creativity is also a contested concept within both cognitive psychology and
philosophy. The working defmition adopted here follows contemporary
psychological, especially connectionist definitions (Boden 1994, Garnham and Oakhill
1994), and a changing educational consensus (Fryer and Collings 1991). An idea is
creative (for a particular person) if that person could not have had that idea before. An
idea is historically creative if no one could have had the idea before (Gamham and
Oakhill 1994:252). Metacognition is important in that creative thinkers are
distinguished by the high quality of 'mental self-government' they exhibit (Sternberg
1988a, 1988b). 27 Memory must also be seen as playing an important, under-
regarded role in creative thinking, as psychologists increasingly claim (Johnson-Laird
1993). 28
Important technical innovations in philosophy, especially metaphysics and ontology,
are identified as having particular significance for the thesis. Chief among these are:
the philosophy of counter-factual and indicative conditionals (Edgington 1995,
Jackson 1991); modal logic and possible worlds (Lewis 1986b); plausible historical
worlds (Hawthorn 1991, Ferguson 1997), and computing, linguistics and possible
worlds (Ryan 1991). Contemporary philosophical work in hermeneutics (Maclntyre
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1981, Verges 1987, Gallagher 1992, Blacker 1991), in Aristotelian literary philosophy
(Nussbaum 1986, 1994), and in the history of philosophy (Rorty et al 1984) is also
given prominence. Certain dominant philosophical perspectives in curriculum theory
and pedagogy, such as social constructivism and phenomenology, prove critical in
demonstrating the case for transcendental realism, providing as they do evidence of the
pervasive presence of philosophical assumptions in teaching, in which one's
epistemological and ontological position is central (see chapter 3).
This study relies on a wide range of academic, cross-disciplinary sources in order to
assemble its main perspectives. Post-modern theory emerging from a range of
disciplines is, for example, argued to be relevant to any foundational philosophical
pedagogy for a pre-philosophical curriculum (see chapter 4). Post-modernism is
perceived, for the purposes of that argument, as consisting of three currents of thought
in the history of ideas: i. cultural critiques of modernist art forms; ii. philosophical or
thought in other disciplines, emphasising the fragmentary, tentative shifting, and plural
nature of reality; and iii. general theories of contemporary society which see new
developments in work organisation, technology, and social forms which are totally
distinctive (as in the notion of a post-Fordist, post-industrial society). 29
 The study
also turns at various points to innovatory thought and re-appraisal in such topics as:
intelligence and creativity (Gardner 1993, Perkins 1984, Sternberg 1985, Boden
1990), counter-factual thinking in psychology (Byrne 1997), critical theory, linguistics
and semiotics (Loux 1979, Pavel 1986, Ryan 1991), computing and artificial
inteffigence (Boden 1994, Caillot 1991, Clark 1997), neuro-science (Cytowic 1995,
Damasio 1994, Ortony et al 1988, Pinker 1994), psychiatry and psycho-analysis
(Hacking 1995), and cosmology and quantum physics (Deutsch 1997, Rees 1997). 30
Particular attention is paid to the hegemonic use of philosophy and pre-phiosophical
teaching in power relations within individual societies: for instance, in dealing with
apartheid within a politically repressive society (Flanagan 1993); or seeking to change
one in which gender relations are unsatisfactory (Haynes 1991). Hegemonic and
ideological assumptions among leading philosophers in the field of critical thinking,
recently subjected to critical attack, are given attention.
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8. The debate re-configured
A re-configuration of the general debate which has emerged in the past decade will be
identified and mapped out during the course of the study. New critiques have
questioned the Enlightenment 'male' rationality and intellectual antecedents of the
critical thinking movement (Haynes 1991, Blacker 1991). They identify the need to
address an emerging, post-modem agenda (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1993, Kuhn
1992, Weinstein 1993a, 1993b). They advocate existentialist perspectives in primary
schools (Bonnett 1994) or concerning intelligence (Gardner 1997). 31
They promote various types of feminist perspective. Haynes (1991) in Towards an
Archaeology of Critical Thinking, for example, offers a Foucaultian (1972) analysis of
the distribution of power and hegemony within the critical thinking movement from a
feminist perspective. Bailin (1995: 191) identifies six important strands in critical
thinking which could give rise to a critique of critical thinking as biased against
women. Critical thinking is argued as 'down-playing the emotions', as favouring the
rational and the linear deductive over intuition, as tending to the aggressive and
confrontational rather than the collegial and co-operative, as privileging individual and
personal autonomy over a sense of community and relationships, as dealing in
abstraction and failing sufficiently to recognise 'situatedness together with lived
experience and concrete particularity', and as presupposing the possibility of
objectiveness. 32 Assiter (1994) makes a neo-Aristotelian case for a 'body-self
perspective in relation to transferable thinking in vocational higher education. 33
9. The structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis is arranged so that philosophical foundations are argued
before proceeding to educational prescription. Chapter 1 has thus far outlined within
the context of the history of ideas some of the main issues and themes which recur.
Features of the sociological phenomenon known as a social movement have been
identified within the logomachy concerning definitions and the place of philosophy
teaching. The appearance of philosophy as a discrete discipline and discourse
tradition has been traced. Contested definitions and arguments have been discerned
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concerning the place of philosophy, critical thinking and cognate developments within
education.
Chapter 2 sets out the main claims and counter-claims concerning the teaching of a
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum, and a position in regard to them is
defmed. Claims are identified which are essentialist, linguistic, developmental,
ineffable, dispositional, transcendental, modal realist, hermeneutic, hegemonic,
democratic, communitarian, and elitist. Various claims for the transferability of
cognitive and ethical dispositional benefits are examined. Ajudgement on each of the
claims is argued, highlighting those claims which are considered of particular
importance or persuasiveness. Those counter-claims which raise important issues are
given attention. A position is taken up which argues for a strong version of a
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum based on the arguments of primacy,
transcendental, modal realism, counter-factual and 'possible worlds' thinking.
Chapter 3 set outs in some detail the leading claim of transcendental realism, following
Kant and Bhaskar, that philosophical concerns are pervasively present in the
curriculum, pedagogy, and organisation of schools. The case arising from the
transcendental argument is that even the purist, who would teach philosophy only to a
minority of talented, older children, must concede that philosophical assumptions and
questions are, as a matter of fact, dealt with through a pre-philosophical curriculum
and pedagogy in classrooms - whether or not philosophy teaching as such is
attempted.	 A post-Kantian, transcendental argument advances a philosophical
rationale for a broad version of a philosophy and pre-phiosophical curriculum. The
importance of notions of narrative, the self, agency and tradition is argued. 35
Chapter 4 proposes that a philosophically-driven pedagogy can be derived from
contemporary work on counter-factual and possible worlds thinking in philosophy,
together with other disciplines including history, linguistics, science, cosmology,
neurology, psychology and computing. Important implications are argued for one's
approach to matters such as cross-domain thinking, sensory modality, intelligence and
creativity, and nan-ative in teaching. 36
 Counter-intuitive, quantitative thinking is
examined, as well as the approach to qualitative and stochastic speculation. 37
 It is
concluded that possibilist thinking typically originates within individual subject
specialisms or discourse and teaching, although generalisable meta-competences can
nevertheless be distilled out.
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Chapter 5 examines claims concerning the effects of philosophising and a pre-
philosophical curriculum on the intellectual, or ethical dispositions and virtues. Links
are made between conditional, possible worlds and dispositional thinking. A trend
towards seeing critical thinking as a vehicle for training moral, including vocational
virtues is traced. 38
 The importance is brought out of conceptions of person,
embodiment, philosophical autobiography, 'cognitive emotions' and ready-wittedness
in developing education of the virtues and dispositions.
Chapter 6 considers discussion by philosophers of a philosophical canon, when its
occurrence in several comparative education settings is examined. Examples are
identified of a canon in pre-philosophy, critical thinking, philosophy for children, and
national traditions of specialist philosophy teaching. The idea of an inferred canon for
the pre-phiosophical curriculum is introduced. Its presence is detected within the
National Curriculum for England and Wales, when it is concluded that a fully coherent
and explicit canon is not yet in place.
Chapter 7 proposes both practical and theoretical ways, arising from the philosophical
position argued in preceding chapters, for implementing a whole school or college
policy for a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. 39 The case is made for
curricular content and pedagogic strategies, including intervention programmes, that
prepare for the formal study of philosophy in the later years of secondary education.
A range of management issues including those relating to staff consensus, planning
and review, philosophical and curriculum leadership are examined.
Chapter 8 argues for the importance of the teacher as a philosophical person, and
professionally as a transformative, public intellectual. Particular responsibilities and
obligations of the teacher, in respect of philosophical identity and autobiography, and
the pastoral relationship with students are highlighted. Problems of personal and
professional ethics which will arise for the reflective practitioner concerning, for
instance, the vulnerable or 'inauthentic' student, or the question of 'ironism' in
pedagogy, are addressed.
A concluding Over-view and Prospects proposesfisrther areas for philosophical
consideration, educational and public policy research. The need for further empirical
research aimed at a more coherent approach to the philosophy and pre-philosophical
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curricuiwn within the National Curricuiwn is identified. Caution concerning moral
education directed towards the training of dispositions and virtues is advised. The
great importance of counter-factual and possible worlds thinking in one's curriculum
arrangements and pedagogic stance is again stressed.
The argument of the thesis is supported and illustrated by a range of Appendices.
These reference and teaching materials, including some of original design, are
conceived as teaching resources for use in the contexts of work in higher education at
Master's level, and INSET and curriculum development activity for teachers and
lecturers wishing to develop a philosophy and pre-phi losophical curriculum in their
schools or colleges.
There will be a need to know whether the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum
which has been taught has been successful A range of instruments and taxonomies
are identified, which will be of help to those teaching and assessing the teaching of
philosophical thinking and the pre-philosophical curriculum, in primary and secondary
schools, and colleges (especially, Appendices 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21,
22, 26). 40
10. Important questions to be addressed
Some philosophical or educational questions arise in more than one chapter; and some
guidance regarding this will assist the reader to gain maximum understanding from the
thesis as a whole.
Chapters 1 and2 address the questions: Does philosophy enjoy primacy as the pre-
eminent and unifying form of meta-cogrntive discourse which is de facto taught, and
should be taught in schools and colleges? Is not pre-philosophical preparation for its
study, in the form of a pre-philosophical curriculum, both worthwhile and justifiable?
To what extent can the teaching of philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum be
seen as a method of bringing about various forms of empowerment and hegemony?
Should the broad democratic claim be accepted, that the study of philosophy can
contribute to the flourishing of a democratic society? To what extent might there be
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scope for the abuse of the teaching of philosophy and the pre-phiosophical curriculum
in terms of ideology and indoctrination?
Chapter 2 asks : Can the fact that children display wonder and the pre-philosophical
beginnings of metaphysical awe be characterised as philosophical behaviour? Can the
natural curiosity that children show in philosophical matters be described justifiably as
'philosophical'? Can the contemplation of ineffable or intractable problems provide
children with a pre-philosophical foundation for the beginnings of metaphysical
thinking? Should the essentialist claim that children have a natural affinity for,
enjoyment of, and interest in philosophical questions, be accepted as evidence that they
are phiosophising in the formal sense?
Chapters 2 and 5 address such questions as: What kinds of philosophical thinking are
not generalisable in the sense of being separable from their originating forms of
discourse or subject disciplines? Does most philosophical thinking first occur pre-
philosophically within an originating and specialist form of discourse or knowledge?
Is the linguistic clarification of problems a main, or a subsidiary role of the
philosophical and the pre-philosophical curricuiwn? Do some subject disciplines have
a larger, more justifiable claim than others that they should teach, and provide
philosophical leadership?
Chapters 2,6 and 7 share a concern with problems such as: Is it a consequence of
teaching philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum, that students acquire
'transferable' metacognitive skills of thinldng and philosophising? How can a canon
for teaching such meta-competences be identified? How can they be more
successfully taught than at present?
Chapters 3 and 6 ask: Is the transcendental argument persuasive, that philosophical
thinking lies behind the appearance of things? Does this entail acceptance of a further
proposition that, at any given time, the philosophical thinking which lies
transcendentally behind our teaching results in a pedagogic and curricular canon?
Chapters 4 and5 raise questions concerning the theory of possible worlds and the
dispositions, such as: Should counter-factual and possible worlds thinldng be taught,
on the grounds that it can make a particular and distinctive contribution to the proposed
curriculum, both cognitively and in relation to the dispositions? To what extent could
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a philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum benefit the formation of dispositions
and virtues? Is some philosophical account of the relationship between thought and
feeling necessary for any full pedagogic or curricular theoiy of the place of philosophy
or pre-philosophical teaching? Has ready-wittedness a special place? Could the
general introduction of values education present particular problems?
Chapters 7 and 8 address questions which concern both individual teachers and
institutions such as: How can a school or college develop its own policy in response to
the various claims? What is the best approach to planning and implementing a
philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum in an individual school or college?
How do we know when we have taught philosophy and the pre-philosophical
curriculum well? What kind of person will the philosophically educated student be?
What are the implications for educational policy school improvement and
effectiveness? What are the implications for the individual teacher or lecturer? Is
there any basis for a rights claim to be mounted, according to which the students are
entitled to be taught, and the teachers obliged to teach a philosophy and the pre-
philosophical curriculum? What implications are there for teachers in terms of
pedagogic and professional ethics? What kind of support could higher education, and
the philosophy of education as a discipline, offer this process? Is it desirable for the
teacher to develop a philosophical position and autobiography, as a person and a
professional, and to take on the role of a public intellectual?
A concluding Over-view and Prospects asks: What should be the focus of future work
in this area, in research, curriculum development, philosophical investigation and
public education policy?
The study aims at comprehensiveness and depth in fonnulating a general theory of,
and approach to a plulosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. Such a unified
account has necessanly to cover a wide spectrum of topics and disciplines. Core
points have therefore sometimes been made briefly in the main text, and carried
forward in detailed footnotes supported by an extensive set of references and
appendices.
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Notes to chapter 1
' Virtue is defined as a settled disposition of the mind which determines choice.
(Aristotle 1921: 2.6). It is both a good quality or an excellence in a person (Mautner
1996: 592). Dispositions can be ethical or relate to non-human facts about the world,
as tendencies or conditional qualities, when in either case they may or may not be
occurrent - an issue examined in chapters 4 and 5 in relation to possible worlds theozy,
and ethical dispositions (Audi 1995:207). This study is implicitly critical of the
Aristotelian distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues, for reasons
which become apparent in chapter 5 in connection with the case for cognitive emotions(Scheffler 1991, Nussbaum 1988).
2 This study emphasises the professional and public responsibilities of the individual
school and college, teacher and lecturer as a philosophical intellectuaL However, as
chapter 6 argues, it is appropriate in a plural society that teachers or lecturers are
influenced by other sources of curriculum advice concerning a canon.
3 See Thombury (1994) for a general analysis of the issues.
4 Coles and Robinson (1992) reported a wide range of activity flourishing in the UK.
5 For instance, the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children long
resisted use of the phrase 'critical thinking' preferring to talk of 'philosophy with
children', but finally renamed its main publication as a critical thinking journal.
Greater recognition, and funding of critical thinking has promoted its currency in the
US at the expense of 'philosophy with children' and high school philosophy (Personal
Communication).
6 For example, see the general reviews of the field by Baron and Stemberg (1987),
Nickerson, Perkins and Smith (1985), Powell (1987), Ramsden (1988), Resnick(1987, 1989), Sternberg and Bhana (1986), and Splitter and Sharp (1995). Some
writers emphasise notions of meta-competence (Bridges 1994) or meta-cognition
(McGuinness 1990, McGuinness and Nisbet 1991).
'7 This is the view exemplified in much primary school practice. See Craft (1991) and
chapter 6 for an account of what an 'entitlement' curriculum heavily emphasising
'thinking skills' might look like. On the other hand, trends towards the teaching of
dispositions, values and moral education appear to grow in strength (Haydon 1997).
8 For example, Sanskrit has no word corresponding to philosophy in the modern
Western sense. Because of the religious orientation of most Indian philosophy,
viewpoints are mainly classified as orthodox or unorthodox according to whether they
subscribe to the validity of the Veda, the orthodox scriptural texts. The dominance of
religion over philosophy in most classical and medieval Indian thought reflects the
orthodox theory that the ultimate aim of philosophy is 'release'. Other examples of
'contrastive rhetorics' (Swales 1990), or 'worlds' can be seen in the philosophical
traditions of China, Judaism or Islam. Mashhadi (1997b:1) shows how quantum
mechanics is more consonant with the non-duality of Asian thought. (I am indebted to
Dr Mashhadi for a number of valuable comments.)
9 See Henry's analysis in Edwards ed.(1967: 252-7); or Copleston (1950, 1953),
Leff (1958), or Price (1992) for more general accounts.
10 Knuutila (1993) in Modalities in Medieval Philosophy describes for example the
sophisticated approach of 13th-14th century scholastic thinkers to 'synchronic
alternative' possibilities.
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11 The approach of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children,
and its adherents, is to work within ahistorical perspectives in linguistic and ordinary
language philosophy. Cam (1994a) believes that philosophical problems such as
whether a universal language is desirable, or how a bat sees the world, can be tackled
by a teacher having no prior knowledge of what philosophers have said. See chapter
8 for further discussion of the pedagogic pitfalls of this extreme Austinian stance.
12 There were exceptions. Some philosophy was taught within the options of the A
level course in Religious Studies. Philosophy was offered in a few secondary schools
as an 0 level, or CSE Mode 3 subject by teachers interested in broadening the appeal
of their existing religious education courses, for example within secular
comprehensives: personal communication from Thomas Talus School, London
concerning the CSE course (June 1986). An 0 level in Logic ran for some years on a
small scale (Plume School 1995). A project in the University of Swansea on 0 level
logic flourished until 1990.
13 Hobbes, for instance, saw philosophy as the knowledge of effects or appearances
as we acquire it by true ratiocination about knowledge of their first causes of
generation. He had no wish to distinguish what he was doing from something else
called science. Indeed, under the influence of Galileo, Hobbes conceived his
philosophical system as one in which the method of geometry and the concepts of the
new science of motion were to be applied to man in society. Condorcet and the
philosophes attempted a similar approach in establishing the philosophy of the
Enlightenment and, thereby, the gestation of social science. See Baker's (1975)
biography of Condorcet for discussion of this point in relation to Enlightenment
thought.
14 See Dykhuisen (1973) for a general discussion of this point. Philosophy was
essentially a critical discipline and, as such, would always have work to do. More
particularly, Dewey's (1910) analysis of reflective thinking was the first of many
attempts to analyse the reasoning process into a sequence of steps. He suggested that
there were five steps: identify the problem, defme the problem, generate hypotheses,
refine a hypothesis, test the hypothesis. This led Kilpatrick, founder of the Project
Method, to claim that American education in the 1920's discovered the problem
approach as a teaching device from Dewey's analysis of reflective thought (Dykhuisen(1973: 40).
5 A continuing genre of popular books with titles such as Straight and Crooked
Thinking (Thouless 1930), Thinking about Thinking (Flew 1975), What is the Name
of This Book? (Smullyan 1978) and Metamagical Themes (Hofstadter 1985) illustrate
this idea perfectly. A new generation of Euroceninc, Anglo-American philosophers
has promoted a renaissance of interest in applied and radical philosophy (Gibson
1984, 1986)
16 Husserl saw philosophy as a science. The truths he sought did not relate to any
particular subject matter. He sought the truths on which all other human knowledge
rests. Like logic and mathematics, philosophy was to be an a priori science or
'phenomenology'. But the phenomenology was to be descriptive, thus distinguishing
its method from the established practice of philosophy, which he considered to be
deducing what must be true of the world from prior assumptions - rather than looking
at the world and discovering what it is like. See Hahn (1967) and Schmitt (1967: 135-
15 1).
17 Giddens (1993: 646). This sociological concept is illuminative for understanding
the rise of critical and creative thinking, philosophy for Children and A level
Philosophy. For instance, the Glasgow-based European Centre for Philosophical
Inquirj, in its claims for community-based philosophy teaching, can be seen as a
reformative social movement -seeking limited change to the social order in relation to
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inequality or social justice. The alterative social movement - which aims to secure
partial change in certain individual traits - can be seen in the approach to the education
of the dispositions in the Californian schools system (Facione and Facione 1992,
1994, Appendices 18 &19). Intellectual social movements with apocalyptic adherents
also invariably exhibit schisms (Cohn 1957: 28 1-6). See for instance Bridges'(1996)
discussion of whether the teaching of competency-based transferable thinldng is
progress or villainy'.
18 Social movement characteristics can also be seen, for example, in the induction
training of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy which sets out to convey a
particular, doctrinal view. The European Philosophical Inquiry Centre, at the
University of Glasgow, claims an 'emancipatory' mission to inner city communities.
(McCall 1994); The Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and Educational
Research in Education (SAPERE) attempts to provide for a coalition of sometimes
competing groups. Turner (1996) provides evidence that this sectarian conflict is
'hermeneutically' located. Lang (1990: 122) provides an account of divisions caused
within the American Philosophical Association by Rorty's intellectual conversion and
the 'subversion from within' of Anglo-Saxon philosophical method as traditionally
pursued in the U.S. setting.
19 However, see how Hughes' (1996) approach combines teaching critical thinldng
with the addressing of philosophical topic in epistemology and the philosophy of
language. Such an approach is unusual (c.f. Groake et a! 1997, Halpern 1997).
20 Personal communication, 6th International Conference on Thinking, Boston Mass,
August, 1994).
211 adopt an 'ordinary language' definition of philosophy in general use in which
philosophy is defined as 'the love of wisdom' and the 'love of exercising one's
curiosity and intelligence' (Edwards 1967). It is the pursuit of wisdom and
knowledge, investigation of the nature of being, knowledge of the causes and laws of
all things, of the principles underlying any department of knowledge, and of particular
philosophical systems; and it involves reasoning - and pure logic considered in general
terms (Chambers 1983). It is that department of knowledge or study which deals with
ultimate reality, or with the most general causes and principles of things, its most usual
sense since 1794; and it involves the requirement 'to speculate or theorise' - an
emphasis of this study (Oxford English Dictionary 1959). Philosophy has also moved
increasingly towards becoming, as Moser (1996: 407) points out in the Supplement to
Edwards'(1967) canonical Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 'a multi-faced discipline that
resists simple characterisation'. See also Monk (1998).
22 Ennis (1991) claims these are: 1. 'To be clear about the intended meaning of what
is said, written or otherwise communicated; 2. to determine and maintain focus on the
conclusion or question; 3. to take into account the total situation; 4. to seek and offer
reasons; 5. to try to be informed; 6. to look for alternatives; 7. to seek as much
precision as the situation requires; 8. to try to be reflectively aware of one's own basic
beliefs; 9. to be open-minded; consider seriously other points of view than one's own;
10. to withhold judgement when the evidence and reasons are insufficient; 11. to take
a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are sufficient to do
so; 12. to use one's critical thinldng abilities'(8-9).
23 'Lower order thinking (LOT) occurs when students are asked to receive or recite
factual information or to employ rules and algorithms through repetitive routines.
Higher order thinking (HOT) requires students to manipulate information and ideas in
ways that transform their meaning and implications, such as when students combine
facts and ideas in order to synthesize, generalise, explain, hypothesise, or arrive at
some conclusion or interpretation' (Newmann and Wehlage 1993: 3).
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See McPeck's (1990) Teaching Critical Thinking for a full account of his position.
See also Lipman (1992), and (1988) in Critical Thinking: What Can itBe?
Gardner's (1997) list of intelligences is as follows: linguistic, logical mathematical,
musical, spatial, bodily or kinaesthetic, interpersonal, intra-personal, naturalist, and
existential. The intra-personal intelligence appears to overlap with the existential in that
reflexivity is likely to be a defining feature of both.
26 Recent work in neurology and on synaesthesia suggests that we might also be
talking about corporeal and sensory modalities. See Clark (1997), Cytowic (1995),
Damasio (1994) and Motluk (1994).
27 High intelligence is not a predictor of creativity, according to Sternberg's (1988a,
1988b) model. Creative thinkers are instead distinguished by mental self-government,
which prefers a legislative (rule creating), rather than an executive (rule following) or
judicial (rule assessing) style, the manner of directing one's intelligence being as
important as its possession.
28 Johnson-Laird's (1993) working definition of creativity, for instance, stipulates
that: 1. The results of a creative process must be new, at least for the creative person,
though they are produced from the existing elements; 2. The results must not be
produced by recall from memory, rote computation or any other simple deterministic
process. Boden (1994) offers a similar definition.
29 See Green (1994: 67-83) for a further discussion of this topic. Some post-modern
thinkers especially stress the aspect of playfulness (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1993), or
its instantiation in adolescent culture (McLaren 1996) or the culture of computing(Plant 1996, Turkie 1996).
30 This is a preliminary case for a pre-phiosophical curriculum, including that for
older students, which covers all of the curriculum subjects; and especially those
concerned with the embodied self - such as drama, physical education and the plastic
arts. Later chapters will argue for humour, wit, post-modernist 'playfulness',
uncertainty and irony as also necessary ingredients. My own teaching has used 'ludic'
material ranging from Mexican hat jokes to Chomskian linguistics. Munis (1993a 30-
31) makes a strong case for a visual approach through picture books in the early years.
However, Olson (1994), Ong (1982), and those who see literature as liberation
(Giroux 1989) also make a strong case for reading and the written word.
ii For the larger debate on rationality and relativism see Hollis and Lukes (1982) and
Oakeshott (1962), or Winch's (1958) The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to
Philosophy.
32 Five articles in Educational Theory, September 1995, explore the theme of bias in
critical thinking, with an overview by Bailin. Balm might also have mentioned
'ironism', as an aspect of 'objectiveness' which has received a good deal of attention
(see chapter 8). The question of how far thinking involves feeling and emotion, as
well as cognition, is also pursued in chapters 2,3 and 5. See Hairaway (1991) for a
feminist perspective on 'situatedness'. However, this is not an argument pursued
exclusively by women philosophers (see chapters 4-6).
33 See Assiter in Bridges (1994: 17-26) concerning Skills and Knowledges:
Epistemological Models Underpinning Djfferent Approaches to Teaching and
Learning.
3 This position is elaborated in chapter 5. See also chapter 3 for the counter-
argument put by Kitchener (1990: 416-31). Whether one calls the activity of the
Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children 'philosophy', as its
progenitors claim, or 'pre-phiosophy' seems to me to be a quodlibet. We practice
algebra and teach statistics to young children without naming them as such. But their
early foundations are valuable preliminary practice for what occurs later as formal
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higher order and philosophical thinking, and it is therefore important that teachers
think carefully about 'progression' from the outset.
35 Definitionally, narrative is taken in this study as having two important features. It
is seen as a 'unique sequence of events, mental states, and happenings, involving
human beings as characters or actors' (Bruner 1990: 43-44). Secondly, as
Schechtman (1996: 96) argues, it is heavily contextual: 'the most salient feature of
narrative form in general is that the individual incidents and episodes in a narrative
taken their meaning from the broader context of the story in which they occur.'
36 The general, philosophical defmition of domain offered by Honderich (1995:
204), as a class of things talked about, quantified, in relation to each other, or from
which arguments are drawn, is adopted throughout this study.
37 Notions of stochastic thinking and process are explored more fully in chapters 4 &
5. One working definition of a stochastic thinking describes it as a probabilistic model
of thinking in which or the outcome of a particular trial is dependent on the outcomes
of preceding trials.
38 Mautner (1996: 593) suggests that there is often an accepted distinction in the
terminology of contemporary philosophy between moral philosophy (which is
concerned with the Kantian, or duty-based approach), and ethics (which is regarded as
to do with the Aristotelian, virtue-based approach).
39 A range of resources which might support that process are provided as Appendices
1-38.
40 The importance of taxonomies originates with Bloom's (1956) attempt at a
dichotomy between the cognitive and the affective, a perspective steadily questioned in
this study. Taxonomies do however present a good opportunity for identifying those
epistemological or other assumptions in teachers' thinking which, as McCann and
Yaxley (1992) argue, need constantly to be made explicit through teacher education.
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CHAPTER 2
Claims and counter claims for
teaching philosophy and
a pre-philosophical curriculum.
1. Four main types of claim
A variety of claims and counter-claims have been made for the teaching of philosophy
and a pre-philosophical curriculum to children of school and college age. A
group of claims can be characterised broadly as ontological, morphological, psycho-
genetic and epistemological. Most have both pedagogic and curricular relevance. Of
these I consider the most important to be the transcendental claim. A second group of
chims is concerned with teaching philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum in
order to engender particular sets of dispositions, intellectual and moral virtues. A
flj group of claims, most claims in fact assert the transferability or generalisability
of the benefits they bring. A fourth group of claims is concerned with how teaching
philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum may be related to issues of power,
democracy, ideology, autonomy - and hegemony, in their political, personal and
societal meanings.
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Each group of claims displays some features of one or more other groups. Many
claims are consequentialist in that they argue that cognitive, dispositional or other
practical benefits arise from teaching philosophy and a pre-philosophicalcuniculum.
This range of claims includes those associated with the notion of 'transfer of training'
which is well-known in the psychological literature. Consequentialist claims
frequently appear in their cognitive aspect, their dispositional, and their hegemonic
aspect.
2. The transcendental claim
The vely important, transcendental claim for teaching philosophy to children, the one
which I consider pre-eminent, is based on what might be called the 'argument from
pervasive holism'. This proposes that philosophical assumptions and questions so
pervade our lives, including the pedagogy, curriculum and organisation of schools,
that the teaching of philosophy, pre-philosophy or higher order thinking must be
accorded important status as a school subject in its own right It can be linked with a
primacy claim which claims that philosophy teaching, uniquely, gives insight into the
unifying and over-riding principles of the disciplines and is an antidote to curriculum
fragmentation, a claim reflected for instance in Baccalaureate programmes (Griffiths
1979, Whalley 1987).
Philosophical support for the transcendental claim may be found in the ideas of Kant,
and post-Kantians such as Bhaskar (1978, 1986). The transcendentalist asserts that
philosophical truths or generalisations, or noumena, are to be found pervading the
empirical appearance of the world; and that it is not possible for us to discover these
entirely unaided by means of a priori ratiocination. We therefore need to be taught.
especially since many 'truths' including scientific ones are counter-intuitive.
Philosophy should be taught so that the transcendental, pervasive presence and
importance of philosophical considerations in the nature of things can be drawn to the
students attention (see chapter 3).
Such a claim, it will be argued, needs to be linked with a possibilist pedagogy which
involves the need for the continuous search for new knowledge and teaching. For
otherwise the transcendental position could, in its simplest form, lend itself to the
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suggestion that with a once and for all puffing aside of the veil of the ignorance we
could suddenly 'see the world as it is' (see chapter 4).
3. The primacy claim
A major traditional argument of philosophers from the Greeks onwards, asserts the
ontological and epistemological primacy of philosophy as, uniquely, the pre-eminent
and unifying 'meta-cognitive' discipline. Philosophy is 'that department of
knowledge which deals with ultimate realities, or with the most general causes or
principles of things' (Passmore 1967: 216-226).
Teaching those philosophical traditions and ideas which unify and transcend the
subjects of the curriculum gives access to a higher-order discipline named
'philosophy', which is concerned with how all the disciplines are conducted.
Through the study of philosophy, students can reflect on the deeper meaning and
significance of what they already know rather than endlessly pursing new knowledge.
Students will thus acquire techniques and insights into how questions which arise in
other disciplines can be approached or even solved. 1 The prior and unifying role of
philosophy contributes a countervailing force to premature specialisation and the
fragmentation of curricula in schools and colleges. Those enthusiastic to teach
philosophy in schools and colleges frequently cite the opinions of philosophers,
including Locke, Vico and Dewey, as anticipating or providing a justification for pre-
philosophical work with children (Lipman and Sharp 1978b: 38-39).
The primacy claim may also be seen as supportive of a consequentialist claim that
teaching philosophy will bring numerous cognitive or other empirical benefits in
relation to our practical affairs and understanding of the world, on account of its being
a pervasive discipline as advanced in the transcendental claim. 2
 The piirnacy claim
arises from, and can be taken together with, other significant claims that a philosophy
and pre-philosophical curricuiwn should be taught.3
39
4. The canonical claim
The transcendental claim and primacy claim could entail a further claim, for a
philosophical and pre-philosophical canon, which is both curricular and pedagogic; a
claim that not only should philosophy be taught, but laying down principles of
selection for what philosophy should be taught. The canonical claim can be seen as
emerging from the transcendental one insofar as a widely held, or commonly held set
of curriculum and pedagogic practices has been found. The question may then arise:
can there be only one canon in a pluralist society? It might be objected that unless or
until all are agreed, a philosophy and the pre-phiosophical curriculum should not be
taught at all. To do so could be ideological or indoctrinatory (Siegel 1987, 1988,
1993). Alternatively one can propose, as in this study, that arrangements for the
curriculum, as well as the 'invisible pedagogy' of school organisation, can be
developed so as to accommodate canonical pluralism. However, discussions about
which canon to teach are complicated by the transcendental claim, that philosophy is
being tau ght force majeure, often through an 'inferred canon'. The central
importance of narrative may also then be asserted (Hauerwas and Jones 1989; see
chapter 3). In chapter 6 several approaches to the canon in philosophy or pre-
philosophy are examined by means of case-studies. How the selection of a canonical
curriculum in philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum can be undertaken in
the particular setting of an individual school or college, and how that applies to the
individual teacher, is set out in chapters 7 and 8 in the form of both argument and
guidelines.
5. The essentialist claim
An argument about the nature of childhood is sometimes used to mount an essentialist
claim for the teaching of philosophy, on child development and pedagogic grounds.
Advocates of philosophy for young children put forward an 'argument from naivety',
for instance, which is strongly reminiscent of the philosophical and educational
theories of Rousseau and the 19th century Romantic notion of 'enthusiasm' (Evans
1940:7-22). 4 Evidence is brought forward to the effect that children are, a priori
and arising from their own nature, intrinsically interested in thinking and philosophical
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questions (Gillespie 1978, Norton 1978, Ra1iford 1996). Lipman and Sharp, for
example, advance an essentialist account of children's natural and innocent interest in,
and perplexity concerning philosophical questions.
Every discipline possesses a consummatory aspect - an aspect in which its materials are
apprehended and enjoyed for their own sake. So it is with philosophy. (1978a 87)5
The authority of not only educational philosophers such as Pestalozzi or Dewey, but
also mainstream thinkers such as Jaspers (1954) is brought forward to authenticate
these naturalistic, essentialist, and almost mystical claims:
A marvellous indication of man's innate disposition to philosophy is to be found in the
questions asked by children. It is not uncommon to hear from the mouths of children words
which penetrate to the very depths of philosophy. (Jaspers in Lipman and Sharp 1978b: 38).
As part of their essentialist case, Lipman and Sharp draw attention to the
developmental adumbrations of philosophical thought, perceptual perplexity and
.,	 .
cunosity m children, corroborated by anecdotes from the early hves of philosophers
themselves (Radford 1996: 3-4; Toulmin 1978:77). According to Lipman, Sharp,
and Oscanyan (1980) there are three ways that children ny to cope with the mysteries
or marvels they find around them: through a scientific explanation, through a fairy tale
or story that offers a helpful interpretation on a symbolic level, or sby formulating the
matter philosophically - in the form of a question' (33). But they concede that it is
pre-philosophy rather than philosophy that they then teach:
Although one doesn't teach philosophical topics to children, it is possible to elicit from
them the wondering and questioning characteristic of philosophical behaviour at any age.
(103)
The paradoxes of appearance and reality, permanence and change, unity and diversity, are
enchanting to them from early childhood, perhaps a decade or two before they are prepared to
tackle Heracitus or Parmenides. (Lipman and Sharpe 1978a 86)6
A rebuttal of essentialism from the Piagetian perspective in child development argues,
however, that it is impossible to teach children philosophy at all. Kitchener (1990:
16-31) claims that psycho-genetic research shows young children to be incapable of
philosophising, since they cannot sustain sequences of post-formal operational
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thought, either individually or in dialogic or group settings. The evident difficulty
that most children have in thinking philosophically could be because they are being
introduced to it too early. They have not reached the 'post-formal operational' stage
of development in their thinking. Kitchener points out that Piagees own position on
this question was clearly set out in his article on 'children's philosophies':
It goes without saying that the child does not actually work out any philosophy, properly
speaking, since he never seeks to codify his reflections in anything like a system. (Piaget
1933: 534)
Other philosophers have argued against teaching philosophy in schools, even at the
stage of post-formal operations, because of the intrinsic, intellectual difficulty of the
subject - and irrespective of the debate over child development theory. Philosophy,
Scruton, Warnock or White (1992) would argue, is of its nature a difficult subject
which can be and should only be taught to an intelligent elite, or minority, of older
students. Some philosophers therefore opposed the introduction of the teaching of A
level Philosophy (Ward 1983: 254). 8 Scruton, for instance, claims that the teaching
of philosophy in schools attempts to introduce 'into the classroom issues which can
only be understood properly at the level of postgraduate research'. He also warns
against the problems of allowing students licence for unlimited questioning.
I am against the teaching of philosophy in schools...It is fine to teach people to question,
but first you must give them some certainties. (Scruton in Watts-Miller and Whiteside
1988: 3)
Warnock would prefer schools to concentrate on a prior understanding of a broad
curriculum.
I am very much against having philosophy A level courses. The study of philosophy should
be based on the history of the subject, it shouldn't be taken too fast, and it's awfully
difficulL (Wamnock in Davies, Pierce and Camie 1987:1)
The essentialist claim that children have a natural affinity for, enjoyment and curiosity
concerning philosophical questions is accepted in this study. However, the Piagetian
critique mounted by Kitchener is also valid in that children cannot be said truly to
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'phiosophise', in the sense of sustaining spoken trains of thought at a post-formal
operational level. 10
6. The c!aim of intrinsic worthwhileness
Some argue that studying philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum which
precedes it has an intrinsic worthwhileness, irrespective of any benefits such as clearer
thinking which might immediately arise, which will make a long-term contribution to
the important educational aim of personal autonomy and flourishing. This argument
has been advanced by those philosophers whose view is that education consists in the
initiation of the immature into worthwhile activities (Peters 1972, White 1973, 1982,
1990). In Towards a CompuLsory Curriculum, White (1973) argues that.
If children were left free not to speak, study mathematics, physics, philosophy or
contemplate works of art, then this might well harm them, since they might never come to
know of whole areas of possible wants, both those connected with the pursuit of these
activities for their own sake and those dependent on an understanding of these activities for
their intelligibility. (35)
A counter-argument is that any educational case for teaching philosophy or thinking is
vitiated if it cannot be shown that such teaching is good both in itself and for the
empirical consequential benefits that it brings. It may be pointed out that philosophy
teaching demonstrably does not bring intrinsic satisfaction universally to all.
However, using the transcendental claim, one can argue that there is a de facto and a
priori necessity for thinking pre-phiosophically (Pritchard 1985): and that,
furthermore, the pre-existing centrality of philosophy within the curriculum, through
the categories of thought and perception, makes it indispensable to individual growth
and flourishing. In such circumstances understanding acquired through a
compulsory initiation into a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum, through
those activities which will make formal philosophy attractive to us later, must be
desirable.
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7. The metaphysical and aesthetic claim from wonder and awe
A variant of the essentialist and the intrinsic worthwhileness claim is the claim from
wonder, a neo-Thomist argument for tackling metaphysical questions. This argument
evades the objection raised by child development theory, simply by proposing that
'philosophy begins in wonder', a lost dimension in education which philosophy
teaching can help to restore. That children have a natural agenda of questions which
elicit metaphysical awe and curiosity is claimed by Gillespie (1978) and others.
Metaphysical questions are very large questions, and most difficult to come to grips with.
Metaphysics is philosophy at its most comprehensive. It involves issues of maximum
generality. You may wonder that your small children can raise such big issues. Yes, it is
wonderful that they do. (Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980: 31)
Buchmann (1989) argues the metaphysical claim from both an Aristotelian and
Thomist perspective, when she describes the 'wonder' which arises for both teachers
and children in subject areas such as mathematics.
Wonderment and awe have their place as well in literary learning...If teacher. go beyond the
surface of form and terms - even concepts and principles - and begin to ask where concepts
and patterns come from or what their meaning is, ready-made answers will dissolve, leaving
things to marvel at. (Buchmann (1989: 51-3) 11
She introduces the interesting argument of Aquinas, that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life, since its subject matter is the unending consideration, and love, of
truth in all its forms. Polanyi (1973: 173), Walsh (1993: 103-117) and Dunlop
(1984: 94-5) argue a similar case in relation to similar notions of 'love of the world' or
the 'intellectual beauty' of science. That metaphysical precocity occurs in young
children is generally accepted in the psychological literature on creativity (Davis 1983,
Torrance 1973, Appendix 20). Logic and proof are central techniques in philosophy;
and it is therefore not surprising to find philosophers having their early interest in
logic generated by the metaphysical apprehension of the aesthetic of which Buchmann
speaks. Russell, for instance, at the age of eleven, was particularly entranced by the
idea of proof in Euclidean geometry.12
44
'I had not imagined', Russell later wrote, 'that there was anything as delicious in the world.
(It was) as dazzling as first love.' (Monk 1996: 25)
The importance of feeling is evident generally in such a claim, and in what Russell in
particular has further to say on the matter. 13
One counter-argument to the claim from wonder is that it is excessively mystical,
evidence for it being difficult to gather. Only by proxy criteria of common sense and
plain observation is it possible to know when children are gripped by awe; since they
cannot put their feelings or thoughts into words, and we do not have privileged access
to their minds. It is therefore doubtful whether sufficient grounds exist for
characterising such mental events as 'phiosophising' in any serious sense. 14 Such
an objection can be partly met, by locating one's claim within mainstream Continental
philosophical theory. Convincing phenomenological accounts concerning awe and
dread and wonder, have been offered by Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre within systemic philosophical accounts of the 'metaphysics' of
emotions or states of mind, as their commentators demonstrate (Grene 1967, Macann
1993). It might be further argued that such an objection is framed within a rather
narrow and particular tradition of Anglo-American linguistic philosophy.
Philosophical theology in the medieval scholastic tradition, for example the work of
Bodin or Plotinus, or religious thinking in the Hindu, Vedic, or Buddhist traditions,
offers considerable acceptance of notions of wonder or mystical apprehension.
Furthermore, within European culture there has been a substantial, literaiy-
philosophical tradition of 'wonder at nature', as reflected in the pantheism of Blake,
Wordsworth, Fichte and Goethe.
One further objection argues that, despite what might be Thomistically &sirable,
education has other more practical purposes in addition to the unending consideration
and love of truth in all its forms. 15 The Thomist position might in its requirement
for reflection or contemplation be criticised on the grounds that 'ironist' thinking can
inhibit action (Arendt 1971, 1978; Rorty 1989, see chapter 8). However many
claims argue, correctly in my view, that reflective, metacognitive thinking pursued
from early childhood onwards is the foundation for good thinking later. 16 I agree
with the essentialist claim that children display wonder and metaphysical awe. While
it is doubtful that such behaviour can be characterised as philosophical thinking, its
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recognition and encouragement is a necessaiy part of the teaching of a pre-
philosophical curriculum.
8. The claim from ineffability and aporia
The ineffable claim asserts that philosophy teaching and learning gives access to truths
or understandings which are unsayable, inexpressible, or incommunicable. For
example, it makes sense to say of something we know ineffably: 'I know something
somehow, but I cannot put it into words' (Kennick 1967:181-3). 17 Alternatively,
something may be thought to be ineffable 'when no description, however correctly
applied, serves to communicate its nature to people lacking direct acquaintance of it'
(Cooper 1992: 22). Cooper and some other philosophers see the ineffable (and the
sublime) as principally relating to aesthetic experience. Raffman (1988, 1993), for
instance, characterises 'nuance' ineffability as the most important of three forms of
ineffable musical knowledge. McMahon (1996) argues for a theory of perception in
which ineffability is an essential attribute of beauty. However, Cooper (1991) and
Moore (1992) also attribute an importance to finitude and contingency which could
have relevance to the theory of possible worlds (see section 10 & chapter 5). The
ineffable can also be aporetic in the sense that one can be agape in wonder at 'ultimate
questions' one contemplates but cannot solve; and where this happens the ineffable
claim will be part of the claim from wonderment. However, the contemplation of
unanswerable or 'ultimate' questions need not be linked with an accompanying sense
of aesthetic or other wonder, and therefore the 'ineffable' claim can also be considered
separately from aporia. Gardner (1993) for instance, sees epistemological
'uncertainty' as essential to the development of personal autonomy; and a reason for
avoiding over-prescriptive curricula.
As with the essential claim from awe and wonder, it is disputable whether the
ineffable is a claim that can be empirically demonstratedi for that would require
privileged access to the contented mind of someone who claimed benefit from
contemplating the ineffable. A more persuasive argument is again to assert the a
priori, intrinsic worthwhileness of the contemplation of the ineffable. One can then
argue that no consequences need necessarily arise - beyond the benefit of intrinsic
satisfaction young persons experience when they are introduced to ineffable or
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metaphysical problems. Encounter with aporia, through the antinorny in philosophy
(1)ancy and Sosa 1992), or the literary device of leaving the reader bemused or 'ax a
loss' (Lodge 1992), is similar to confronting the ineffable. 18
The ineffable claim has another aspect. While other claims assert that the teaching of
philosophy can alter the world or bring cognitive benefit, the ineffable claim contains
the notion that philosophy should be taught at least pardy because it can have no effect
on the world. Children will find that studying philosophy will differ, beneficially,
from their experience in all other subjects, because the problems encountered are
frequently intractable, even insoluble. 19 Understanding and acceptance that 'some
problems are intractable', Lipman et al (1980), Almond (1990) and others argue, is
especially important for children. 2° It is the very experience of fmding that some
problems defy solution, yet invite curiosity and specu1ation, that constitutes the special
value of teaching philosophy.
Philosophy syllabuses in schools have on the whole emphasised epistemology and
moral philosophy rather than aesthetics or metaphysics. The importance of the
ineffable claim consists in the scope it offers for a recrudescence of metaphysical
thinking within the school curriculum. Important new developments in philosophy
and logic, and in the mathematics and computing curriculum, concerning questions of
'vagueness', uncertainty and the logics which accompany them, underline this need
(Kosko 1994). Regarding the empirical counter-argument that teaching philosophy,
or pre-phiosophy has no measurable benefits or solutions, it is not an adequate
objection simply to show that the attempt to solve a problem by phiosophising has
been unsuccessfuL The experience of making an aporetic attempt to solve a
philosophical problem may be a sufficient justification, and pedagogic strategy in
itself.
I support the claim that the contemplation of ineffable or intractable problems can
provide a pre-philosophical foundation for the beginnings of metaphysical thinking.
While denying that such activity meets the requisite criteria for being 'prope?
philosophical thinking, I wish however to argue that it represents a crucial encounter
with metaphysics that may not be available elsewhere.
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9. The hermeneutic claim
Both neo-Aristotelian philosophers such as Nussbaum (1988, 1990) and some
philosophers of critical thinking (McPeck 1990) have suggested that intellectual
benefits inevitably accrue from the study of particular subject disciplines or
discourses. 21
We frequently cannot determine whether evideuce is good or not, because such ajudgement
depends upon special knowledge. One has to be a fellow participant in the particular domain
of meaning to appreciate the proper significance of the evidence. (McPeck 1981: 28)
McPeck attempts to draw a sharp division between logic and critical thinking, arguing
that the assessment of good reasons is dependent, epistemologically, on specialised,
field-dependent knowledge rather than solely on logic. Such an argument can lead to
a hermeneutic claim, epistemologically (Hekman 1986, Outhwaite 1987), in relation to
moral philosophy (Gallagher 1992), to the school curriculum generally (Atkins 1988),
or specifically to subjects such as geography (Harraway 1996). 22 The question,
discussed in chapter 1, then arises: does philosophical thinking occur first, originate
or flourish best within specialist forms of discourse and study? It may be pointed out
that a purely meta-cognitive subject like philosophy has functioned since the
Enlightenment on a free-standing basis, having its own innovations; and that
philosophical thinking cannot therefore be said to be confined or inextricably linked to
its originating, often non-meta-cognitive disciplines. 23
 However, an exclusive
reliance on a philosophical system which is not informed, and continually modified by
reference to the 'empirical' world, including scientific discovery, would in my view
be limited and sterile. The history of those deductive systems which have attempted
to operate independently of empirical tradition, such as large areas of medieval
scholastic thought, demonstrates the possible pitfalls of such an approach.
I accept the claim that most thinking does often first occur, pre-philosophically, within
an originating and specialist form of discourse or knowledge: but I shall also wish to
argue that meta-cognitive thought, as in the case of philosophy or historiography, can
metamorphosise into a new and separate subject or sub-genre.
	 A significant
hermeneutic claim can also be mounted in relation to the notion of the 'situated'
person and this argument is treated below.
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10. The conditional, counter-factual and possible worlds claim
Transcendental realism could appear to suggest that once a step forward has occurred, the
search for further meaning or new paradigms would be unnecessaly. There would be no
more to be discovered or re-formulated. Education would often be a finite activity if this
were so and we should be incurious. What is needed therefore is a philosophical
position which encourages continued questioning of the world, through empirical,
metaphysical, and conjectural speculation. (A world or domain is taken, following
Honderich (1995: 204), as a 'a class of things talked about, quantified, in relation to each
other, or from which arguments are drawn.') Such an account will give an important
place to conceptions of pedagogy and curriculum which see narrative as central to the
process of becoming a person, or developing a canon (Schechtman 1996, Maclntyre
1989).
A branch of philosophy has grown up which, exploring the field of indicative and
subjunctive conditionals, provides a foundation for thinking about possibility in new
ways relevant to the curriculum and pedagogy of a pre-philosophical curriculum
(Edgington 1995, Jackson 1991, Thornbury 1997b, 1998). It also makes provision
for a theory of the dispositions which has considerable relevance to claims that the
philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum should have a moral or ethical
agenda.
The philosophical position of modal realism or 'possible worlds' as advanced by
Lewis (1986b) claims that there are many possible worlds, any or all of which may
actually exist. Most other philosophers take the view that, while there are many
possible 'ersatz' worlds worth identifying, there is only one world which actually
exists (Jackson 1991, Edgington 1995). Important achievements attributable to
counter-factual thinking through sustained, rigorous stochastic speculation have
occurred in qualitative historical studies (Hawthorn 1991, Ferguson 1997),
quantitative and counter-intuitive economic history (Fogel 1970), and in mathematic,
scientific or geographical innovation, (Gregory et al 1994, Hager 1995, Pearl 1988).
The possible worlds claim, it will be argued, can provide the foundation for a
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum and its pedagogy. It encourages
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children in sustained philosophical enquiry, engaging in speculation about unsolved
problems, or possible solutions. 25 It requires that proper account be taken of the
place of play, creativity, imagination and the aesthetic dimension through an active
pedagogy and curriculum - as the proponents of philosophy for children argue.26
There is considerable scope also for developing possible worlds theory in the subject
areas 27
The possible worlds and conditionals claim is also important in relation to moral or
ethical education. Dispositionality, a tendency of an object or system to act or react in
characteristic ways in certain situations, is a concept of importance in conditional
theory, since conditional, hypothetical and counter-factual statements are implied by
dispositional claims (Audi 1995: 207). Virtue ethics sees virtues as settled
dispositions of the mind which determine choice (Mautner 1996: 593), something
half-way between a capacity and an action (Kenny 1992: 84). Dispositions as
counter-factual capacities can be seen as pivotal, since they need to be maintained, or
reformed when one is attempting to achieve a virtuous life (Williams 1987, White
1996). The possible worlds claim envisages a place for exploration of both
paradigmatic, or rule-governed, counter-factual possibility; and contingent, post-
formal and post-modern thinking involving tentativeness, metaphor, playfulness and
irony.
It will be argued that such thinldng brings educational benefits to a philosophy and
pre-philosophical curriculum, in the major areas of aesthetics, epistemology, ethics,
and ontology within philosophy (see chapters 4 and 5). However, there are counter-
arguments to the possible worlds account. The epistemological objection, as to
whether a possible world has material facticity, is widely discussed (Jackson 1991,
Edgington 1991, 1995). There may be a serious educational objection as to whether
non-existing worlds can be taken as seriously as existing worlds. Teaching 'possible
worlds' could be criticised as leading to a lack of discrimination between 'reality' and
fantasy, damaging to children when it is taught as a foundational philosophical
perspective. However, a methodology for deriving rules for thinking conditionally
and stochastically, in approaching 'possible worlds' through particular subject areas,
and through the curriculum as whole, can be successfully devised. This is is set out
in chapters 4 to 7. 29
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11. The linguistic clarification claim
The linguistic claim takes a confined view of the concerns of philosophy, and of its
pre-philosophical foundations, as being based on linguistic or common language
usage and its need for frequent clarification. This view of the philosophical mission
has dominated the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy in the twentieth
century, its methodology and other manifestations (Austin 1962, Norris 1985,
Toulmin 1958). The linguistic claim can be seen as one for cognitive benefit, since it
offers a metacognitive 'system' for transferable thinldng (Norris 1992a, 1992b), a
claim also made on behalf of philosophy with children (Haas 1976). As a tradition it
is clearly represented in critical thinking texthooks. 30 Philosophy teaching
proceeding by the discussion method can be carried on through talk, does not require
written attainment, and is therefore uniquely accessible to all students. 31 The
linguistic claim would argue that children in learning to phiosophise should use the
natural or 'ordinary language' so much favoured by the twentieth century
philosophical tradition. Children do use 'ordinary language' and so, it is argued,
they are linguistically well-equipped for philosophising.
There is also a broader sense of the linguistic claim which argues the need for
recognising, as children already 'naturally' recognise, that language and dialogue are
central to being or becoming a person (Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980). 32 The
linguistic claim is sometimes extended into a democratic, social constructivist, and
even global claim for a community of enquiry (Splitter and Sharp 1995). Although
the advocates for philosophy with primary children do not claim him as an influence,
their account strongly resembles that of Habermas (1970, 1981) concerning
'communicative competence' in a consensual 'ideal speech situation'. 33
The primacy claim described earlier, emphasised philosophy's leading role in offering
primary explanations of the world, rather than its 'Humean journeyman' role in
helping with second-order clarification of philosophical and linguistic confusions. In
the majority of cases the clarification of fallacy or linguistic solecism is not the key
device for solving problems or advancing philosophical argument. Restricting
oneself to an exclusively linguistic approach could be seen as placing limitations on
one's teaching aims and purposes. A minimum journeyman or Austiriian claim might
of course argue that greater personal autonomy for the learner is gained through the
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acquiring of competence in linguistic analysis. It may then be extended into notions
of empowerment and hegemony. Kincheloe and Steinberg (1993), for instance,
propose that post-formal thinkers, operating at a metacognitive level, 'are able to see
the way power shapes their own lives.'
I agree that linguistic clarification has an important contribution to make within the
formal teaching of a philosophy and pre-philosophical cuniculum, but consider that it
should not represent philosophy as performing merely a service function in relation to
the school or college cun-iculum.
12. The claim which relates to 'being a person'
A number of writers have advanced the claim that learning to think philosophically
increases one's sense of 'living as a person' (Wollheim 1984: 283). The claim that
philosophy teaching engenders personal autonomy and develops intellectual autonomy
is found, for example, in the case of philosophy teaching in France, where the
Baccalaureate system combines cultural hegemonism with an emphasis on the need for
students to learn to think, as persons, reflectively and autonomously (Griffiths 1979).
34 In relation to philosophy with children, Lipman puts the argument thus:
The confusion that a child feels about personal identity, life career, future life style as an
adult, family expectations, peer relationships, ambivalence towards education, and so on can
be dispelled only if the child is encouraged to reflect upon and analyse the basic direction of
his own life.. Philosophy for children is serious about encouraging children to think for
themselves, and it will help them discover the rudiments of their own philosophy of life. In
so doing it helps children develop a more secure sense of their own identities. (Lipman in
Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980: 79-80)
Paul (1982: 5) affirms that the strong version of critical thinking is 'ultimately intrinsic
to the character of the person'. He emphasises the importance of reciprocity, of
sympathetically entering into the world view of one's opponent, a position which both
strengthens the hermeneuticist claim and presents it with a difficulty - for the whole
point of individual rootedness of perception is that one sees matters uniquely, as no
others can. This model of critical thinking can be seen as analogous to that of
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empathy or 'sympathetic re-enactment in the study and teaching of history; and it also
resembles the 'ideal speech setting' and 'communicative competence' theory of
Habermas (see chapter 5).
The importance of the concept of personhood is present in claims for attention to
philosophical auto-biography, 'narrative self-constitution' (Schechtman 1996) and
moral agency (Johnson 1993). It is present within the canonical claim (chapter 6) and
in the concern with reflexivity in teacher thinking. 35 Notions of the body-self and
embodiment form a central, conceptual criterion of personhood within the hermeneutic
perspective (Atkins 1988, Clark 1997, Merleau-Ponty 1962). With reference to
subject disciplines, hermeneutic claims are made by geographers concerning the
inescapable partiality of one's view, including 'situated knowledge' (Harraway 1996,
Gregory et al 1994:9). There is support for the claim from philosophical neuro-
science, which identifies as Descartes' Error the failure to acknowledge the
hermeneutic location of the person as a neuro-biological 'self' (Darnasio 1994, Clark
1997).
Assiter (1994) argues for the Aristotelian, corporeal notion of the person.
	 She
proposes a competency model of the person construed broadly as underlying
characteristics and ability to transfer knowledge from one context to another. This is
to be preferred over more traditional models of persons and thinking in higher
education.37
 Coia (1992, 1993) sees concepts of the person, and theories of
personal identity, as central to personal and social education, and stresses the
importance of philosophical autobiography. 38 Some philosophers and writers
emphasise more the benefits of, and scope for notions of multiple identity or
personality (Hacking 1995), 'drafts of identity' (Dennett 1996), or personal
discontinuities of identity (Parfit 1988), including those found in computing
(Harraway 1991, Plant 1997, Ryan 1995b, Turkle 1996). 39 A more general
pedagogic claim for teaching philosophy which relates to becoming a person, as
advocated by Lipman (1992) involves joining in philosophical enquiry with others.
Such a case can be supported by the social constructivism of Vygotskian research,
which concludes that learning often occurs best when children combine socially, in
undertaking assisted learning, which is sccffolded by peers and adults, within a
community of enquiry (Berrill 1990, Cole 1985, Lipman 1991, 1996).
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These arguments concerning the person, and personal growth, are also often linked
with proposals for developing dispositions and virtues (see chapter 5). Claims
concerning the contribution of the philosophy and the pre-phiosophical curriculum to
the development and flourishing of the person are therefore central to the argument of
this thesis.
13. Claims of transfer
I turn now to examine in detail a series of claims which develop the notion of
transferability, cross-domain thinking in my view being central to any project
concerned with philosophical and pre-philosophical education, as will be further
argued in chapters 4 and 5.
Do claims for teaching philosophy, or critical thinldng as a separate subject involve,
necessarily, at least a weak assertion of transfer? For a psychologist like Sternberg
(1987: 258) the transfer claim is 'the fundamental question' in the teaching of
thinking. Like 'snake oil', it merits considerable scepticism (Sternberg and Bhana.
1986). The matter has been much studied in relation to critical thinking (Nickerson
1985, Norris 1992a, Maclure and Davies 1991). The concept of a 'transferable'
liberal education can be argued to be implicit in the work of a number of philosophers
of education, including Hirst (1974), White (1973) and Bailey (1984), all of whom
clearly believe that the important effects of education cany over into adult life.
14. The claim of transferable liberal education
Bailey (1984) claims that a liberal education is one which enables people to understand
the choices they have, to make those choices and to pursue their chosen paths in a
social world. There should be an understanding of different ways of life, or forms of
activity which might be valued for their own sake; and an understanding of the
different forms of knowledge which structure human thought and provide the basis
for critico-creative thinking and the development of rational (or more extensively
personal) autonomy. For Bailey it is generalisability, what cognitive psychology has
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traditionally called transfer of training, that is the benefit most often sought and gained
from thinldng in single subjects or discourse.
The extent to which thinking is subject-specific within originating forms of knowledge
and activity and therefore untransferable, or whether there are transferable thinking
sidils, has been much debated within the critical thinking movement (Hager 1991,
Hemstein et al 1986, McCarthy 1996, Norris 1992b). The argument that the
potential for generalisability often originates within the subject discipline will be
presented in some detail in chapter 3. It claims that, generally speaking, most
thinking which is of value to us begins as domain-specific - although this is not to say
that meta-cognitive disciplines like logic or philosophy itself cannot emerge in their
own right. Many writers claim broad benefits of transfer arise from philosophy
teaching with children (Evans 1976, Fields 1995a, 1995b, Lindop 1990, Robinson
1995, Whalley 1980). Whalley (1987) asserts, for example, that there are six such
benefits. Children taught philosophy in school learn to reason; they discuss matters
which arise out of but are not officially part of the curriculum; they are made aware of
problematic issues; they discover what co-operative argument can achieve; they
encounter an antidote to curriculum fragmentation; and they learn to have confidence
in thinking for themselves.
The proposition that meta-cognitive thinking, thinking about thinking, can be taught is
a peculiarly important feature of philosophy teaching itself. The claim is sometimes
made that philosophy, as the most general of subjects, is the most adaptable to
particular needs whatever the nature of the enquiry. As Fisher (1990) points out,
philosophers find there is a regrettable lack of empirical research which could support
this unexceptionable claim. 41
 Nevertheless claims for teaching philosophy, a pre-
philosophical curriculum, higher order thinking and skills continue to stress the
benefits of transferability that will accrue. There is a continuing assumption among
educators that the teaching of philosophy confers generalised intellectual, economic
and other benefits on the elites it selects, trains and serves - even if this belief is not
much articulated or made explicit Barrow (1991) observes that such benefits were
invoked in traditional claims for the transferability of a classical education.42
55
15. LInguistic transferability
Those advocating the Humean and Austinian approach to philosophy teaching, it was
suggested in chapter 1, have seen the subject as a journeyman's tool for the second-
order clarification of philosophical and linguistic confusions. However, the linguistic
claim may also be seen as asserting a transferable system for training the mind. A
linguistic philosopher attempting to explain philosophy to an educationist might
describe 'philosophy' as the subject discourse of meta-cognitive competence. Inter
alia it is the subject discipline which deals with the epistemological, aesthetic, moral
and metaphysical questions which surround thinking, while through its association
with logic acting as a technical resource. That technical usage has been an important
one in twentieth centuiy linguistic and 'ordinary language' philosophy as, say,
exemplified in the work of Austin. It has its parallel, applied forms in critical
thinking, argumentation theory (Secor 1987); and in linguistics and English studies, in
models of how multi-dimensional written argument develops (Berrill 1990), and of
'dialogic rationality' in rhetoric (Myerson, 1994).
The Austinian approach is found in explicit form in the pedagogy of A level
philosophy teaching in England and Wales. The Institute for the Advancement of
Philosophy with Children, with its emphasis on procedural language, works on
'transfer' within that linguistic philosophy tradition. The teaching of informal logic
courses in the U.S. directed towards forming the habits of logical thought, has a
visible provenance in the traditions of linguistic and analytical philosophy (Govier
1987, 1988; Groake et al 1997, Halpern 1995ab, Hughes 1996). 43 Hughes, for
example, combines treatment of problems in the philosophy of language and
epistemology with teaching a conventional programme of critical thinking exercises.
In Europe, particularly in the Netherlands, a new field of argumentation studies has
originated from the discipline of linguistics. It claims transfer through the detailed
analysis and clarification of linguistic form in argument, and the examination of
participants' assertions, when the resolution of personal as well as philosophical
problems can be achieved (Van Eeemeren and Grootendorst 1984, Van Eemeren
1987).	 The emerging genre of philosophical counselling makes somewhat similar
claims, and demands on competence in linguistic technique (Rahav 1996).
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16. The claim of transfer across subject areas
Some thinkers believe that subjects are in fact very much self-contained in their
discourse and transferability is therefore limited Nussbaum (1986, 1988), McPeck
(1990; chapter 4). We live and think as persons within particular continuing
traditions of discourse or language, 'finding a voice' as poets or writers, or as
teachers (Grumet 1990) within a tradition and personal, hermeneutic location.45
Even an invented language will eventually come to develop its own distinctive,
hermeneutically unique character, with its 'parole' aspects in speech and orthography,
like that of any other 'living language' (Saussure 1988).
Bridges (1994) observes that traditionally philosophers of education have discussed
the claim for general thinldng skills which lie across the curriculum with varying
degrees of scepticism and hostility. He finds that Within the 'thinldng' traditions of
critical, creative and problem-solving thinldng, 'all thinldng is thinking about
something'. However, what one is thinking about and the kind of knowledge one is
dealing with make such a significant difference that thinking cannot be regarded as the
same activity in different places. In particular, success in one area or domain of
knowledge will not be sufficient to enable a student to transfer that thinking ability to
another domain, as Barrow (1987) also points out.
A central tenet of the critical thinking movement has been that thinking is transferable.
However, this has been repeatedly challenged in the 'Great Debate' which has gone
on between the principal critic of critical thinldng, McPeck, and his opponents
(McPeck 1990, Quinn 1994). McPeck's argument is conducted in terms of
philosophical logic. His much-cited critique of the transferability claims of the critical
thinking movement asserts:
It is a matter of conceptual truth that thinking is always about X, and the X can never be
'everything in general but must always be something in particular. Thus, the claim, 'I teach
my students to think' is at worst false and at best misleading. (1990: xiii)
McPeck parts company with many critical thinking theorists over the role of the
disciplines, in emphasising the central importance of the particular disciplines. He
sees the disciplines as 'structured embodiments of the simple forms of life which gave
rise to them which attempt to provide progressively more sophisticated insights' (40).
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The relevance of disciplinary knowledge is grounded in relationships between the
disciplines and everyday life. He therefore claims on two grounds that a traditional,
discipline-based education is the best way of teaching critical thinking:
First, the disciplines, over the millennia, provided many important answers to important
problems which used to perplex mankind. Second, through the use of their general concepts,
and rich language, the disciplines provide a very powerful set of analytic lenses through
which students can come to understand problems, and to grapple with them in rational ways.
(34)48
On the other hand, if one could only think subject-specifically, there could be no
transfer and each subject effectively would be a restricted zone, a private language,
temporarily public and accessible only to those at that moment working within it; and a
meta-subject such as philosophy itself could never have emerged from theology (see
again chapter 1).
17. The claim concerning transferable meta-competence
Most of those wishing to see a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum
introduced argue, however, that a distinct body of transferable meta-competences can
be isolated and taught. Bridges (1994) gives the name of transferring skills to the
ability to function in a metacognitive way. '9 Transferable skills, on the other hand,
are those core skills such as word processing which can be deployed with little or no
adaptation, in a variety of social settings or contexts. Cross-curricular skills, such as
the ability to interpret a graph, are identified by a feature of applicability across a
variety of cognitive domains such as school subjects. Meta-competences, or meta-
cognitive thinking (or transferring skills) are transferable across vocational or
professional areas. Transferable dispositional skills have been claimed to be
achieved, with business professionals by Senge et at (1994), with health professionals
by Winter (1992), within nursing education by Benner (1994), and with early years
teachers by Katz (1993). Gotz (1989) makes the philosophical case for ethical
transferability, arguing that moral skills are dispositions acquired through training and
built on talent just like sporting skills.
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18. The empirical claim for transfer
Having surveyed claims for cognitive benefits from critical thinking in the subject
areas, the social studies specialist Newmann (1990) offers 'the optimistic conclusion
that just about any kind of thinking can be taught to some degree'. Belmont and
Butterfield (1977) find that 'flea? transfer is relatively easy to teach, but 'far' transfer
is extremely difficult to achieve through teaching. Often an individual who has
learned a sidil in principle fails to apply that skill. Similarity between the learning and
the target contexts is no guarantee for transfer. Transfer of learning in problem-
solving is most likely to occur when an explicit hint is given that two problems are
related, and when the target problem is easier than the initial problem. 50 Schecht
(1989), after an extensive review of the research, concludes that thinking about
significant matters cannot be distilled Out into a wholly generalisable set of techniques:
Much can be done to develop skills in recognising, analysing, and evaluating arguments -
skills that are generally applicable regardless of subject matter. Students can learn
something about the nature of argumentation; they can learn to distinguish different kinds
of arguments and to understand the criteria relevant to determining the cogency of each;
they can learn to identify and to be alert for some of the more common fallacies in
reasoning. But substantive knowledge is also essential in many facets of argumentation -
knowledge which may be general or rather specific. In assessing arguments, such
knowledge is needed in determining the acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency of premises
(138). 51
Siegler (1991) advocates a similar perspective. He points out that under Piaget's
influence great emphasis was placed on processes such as accommodation and
assimilation that were believed to influence all of cognition. However, research has
shown that a child with sufficient domain-specific knowledge can generate more
advanced performance than an adult with less knowledge, thus demonstrating the
importance of both domain-general and domain-specific thinking. The current
challenge would now be to illustrate how general and specific processes interact to
produce cognitive functioning (259). Donald (1985, 1988, 1992) offers an empirical
working model of how particular categories of thinldng occur within specific and
general thinking in the main subject domains such as science, technology and
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languages. She identifies six main, transferable categories of thought process: these
being description, selection, representation, inference, synthesis and verification
(Appendix 29). These forms of thinking are all relevant to subject disciplines, but
Donald finds that there are significant differences of usage and emphasis between
various subjects in the extent to which they appear. 52
19. The transfer through problem-solving claim
Many intervention programmes have advocated problem-solving as the best and most
practical pedagogic approach to transfer and learning. These claims are of some
importance because they lead to the most visible forms of practice in schools through
the adoption of materials. 53
 Claims on behalf of problem-solving usually claim
improvements in attainment which arise from the transfer effects of teaching a
particular technique.
One long-standing research programme in Britain claims benefits in classroom
achievement in children's problem-solving. Adey (1989, 1991), Shayer (1991) and
Shayer and Adey (1989), have a neo-Piagetian approach to 'cognitive acceleration' in
science (CASE) and make substantial claims of transfer. They claim that the teaching
of general thinking skills within science lessons as a form of problem-solving brings
general improvement in examination attainment in the later school years, not just in
science but in cross-domain transfer (Shayer and Adey 1989). 5 The CASE results
are of particular interest for the extent to which inductive thinking in one curriculum
area, namely science, is claimed to be broadly transferable to other subjects. 55
 The
specific CASE claims for 'cognitive acceleration' have, however, been challenged by
Desforges and Brown (1979). Furthermore, the Piagetian, genetic epistemology on
which such approaches are based has been severely criticised by Donaldson (1979),
Matthews (1994) and Meadows (1982). 56
De Bono (1991) and Feuerstein (1979, 1980) are also prominent among those making
claims concerning the teaching of generic techniques of argument. 57 Dc Bono
emphasises the links between creativity and the transfer involved in problem-solving,
continuing a tradition in 'creative and divergent' thinking begun by Torrance (1973).
58 He argues that his concerns are complementary to those of Popper in reviving a
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traditional distinction between the logic of proof and the logic of invention or
discovery, in his distinction between vertical and lateral thinking. 59
 Feuerstein's
Inszru,nental Enrichment programme claims to have achieved 'fa? transfer with low-
achievers. Blagg et al (1988) in a review of the Somerset Thinking Skills Course,
based on the Feuerstein materials, concluded however that there was no evidence to
imply that Instrumental Emichment had more than a minor transfer influence on the
work or study skills of mainstream, low achieving UK adolescents. 6° The problem
has been to know how far 'bridging' to other subjects and contexts, the transferability
of 'generalisable' thinking skills, reliably occurs following intervention. 61
The examination results for the various specialist philosophy courses offered to older
students in different countries suggest prima facie that some transfer of learning
occurs within the subject; but no specific, systematic studies of its transfer effect on
other subjects have yet been undertaken. Research evidence collected by the Institute
for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children has claimed that improvement in
cognitive attainment occurs through its programmes (Lipman et al 1980); and others
sympathetic to the approach have endorsed these claims (Coles and Robinson 1992,
Fields 1995b). 62
20. The claim of cross-domain transfer
The view is taken in this thesis, and amplified in chapter 5, that thinking may occur in
modalities other than language (Rolls 1997, Damasio 1994). The nazivisr perspective
in evolutionary biology argues that psychological mechanisms have been structured
into domain-specific modules by evolutionary history. Language is seen as a
particular case of this instinctual-seeming phenomenon (Pinker 1994), as are human
fears and phobias, parent-child interaction and partner selection (Ohman 1997:253).
Siegler's (1991) conclusion concerning specific and cross-domain thinking in the
linguistic domain, based on a survey of the empirical studies, is extremely important
in relation to the debate about transfer.
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Domain-specific and domain-general properties can work together to produce both
performance and cognitive change. It appears that across a variety of domains, strategy
choices are produced by a domain-general process opemling on domain-specific knowledge.
(Siegler in Light 1991: 259)
There is evidence that cross-domain, cross-intelligence and even cross-sensory
'transferable' thinking features in some of the most creative human thought and
achievements. Kornhaber and Gardner (1991) provide examples of thinkers who
have worked across different types of intelligence to come up with unusually new, or
creative contributions to thought. 63 Some deny, however, that cross-domain
thinking can be taught. In a critique of Gardner's position, Bresson (1991) explores
the question of the relationship between specific types of intelligence, knowledge and
the procedures of intellectual activity. He finds that transferable critical thinking
cannot be directly taught, although the teacher could set up a situation in which it
might occur.
Critical thinking constitutes procedural knowledge and remains implicit; only its effects,
its explicit and conscious results -not the process involved- are judged. Mathematical
discoveries are a good example; many mathematicians have written about the role intuition
plays and about a moment of surprise following their own discoveries (he cites Poincare
and Hadamani)... There is thus no form of direct learning which can develop critical
intelligence. One can only tty to induce the spontaneous acquisitions of these ways of
thinking. (Bresson 1991: 174-5)
The various kinds of intelligence or critical thinking are simply possibilities for
directly applying what is known alre&ly; and for comparing different kinds of
knowledge, combining them, drawing conclusions, developing analogies and
inventing. Transfers between specific kinds of intelligence do take place when
relationships established in various fields are analysed in abstractive systems such as
artificial intelligence, when a new kind of knowledge is brought into being. Donald
(1992) in her taxonomy puts forward an analogous notion of 'connections between
connections' (Appendix 29). The account of cross-domain creativeness given by
Bresson is not unlike accounts of stochastic process and thinking, which will be
discussed in chapter in relation to counter-factual thinking (Hager 1995).
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Educationists caution against high expectations of transfer. A survey for OFSTED by
Adey and Fairbrother, Learning Styles and Strategies, expresses doubts about the
value of the concept (1995: 22). An influential project in UK higher education
concerned with the transferability of thinking, the MENO/[JCLES prqject, specifically
reserves its position over whether transferable thinldng skills exist at all. 65 Despite
some research and theoretical reservations, I agree that the conceptions of transfer
should place equal emphasis on domain-specific
	 general approaches. It will be
argued that any pre-philosophical curriculum must be built initially around subject
teaching: but that philosophy should also be taught in its own right as the subject
which, although originating and grounded in other disciplines, specialises in
transferable meta-cognition and enquiry (Moser 1996: 406-7, see chapter 3).
21. The claim to develop intellectual and ethical dispositions
and virtues
The argument that our dispositions, virtues and even political behaviour can be
significantly influenced by the transfer effects of a philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum is an important one. Claims concerning social and political hegemony are
among some of the most far-reaching that critical thinkers and philosophers, lecturers
and teachers, have to address - since they are central to the role of the school or
college in a society.
Many of those enthusiastic to see a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum
taught in schools and colleges identify its potential contribution, usually through the
transfer of training, in the area of values education and the education of dispositions
and virtues (Sharp 1984). There has been increasing interest in the virtues among
philosophers; and in the UK in values education and the thinking which accompanies
it (Haydon 1990, 1996, 1997; OFSTED 1994a, 1994b). In the US there are similar
developments. Lipman and Sharp (1978a) argue that philosophy with children
produces virtuous intellectual dispositions; and that through philosophising children
learn to improve their moral judgements: to develop techniques for making such
judgements, and thereby learn to love and care for' such techniques. The claim that
philosophical thinking can be seen as virtuous activity by A level students is made by
Almond (1990). She argues that in order to pursue objects philosophically ,'a moral
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commitment' is required on the part of the enquirer to the truth and to 'those moral
virtues that the pursuit of truth entails'. Her list is similar to that of the critical
thinkers: 'honesty, openness, respect for other persons as centres of thought and
feeling, and the courage or willingness to pursue an argument to its conclusion,
whatever that may involve' (20).
Initial emphasis on virtuousness in correct procedural thinking has, however, been
progressively expanded into a concern with broader dispositions, moral and ethical
virtues. Ennis (1962, 1991, 1995) reconstructs his definition of critical thinking so
as to stipulate a disposition to think critically which is established as a habit, or trait of
character (see also chapter 5).	 Paul (1982, 1990) emphasises the importance of
the dispositions, for instance empathy, in his conception of 'substantial' critical
thinking. Resnick (1987) argues a deontological case. Facione and Facione (1994),
in introducing a state-wide approach and testing instrument for improving the
performance of California school-children, claim to be able to teach and assess
dispositions towards, and even a 'passion for critical thinking'. 67 Bridges (1994)
postulates the existence of transferring meta-competences which have important
dispositional, affective dimensions:
The sensitive and intelligent discernment of similarities and differences between one sociaL1
cognitive setting and another ...(added) to whatever cognitive equipment it is which enables
someone to modify, extend or adapt a previous repertoire of response to the different
requirements of the new situation; to the attitudes or dispositions which support both of
these - perhaps a combination of the receptiveness and sensitivity which is necessary to the
first of these requirements with the confidence or enterprise which supports the second.
(1994:13)
The meta-competences involved in sensitive responsiveness and adaptation in an inter-
personal setting, for example, involve very different skills from the usual technical
skills of negotiation. Winter (1992, 1994, 1996) in training the 'competence' of
health service professionals in the United Kingdom setting, and Benner (1984) in
relation to 'reflective' nursing education in the U.S., make similar claims to engender
transferable social thinking and dispositions.
There are a number of counter-arguments to the claim that philosophy and pre-
philosophy can be used to teach the dispositions and virtues. It can be argued
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ineffably, along Wiugensteinian lines, that philosophy and thinking 'leaves everything
as it is' and so there is no need to demonstrate that dispositions or virtues result.
Teaching is by definition supererogatory. Or it may be argued that philosophy
teaching does affect the dispositions, but its effects cannot be easily predicted and are
just as likely to be deleterious as beneficial, for instance in precipitating adolescent
depression (Ward 1983, see chapter 8).
	 Thirdly, it may be argued that the
'ironism' necessary to thinking philosophically may inhibit the disposition to action
(chapter 8).
Teaching philosophy, critical thinking and the pre-philosophical curriculum should, I
agree, bring cognitive and affective benefits related to the formation of dispositions.
But there are pitfalls in the uncritical teaching of the dispositions, or values education
(see chapters 5,7 and 8). The complex history of claims concerning affective, as
distinguished from cognitive, dispositions is traced in chapter 5. The argument will
be advanced there, and in chapter 4, that Aristotelian 'ready-wittedness' as a
disposition can be linked with a 'possible worlds' account of wit and cognitive
emotion. Dispositionality will therefore emerge as a key concept in this study,
relating not only to causation in the non-human, material aspects of the world but also
to moral and ethical life in conditional and possible worlds.
22. Hegemonic, elitist and democratic claims
Evidence from the history of philosophy teaching in different countries supports the
claim that teaching philosophy to selected students can assist the establishing or
maintenance of cultural and political hegemony, and in both dominance and
emancipation (Griffiths 1979, Newcombe 1977). The case is also strongly made in
relation to critical thinking (Bridges 1994, Flanagan 1993, Haynes 1991, Newmann
1990, Splitter and Sharp 1995, Weinstein 1990).
Many countries provide exemplifications of how philosophy teaching in the schools
can be used to promote political change, illustrating the Gramscian argument that
political hegemony is pursued in totalitarian and democratic regimes through
philosophical education (Entwistle 1979, Gramsci 1971, Griffiths 1979). 69 In
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, for nearly seventy years the philosophy of
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Marxist Leninism was taught in the school and higher education th a training and
indoctrinatory rationale (Kaltgakhchian and Petrov 1964). Western European
countries such as France and Spain can be seen as having frequently used philosophy
teaching as an aid in the shaping of the polity, and in the selection and maintenance of
meritocratic, public and professional elites and intellectual traditions (Giroux 1988,
1989, 1994 and see chapter 8). Flanagan (1993) argues for critical thinking as
providing an emancipatory pedagogy to replace apartheid. As Almond (1990:21)
warns, to teach philosophy may cany some risks as the great competing ideologies of
marxism and liberalism illustrate: 'It may also, however, be an agent for change in the
world'.
Justifications for teaching philosophy for its contribution in the young to an
understanding of, and disposition towards practising the democratic way of life, have
been traditionally emphasised by philosophers - from the Greeks to Dewey.
However, practice seems often to have concentrated on the education of elites, even
when the provision of democratic education has also been in mind. 70 The central
contribution of the study of philosophy in the formation and education of elites can be
identified in many educational systems (Griffiths 1979). 71 Such approaches imply
that philosophy teaching should be used for the education and training of elites, and
that it is therefore a semi- exclusive purview of the intellectual and power elite. The
Clitist claim for philosophy teaching has not been much announced or discussed as
such, even though it has played a significant role in many, including totalitarian
regimes. The claim may be characterised as asserting that the teaching of philosophy
helps us to select members of an elite, forming in them attributes of character and
intellect appropriate to the leadership role which they will assume in their society. It
will be shown that philosophical and pre-phiosophical curricula have been used for
the training and formation of both democratic and anti-democratic Clites. Issues
around potentially desirable or undesirable outcomes will be addressed in chapter 5.
Some argue a combined elitist claim, that the linguistic, moral, cognitive, and other
benefits which arise from the teaching of philosophy and higher order thinking can
combine to confer a benefit of empowerment, increased capacity to act in the world, to
control one's own life or to achieve cultural or political hegemony over the lives of
others (Shapiro 1984). As Griffiths (1979) shows, the geographical incidence of
philosophy teaching in mainland European schools tended to reflect patterns of
cultural and political dominance arising from the imperialism of the 18th and 19th
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centuries. French cultural hegemony influenced the philosophy teaching of Spain,
Portugal and their colonial possessions, and countries like Italy, Egypt and Malta
which were subsumed under the Napoleonic Code and its curriculum reforms. The
evidence for this claim is well-established in the comparative education literature; and
is reflected in discussion of the canon in philosophy or pre-philosophy.
The broad democratic claim for teaching philosophy and pre-philosophy can be
regarded partly as an empowerment, or hegemonic claim. Epistemologically and
pedagogically, it proposes that philosophy teaching, usually on the Socratic model,
will uncover dormant assumptions, reduce prejudice and engender democratic
rationality. Solutions to problems in the sense of clear answers may not always be
forthcoming, it is argued, but philosophy teaching will contribute to an educationally
healthy school ambience; one in which tolerance, rationality and democratic practices
are featured.
When children are encouraged to think philosophically, the classroom is converted into a
community of enquiry. Such a community is committed to the procedures of inquiry, to
responsible search techniques which presuppose an openness to evidence and to reason. It is
assumed that these procedures of the community, when internalised, become the reflective
habits of the individuaL (Lipman and Sharp 1978a 88) 72
Gutmann (1987) and White (1989b, 1996) argue that rational deliberation, which for
Gutman specifically includes critical thinking, is important for democratic education.
There is certainly evidence of an efflorescence of interest in philosophy teaching in
schools and colleges in those countries which have suddenly had access to new
political and social liberties following the collapse of the Soviet bloc.73
A democratic claim which emphasises the vocational benefits that can arise from
thinking in philosophical mode within, or preparatory to entering the work-place is
advanced by some educators. Newmann (1990), for example, argues for higher
order thinking as an educational goal closely concerned with empowerment and
personal, democratic and economic autonomy. 74
 Weinstein (1993b) wishes to
know whether critical thinking will help to liberate the mass of urban students, when
he urges a new type of 'rationalist hope and utopian vision' addressing social
injustice. 75
 Haynes (1991) raises the question of whether the critical thinking
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movement has tended to take an Enlightenment rather than a post-feminist view of
rationality and the hegemony of
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The Gramscian position makes education central to the replacement of the dominant
ideology in achieving social or political advance, albeit adopting what Entwistle
(1978) shows to be an otherwise rather conservative approach to the curriculum and
other aspects of schooling. l The ideas of Althusser (1984) provide a similar
ideological and philosophical framework. Althusser's account of how the relations of
reproduction are secured involves the proposition that different 'ideological state
apparatuses' may provide, at different times, the main area for hegemonic struggle and
debate (53). In the pre-capitalist historical period of the middle ages there was, for
example, one dominant ideological state apparatus, the Church, and a theological
logomachy that accompanied its dominance. The importance of critical thinking and
philosophical study for those arguing in this tradition is conveyed in Althussefs
dictum that 'philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in the field of theory':
The ideological state apparatus which has been installed in the dominant position in mature
capitalist social formations as a result of violent political and ideological class struggle, is
the educational ideological state apparatus. (26)
The territorial disputes over intervention programmes within the 'thinking' or pre-
philosophical curriculum in schools and colleges may be seen as a form of this
response. Some subject specialisms want to claim canonical hegemony for their
subject as the principal site for this struggle to take place, as is shown in chapter 6 for
the case of both English studies and science. 78
 The claim that the teaching and
learning of philosophy should be undertaken for its universalistic benefits, in
personal, social and educational contexts, is taken to a logical conclusion in the
community-based approach of McCall (1994, see also Turner 1996). The EPIC
project for philosophy in the community claims to have brought about empowerment,
emancipation, improved moral behaviour and self-assertiveness, and crime reduction
among a disadvantaged urban population.
Such arguments can result in the school, college, or university, being seen as the key
institution for developing social and political change and philosophical democracy.
The view may be Habemiassian, concerned with the engendering of the 'ideal speech
situation', and consensual truth-seeking. Or it may be more radical in asserting that
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through philosophy teaching, ideological assumptions taught as a 'hidden curriculum'
or 'invisible pedagogy' will become transparent. On such a view, philosophy
teaching becomes a source of empowerment and liberation, helping to reform social
and political arrangements by radicaiising and politicising students.
One counter-argument to such claims is that the teaching of philosophy and its pre-
philosophical foundations, far from being democratically empowering, has
contributed just as often in the historical record to the emergence, or maintenance of
anti-democratic elites and regimes. The historical evidence needs to be borne in
mind, as Almond warns, for philosophy teaching may easily lend itself to ideological
abuse, indoctrination, bias and misuse. This perception is voiced within the
contemporary critical thinking movement by Haynes (1991), who sees the claim to
pursue 'rationality' as a disguise for post-Enlightenment aims of gendered, male
hegemony and domination.
Another objection concerns the possibility of indoctrination, it may be objected by
rights theorists that advantage should not be taken of the 'imperfect rationality' of
children. 8° It may be said that since philosophy teaching cannot help but be
ideological its teaching will inevitably involve a strong risk of indoctrination. This
matter is discussed in philosophical terms by Siegel (1987, 1988). Others indicate
the need for teachers to develop the pedagogic skills for minimum intervention and
democratic classroom management in lessons dealing with philosophical issues
(Duncan 1972, Stenhouse 1975, Stock 1987).
The claim that the philosophy and pre-phiosophical cuniculum is capable of the
development of intellectual autonomy, political empowerment and emancipation must
be conceded. Philosophy teaching can be, and has also been used for indoctrinatory
and illiberal purposes; but I agree with Siegel, and with Myerson (1994) that this is
less likely to occur where 'dialogic' rationality is a foundation stone of one's
pedagogy.
One must take rationality, and reasons, seriously in order even 10 raise the question of the
possible influence of ideology on the evaluation of reasons. The ideology objection thus
presupposes a commitment to rationality. (Siegel 1988: 73)
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23. Personal and vocational hegemony
For Bridges (1994) there is a problem about the account of transfer in liberal education
given by Bailey and other liberal educators. It is that even relatively successful
experience of liberal education as a student would not be a sufficient condition for
one's positive freedom or liberation within most real social settings. Bridges
therefore wishes to link the theory of transferability through liberal education with
work-place learning in vocational education. It is possible to see a broader 'liberal
justification' for the pursuit of transferability than the traditionally academic one:
The idea of the 'educated person' is that of a scholarly individual who has been neither
educated or trained to exercise useful skills; who is able to understand but not to act. A
well balanced education should.., embrace analysis and the acquisition of knowledge. But it
must also include the exercise of creative skills, the competence to undertake and complete
tasks and the ability to cope with every day life; and also doing all these things in co-
operation with others. (8)
The itheral vocational claim for the teaching of transferable thinking made by Bridges
(1994), and by Winter (1994), can be seen as a variation of the ideological claim. It
is associated with the belief that in economies driven by technological innovation and
commercial competition, knowledge and ability must be 'transferable'. However
such recognition is to be reconciled with the belief, widely held within the institutional
culture of higher education, that 'academic freedom' is to do with the 'intrinsic' value
of specialised knowledge (Winter 1994:53).
Bryan and Assiter (1995) are similarly concerned with the vocational 'competency
strand' in liberal humanist education but offer a neo-Aristotelian solution. They argue
for competency and transfer in thinking conceived along Aristotelian lines as practical
knowledge in 'the practice of a craft'. The pitfall of mere 'verificationism'
concerning competency can then be avoided, and such a position is also consonant
with other perspectives such as that emphasising 'body-self. 81
 Assiter in particular
gives education and training in 'competency' in thinking a central position within the
curriculum and offers a model of good thinking which she sees as having resonances
of the craft guild. Her analysis is of some interest in that it agrees with the feminist
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and hegemonic critique of critical thinking mounted by Haynes (1991), while offering
an approach which emphasises the physical, cross-domain, and 'body-self' or
corporeal nature of thinking. 82
 Gubbay (1994) advances a Gramscian and
'socialist' view of transferable skills within the 'new vocationalism'. 83
 He
advocates curricula which develop a range of theoretically-informed thinking,
practical, and social skills. Thinking skills and vocational values will include the
willingness and capacity to challenge common assumptions and authorities, while
being imaginative, creative and self-criticaL8
I agree that teaching competency in transferable thinking can be a powerful tool for
empowerment and hegemony, for developing the vocational virtues, and more broadly
in 'vocationalising the liberal ideal' (Pring 1995: 186). 85 However, I subscribe
most strongly to the broader democratic and vocational claim, that the study of
philosophy will contribute to the flourishing of a productive, democratic society.
24. Which claims have been most prominent or discernible?
What can be concluded from a review of the teaching philosophy and the pre-
philosophical curriculum within a broad 'social movement' which has been building in
a number of countries?	 Which type of claim or justification has been the most
prominent or discernible? What is immediately observable is that the range of claims
for the teaching of philosophy and the pre-philosophical cuniculum has been
progressively enlarging, reaching well out beyond the conventions of Enlightenment
thought, or Anglo-Saxon linguistic and ordinary language philosophy. For example,
dispositional claims have been increasingly explored and promoted and an emphasis
on values education, virtues and dispositions is increasingly prominent. It is
noticeable that the argument for the primacy of philosophy has not been asserted
formally, nor has the idea of a unified curriculum offer in philosophy and pre-
philosophy been explored (see chapter 6). The combining of the teaching of critical
thinking together with an elementary approach to simple topics in the philosophy of
mind or language stands out, for example, as an unusual experiment (Hughes 1996).
Explicit justification of the teaching of philosophy or pre-phiosophy and higher order
thinking, on the grounds of their importance to a democratic or economically
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flourishing society has frequently occurred. Claims which are communitarian,
essentialist, hegemonic, and emancipatory have all been educed to support such a
case. Informed by the philosophy of John Dewey, the egalitarian approach of
Matthew Lipman and the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children
represents a particularly strong version of the democratic and communitarian claim.
A democratic tradition of intervention has been established by those who, like
Feuerstein (1980), have worked to improve the thinking of the majority and the
intellectually disadvantaged children in the public schools system. 87
 This contrasts
with the views of Rorty (1989:73) and others who think that it is a mistake to look at
philosophical reflection as an instrument for implementing 'liberal hope' (chapter 8).
The claim for cognitive benefits, usually involving some form of transferable
thinking, has been frequently cited. However, that claim has sometimes placed the
philosopher in an Austinian or journeyman role which fails to take account of the
broader philosophical and pre-phiosophical agendas. 88
 The emphasis on linguistic
clarification is mistaken in my view. It leads to a mistaken concentration on
intervention, problem-solving and thinldng skills programmes promising quick
results, but resulting in a pedagogic vacuum in which more philosophical conceptions
of a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum are neglected.
However, as Weinstein (1993a) points out, the debate has been reconfigured in the
past decade, by a wave of criticism concerning the claims and assumptions of
traditional critical thinkers and philosophers. Swingeing critiques of critical thinking
and philosophical practice have been mounted by a range of writers including Green
(1994), Kincheloe and Sternberg (1993), Mclaren (1996), Siegel (1993) and
Weinstein (1993b). Some have questioned whether acceptance of a pluralism of
post-modem rationalities is to be welcomed (Green 1994). Others like Haynes
(1991), Assiter (1994) or Thayer-Bacon (1993: 95), focus on the issue of anti-
feminist 'bias' in the critical thinking movement. They stress the implications of
situated female, hermeneutic knowledge for thinking (Harraway 1991).
Weinstein (1993), in reviewing this range of developments, concludes that Paul's
(1990) emphasis on 'classroom thoughtfulness' in relation to bias, ethnocentrism, and
sociocentrism, and the need for substantial and empathetic thought, may prove more
sustainable in the new setting than the stance of McPeck and 'more traditional
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89 He wishes 'inclusion' to be a major objective of the critical thinking
movement within US national educational policy.
Will the limitations of conservative educational prtices be replicated in educational reforms
replicating critical thinking; or will the urban tmder-class, the disenfranchised and oppressed,
the non-literate, the non-technological cultures be included? (Weinstein 1993a 17)
25. A rights or curriculum entitlement claim
Arising from the 'strong version' of claims identified in the present chapter, a rights
claim can be derived for teaching philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum. At
its simplest, such a claim might aim for parity of treatment, as in the argument for the
right to offer and receive specialist philosophy teaching put by Ward (1983). He asks
whether given the wide range of nearly one hundred A levels already on offer, would
it not be natural and equitable to add hil90
A persuasive rights claim can be founded on the notion of a curriculum 'welfare right'
(Wringe 1981). For if philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum are as
important as the claims for teaching them suggest, children will have an entitlement or
right to be taught such a curriculum, and teachers and lecturers an obligation to
provide it. A 'welfare' claim to the right of a curriculum offer in the teaching of
philosophy and thinking will argue that it is central to an individual's intellectual
welfare and flourishing. 91 The withholding of access to the philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum would then be a deprivation of such importance as to
constitute the denial of a welfare right (Wringe 1981). A different form of
meritocratic rights claim could be based on the case for offering philosophy or pre-
philosophical teaching only to that selected elite of children likely to benefit cognitively
or dispositionally. If the right was confined in this way the status of, or need for a
pre-philosophical curricuiwn as a universal entitlement might then be questioned.
The position taken in this thesis is that there are compelling reasons why teachers
should develop a school or college policy for a philosophy and pre-phiosophical
curriculum. The need for such an approach, and good reasons why it might take a
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particular form, responding to a strong set of claims, have been adumbrated in this
chapter.
The argument of chapters 3,4,5 and 6 will be that the transcendental, possibilist,
canonical and primacy claims, when combined, amount to a formidable case for
universal entitlement to apre-philosophy and philosophy curriculum.
Surprisingly, neither the philosophical literature on children's rights, nor the literature
on philosophy for children have been concerned with the intellectual rights of access
to a pre-philosophical or philosophy curriculum. An exception to this is the case for a
curriculum entitlement proposed by Craft (1991), who argues that in order for
children to be enabled to learn they need analytical, intellectual skills relevant to
problem-solving. This will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7•93 There are
important implications arising, too, from the claims for ethical education. The
growing tendency to link critical thinking with the major virtues of character, for
example, could make the entitlement to moral or 'values education' a more prominent
issue than it has been (see chapter 5).
What might be involved in designing and implementing such a curriculum reflecting a
combination of claims within the context of a canonical National Curriculum, and a
whole school or college policy, is discussed in chapters 6,7 and 8.
Notes to chapter 2
I It was on the basis of this type of argument that many educators welcomed the
introduction of A level philosophy (Thornbury 1984).
2 For instance, it may be pointed out that our philosophical tradition has broadened in
recent decades to include many new areas of applied philosophy. The growing
importance of applied philosophy in cosmogony, socio-biology, artificial intelligence,
justice, animal rights, medical and business ethics might be mentioned. There has
been considerable synergy between philosophical logic and computing, developed on
foundations provided by Russell and Frege who sought to give mathematics greater
security by founding it on notational logic (Pearl 1988).
3 The pre-philosophical curriculum is therefore the term used most frequently in this
thesis for what precedes theformal teaching of philosophy, which I consider can
begin for most children at about sixteen years.
4 Notions particularly associated with the poets of the romantic movement, such as
Wordsworth, Goethe, and Fichte (Evans 1940).
Lipman (1991:14) also sees himself as having been imbued with the child
development ideas of Vygotsky from 1939 onwards, but in respect of the social
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origins of thinking rather the cognitive social learning that Vygotsky characterises as
'proximal development'.
O Psychological studies of children's 'magical' thinking relevant to Lewis's notion of
magical 'ersatzism' in counter-factual thinking in 'possible worlds' are discussed in
chapter 4.
" 'Even as Tylor was wrong in spealdng of the 'savage philosophy' as that which
concerns the mystic representations of primitive society, so also one cannot speak,
other than by metaphor, of the philosophy of the child' (Piaget 1933: 534). However,
these early philosophical experiences of puzzlement or awe which occur can be seen
as examples of Scheffler's (1991) 'cognitive emotions' (see chapter 5). See
Demetriou and Efklides (1987a, 1987b) for an integrated model embracing formal and
post-formal thought, structuralism and neo-Piagetian theories.
Ward's (1983) article is valuable as a general survey of the issues including the
contemporary reception by professional philosophers of the A level proposal.
9 Warnock (in Davies et al 1988: 57) argues: 'I do not think it possible to study
philosophy profitably without entering fairly deeply into the history of the subject, and
for this there is not time at school, nor could it be a subject that would interest more
than a few pupils. Instant philosophy, philosophy that springs into being on the
television screen, is fun, but it can hardly be serious.'
10 It is partly for this reason that I wish to characterise most of what goes on in
schools as the pre-philosophica! curriculum. However, I am convinced that pre-
cognitive philosophical thinking does occur in the young in the form of the
philosophical apprehension of the ineffable, 'cognitive emotions', 'body-self and
neural intimations of intellectual possibility (see chapters 4 & 5).
11 Assiter (1994) uses an Aristotelian argument for arguing the place of thinking in a
vocational education curriculum (see below). The Aristotelian cum Thomist case can
be inflected in various ways. See Buchmann (1989) and Greene (1991a, 1991b).
12 'Previously, alone in the garden at Pembroke Lodge, Russell had speculated a
good deal about things he did not know, and could not know: what had his parents
been like? was his mother really wicked? Why did his grandmother tremble at any
mention of insanity? were his grandmother's religious beliefs true? On some of these
questions he might have opinions, on others he could only weave fantasies, but to
none of them could he know for certain the right answer...The beauty of geometry
was that the truth of a proposition was not just asserted, it was proved. The idea that
something - anything - could be known in this way was delighthil, intoxicating'(Monk 1996: 26).
13 Some of those committed to the teaching of argument 'as a primary act of mind'
have therefore been anxious not to lose sight of its affective aspect. They have been
uncertain however whether, in Searlian terms, argument is 'non-feeling', neutral, or
'locutionaiy' only (Mitchell 1992a).
14 This point is not a purely philosophical or abstract one. The Frwnework for the
Inspection of Schools in the UK (OFSTED 1994) seeks evidence of children
exhibiting a sense of wonder and curiosity is as measure of a successful lesson.
15 Attention to the pure truth is what Scott (1989:26) calls cultural accountability, as
one of four forms of accountability in higher education.
16 See chapter 8 for a fuller discussion of 'ironism'.
17 The philosopher Radford (1996: 4-5) gives an account of such an experience,
which occurred to him at five years. For a fuller discussion of this matter see Kennick
(in Edwards 1967: 18 1-3). The problem can be linked with the preoccupations of
Schlick and the early Viennese logical positivists and is reminiscent of Keat's
definition of poetry as the attempt to describe the taste of a peach. Our sense of taste
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tells us exactly what makes up 'peachness' but we cannot easily find a description in
ordinary language.
18 An aporia is defined as a difficult problem that arises when we are trying to
extend our knowledge and seriously impedes our progress, especially when there is
an antinomy of equally strong arguments for and against a particular solution (Dancy
and Sosa 1992: 19). Lodge (1992) describes its literary use in Conrad, Beckett and
Fowles, in its Greek meaning of a 'pathless path'. The associated use of the irope of
aposiopesis also frequently occurs - as when a narrator breaks off in mid-sentence
(219-22). Aporia is an effective aesthetic and didactic device, familiar examples being
Hamlet's soliloquy (Lodge 1992: 219) and Frost's (1955: 78) poem, The Road Not
Taken (see also chapter 4). Aporia may also play a part in wit (see Thornbury 1998
and chapter 5).
19 Wittgenstein observed 'Philosophy leaves everything as it is' (Philosophical
Investigations, (124: 49e), although earlier he had written 'What we cannot speak
about we must pass over in silence' (Tractarus Logico-Philosophicus, prop. 7). The
position, among many others, is satirised in Benjamin Hoff s (1982) The Tao of
Pooh.
20 As Almond (1990) puts it, philosophy is left, then, with what may well be the
most resistant questions to the techniques of resolution, available to human beings
(22). Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan (1980: 36-7) provide a list of the large questions
that children raise (e.g. What is space, identity, matter, meaning, value, reality, life
and death?) in defming metaphysics as 'philosophy at its most comprehensive. It
involves issues of maximum generality.'
21 Protagonists argued variously for a narrow approach in 'informal logic' teaching
(Govier 1988); for critical thinking as 'the correct assessing of statements' (Ennis
1962: 83), and as 'a tendency to exercise the proficiency' (Ennis 1979: 17). For the
stages of the development of his position, see Ennis (1962, 1979, 1987, 1991, 1994).
For an approach to critical thinldng which insists that thought is context-specific to
subject teaching see McPeck (1981, 1990).
22 See Atkins (1988: 437-8), Gallagher (1992), Nussbaum (1986) and Rorty (1984)
for hermeneutic discussions of this point. Hermeneutic is used in the sense of the
term brought into philosophy from theology by Dilthey in the 19th century; as the
discipline that is concerned with the special methods of the human studies, of
geisteswissenschoften; and in the broad sense adopted by Heidegger of general
metaphysical purport (Heidegger 1962, Hekman 1986). See Perkins (1984) for a
psychological view on whether cognitive skills are context-bound.
23 For example, Grossteste and other scholastic philosophers fine-honed the
processes of argument in such a way as to provide a conceptual tool to assist 13th
century scientific endeavour (Leff 1958: 186-9).
24 Chapter 1 identified how philosophy emerged from its herrneneutic context of
historical tradition, as a tool of theology, into its role as a discrete, singular discipline.
Edgington, a leading British philosopher in the field, also takes this pedagogic and
heuristic view in relation to the teaching of philosophy itself (Thornbury 1997a).
26 'Unless children can imaginatively envisage how things might be, and how they
themselves might be, it will be difficult for them to set goals towards which they can
grow' (Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980: 65). 'It is an unfortunate part of
traditional education that training in logical rigour is often assumed to take place only
at the expense of imagination and creativity. The approach taken in this program
supposes on the other hand that logical thinking can be encouraged by means of
creative activity and, conversely, that creativity can be fostered with the development
of logical ability. The two go hand in hand'(Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980: 64).
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27 For instance, in relation to art and the aesthetic through the philosophical notion of
an 'art-world' (Cooper 1992, Wollheim 1980b); or in exploring geographical
possibilism's conception of the genre de vie (Johnston et al 1994: 216); or reference
group theory (Runciman 1966); or transworld depravity in religious education; or
even the notion of the philosophical underworld (see Honderich 1995: 678 and
chapter 4).
The research case for re-visiting notions of creativity has been made by Balm
(1994) and Fryer and Collings (1991). The 'divergent' versus 'convergent' thinker
account of Torrance (1993) has been largely discarded. For a coherently worked-out
claim concerning creativity in post-formal thinking see Kincheloe and Steinberg
(1993).
29 Stochastic, as used by Pauling and by Fogel, has the meaning of 'conjectural',
while Ferguson sees its locus as more in contingency and 'chaos theory'. Conjectural
thinking in mathematics is a formal technique involving exploratory thinking within a
deductive system. See also chapter 4.
30 For example, see Groake et a! (1997), Halpem (1995a, 1995b, 1997) and Hughes(1996).
31 'Under suitable circumstances, a room full of children will pounce on an idea in
the way a litter of kittens will pounce on a ball of yarn thrown in their direction. The
children will kick the idea around until it has been developed, elaborated upon, and
even in some instances applied to life situations, although the latter is seldom achieved
without the teacher's artful guidance' (Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan (1980: 104).
32 'The child senses that the language and concepts adults employ in presenting a
view of the world or in presenting a directive for how the child should act in that
world - that language and concepts form an intimate part of the adult world view'(Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan 1980: 80).
33 See Habeimas (1978) in Knowledge and Human Interests for a general account.
34 Griffiths (1979) gives a full analysis. It was thought that students would
discharge their social responsibilities more effectively, autonomy being linked with
social conscience - as the Manual of Inrtruction issued in 1925 and current for over
fIfty years revealed. The approach to the philosophy component of the International
Baccalaureate was close to the French model. Stress was placed on critical reflection,
and upon the importance of themes, problems and ideas rather than the doxographical
study of authors and texts in the selection of a canon. See also Druet's (1987) The
Evolution of Philosophical Ideas in France.
35 Reflection is prominently involved as Radford (1996: 311-12) in his case for the
'examined life' makes clear. Work in English studies and on teacher reflectiveness
would tend to support such claims (see chapter 8). Support for this claim can be
derived also from Maclntyre (1981, 1988) in general philosophy; from Berrill (1990)
and Fox (1990) in education - who identify links between narrative and argument;
from Hawthorn (1991) in the content area of history, and among those see stories as
the key access device for understanding ideas through feelings or cognitive emotions.
This matter is discussed more fully in chapter 7.
36 Her case is that the physical aspects of education were devalued by the
Enlightenment commitment to universal, context independent knowledge, 'a very
different perspective from humanism which did not forget the body' and the notion of
the 'knowing subject'. Many feminists have pointed to the implicit association of
masculinity with the rational, mental side of this dualism and femininity, with the
bodily domain (21).
37 See Assiter (1994: 17-26). The detail of her argument runs as follows. According
to Plato in the Gorgias, it is a precondition for engaging in rational enquiry that one
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should already possess and recognise certain moral virtues. A prior commitment to
those values is required if enquiry is to proceed. Enquiry into the nature of what is
good is conceived by Aristotle as analogous with the process of becoming a master
craftsman. The knower is transformed in the process of gaining knowledge in the way
that a craft worker is changed as he gains understanding and skill in the practice of his
craft Aristotle saw coming to terms with the discipline of philosophy, one of the least
'vocational' of subjects, on the model of a craft. He argued that the apprentice not
only needs the knowledge requisite for the exercise of a particular skill, but
additionally he or she must acquire knowledge informed by 'reason', that is
knowledge informed by critical reflection on alternative approaches to the exercise of
the skilL This constitutes the end-point for that particular agent in his/her particular
circumstances. 'Guilds, on this perspective, are located in a context, one which
contains the history of the craft. Furthermore, rationality and knowledge, on this
model, are historically and contextually situated. Knowing subjects are fully-rounded
persons, with bodies, and members of guilds' (Assiter 1994: 22).
i8 As I do also in chapter 8. See Coia (1992) in Conceptualising the Person in
Personal and Social Education. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of London.
39 Some of these are similar to the imaginary companion, a common phenomenon of
childhood in which non-existent playmates (children and sometimes animals) have,
for the child, a very real existence. Although compatible with good mental health, they
sometimes persist into adult life (McKellar 1979: 176).
40 'The knowledge and understanding to be gained in a liberal education must be as
fundamental as possible in order to have the generality of application that is more
rather than less liberating. The term 'fundamental' is used here in the sense of
necessary foundation, and stands opposed to certain particular items of knowledge
that might be useful in themselves but upon which nothing or not much can be built.'(Bailey cited in Bridges 1994: 10).
41 Fisher (1990: 123-128) reported that a Universities Working Party had no
empirical evidence available to defend the position of the subject to government.
Fisher concluded: 'What is really needed is research into the transferability of
philosophy.'
42 'mere is a certain irony in the contemporary pre-occupation with generic skills
such as those of critical thinking, values clarification, interpersonal relations and
creativity. Not so long ago it was firmly believed that a classical education in some
generic way made a better man of one ...By studying the Classics, individuals would
be fitted to take posts of responsibility in the Civil Service, in Industay, in Education,
and in Government throughout the British Empire, or so it was held' (Barrow 1981:
7).
43 See these writers for examples of a typical approach to the teaching of informal
logiq and Fisher (1989a, 1989b) or Groake et al (1997) for an adaptation of this
approach to UK needs. See also Weinstein's (1988) discussion of the relationship
between reason and critical thinking.
The claim for the journeyman, second-order role of philosophy was evident here
but, unusually, the Netherlands 'argumentation' school also emphasises the applied
contribution they can make to the clarification of feelings, for instance in cases of
marriage guidance (Van Eemeren et a! 1984).
45 This can occur in more than one 'voice' or culture, as in the case of the bilingual
or deracinee writer, e.g. Conrad, R.S. Thomas, or Julien Green. The example of
Pessoa (1974, 1992) shows that a multiple voice and identity can be authentic, as
Pontiero (1992) argues in his introduction to The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis.
I allude to the linguist Saussure's (1988) distinction between language in theory(langue) and practice (parole).
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47 Barrow (1987) puts the point in this way: 'As a matter of logic one has to think
critically about something (or display one's creative talent in some specific context or
contexts) and since what constitutes sound critical thought or creative expression in
one area such as histoiy differs from what constitutes it in another (say physics) it
follows that a necessary condition of being critical or creative is understanding of
particular domains' (186-199). Bridges (1994: 11) cites Hirst (1975) and McPeck(1987) in support of this position.
48 See McPeck (1990: 34). It has to be supported by a theory of domains of
knowledge; but where do we draw the boundaries between such domains? Hirst
(1965, 1993) offers such a theory of domains or 'forms of knowledge', lately
amended. Bridges (1989: 11) claims that the idea of separate forms of knowledge
'has been eroded in so many different ways that it is difficult to regard it as a
defensible representation of water-tight compartments.' He argues that the logical
coherence and integrity of history as a subject can be attacked by showing that there
has been repeated drawing and re-drawing of its boundaries - as in the case of
archaeology and history, or history and science. A similar view is advanced by
Barrow (1987: 187-199).
49 These are as it were the meta-skills, the second order skills which enable one to
select, adapt, adjust and apply one's other skills to different situations, across
different social contexts and perhaps similarly across different cognitive domains
(Bridges 1994: 9).
50 Green concludes: 'Near transfer has been demonstrated frequently; far transfer has
proved more elusive' (Green in Bridges 1994:42). Andre's (1989: 61) definition of
problem-solving is followed here. 'A problem is a situation in which the individual
wants to do something but does not know the course of action needed to get what he
or she wants. Problem-solving consists of the mental and behaviour activities that are
involved in dealing with problems.' See also De Corte (1990) and Covington (1987).
51 Schecht goes on: 'The degree of subject dependency in assessing the sufficiency
of premises is least in deductive arguments, greatest in conductive arguments. Critical
thinking courses, then, can assist students in developing basic reasoning skills,
although such courses cannot provide an understanding of all of the information,
methodologies, or perspectives which may also be necessary for the assessment of
arguments in various subject areas. However valuable it may be, what can be taught
and learnt in a critical thinking course is not in itself sufficient to enable students to
make rational judgements in many specific contexts' (138).
52 Donald (1992:413-30). This study was of particular interest in two respects.
Donald set out to establish that a field of study could meet some general set criteria for
a discipline. The criteria used in this higher education study included: 'a general body
of knowledge with a reasonably logical taxonomy, a specialised vocabulary, an
accepted body of theory, a systematic research strategy and techniques for replication
and validation.' (See Appendix 29 & Donald 1992).
53 There was interest in a number of countries in applying the problem-solving
approach: see Nickerson (1985a: 64-109), Fisher (1989a, 1989b); and Voutilainen
(1991). In the primary school a variety of approaches compiled by Fisher included
the use of computers, decision-making and games approaches. Examples of material
developed for the primary class-room include Bicknell's (1987) Think Books, Cam's(1994) Thinking Stories, Lake's (1996) Zeto and the Gorgon Warriors and Sprod's(1993) Books into Ideas. Jackson (1983, 1987) and Dowson (1987) have approaches
to problem-solving based on the idea that 'all problems have the two outstanding
features of an objective that someone is trying to reach and an obstacle that is
preventing them from reaching it. The key to the solution of any problem can be
found in a clear definition of the problem in terms of the object and the obstacle'
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(Jackson in Fisher 1987: 20). Siraker in Fisher (1987: 105 -124)) advocates both the
posing and the solving of problems using micro-computer simulations in which
logistical variables have to be manipulated. There was also a growth of interest in
problem-solving and thinldng in particular subject areas, for instance in science
teaching.
54 Concerning the balance of professional opinion, they observe: 'The evidence
seemed to balance somewhat heavier on the side of domain-specific learning as the
practicable route to improved education. The results of the CASE project have thrown
some weight on the other side' (Adey 1994: 124). However, CASE applies to early
adolescents. Shayer (personal communication) comments that no one has made
intervention work for adults, young or old.
55 
'At the end of the two year intervention period, there are some real gains in the
levels of cognitive development of experimental students but no measurable
improvement in their science achievement. One year later, the gains in cognitive
development have almost disappeared, but most of the experimental groups show a
significantly higher proportion of students achieving high results in science compared
with controls' (Adey in Maclure 1991: 87). A second cuniculum project applying the
CASE approach to mathematics teaching was begun by Shayer and colleagues in 1995
(personal communication).
56 Matthews (1994: 93) claims that philosophical discussion of death among children
sharing the experience of death in a leukemia ward showed that their stage of
understanding was at considerable variance with the Piagetian model. Reading
Charlotte's Web (White 1980) helped them to 'model a good death'.
57 Evaluation of the De Bono scheme, in the Australian setting, claimed 'impressive
results' with 'significant shifts in scholastic aptitude and originality in keeping with
earlier results...originality is most improved, followed by flexibility and then fluency'
(Edwards 1991: 28-9). Shayer (1991) however takes the view that this approach is
only suited to the more able secondary school pupil
58 As I argue in chapter 7, in relation to work by Bailin (1994), Fryer and Collings
(1991) and others, this 'heroic' view of creativity is now discredited among the
academic and research community, and teachers.
59 Despite the title of The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper had virtually nothing
to say about the genesis of new theories - only about how to evaluate them. De Bono
claims an interest in the genesis of new or 'divergent' thought but appears to be
unaware of the work by philosophers on counter-factual theory and modal realism, or
their expression, for example, in science fiction (Clark 1995). His philosophical
position has never been fully argued through. See chapter 4 for further discussion.
60 There were grounds for 'mild optimism' about the positive attitudinal and
behavioural change in the pupils and clear evidence of positive benefits for the
teachers. See also Blagg (1991). Evaluation studies of Feuerstein's Instrumental
Enrichment, were reviewed by Nickerson and reported in Maclure (1991). These
studies showed generally beneficial effects, although reservations were expressed that
some of the measures used resembled the training materials. An extensive study by
the Schools Council (Craft and Weller 1983) was cut short, but its early findings were
that 'the evidence was mixed but largely positive'.
61 See Craft and Weller (1983), Feuerstein (1979, 1980) and Nickerson et al (1985).
The Feuerstein approach concentrated on improving cognitive performance of the low-
achieving adolescent through a three year series of problem solving tasks grouped in
14 areas of specific cognitive development. A terminology of 'instruments' rather
than lessons, was favoured 'because in and of themselves they are virtually free of
specific subject matter.' Link and Edwards (1991: 32-39) concluded: 'The evidence
was mixed but was largely positive, in some cases extremely so. Evaluator's
80
observations have frequently shown that pupils enjoy lessons: they are interested,
motivated and gain in self-confidence. Pupils were felt to be learning in most lessons
observed. One evaluator reported on the apparent ability of even seriously
handicapped pupils to keep up with the group. In some cases the teachers reported
improvements in attendance and behaviour, and noted increases in pupils' spans of
concentration. In others, greater concern for accuracy and planning was observed,
and pupils were described as less impulsive and as being concerned with checking
their work more carefully' (45). For an account of the development of the Feuerstein
programmes see Nickerson et a! (1985: 147-187).
62 See Lipman et al (1980).
63 See Kornhaber and Gardner (in Maclure 1991: 161) who give the example of
Robert Bakker (1986) who used logical-mathematical intelligence to interpret dinosaur
strides, and spatial intelligence to visualise the structure of dinosaur anatomy. He then
hypothesised from their metabolic rates that these creatures were warm-blooded. (The
Bakker thesis was subsequently been challenged, and finally confirmed by other
scientists in 1998).
64 'Experience tells us that there are conditions which relate to a specific field of
knowledge and others which enable generalisations covering several fields. The
teacher can explain, for example, a fairly large number of possible relations between
conceptual categories, and lead the student to fmd others spontaneously. This
transformation of representations is a way of helping meta-knowledge to develop'(Bresson 1991: 175).
65 'The whole matter of thinking skills - their nature, their interrelationships, their
teachability, their transferability and so on will no doubt continue to be controversial
for a long time to come' (MENO 1994:1). Underlying the MENO project is the idea
that problem-solving skills could be transferably taught. 'We need to say, for
example: now here's a problem in Chemistry, or Economics or Business: what kind
of insight would you use? and thereby refer students back to the Problem Solving
skills with which they should be familiar. Similarly, with Critical Thinking we need
to ask: is this a rational position to take, bearing in mind the way in which you had to
justify your positions when 'thinking critically'?' (UCLES 1994: 12). The approach
has been applied to undergraduate assessment and to the development of AS level
draft papers by Fisher (1989a, 1989b, 1997; and personal communication). See also
Hemstein et al (1986).
66 A term coined by Newmann (1990). It is also worth noting that many claims for
teaching philosophy which are based on naturalness and intrinsic worth are in effect
dispositional or values claims.
67 See Facione and Facione (1990, 1992, 1994), chapter 5 and Appendices 18 & 19.
Ennis (1991) also combines the three strands of critical thinking, creative thinking,
and reasoning in his modeL
68 Fears that teaching students philosophy or thinking in some depth would lead to
depression or mental illness was mentioned to Ward (1983: 14) by some early critics.
This objection, although apparently trivial, raises a fundamental question about the
relationship between thought and feeling. Chapter 8 addresses this question in
relation to Plato's objections to teaching philosophy to the young, and the depression
of late adolescence suffered by MilL The medical and psychiatric evidence suggests
that depression induced by philosophising, other than through the stress of one's
academic studies, does not feature in current clinical models of aetiology or
epidemiology. Academic impairment becomes likely only at 'moderate to severe
levels of depression' (Heiigenstein et al 1996). Beeferman and Orvaschel (1994)
however suggest that group psycho-therapists should begin to target more the
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'cognitive aspects' of adolescent depression. For state-of-the-art reviews of the
psychiatric literature and research see Oliver et al (1995) and Birmaher et a! (1996).
69 Logomachy in newspaper coverage and articles featuring prominent philosophers
who clashed about the introduction of A level philosophy into schools in the UK
illustrated this point during 1986. A libel Suit resulted in which Roger Scruton,
professor of philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, was the chief
protagonist (Guardian 1985). For discussion of the Gramscian question see
Entwistle (1979), Gibson (1984, 1986) and Wolff (1981). The evolution and
vicissitudes of the subject in Italy underlined the political strength of the subject as
perceived by decision-makers. In Italy philosophy remained a pre-university course
taught by specialist teachers. Following the original French influence, however,
considerable changes occurred after the School Reform of 1923 under Giovanni
Gentile, Minister of Education. In an effort to ensure that students would begin to
appreciate philosophical thought for themselves, Gentile replaced textbooks written by
teachers by the study of original classics of philosophical thought. A strong
connection between the history of philosophy and philosophy was asserted and
strengthened by making the same teacher responsible for both subjects. (This was an
early attempt to solve the question that often is asked: if philosophy is not to be taught
by a separate teacher or department, within whose jurisdiction does it fall?). The
notion of a philosophical canon was therefore strongly evident in Italy's approach.
70 The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children materials are much
used in U.S. programmes of extension or enrichment for the gifted, despite the
protestations of Lipman and colleagues and their intentions concerning the democratic
'community of enquiry'.
71 Griffiths (1979) shows how in Italy the notion of a compulsory requirement for
the elite to have some understanding of philosophy emerged, together with the
expectation that transfer would arise from training the mind. The main emphasis was
upon the acquisition of a philosophical perspective in such topics as the philosophy of
science, theory of knowledge and mathematical logic, ethics, and the philosophy of
religion being introduced towards the end of the second year. The rise of fascism in
Italy after 1936 brought other changes. Pupils were compelled to study Mussolini's
Doctrine of Fascism, and political economy and public law were added to the
syllabus, when it was intended that philosophy teaching should vindicate the political
philosophy of the state. When a totalitarian régIme decides to use philosophy teaching
to vindicate and support it, the assumption behind such an approach must be that
philosophy can be used in a way that is ideological and indoctrinatory. The case of
Spain presents another example of philosophy teaching as a device for setting an
ideological, moral and political educational climate in the state as well as classrooms.
A syllabus was issued by the Ministry of Education under Franco. Textbooks had to
be approved by central government. However, teachers had discretion to choose
Within the list. These were modified considerably after the political reforms of the
early 1980's. The aims of teaching philosophy in the Institute, or upper secondary
school emphasis cross-curricular integration, and the links between philosophy and
other knowledge that the student was acquiring (White 1988). I am grateful to John
White for giving me a personal account of some of these developments.
72 Lipman and Sharp (1978a: 88). In all of this the role of the teacher is crucial. The
pursuit of a democratic or communitarian classroom style of discussion, Lipman and
Sharp argue, does not entail an equalising of the status of the teacher and students.
rise of the International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE) can be
seen as reflecting the celebration by states formerly under totalitarian regimes of their
newly acquired philosophical emancipation (Weinstein 1990). This development had
some characteristics of a social movement as discussed in chapter 1, not least in the
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emphasis placed on 'market' as opposed to political freedom, by some of the Eastern
European philosophers of education.
74 'Higher order thinldng is necessary for people a. to participate as responsible
empowered citizens in a democracy b. to contribute as productive workers in a
technological society; and c. to have rewarding personal lives which include managing
one's private affairs, continuing to learn and benefiting from culture' (Newmann
1990: 41-56).
75 Siegel (1993) retorted that far from being an exclusively post-modernist
enterprise, such a project would require traditional epistemology, moral theory and
'meta-narratives'.
76 Haynes (1991: 121-137). See Baker (1976) for a history of ideas account of this
context.
77 Those influenced by Dewey (1910), Gramsci (1971), critical theorists, Marxists,
sociologists of knowledge, hermeneuticists and 'radical' philosophers would want to
argue that teaching philosophy can lead to increased personal and collective hegemony
(Giroux 1988: 196-203). The 'critical hermeneuticist' Gallagher (1992) draws
attention to the hidden curriculum which philosophy can help to identify and de-
mystify.
7 How this meets the criteria for a 'social movement' was discussed in chapter 1.
79 See also Joyce (1996). The European Philosophical Enquiry Centre (EPIC) set out
to use philosophy for community empowerment, being funded by the Scottish Office
from its Crime Prevention Budget. McCall, the Project Leader, claims that EPIC
Philosophical Inquiry activities persuade violent, alienated teenagers to begin to argue
out their conflicts (Joyce 1995: 4). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) make
similar claims for argumentation theory as giving benefits within marriage guidance
and conflict counselling.
80 See Wringe (1981) and Archard (1993) for discussions of rights, and Patricia
White (1989a, 1989b) for a treatment of personal and social education. In respect of
stage theory, I have in mind here particularly the work of Kohlberg (1981) and Piaget
(1926).
l Assiter (1994: 17-26) believes that the approach to National Vocational
Qualifications fell into the 'pitfall of verificationism'.
82 Bryan and Assiter's (1995: 37) claim is that: 'In the 17th and 18th Centuries the
physical aspects of education were devalued further alongside the Enlightenment
commitment to universal, context-independent knowledge and reason.' This matter is
examined again in chapter 4.
83 His view is compatible with Wiener's (1985) critique of English Culture and the
Decline of the Industrial Spirit.
'A socialist view of transferable thinking in education will develop multiple facets
of individual human potential, and will encourage an active citizenship able to
challenge existing social relationships - as well as providing students with the skills,
knowledge and values that enable them to be economically productive' (Gubbay 1994:
50-51).
85 Critical thinldng in Facione and Facione's (1992, 1994) criterial formulation - or
Lipman's pedagogic style - can be seen to be implicitly tilting at rigidly-held
dogmatisms, e.g. creationist teaching in US. (See Appendices 18 & 19; and Facione
and Facione 1992, 1994). Morrison and Ridley's schema is critical by implication of
vocationally 'instrumental' education (see Appendix 2).
86 These would include the emerging economies of S.E. Asia, for example, as well
as the fledgling democracies of the former Soviet bloc.
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87 The work of Adey (1991, 1994), De Bono (1970), Feuerstein (1979, 1980) and
others offering intervention programmes of transferable thinking, is assessed in more
detail in chapter 3.
88 This has been associated with the need for philosophy when under threat, in the
universities and elsewhere, to find a new role. This is particularly evident in the US,
where the rise of informal logic and critical thinking has sometimes displaced high
school philosophy. Some UK universities, during a period of financial cuts, retained
philosophy departments to perform a service function in teaching higher order
thinking and academic literacy instead of closing them. Some valuable work has
resulted from this otherwise regrettable development (Fisher 1989a, 1989b,
University of Cambridge Examinations Syndicate 1994a, 1994b).
89 Weinstein (1993) claims: 'Just as McPeck can be seen as reflecting the
conservatism of English upper-class education Paul can be seen as reflecting the
optimistic liberalism of progressive education: the belief in a unitary political and
social discourse without which democracy loses its core'(l7).
90 'One discipline, however, is significant through virtue of its absence - philosophy.
Apart from 0 and A level logic, which includes a little philosophy of science, it is still
impossible to follow a formal, examinable course in philosophy in schools. Given the
recent rapid growth in the curriculum it is odd that philosophy should have been left
out in the cold and it is natural to assume the omission will be rectified' (Ward 1983:
252).
91 Wringe (1981: 135): 'A welfare right...is the right to receive help or goods from
others in circumstances of extreme need, when one is unable to obtain these things by
ones own efforts..All that is required is that an individual should have present or
future interests capable of harm through neglect or deprivation.'
92 Others would object to any rights or entitlement claim at all. For instance, it
might be argued that responsibility for educating the young philosophically, and
especially dispositionally, is a family, generational or religious responsibility and not
one for the larger society.
93 'The whole curriculum in English schools, as defined by the National Curriculum
Council, which comprises the subjects of the statutory curriculum, the five named
cross-curricular themes, cross-curricular skills and cross-curricular dimensions, can
be seen as an entitlement curriculum' (Craft 1991: 183).
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CHAPTER 3
The transcendental claim: the pervasiveness of
philosophical matters.
1. The transcendental claim
The transcendental claim for teaching philosophy to children was introduced in chapter
2 as the claim of ubiquitous 'embeddedness': that philosophy lies behind all things,
that philosophical assumptions and questions pervade our lives, and particularly the
pedagogy, curriculum and organisation of schools and colleges. Because of its
comprehensiveness, the claim can be argued to support a comilary that philosophical
thinldng must have primacy, unifying and overall importance in any proposed
educational arrangements. If important truths lie behind the surface of 'the
presenting symptoms' of the world, and especially if many of these truths are
'counter-intuitive', then teaching will be needed to help students penetrate through to
certain truths, understandings and further possibilities (see chapters 4 and 7).
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The transcendental claim can be substantiated by showing that our present educational
arrangements reflect a pervasive presence of arguments, rhetoric, assumptions, issues
and content of a philosophical nature involving higher order thought Following a
demonstration of such pervasive philosophical concerns in curriculwn, pedagogic and
education management, it will be argued that a philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum can be best built on the twin foundation of the transcendental coupled with
the possibilist claim (see chapter 4).
2. Kant and the transcendental
Although the transcendental argument has been employed at least since Aristotle, it is
chiefly associated with Kant whose use of it was intended to establish that possession
and application of certain concepts is indispensable to empirical experience. Kant
distinguished objects and events as they appear in our experience from objects and
events as they are in themselves, independent of the fonris imposed on them by our
cognitive faculties. The former he called phenomena; the latter noumena or things-in-
themselves. Phenomenology in the 19th century was defined as a science through
which we come to know mind as it-is-in-itself through the study of the ways in which
it appears to us. For Kant, writing in the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781,
phenomena are all we can ever know.
If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our
sensuous intuition this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we
understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar
mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us,
of the very possibility of which we have no notion - and this is a noumenon in the
positive sense. (Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N.K. Smith 1929: 176-78)
The transcendental argument may therefore be taken as one which shows what must
be the case if a certain thought or experience is to be possible. In the case of
transcendental realism what lies behind appearances is held to be ultimately real; in the
Kantian version it is ideal, hence transcendental idealism. 1
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One philosophical difficulty in relation to Kant's concept of the noumenal has a direct
effect on theoretical pedagogy and thus the approach to practical classroom teaching.
Kant postulated the existence of a final version of reality, the noumenal, which
remained behind all presenting appearances as an ideal which could not be directly
apprehended. Hegel on the other hand, in Phenomenology of the Spirit, took the
view that noumena are knowable (Acton 1967: 442-443). He traced the mind, or
spirit, through various stages in which it apprehends itself as phenomenon, to the
point of full development where it is aware of itself as it is in itself - as noumenon. A
transcendental or a possible worlds approach to the teaching of philosophy and
thinking, or teaching generally, raises this question in relation to the noumenal: is
there to be assumed a final solution to the problems in physics, or maths which
children study? Is philosophical, or scientific education for that matter, like the
musical game of passing the parcel, when all the wrapping paper will be progressively
taken off the intransitive realm and we shall finally see the world as it really is?
3. Bhaskar and the transitive realm
With the Kantian schema and the noumenal problem in mind, Bhaskar (1978, 1986)
argues that natural science involves a fundamental distinction between two sorts of
event. There are those events that belong to a transitive realm - the actual worlds of
relations between objects and phenomena, accessible to an observer through sense and
perception. Other events belong to the intransitive realm which is equally real but
accessible only through theoretical construction and experimental manipulation. Our
perception of this realm is refracted, as the evidence of bias in counter-factual thinking
and inference described in chapter 4 will show.
In Bhaskafs (1986) account the transitive realm, the world of relations accessible to
an observer directly, is constituted by 'a hierarchy of law-like, necessary and
generative mechanisms.' This hierarchy of generating mechanisms includes in the
biological realm, the DNA code; in the chemical realm, the table elements and their
conjunctures and permutations; and in the physical realm, the structures of atomic and
sub-atomic matter and energy fields. That science operates in this way and not by
empiricist principles, according to which scientists merely seek for an order among
observables, is testified by the existence of the experimental method, which
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presupposes that no order among observables is immediately apparent. It is only
when such observables are deliberately removed from their normal contexts and
conjunctures that, according to Bhaskar, the hidden order of the intransitive real
becomes apparent. 2
 The transcendental realist position provides a general set of
philosophical assumptions and explanations by which science teachers may proceed.
It also provides a justification for education and teaching, since it is unlikely that an
individual can sit down, and through pure introspection, gain eventual access to the
entire intransitive realm. Such leisured reflection may at times be part of the
investigative repertoire of the scientist, but it is wasteful of time for others. Therefore
one of the main purposes of education will be the opening up and communicating of
the intransitive realm to students, particularly in respect of counter-intuitive truths.3
For Bhaskar the intransitive realm is both extensive and constantly growing, as
scientific and other thought progresses.
As distinct from a Kantian approach, it is not my view that in elucidating the fundamental
categories of our understanding we reach an unchanging structure that is a priori in all
rational thought in all times and places. That there exist any elements of thought that can be
known to be immune to changes making transcendental demands upon us I do not accept.
(Bhaskar 1986: 92)
However, the position taken up over the issue of the noumenal will still be critical
when translated into educational praxis. It is possible to see Bhaskar's position as an
example of finite stage theory, with some ultimate resting point of final truth about the
particular aspects of the intransitive world (Kohlberg 1981, Piaget 1926). Or one can
argue that it involves seeing education in terms of an indefinite, unending series of
small steps forward punctuated by occasional paradigm shifts of stage theory.
Bhaskafs attempt to solve a particular problem in the logic of scientific discovery by a
new and overarching theory offers a considerable improvement for educationists on
the falsificationist views of Popper (1959). Popper's account of falsification has
sometimes been criticised as not corresponding to how the scientific or intellectual
community actually proceeds, that is, according to Kuhnian (1970) paradigms or
notions of 'mentalities' (Vovelle 1990). Popper was, for example, unable adequately
to account for why falsification is not necessarily accepted; or how, within the terms
of Popperian theory, the particular point in time at which a new paradigm supervenes
is differentiated from other instances of falsification. 4
 Bhaskar appears not to be
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Kantian in the strict sense, in that he offers no place for the noumenal as ideal. 5
 If
Kant considered the real world as ultimately unknowable except through, as it were, a
number of proxy statements, Bhaskar on the other hand appears to hold the Hegeian
view that these descriptive approximations can describe a permanently replaceable,
scientific reality. Scientific understanding will continue to progress.
4. The case for teaching
For Bhaskar the counter-intuitive findings of science are just one example of why the
appearance of things cannot be taken for granted. However, importantly for this
study, this does not apply just to science; it will apply just as much to any other
subject discourse where philosophical thoughts explicitly or implicitly pervade or lie
behind the surface of the subject. In Bhaskar's account the intransitive realm is not
immediately apprehensible; it is frequently counter-intuitive, contradicting the
assumptions of common sense or prima facie observation. What the existence of a
separate realm of knowledge, the intransitive which is not immediately accessible,
brings home is our need for help in gaining access to it. Help is needed in
uncovering the intransitive realm: teaching will be required. There is thus an
important pedagogic dynamic in Bhaskar's transcendentalism.
On the transcendental realist view of science, then, its essence lies in the movement at any
one level from knowledge of manifest phenomena to knowledge, produced by means of
antecedent knowledge, of the structures which generate them. As deeper levels of reality are
successfully identified, descnbed and explained, knowledge at more superficial levels is
typically, revised, corrected or more or less drastically recast, issuing in a character pattern
of description, explanation and redescription for the phenomena understood at any one level
of reality. (Bhaskar 1986: 63)
A persuasive feature of such an account is that it fits in remarkably well with child
development theory within the general framework of educational theory. It is
remarkably similar to the Vygotskian (1962, 1991) claim that children need teaching in
order to pass through a 'zone of proximal development', in which the next step in
learning can only be achieved with assistance. However, Bhaskar gives a very
limited place to apprehension of the ineffable as part of that process.
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Transcendental realism is also and equally opposed to any non-immanent or anscendent
realism, which posits a sphere of pure uncognisable other-being, defined in terms of its
inaccessibility to human beings (as are Kantian noumena). A realm of 'ineffabilia', e.g.
held in conttast or conjunctions with the sensibilia or intelligibilia of empirical or
conceptual realism, is certainly conceivable, but it is something about and for which
nothing (or at any rate very little) can be said. (Shaskar 1986: 8)
Bhaskar's position of 'critical naturalism' in the human sciences has developed into a
movement in both philosophy and the human sciences known as critical realism
(Collier 1998: 720-22). Critical realism offers a vigorous notion of 'emancipatoiy
social practice' of relevance in education (Corson 1990b: 223). 6
The worthwhileness of making a strong philosophical case for teaching the pre-
philosophical in schools becomes evident when we look at the work of Bhaskar; for
the merits of his analysis are pedagogic as well as philosophical. We are provided
with a philosophical account of why teaching is needed, and with the basis of a
pedagogy which will encourage us to pursue the counter-intuitive, the counter-factual
and the creative in our scientific and other thinking.
The case for teaching can thus be specifically advanced from the transcendental
perspective. It would begin by arguing that most people would surely wish, and
indeed need to have assistance in proceeding to a greater understanding of the world
as it is, transcendentally. Given the evident difficulty of this endeavour, which
attempted on an unaided basis would become an awesome task, there comes a need
for some form of educational provision and teaching. 7
 We are also impelled by
Bhaskafs account towards a pedagogy of transcendental realism which translates into
a style of teaching and classroom practice exhibiting an unremitting drive towards
exploring further layers of reality. This will require a full repertoire of active and
interventionist approaches on the part of the teacher. These may in turn come to be
seen as a canon (see chapter 6). 8
The pursuit of Bhaskarian transcendence may also be viewed more personally, in the
sense proposed by Sarire (1958) in his account of facticity and 'authenticity'. By
facticity, Sarire means that certain things can be said to pertain to us in a factual way.
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Our consciousness is never perfectly identified with our facticities; we are more than
our body, our past or our environment (Catalano 1985). By the mere fact that we can
contemplate our facticities and examine them as 'objects', we know that we are not
identified with them. We can interpret our relation to these 'facts' and in this sense,
we transcend them. In particular, at any moment, we recognise that what we are
actually doing in reacting to things is one of many possible modes of behaviour.
Thus our 'transcendencies are our possibilities' (Catalano 1985: 82-4) in two senses:
in what we might be doing or what might be happening to us; and what we are
actually doing, insofar as it is not necessary for us to have chosen this action. As the
term is used here 'transcendencies' does not mean remote or far-fetched possibilities,
but believable ways of behaviour in the Sartrean sense. 9 Human beings for both
Bhaskar and Sartre, exist as a synthesis of facticity and transcendence.
However, the severely cerebral bias of Sartre's notion of total mental freedom can be
seen as similar to the male, Enlightenment rationality attacked by critics of critical
thinking. His account can be improved upon, in my view, by adopting Merleau-
Ponty's emphasis on the 'body-self and its dialectical ambiguity in negotiating with
the world (Macann 1993, Damasio 1994); through a neo-Aristotelian, feminist or
hermeneutic emphasis on practical knowledge and corporeality (Assiter 1994,
Harraway 1991); and by emphasising the narrative nature of self-constitution
(Schechtman 1996). There are particular implications here for the curriculum, and for
the teacher as a person and a thinker (see chapter 8).
5. Empirical evidence for the transcendental claim
What is the empirical evidence for the transcendental claim? There are three main
areas, or domains (and their sub-domains) from which the evidence for the
pervasiveness of philosophical concerns can be gathered. When taken in combination
they amount to a demand for considerable 'thoughtfulness' on the part of teachers as
ironists, reflective practitioners and public intellectuals (see chapter 8). 10 Firstly,
there are the philosophical messages of the school, and the broader society, as
signalled through the management philosophy of the school, college or responsible
educational body. Secondly, there is the philosophy informing the pedagogic practice
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of the teachers, whether in teaching philosophy as a specialist subject or in teaching
other subjects. Thirdly, there is an area of philosophical subject content in the
various specialist subjects, when philosophical concepts are both explicitly or
implicitly taught. In the case of the teaching of philosophy as an identified subject on
the school or college timetable, the 'transcendental' in the form of philosophical ideas
and issues will be highly visible as the central agenda. The presence of philosophy
teaching will also imply a philosophy of philosophy teaching (and stances towards the
pre-philosophical curriculum), consisting of a set of claims and a rationale for why the
subject is being taught at all, and why in that particular form. 11
Just as curriculum theorists offer meta-analysis which informs the practice of teachers,
so does education management theory. Greenfleld (1989), pressing for a subjectivist
and phenomenological perspective 'that reality is socially defined', questions the
assumptions of functionalism in scientific management, organisation and method
studlies. 12 The philosopher Hodgldnson (1991: 193), for example, argues that there
is actually a philosophical method by which leadership can be pursued within
management and organisations.
Management theory frequently uses philosophical language and concepts. Orthodox
meta-explanation in the education management literature, for example, seeks to explain
ambiguity, the rational-bureaucratic, the collegial or consensual, in phenomenological
language. Hoyle, Weick, and Baidridge argue, for example, that 'conceptual
pluralism', 'loose coupling' and 'competing rationalities' are endemic within
educational organisations (in Bush 1989). 13 This is of some consequence for the
kind of philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum that can be offered to students.
Management philosophy is, ventriloquially, the voice which determines the
architecture and physical detail of a school in ways which, for instance, may facilitate
or militate against the community of enquiry or democratic forms of life - in
concourses, corridors, dining-rooms and playgrounds. Utopian, educational
experiments in visionary school architecture, building utopian school communities in
rural or urban settings, have a long history: and they are the expression of strong
possibilist positions (Thornbury 1978, see chapter 4).
Philosophers of education have been influential in the culture of professional teacher
education through a substantial permeation of philosophical ideas, categories and
concepts. Some explicitly claim that philosophical opinions which inform and
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pervade their professional concerns have practical consequences to do with how
teachers, and therefore children, act in classrooms. O'Loughlin and Campbell
(1988), for example, argue that critical pedagogy must begin with the pre-existing
beliefs of the prospective teachers, what Sirawson (1959) would call their 'descriptive
metaphysics'. 14 McCann and Yaxley (1992) see this as one of the central tasks of
the philosophy of education in relation to teacher training. 15
A number of philosophers of education have proposed that a general epistemology
underpins, or should underpin our curriculum arrangements. These include Phenix
(1964), Hirst (1974), White (1973, 1982, 1990), White and White (1985), and Walsh
(1993). Hirst (1974, 1983), for example, begins by distinguishing sevenforms of
knowledge each involving the use of concepts of a particular kind and a distinctive
type for its objective claims, when his inclusion of philosophical understanding is of
some interest. 16 His later position goes on to emphasise forms of practice and
discourse rather than forms of knowledge (Hirst 1993, Barrow and White 1993,
Walsh 1993: 139). 17 One can argue that Hirst's social practices can be discerned,
for example, in the institutional theory of art, in which an understanding of art and the
status of art objects are seen as institutionalised activities (Dickie 1984); in the context
of the history of art (Danto 1981); in the historian's notion of ideology and mentalities
(Vovelle 1990); or the psychologist's conceptions of domain,fra,ne, schema, scripts
and worlds (see chapter 4).
The pedagogic practice of teachers in the classroom reflects underlying
epistemological and other philosophical assumptions through their theories of learning
(Wood 1988, 1992). Constructivism, for instance, postulates various models of the
world, in which it can be said of a problem that we are on the way towards its solution
- but that no piece of scientific knowledge is firmly in place for all time (Driver 1988,
Appendix 13). All we have at any given moment, in a phrase of Popper's, is
'provisional dogma'.
There is an epistemological implication of this view of knowledge as constructed which has
yet to be taken seriously by educators, and that is that to know something does not involve
the correspondence between our conceptual schemes and what they represent 'out there'; we
have no direct access to the 'real world'. Clough and Driver (1991: 263-292)
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In geography teaching the approach to cognitive and mental mapping, predicated on
phenomenological theoiy, has been widely influential in work schemes for children
from the primary school onwards (Agnew et a! 1996, Downs and Stea 1973, Gregory
et al 1994, Gould and White 1974, Johnston et a! 1994). The learning theory of
phenomenography embodies a somewhat similar approach, in its emphasis on
classifying possible ways in which a child might conceptualise a physical occurrence
in the external world, such as what happens in terms of the physics of motion when a
bicycle is ridden (Marton 1981). Prosser (1993: 21) sees phenomenography as a
theory of learning which emerges from a research methodology, 'which aims to
identify peoples' qualitatively different experiences and understanding of the world,
and systematically describe them in terms of categories of description.' 18
The importance for educational philosophers of the philosophical questions and
assumptions found in school organisation, pedagogy or subject teaching is also
empirical. Such assumptions influence those who prepare teachers, and those who
make political decisions concerning educational policy; and they remain in the minds
of teachers who are indirectly influenced by them, having forgotten the origins of their
own thinking. Following the transcendental account, if there are important theories
and systematic explanations that lie behind school curriculum, organisation or
pedagogy, we would wish teachers to be aware of them. The general principle, of
attempting to penetrate what lies behind the general appearances of the world, is
relevant not only to all those who are taught, but also to those who teach.
6. The presence and prominence of ideology: the ideological
objection
Much curriculum theory can be discussed in terms of its underlying philosophical
assumptions in terms of ideology, as Lawton (1973, 1983, 1989) successively and
others show. Skilbeck (1976), for instance, identifies four main ideologies as
informing curriculum provision: those of classical humanism, progressivism,
reconstructionism and instrumentalism, each representing a particular philosophical
approach to the structure and content of the curriculum. 19 Lawton (1983) offers a
general curriculum theory derived from cultural anthropology which sees the
curriculum as an empirically founded, categoric system of thought informed by certain
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cultural sub-systems.	 Walsh (1993: 53) formulates an educational theory
involving a typology of four forms of discourse; the utopian, the deliberative, the
evaluative and the scientific. The first of these is particuiarly relevant to the study of
'possible worlds' of ethical counter-factual thinking (see chapter 5).
Hodson (1988) advocates a Kuhnian approach to curriculum development which
views teachers as constructors and dc-constructors of their own 'curriculum
knowledge.' Corson (1988, 1990a. 1990b) draws on the ideas of Popper and
Bhaskar to argue that philosophy can provide and generate valuable paradigms for
how we should look at the development of our curriculum. Morrison and Ridley
(1989) offer a taxonomy which illustrates the complex, ideological context of much
curriculum planning (Appendix 2). Pope (1993) and Donald (1992) show how
ideological assumptions are extensively present when teachers, and university teachers
think about curriculum and pedagogy (Appendices 23 & 29). Constructivism has
been a major ideological perspective, for science teachers in its 'strong form' and for
many other teachers who practice its 'convenient' or weak form (Watts and Bentley
1991). Driver (1998) sets out stipulative criteria for applying constructivist method in
teaching (Appendix 13). 21
Some writers propose ideological agendas in the teaching of philosophy or critical
thinldng (see again chapter 2). Philosophy teaching would be seen as ideological, for
example, by 'radical philosophers'; by phenomenologists concerned with the
intentional activities of consciousness; by critical theorists addressing the historical
strategies of domination and liberation; and by structuralist theorists and semioticians
examining the unconscious codes of languages. A number of thinkers give a
prominent place to one's ideological stance in teaching thinking for democratic,
hegemonic, economic, vocational or emancipatory purposes (Assiter 1994, Facione
and Facione 1994, Haynes 1991, Newmann 1990, Paul 1982, Weinstein 1990).
Each makes some transcendental claim of philosophical pervasiveness, of
explanations which lie behind events, which are also ideological and to do with power
relations in society. For example, as discussed in chapter 2, Haynes (1991) and
Weinstein (1993a, 1993b) take critical thinkers in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical
tradition to task for promulgating a 'hidden curriculum' which is patriarchal,
Euroceniric and hegemonic.
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Those advocating the Marxist form of ideology, which seeks to replace 'fictions or
distortions of objective reality', argue that reform in schooling will either precede, or
come in the train of economic revolution. Gramsci (1971), Habermas (1970, 1981),
or Freire (in Giroux 1989), for example, are shown as identifying the crucial role of
schools and education in helping the working classes to gain knowledge as a source
of power; and to understand their situation of historical struggle or exploitation (see
also Brent 1983, Harris 1979). Such thinkers argue that the control of society can be
achieved through hegemony in school; and they seek to make the educational sphere
the principal arena, or 'dominant instance', through which a revolution in philosophy
as praxis makes itself felt. Cultural semioticians also portray the curriculum,
pedagogy and organisation of schools as ideological (Sturrock 1986).
	 Linguistics
has influenced epistemological stances among teachers, Bakhtin's (1981) dialogic
account of speech and thought, for instance, contributing to a view that 'argument' is
a 'dialectical' process, even within the individual; and that the characteristics of
rationality are themselves arguable (Myerson 1994: 148).
The accusation of 'being ideological' in wanting to teach philosophy or a pre-
philosophical curriculum can, however, be countered by the claim that the pursuit of
rationality is one's 'ideological' purpose. It is therefore acceptable to be ideological.
This is Siegel's (1988) response to the 'ideological objection' when he argues that
fundamental educational ideals, like critical thinking or rationality, can be justified
without reference to some 'prior ideological commitment' as long as one adopts the
liberal conception of ideology. He characterises the liberal conception as 'any set of
directive ideas', the 'central tenets of a culture', or 'a framework of explanation and
justification'. The Marxist notion of ideology, he argues, would fail to meet the
criteria of this stipulative definition (64). 23 Whether we ought to embrace the thesis
of ideological determinism, or any other thesis, depends for Siegel on precise reasons
that can be mustered and on the rational force those reasons offer for a given claim:
'Thus it is rationality which is basic, not ideology' (73).
Some philosophers and linguists therefore wish to see both dialogic method and the
notion of rationality kept open to double arguabilizy, in some reformed model of
relativism and rhetoric (Myerson 1994). Earlier discussions of indoctrination by
philosophers of education also remain relevant to the ideological question (Snook
1972).
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7. The case of English studies
There is similar evidence for the transcendental claim when one examines specific
subject contexts, or domains. In the case of English studies, the teaching of a range
of pervasive, 'embedded', philosophical assumptions and content is revealed (Davies
1990, Kress 1994). Davies (1990) shows a variety of strands in the extent to which
English teachers have their own assumptions and practices, philosophical curriculum
and pedagogy. These relate to several of the claims discussed in chapter 2. English
studies has had a pre-occupation, for instance, with language and linguistic theoiy, as
have had most contemporary philosophers and schools of philosophy. Oral teaching
is seen by English teachers, just as it is by philosophers, as a key concern and method
for teaching and thinking. Some topics within English studies require the formal
teaching of some philosophical understanding in the context of literary hermeneutics
and exegesis. English teachers explain the philosophical context of the Romantic and
Enlightenment background to 18th century literature. Philosophical content is taught
in explaining pantheism, the revolutionary ideas in the poetry of Wordsworth, and the
cultural background of an emerging industrial society.
Much meta-analysis, and many meta-cognitive concepts in English studies, are
essentially philosophical in nature. English teachers are constantly responding to the
philosophical claims of post-structuralism, post-modernism, critical theory,
deconstruction and discourse analysis (Eagleton 1983, Norris 1982, Swales 1990,
Myerson 1994). English teachers bring their conclusions and assumptions about
society and human purpose explicitly into their teaching. Philosophical systems and
world-views rely heavily on their presentation or interpretation through the novel,
poetry or the play - sometimes intentionally, as in the case of Sarire - and have an
enormous effect on the teaching of English (Gibson 1984, 1986). A considerable
body of discussion, essentially philosophical in import, is devoted to such themes in
the specialist journals of English studies or critical theory (Davies 1990). 24
Much work on argument in English studies draws on the developmental psychology
of Vygotsky (1962, 1991) or the 'dialogical' theory of communication and
imaginalion of Bahktin (1981), which emphasise social learning and reject the notion
of passive communication or transmission of understanding. 25
 Linguistic
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specialists influencing English teaching stress the importance of communicative
competence which arises through discourse communities (Appendix 15, Swales
1990). Similarly, reading development theory influences how children are taught to
read. In the phenomenological method characterised as 'a psycho-linguistic guessing
game', learning takes place through guessing what a particular word or phrase might
mean in a particular context. There are no errors for a young child learning to read,
only 'miscues' (Goodman 1972; Iser 1978, 1988). Psychological research on the
positive role of 'uncertainty' in the learning process underpins this pedagogic strategy
(Acredolo and O'Connor 1991).
However, the philosophical assumptions and ideas which are pervasively present, or
embedded, in the minds of English teachers may not always be clearly perceived by
them, or enunciated by them for the benefit of their students. Many philosophical
perspectives and assumptions which under-pin the teacher's own view of the subject
are not introduced to school students until late in their studies.	 The case of
English studies shows especially clearly how teachers who may have little or no
formal training in philosophy, in fact teach an 'invisible pedagogy' and subject content
pervaded by philosophical concerns and assumptions.27
8. Curriculum territoriality: the claimants
There is a great variety of contexts in the general curriculum, therefore, where
philosophical matters are being dealt with by teachers. Some of these matters are a
source of debate or contention among teachers, being examples of Gallie's (1956)
'essentially contested concepts.' It is not surprising, consequently, that the question
often arises of 'who owns what knowledge?' in relation to the teaching of thinldng
and argument, critical thinking and philosophy for children. Some questions are
contested in the sense of curriculum territoy (Ball 1989). The importance of the
sociology of knowledge in such contexts underlines the power of the transcendental
argument (Young 1971a, 1971b; Young and Whiny 1976, see again chapter 1). 28
English studies has been in the forefront in claiming a special place in the teaching of
philosophy, argument and thinking, as, for instance, in an early proposal for a six
paper syllabus in Philosophy and English at A level (Eaton 1984). 9 Andrews,
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Costello and Clarke (1993:233), Costello and Mitchell (1995) and others claim
hegemony for English studies. English teachers should take the dominant role in the
teaching of thinking, argument and rhetoric, 'an area of neglect in English teaching'
(Clarke 1984), and more broadly in 'designing social futures' through a 'pedagogy of
multi-literacies within hyperspace'. 30
 Kress (1994) makes the claim, on behalf of
the 'New London Group', that English studies is the 'unique, moral site' in which
students' thinking in school occurs.
The curriculum as a whole contributes to the development in human beings of what Pierre
Bourdieu calls a 'habitus', a set of deeply ingrained dispositions which form a second nature
and act as the a basis of habituated practices, often no long available for the individuals
inspection. All pans of the curriculum have their part in this, the mathematics or science
curriculum no less - perhaps even more so than the English curriculum. It is however only
in the English curriculum where these issues are or can be made available for debate...
English is the only site in the curriculum which can deal with questions of individuality in
a moral, ethical, public social sense. (102)
A similar case is made on behalf of science education, however, as when Shayer
(1991) and Adey (1994) claim that the effective foundations of inductive thinldng
which will transfer to other subjects can best be laid through 'cognitive acceleration'
programmes led by science teachers (see again chapter 2). Others point to the
fecundity of science in posing philosophical questions, as with the Heisenberg
principle of uncertainty, or quantum theory, cosmogony, and parallel universes
(Deutsch 1997, Phillips 1987). 31 In biology, topics such as animal rights, socio-
biology, euthanasia and cloning, are said to raise a wide range of questions in ethics
and moral philosophy (Singer 1993). Teachers of science claim to be at the leading
edge of new approaches to knowledge and thinking (Fensham 1988, Phillips 1987).
They are, more than most teachers, also concerned with teaching the counter-intuitive
(see chapter 4).
Any whole school or college policy will therefore need to address questions of
curriculum territoriality and ideology with great sensitivity. How this might be done
in the context of an overall philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum is addressed
in chapters 7 and 8.
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9. The importance of narrative, the hermeneutic perspective
and tradition
The important argument is now introduced that an important feature of transcendental
realism is its reliance on narrative provisionaiity. Narrative, taking Currie's (1998:
654) defmiiion as 'the means by which a story is told, whether fictional or not', will
emerge as one of the central concepts in the approach to a philosophical pedagogy
which is begun here and amplified in chapters 4,5 and 8. That the transcendental
realist search should be seen in terms of narratology, hermeneutics and history
appears not to have been envisaged by Bhaskar. A view which sees narrative as
foundational to living as a person is argued by Bruner (1990), Schechtman (1996),
Ryan (1996) and others. Narrative as 'self-portraiture' also emerges as an important
concept in relation to notions of the conditional, counter-factual and possible worlds
thinking (Schiffrmn 1996). Macey (1990: 57) argues that the 'construction of
plausible narratives is one of the ways in which human subjects assess and interpret
their lives.' 32
 Some philosophers of language also place importance on the
centrality of ideas of narrative tradition and the canon (Hauerwas and Jones 1989). 33
For Maclntyre (1981, 1984, 1989) the importance of narrative arises from the fact that
any explanation or enterprise has by its very na1ure to take a narrative form related to
virtues within a tradition. What a tradition of enquiry has to say, both to those within
and to those outside it, cannot be disclosed in any other way. Maclntyre is critical of
those post-Enlightenment thinkers who have a concept of rational enquiry which is
seen as culture-free. For him rational enquiry is inseparable from the intellectual and
social tradition. 34
 Maclntyre (1981) argues in After Virtue: A Study of Moral
Theory that man is 'essentially a story-telling animal', since the story of his life is
always 'embedded' in the story of those communities from which he derives his
identity.
What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific past that is present to some
degreeinmyptIfindmyartofahyandthatisgeneraMytosay,whetherI
like it or not, whether I recognise it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition. It was important
when I characterised the concept of a practice to notice that practices always have histories
and that at any given moment what a practice is depends on a mode of understanding it which
has been transmitted often through many generations. And thus, insofar as the virtues
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sustain the relationships required for practices, they have to sustain relationships to the past-
andtothefuwre-aswellasinthepresent. (1981:206-7)
Taylor (1989: 52) asserts that in our pursuit of 'the good' we must inescapably
understand our lives in narrative form as a 'quest'. Nussbaum (1986), from the
perspective of neo-Aristoteian literary theory, claims that narrative forms are the
context for much important philosophical and other thinldng. 35 In chapter 5, her
claim will be examined that some philosophical understanding can be delivered only
through the narrative experience of a play or a noveL Egan (1989, 1997) makes a
strong case for story-telling as key pedagogic strategy for teachers promoting
imaginative life in children. Schechtman (1996:93) advances a theory of identity in
which narrative is important in the lives of persons, and with Dreyfus (1995) argues
for the individual embodiment of person within narrative self-portraiture. Schectrnan,
draws on Dennett, Sartre and Heidegger, in proposing that persons are self-creating
through 'narrative self-constitution'; and that one needs such a narrative self-
conception in order to be a moral agent at all (159).	 Maclntyre (1981, 1989) in
effect argues for what Rorty (1984) would call the canonical (see chapter 6). For he
emphasises the importance of narrative within a tradition:
The narrative phenomenon of embedding is crucial: the history of a practice in our time is
generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the large and
long history of the tradition through which the practice in ifs present form was conveyed to
us; the history of each of our own lives is generally characteristically embedded in and made
intelligible in terms of the large and long history of a number of traditions. (1981: 206)
Struever (1985), in discussing contemporary theories of historical discourse,
concludes that history is an 'argument tradition' within a discourse community. For
Struever, the constraints on the writing when a historian constructs an account of an
event originate not only in the text itself, which might be as richly detailed and
coherent a narrative as any novel, but in the discourse community of its production
and reception. History is argued narrative.37
Unlike the story-teller the historian must not only narrate zgumerns, he must also argue
narratives. This argued narrative makes demands. The discursive criterion that distinguishes
narrative history from historical novels is that history evokes testing behaviour in
reception; historical discipline requires an author-reader contract that stipulates investigative
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equity. Historical novels are not histories, not because of a penchant for untruth, but
because the author-reader contract denies the reader participañon in the communal project
(264)
This viewpoint, when applied to the place given to the history of philosophy, or the
canon of philosophical works chosen for study, integrates closely with the 'new
hermeneutics' of Rorty (Kruger 1984). It links with accounts given by Ricoeur
(1984: 5-8) of narrative identity and the hermeneutic 'circle of continual self-
reflection' (Kearney 1988). 38 It involves the rejection of 'grand narrative' in favour
of a local narrative and hermeneutic (Gallagher 1992), embracing a 'multi-voiced'
view of the historian's task as being to provide an 'assemblage of narratives' (Evans
1997: 146-150). 39
A perspective which emphasises narrative can be found in Gadamefs attempt to
disclose the true nature of philosophy, and in particular its historicity, by relating it to
art and the Geisteswissenschaften (Kruger 1984: 87). GaLlamer has two principal
theses: firstly, that the typical, and also the highest form of cognition in the human or
social realm is not discovery or explanation of facts but understanding. Secondly that
understanding is conceived not as an act of subjectivity, (i.e. an activity performed
according to certain methodological rules), but rather as moving to one's place within
the continuing tradition (Kruger 1984: 88). 40
Gallagher (1992), in Hermeneutics and Education, helpfully adds to this picture. He
distinguishes between four main approaches and competing definitions which are
found in contemporary hermeneutic theory: the conservative, moderate, radical and
critical (Appendix 32). Gallagher wishes to see adopted a moderate, local
her,nenejaic in which a 'hermeneutics of trust rather than suspicion' prevails, and in
which classroom practices of play, self-narrative and self-understanding are given
emphasis (28). His conception, I shall argue, is particularly relevant to a teache?s
individual position concerning philosophical autobiography, pedagogic ethics and a
response to ironism in one's professional thinking (see chapter 8).
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10. Narratology, exposition and fiction
The hermeneuticism of Maclntyre, Nussbaum and Gallagher elevates narrative into a
position of some philosophical prominence, especially in counter-factual thinldng
about 'possible worlds' and genres. 'Tell us the story' is a locution which features
frequently in the argot of the professional philosopher and elsewhere. It means
'argue the narrative of how you reached your present position', and underlines the
extent to which philosophers draw heavily on the mode of narrative exposition.
Similarly, the attempt to counter another philosopher's position, or to solve a problem
often takes the form of 'a counter-factual story' or counter-argument. Much
philosophical discussion of the problem of identity is formulated in the counter-factual
narrative of 'thought experiments', as Parfit (1988) illustrates. Even the shortest,
short story can be used to put forward a philosophical argument. Scallen (1995)
identifies a rhetorical narrative of 'legal story-telling' used in jurisprudence, in which
stories do not simply illustrate a point but rather function as the evidence for the legal
argument. These are examples of Nussbaum's (1989) embedded notion of meaning
seen at work in a vocational and professional discipline.
Those who teach the young often wish to use the narrative form in assisting the
development of thinking. Hughes' (1996: 286-292) textbook on critical thinking, for
example, has a section devoted to story 'puzzle cases' and paradoxes. 41
 Fisher
(1996), Matthews (1976, 1984, 1994), and Sprod (1993, 1995) demonstrate the
power of works written for children in which philosophical issues are raised. Lowe
(1995) shows, for example, how through narrative Alice in Wonderland stimulates
thinking about complex problems in philosophy.
There is a dimension of progression and the developmental to be identified here in
relation to the conception of narrative. The phenomenologists Marton and Carisson
(1992: 1) show how students approaching a Kafka story arrive at a 'limited number of
qualitatively different ways of understanding the parable'. Fox (1989b, 1990) and
Benill (1990) analyse how children's thinking moves from narrative and experience,
through exposition, into argument. Fox (1989a) finds activity in dialogic, narrative
discourse to be essential for developing the capacity for argument. Argument is
construed by young children 'as discussion and negotiation between characters in a
dialogue'. She makes a hermeneutic, transcendental claim similar to that of
Nussbaum:
103
It is in the practice of this kind of rhetoric at an early age that, in my view, all the
linguistic and intellectual tools required for later 'rational' or 'disembedded' discourse lie
ready to be used. (I placed these terms in quotation marks because I doubt whether there is
such a thing as completely impersonal or disembedded discourse, though we like to think
this ought to be the case when we are expounding a scientific theory or argument). (30)
The emphasis on the role of narrative in argumentative writing and thinking in the
British setting is argued in a Report of the Assessment of Performance Unit (Gorman
1988):
The use of nanacive in our culture as a vehicle for persuasion is a mode of such long
standing, and potential sophistication, that it would be a mistake to conclude that young
writers are backwards because they respond to an argumentative task by producing a story.
We do need to ask questions however about the ways in which such questions are
conceptualised, and whether the same writers have any capacity to abstract from the
nanative frame such key points of the episode as would serve to shape the logical
underpinning of the general belief. If neither of these 'revisions' can be undertaken, it may
well be that such children are for the moment stuck in one mode of written discourse,
unable even to exploit that one for anything other than a recounting function. (154)
Furthermore, as Feezel (1995) illustrates for sports and physical education, the
making of narrative and exposition is important in giving shape to our experience in all
the curriculum areas. 42
Berrill (1990) explores most fully, empirically and conceptually, the special
relationship which seems to exist between narrative, exposition and argument. She
finds that students rely strongly, in their writing, on descriptive generalisation which
is 'in essence exposition rather than argument (82-4, Appendix 8). 43 Like Paul
(see chapter 2), Ben-ill identifies empathy as having a role in the approach to authentic
exposition and argument.	 She finds that the writing of exposition is a bridging
stage prior to the production of proper argument - and thus offers an account of how
progression occurs in the capacity for pre-philosophical and philosophical thinking.
Ben-ill identifies an empirical relationship between feeling and rhouglu in the transition
through narrative, to exposition and then formal abstract thought (see chapter 5).
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11. Speech acts, feeling and fiction
The importance of feeling, the affective as well as the cognitive dimension, emerges
from the accounts given by Fox, Berrill and others (Damasio 1994, Dunlop 1984,
Polanyi 1973, Scheffler 1991). This matter is further explored in relation to the
dispositions and personal autobiography in chapter 5. One of the linguistic and
epistemological difficulties to be raised, however, is the question of how far proof
through narrative, exposition or argument, is hortatory - designed to persuade us
through our feelings. Mitchell (1992a) is anxious not to lose sight of the affective
aspect of argument, although unwilling to commit herself to a view on whether - in
Searlian terms - some argument could be 'non-feeling,' neutral, or 'locutionary' only.
We take argument to be a process of argwnemation, a connected series of stolements
intended to establish a position (whether in speech and/or writing), sometimes taking the
form of an interchange in discussion or debate, and usually presenting itself as a sequence
or chain of reasoning. We do not see reasoning as necessarily opposed to feeling, neither do
we think evidence is necessary to the definition though we would expect most arguments to
contain evidence of some sort, if not fully-fledged proof. Author's italics (20)
Is it through gradual, transitional stages of 'felt' narrative and exposition, that pure
argument, neutral of feeling or emotion, is eventually arrived at? One solution to the
problem of whether feeling is present in argument, what Gubb (1987) calls 'the
confusion over whether to be hortatoiy or balanced and objective', is to appeal to
Austinian (1962) or Searlian (1969, 1979) speech act theory.
Medway (1989) draws on Searle's distinction between the illocurionary and the
perlocurionary. illocutionary writing, for example a paragraph of information, does
not set out with the intention of persuading, and is not hortatory. Any writing
undertaken with a narrative intention would, however, by defmition be
percolutionary, since it sets out to persuade. Niniluoto (1985) argues that the author
of a fiction text T can be viewed as performing an illocutionary act of recommendation
of the form: 'let us imagine that T!' It could also be claimed that the hermeneutic
account, which commits one to a view of argument as narrative moving the actor
forward Within a tradition, is necessarily perlocutionary (Maclntyre 1981: 206-7).
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Thus Groake et al (1997) give an important place to notions of rhetoric and audience
in their teaching of critical thinking as being concerned with reasoning.
Ryan (1991: 62), however, argues that there is a category of narrative non-fiction and
gives the example of a problem in 'story math' (see Appendix 32). She is uneasy
about accepting speech act theory, since it is open to a criticism made by Searle
himself: that we presuppose the existence behind every textual utterance of 'true-self,
an authentic, self-consistent, essential subject. There are various objections to this
view, however. For example, we can ask what would be the position concerning
automatic writing, as in the case of Enid Blyton (McKellar 1979: 8 1-83), or a writer
like Pessoa (1974) who writes poetry within several pseudonymous 'multiple
identities'? 45 Such discussions underline the need for some means of identifying
authentic, introspective thinking (chapter 8). There is a further difficulty with a
Searlian account, especially if one accepts Siegel's view that rationality carries its
own, intrinsic persuasive force, critical thinking being 'the educational cognate of
reason'. For on the deconstructive view (Derrida 1976), Norris 1982, Pave! 1986),
any text containing a reasoned argument could be read as perlocutionary, irrespective
of its register or authorial intention. All texts will be susceptible to readings based on
feeling. Pavel (1986: 80) claims, for example, that fictionality is in fact a 'historically
variable property', citing how erosion of belief in Greek deities made their adventures
available for fictional treatment in tragedy and epic poems.
This is an important point, since it underlines the narrative provisionality of
transcendental realism, including the constant possibility that one possible world may
turn into the domain of another. It is also consonant with the notion of the paradigm
shift (Kuhn 1970) and with the ideas discussed in chapter 2 of cross-intelligence,
cross-domain, or sensory 'stochastic' thinking (see also chapter 4).
The objection takes on additional force if one accedes to the post-modern emphasis on
tentativeness and 'playfulness' (McHale 1987). If all explanation is seen as
'historically variable' the notion of a permanent methodological gap between different
subjects, as in the case of the 'two cultures' of science and the arts, tends to
evaporate. Any account in, say, physics will be just as provisional or metaphorical
an account as one in a novel, play or poem.
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Bruner (1986) is therefore in my view mistaken when he asserts in Actual Minds,
Possible Worlds that there are two different ways of approaching reality, the scientific
and the literary; the one responding to thinking about cause and effect, the other being
narrative and concerned with making possible worlds (see chapter 4, Nash 1990,
Olson 1990, Pave! 1991). If scientific, like philosophical explanation is only a
provisional dogma or stoiy, as Francoeur and Francoeur (1994) or Mashhadi (1997a)
argue an antinomy between these two areas is then not sustainable. In chapter 4,1
shall Therefore maintain that the use of 'transcendental modal realism' and possible
worlds theory as one's philosophical pedagogy removes a spurious distinction
between scientific, and other types of thinking or argument.
Can narrative, didactic fiction, written specially to teach philosophy, succeed? If we
agree that the 'thought experiments' and short stories of argued narrative used by
philosophers are effective, then the possibility that longer stories will be successful
clearly exists. It can be argued that many examples of longer fiction in teaching
philosophy can be identified such as the Dialogues of Plato. Some philosophical
fiction written with a didactic purpose has been universally acclaimed, for example
Voltaire's Candide or Orwell's Animal Farm in the field of social and political
philosophy. The allegory, utopian fiction, or the roman these have all been
attempted with a teaching purpose in mind. 47
 However, the relative lack of merit of
the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with Children's (IAPC) materials as
children's fiction underlines the need for considerable literary expertise on the part of
those writing didactic fiction for teaching philosophy. The best-selling philosophical
novel, Sophie's World (Gaarder 1995) has met with a very critical response from
some philosophers. 48 Gooderman (1997: 63) suggests that it is the writer's
conceptualisation of childhood, reflected in the approach to a young audience, which
is crucial, especially in the case of moral education. He identifies four possible styles
of writing, three of which are didactic and often ineffective, and therefore best
avoided. It may also be important to distinguish between narrative, fiction and
literature. Ryan (1991), whose approach to possible worlds and narratology is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, attempts to do just this (Appendix 32).
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12. Can a pre-philosophical curriculum be distilled out?
This chapter has put the case for a position of transcendental realism supported by a
particular approach to the theory of narrative. The question then arises: can all of this
embedded, pervasive philosophical content be distilled out and taught? Can all the
philosophical ideas which are found in the teaching of individual subjects be separated
out and re-assembled as a discrete philosophical syllabus, or as separately taught pre-
philosophical curriculum? Should meta-thinking, or philosophy be taught as such?
Having assembled the evidence for the pervasive presence of philosophical questions
and assumptions in our educational arrangements, do we want to draw the identified
content together to make a subject called philosophy for schools?
Chapter 1 traced how, historically, philosophy emerged as a separate discipline out of
developments in epistemology and logic which were associated with scholasticism.
Such an argument is consonant with the case that 'thinking' and philosophising are
hermeneutically located within particular traditions of historical and narrative
continuity. Some philosophers mentioned in chapter 2 argue, like Nussbaum or
McPeck, that subject study is prior to meta-cognitive thinking in general, and therefore
should have primacy. Meta-cognitive thinking, or early philosophising is not to be
seen as a generalisable form of discourse, but rather as a set of discourses which
inhere in particular, specific, and usually subject forms of knowledge. However, I
wish to claim that it is necessary to decide upon, and possible to have criteria which
distinguish thinking which can be taught separately, meta-cognitively and
generalisably, from that which must be left within a subject content or experiential
area. I propose that, despite circumstances of curriculum territoriality and
'contestedness', a canon can be arrived at for apre-phiosophical and philosophy
curricuiwn which combines the two aspects. The question of how a curriculum and
whole school or college policy should then be organised is addressed in chapters 6
and 7.
Notes to chapter 3
' Since Kant, the transcendental argument has been used in various attempts to refute
scepticism. If a sceptic argues that we are not justified in belief that there is an
external world, the transcendental argument is used to show that such a belief is a
necessary condition in order for our discourse and experience to occur at all. Siegel
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(1987, 1988) advances such an argument in defence of the 'ideological' commitment
of critical thinking to rationality.
2 Bhaskar (1978, 1986) offers a form of post-Kantian categorical argument. Order in
nature is not between things and events, but between 'pure'
 generalities
uncontaminated by time, space and context. For him the assumption of the truth of
transcendental realism is the condition for the existence of science in the first place;
and all scientists are transcendental realists even if they protest that they are
empiricists. Transcendental realism, rather than critical realism, is the term used
throughout the discussion here, since it more accurately represents Bhaskar's
philosophical provenance, as opposed to the movement he has inspired.
Even the most extreme advocates of the discovery method or Bruner's (1986)
'spiral curriculum' do not claim such a position.
4 Whereas Popper (1959, 1960) gives too much authority to the teacher in
emphasising scepticism, and the elimination of theories by demonstration of their
falsifiability, Bhaskar's account leads to methods of teaching other than those which
merely involve the transmission of knowledge. They should encourage the learner to
be autonomous, to question the world, generate hypotheses and be critical of
'provisional dogma'. Bhaskar's account encourages a pro-active, more dynamic view
of teaching and learning sympathetic to social constructivism, 'possibiism',
imagination, playfulness and creativity, which has been lacking in the traditional
approach to science and science teaching. Bhaskar has incurred strong criticism from
some philosophers: see, for example, Luntley's (1995) hostile review of Bhaskar's(1995) Plato Etc: The Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution.
For Bhaskar, we really do break through to some version of the truth; access to the
intransitive realm is access to a form of truth. Bhaskar disagrees with Popper's
assertion that all scientific truths are provisional dogmas since for him the real world is
knowable.
6 See Corson (1988, 1990a, 1990b). This claim can therefore be linked with the
hegemonic claims made by Freire and Gramsci (see Giroux 1989). The version of
ethical and epistemological transcendentalism offered by Sartre (1958), particularly his
notions of 'facticity' and 'transcendence', can be also used to support the pedagogic
implications of the Bhaskarian account (Catalano 1985, Macann 1993).
7 It can also be argued, if noumenal absolutism is set aside, that this need will never
abate. The exceptional individual, or auto-didact, may of course acquire sufficient
personal autonomy and educational skifis to manage unsupported by institutions of
learmng and teachers. The distinction between education and schooling is an
important one. For most people, life-long education perinanente will be required.
8 Newmann (1990: 52) provides a practical scheme for dealing with the
provisionality of explanation by encouraging students to exhibit 'curiosity and
scepticism' and an awareness that not all assertions emanating from authoritative
sources are absolute or certain. This he links with the need for students to generate
'unconventional ideas, explanations, hypotheses or solutions to problems.' Bhaskar
does not deal with the question of how far one defers to the discourse community
(Swales 1990, Myerson 1994), the community of enquiry (Lipman and Sharp 1978a),
the community of scholars (Kuhn 1970), or the dominant instance (Althusser 1971) in
relation to a canon of transcendental realism.
9 In terms of the argument of this thesis, I would combine epistemological, aesthetic,
ethical and metaphysical possibility.
10 Notions of the 'reflective practitioner' (Schon 1983) and 'teacher thoughtfulness'
(Newmann 1990) are discussed more fully in chapter 8.
may then be claimed that a philosophical position should be taken up by every
school and teacher in a formal school policy, not only for curricular provision but also
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in relation to rights and responsibilities concerning access to the curriculum (chapter
7).
12 Greenfield (1983) takes the 'phenomenological' position in criticising the apparent
assumption that organisations are not only real but also distinct from the actions,
feelings, and purposes of people. He claims that there are two contrasting views of
social reality. Realism, which is characteristic of the systems approach, assumes that
the world is knowable as it is, and that organisations are real entities with a life of their
own. The phenomenological, or idealist perspective postulates that the world exists,
but different people construe it in very different ways, reality being 'socially defined'.
Greenfield is consequently impatient with the mistaken belief in the reality of
organisations, a reification which diverts attention from the human actions and
intentions. This example is unusually transparent in demonstrating the extent to which
philosophical assumptions pervade in management theory. Greenfield is unusual in
couching much of his critique in recognisably philosophical language.
13 However, the language of relativism that such theorists use is laden with
problematic, philosophical assumptions (McCann and Yaxley 1992). Here is an
important area in which philosophers can help the forming of 'whole' school or
college approaches (see chapters 7 and 8).
14 Strawson (1959) in Individuals wishes to avoid the vices of 'speculative'
metaphysics, in favour of a 'descriptive metaphysics' which will concern itself solely
with analysing our concepts of the actual structure of our thought about the world
(Lacey 1976: 129). For a detailed discussion of the educational issue see O'Loughlin
and Campbell (1988: 25-33).
15 An example of such a task is proposed by Thornbury (1996), who argues for
closer links between philosophical accounts of authenticity and the education
management concept of 'collegiality'. See also chapter 8.
16 These were: 1. the truths of formal logic and mathematics; 2. the truths of physical
science; 3. awareness and understanding of our own and other people's minds; 4.
moral judgements; 5. objective aesthetic experience; 6. religion; 7. philosophical
understanding.
17 Hirst (1993) subsequently revises his account (Walsh (1993: 139) to emphasise
more the 'intelligence that is acquired and exercised in educational practice' and which
recognises the 'tacit theory' which is continually extended and 'made explicit' by
practitioners working in common (44). Hirst has thus moved more towards a
hermeneutic perspective compatible with Maclntyre's notions of tradition and
continuity.
18 Phenomenographers are constructivists who believe that there are a finite number
of possible ways of seeing a problem and its solution.
19 Classical humanism is said to concentrate on a curriculum focusing on cultural
heritage and the passing on of the highest achievements and products of the arts,
sciences and other areas of human endeavour. Progressivism stresses 'children-
centred' approaches, discovery-learning and the child's freedom to explore his/her
own interests. Reconstrucrionism sees education as a means of improving society, as
a force for planned progress and the development of a democratic community.
Instrwnentalism envisages the main purpose of the curriculum as being to prepare
children for adulthood - working life, leisure, parenthood, citizenship. (Skilbeck
1976).
20 The social-political, economic, communication, rationality, technology, morality,
belief, aesthetic and maturation sub-systems.
21 Blacker (1994) argues, however, that 'good constructivist pedagogy' needs to be
rescued from the 'deficient theory that parented it' (303). See Watts and Bentley
(1991: 17 1-182); and Gilbert and Swift (1985: 681-696) who argue that any 'strong'
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version will involve a complex, coherent and self-consistent set of beliefs and
classroom practices, including considerable attention to alternative conceptions.
22 'Bahktin, who was primarily but far from exclusively a student of literature,
expected to find material evidence of the various ideologies competing in any society
in every kind of cultural manifestation. Indeed, this was for him the only evidence
discoverable for the existence of ideologies, which are not private and immaterial
forces in social life but public concrete ones. Bahktin thus installs a potent tradition of
Semiotics as revelation' (Sturrock 1986: 90).
23 'Contrary to this conception of ideologies as undesirable and as something to be
overcome, ideologies... are not something to overcome; they are, rather, necessary for
thought. The critical task is then not to forswear ideology, which is impossible, but to
adopt the best ideology one can. This sense of 'ideology', unlike the Marxist
sense...takes ideologies to be necessary' (65).
24 Davies (1989) shows for the social movement of English studies (and the same
can be argued for other subjects) that among practitioners there are competing
rationalities and 'contested' conceptions about the meta-cognitive foundations of their
discipline. English teachers within the NATE (National Association of Teachers of
English) have been territorially agile, for example, in asserting the hegemonic
possibilities of the 'Electronic English' for their subject. But Snyder (1997: 31) also
points out that 'the historical record shows that many English teachers have tended to
resist the new technologies'. She argues that the future lies with inter-active hyper-
text and hyper-fiction. See the relevant issues of English in Education, Vol 31, no 2
(1997), for a series of articles on the theme of English teachers and computers,
'hyperfiction', 'electronic English' and 'cyberspace'.
Bakhtin (1981) argues that all communication must be a dialogue between
individuals in which listeners and speakers both play active roles. The listener
receives the word from the speaker, but that reception carries with it a mental act
which requires the listener to understand the world from the speaker's point of view
before approaching it from his own point of view. Vygotsky's (1962, 1991) account
of socially 'assisted' learning has been similarly influential.
26 For instance, not until the sixth-form will a philosophical stance on deconstruction
be conveyed in formal language to pupils. Yet the English teaching by that department
of that pupil for several years already may have been predicated on such a position.
English teachers may lack philosophical competencies which would enable them to
have more sophisticated, and possibly different, philosophical positions and practices.
But as Ree (1978, 1992) points out, philosophy has not been good at building bridges
either. John Dixon (1994) argues 'the excitement over Derrida would not have
occurred if English teachers had been more aware of the habit of Ayer, Joad and
others insisting on it all depends what you mean'. English studies in England had
little need of a deconstructive initiative since there was already an extremely strong
tradition in textual analysis and exegesis. (Personal communication)
27 This problem with which each individual teacher and the staff as a whole must
come to terms is examined again in chapter 7.
Two examples may be offered. Set theory is claimed by the mathematicians but is
actually involved in all thinking. The SRA Think Labs (1980) for teaching
comprehension and logical thinking skills contain many verbal problems which draw
on set theory, but are not seen as mathematics materials. The widespread use of the
Prisoner's Dilemma puzzle illustrates how there is no natural or essential curriculum
setting for a philosophical teaching-point. It is found in business studies, geography,
health education, logic, peace studies, and games theory in maths. The need to plan
the appropriate revisitation of philosophical topics within a spiral curriculum is
essential in putting a whole school or college policy in place (see chapter 7).
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29 The Philosophy papers were to cover Philosophy, Logic and Psychology; and the
English papers were to cover: Linguistics, History of English Language and History
of English Literature.
30 Clarke concludes, as assessor to a major funded project: 'A starting assumption
was that arguing is so much a matter of language that it is the natural property of the
English teacher, primary or secondary: 'Let's try some philosophy in the secondary
school', he adds (Andrews, Costello and Clarke 1993:23). One way of pursuing a
claim for curriculum hegemony is to provide resources for teaching argument, as
Clarke and Sinker (1992) have done.
31 Some argue like Bhaskar (1986), however, that positivism in science based on the
empirical methods of the natural sciences has proved anti-philosophical. The tendency
of positivism was to reduce the life of ideas to a cult of verifiable, or falsifiable
certainty. The mechanicist fixation upon objects and facts is accompanied by a neglect
of the human, historical and structural factors which determine, in the final analysis,
the meaning of such facts (Mashaddi 1997a, 1997b, Mashaddi and Kahn 1997).
32 As chapter 4 shows, counter-factual history leans heavily on the notion of the
plausible. Possible worlds theorists argue for the closeness, or accessibility, of such
worlds.
33 There is also the consideration that memory and previous knowledge are central to
the notion of a canon. See Alexander et al 1994, Bloom 1994, Fincher-Kiefer 1992,
Neisser 1982.
34 'Abstract the particular theses to be debated and evaluated from their contexts with
traditions of enquiry and then attempt to debate and evaluate them in terms of their
rational justifiability to any rational person, to individuals conceived of as abstracted
from their particularities of character, history and circumstance, and you will thereby
make the kind of rational dialogue which could move through argumentative
evaluation to the rational acceptance or rejection of a tradition of enquiry effectively
impossible' (Maclntyre 1988: 398-99). His position is similar to that of Nussbaum
(1986, 1990) who argues that texts are inseparable from the experience of the
philosophical ideas that they present Maclntyre thus sets the context for the
importance of narrative in all philosophical activity. This has importance also for the
hermeneutic claim.
35 This does not prevent Nussbaum herself, for example, from writing in the meta-
discourse of philosophy.
36 In Schechiman's (1996: 2) account the four features of personal existence which
are crucial are: survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern and
compensation (for present sacrifices by later benefits).
37 There is a strong resemblance to Kuhn's (1970) account of how scientific
revolutions occur only when scientific communities change their beliefs.
38 Ricoeur begins this account in Hermeneutics and the Hwnan Sciences (1981) and
continues it in the three volumes of Ti,ne and Narrative (1984, 1985, 1988). Kearney(1988: 17) undertakes a discussion of 'narrative identity' in relation to imagination.
See also chapter 4.
39 Other contemporary historians wish to reject narrative history as inappropriate to
the post-modem context. Some, like Zeldin, replace narrative history with a
'pointillist' technique of writing, for instance; and the post-modem critics have
claimed that historical narrative is to be distrusted as 'inherently anti-intellectual', a
form of 'tutelary narration', and the 'discourse of bourgeois society' (Evans 1997:
149).
40 Kruger claims that understanding in the sense of moving to one's place in the
tradition breaks with the idea of an unaffected observer. It also enables, for the
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purposes of this study, a direct connection to be made with notions of empathy, the
body-self and embodiment perspectives in constructing aphilosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum.
41 A well-known example would be Russell's (1912:76) memory paradox, which
asks What would it be like if this world, with all the memories of it that we have, had
been created only five minutes ago - and us with those memories? Interestingly,
Ryan (1991) would not classify this as a fictional narrative.
4z Any pedagogic and curricular stance in relation to a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum should, in my view, attach considerable importance to
Berrill's account of the development and assessment of written thought through a
stage of exposition. Feezel (1995: 95) likewise argues that our stories about sporting
events attempt to give shape to our otherwise amorphous and fragmentary experience.
He cites the example of Antoine Roquentin, in Sartre's novel of that name, who
makes the discovery that the way to deal with la nausé is to make up stories.
43 'They seem to be exploring the underlying assumptions which are brought to the
argument, possibly trying to establish a common ground of understanding which is
necessary before rational argument can take place...If sixteen year olds are writing
exposition when we expect them to write argument, they may be showing us more
than we ourselves know about the nature of socio-cognitive development' (Berrill
1990: 84).
44 'It may be that these sixteen year olds are attempting to acknowledge the validities
of the opposing points of view and to demonstrate the validities of their own
position...[They had been asked to write about their relationships with their
parents]...Writers of developed argument incorporate an appreciation of the validity of
alternative points of view in theirs, usually from the outset as well as through the
argument...Once we recognise the presence of this appreciation in the writing of our
pupils, we need to give them strategies for condensing their understanding rather than
having their explanations dominate the writing as it does in these papers' (Berrill
1990: 84).
45 In a correspondence with Blyton between 1953-7, McKellar (1979: 82) examined
her claim that she could both write a story and read it at the same time: 'Sometimes a
character makes a joke, a really funny one that makes me laugh as I type it - and I
think "Well I couldn't have thought of that myself in a hundred years". Then I think,
"Well, who did think of it then?"
46 For a fuller discussion of fiction, narrative and possibility, see chapter 4. A good
modern example of this phenomenon can be seen in the way the myth of Icarus was in
effect metamorphosised from myth into legend, upon the anivail of the hang-glider in
the mid 20th century.
47 Matthews has developed the discussion of stories for their philosophical content
into an art form: see Matthews (1976, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1994). Murris (1993a,
1993b) attempts the same task with early childhood picture books. The creation of a
searchable, public data base classifying the entire range of children's (and adult)
fiction in terms of the philosophical issues they raise, would provide a resource of
great value.
48 Sophie's World: A NovelAbout the History of Philosophy (Gaarder 1995) was
written by a teacher of philosophy to encourage student engagement with the subject.
Ree's (1995) hostile review highlights notable pitfalls that can arise within the genre.
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CHAPTER 4
Parallel, possible and plausible worlds
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamed of in your philosophy.
(Hamlet Act I Scene V: 165)
Suppose some adult had told a child that he had been on the moon. The child tells me the
story, and I say it was only a joke, the man hadn't been on the moon; no one has ever been
onthemoon;themoonsa1ongwayoffandmpossibletocIjinbupthorfly
there. Ifnowthechildinsists,sayingperthereisawayofget1ngtherewbjchIdou't
know etc. what reply could I make to him? But a child will not ordinarily stick to such a
belief and will soon be convinced by what we tell him seriously. Wiugenstein, speaking
in 1950 (Wiugenstein 1992:107)
1. The context of counter-factual and possible worlds discourse
This chapter presents an inter-disciplinaiy argument that the study and teaching of
possibility, arising from conditionals and counter-factuals, must feature strongly in the
educator's approach to thinking. The argument leads to a revised classroom approach
to narrative, imagination, subject teaching, cross-domain thinking, creativity,
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embodied identity, and memoiy. There are major implications, too, for ethical life,
the dispositions and virtues which will be addressed in chapter 5, and also for public
intellectual life (see chapter 8).
Throughout the history of thinking there have been numerous examples of the failure
of predictive vision, especially in cross-domain thinking, by public intellectuals having
expertise in the relevant fields. For example the philosopher, mathematician and
engineer, Wittgenstein, searching in conversation in 1950 for an example of an
inconceivable event, seized on the idea of putting a man on the moon. Yet within a
very few years, on July 29th 1969, the US. Apollo space mission landed on the
moon. How could Wittgenstein have made such a mistake? After all, he was in
touch with the scientific community and therefore aware of the reasonable possibility
of a moon-landing within a few years. How can educationists ensure that the young
learn to avoid such solecisms as Wittgenstein's error?
Chapters 2 and 3 argued that transcendental realism involves a continual search for
further meaning or new paradigms. Education would often be a finite activity if this
were not so. This chapter will argue that conditional, counter-factual possible worlds
discourse and talk is desirable for practical and for general as well as philosophical
reasons. Such thinking flourishes, transcendentally, within the general culture from
which our curriculum will be drawn; and is an indispensable feature of the pre-
philosophical education of the young. A philosophical position and pedagogy for the
teaching of philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum is needed which
encourages continual questioning of the world, through empirical, metaphysical (Loux
1979), and stochastic speculation about counter-factual and possible worlds. 1 A
renascent branch of philosophy which concerns itself with conditionals provides a
foundation for new ways of thinldng about possibility (Divers 1997).
2. Inter-disciplinary and cultural interest in counter-factuals
The appeal of counter-factual thinking and possible worlds thinking is illustrated by its
popularity in fiction and film (Rubin and Ramis 1993, Herman 1994) and poetry
(Karon 1993). Notions of the literary and fiction are much discussed by philosophers
and theorists (Lewis 1983b, Ryan 1991, 1995c). The contrast in consistency
115
between literaiy possible worlds and real-life is popularly explored in 'puzzles in
classic fiction' which ask such questions as Can Jane Eyre Be Happy? (Sutherland
1997). A growing phenomenon in the television media has been the making of
'hypotheticals', educational or other programmes where professionals and experts
consider the unfolding of imaginary scenarios (Millson 1994). 2 The director
Jonathan Miller (Benedict 1996) claims that the theatre is essentially a playful,
'counter-factual enterprise': and the experimental plays of Ayckbourn, Brecht, Brook
and Wilson illustrate the particular fecundity of drama in treating 'possible worlds'
problems (Counsell 1996). 3
Visual, perceptually 'impossible' worlds have been devised by the mathematician
Escher and others (Hofstadter 1979). Counter-factual 'sci-fi' examples have been
much used to illuminate discussion of personal identity, time travel and other matters
in philosophy (Clark 1995, Ehring 1987). Science fiction has long-standing links
with philosophy and metaphysics, as Clark (1995) in How to Live Forever: Science
Fiction and Philosophy, and others have shown (Miller et al 1990, Philips 1984,
Skyrums 1976). 4 The widely-used Cornell Critical Thinking Test uses a counter-
factual science fiction scenario based on an imaginary planet on which a group from
earth have landed in search of an earlier expedition (Ennis and Millman 1982,
1991: 19).
A swathe of professional disciplines including science, cosmology, mathematics,
history, economics and psychology, have each generated a large literature looking at
applied conditional and counter-factual thinking. Counter-factual and possible worlds
have been used in explanation and hypothesis in the subject disciplines of science and
mathematics; in physics, for example, in the notion of parallel universes in quantum
theory; or in the idea of morphic resonance in biological science (Wolf 1990,
Sheldrake 1988, 1994); and increasingly in psychology (Byrne 1997, Eysenck and
Keane 1994). Specialist thinkers in maths and computing have engaged in the
creation and exploration of rule-bound, deductively-based, micro-worlds, probabilistic
systems and 'virtual reality' (Boden 1994, Bliss and Ogbom 1989, Pearl 1988), and
imaginary architectural worlds (Hofstadter 1979). Notions of the conditional and
counter-factual have influenced decision game theory (Stalnaker 1996, Bicchieri
1998), air-traffic control (Cavalcanti 1995), theorems about human behaviour in
economics and management theory, and stochastic theory in mathematics. Sports
sociologists have looked at counter-factual thinking in Olympic athletes (Medvec et al
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1995, 1997), criminologists at violent crime (Nario, Redmond and Branscombe
1996), and lawyers at torts and juries (Feigenson 1995).
Psychologists see counter-factual thinking based on 'mental models' as providing
clues to the links between cognition and emotion (Byrne 1997, Garnham and Oakhill
1994). Schemata, frames and scripts (Eysenck and Keane 1995: 261) are used to
chart the planning of ethical intention and action. Work of considerable interest has
been undertaken by cognitive psychologists on inferential aspects of children's
counter-factual and causal reasoning (Harris et al 1996). Children's thinking about
magical events seen as counter-factual occurrence and reasoning has been reported in a
growing literature (Harris 1994, Chandler and Lalonde 1994, Rosengren et al 1994).
The idea of thinking modally can also be linked with new psychological and
neurological theories which argue that cognition and emotion are linked (Byrne 1997,
Rolls 1997, Damasio 1995), and that intelligence and thought appear in different
forms, sites or sensory modalities (Gardner and Perkins 1989, Sternberg 1985, 1988;
Perkins 1994, Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1994, Pinker 1994).
3. Philosophical discussion of conditional, possible worlds
As Dudman (1991) points out, the conditional idea has long fascinated speculative
minds, and especially philosophers: 'the result is that there are hundreds of
philosophers in the world today 'who care how f works in English'. 	 Important
advances in technical, analytical philosophy in the areas of indicative conditionals,
counter-factual theory by Kripke, Lewis and Stalnaker have built on earlier interest by
Leibniz and Giordano Bnino (Ashworth 1998, Edgington 1995). Other philosophers
have explored the related area of thought experiments (Sorensen 1992, Gooding
1998).
Philosophers give a range of different accounts of conditionals, possible worlds and
their truth claims which, drawing on a tradition with beginnings in Platonism and Neo-
Platonism, informed many of the concerns of scholastic philosophy and the medieval
world view. The intellectual tradition of a Great Chain of Being, referred to in chapter
1, can be seen as historically coterminous with these developments. Having
originated with Giordano Bruno (Ashworth 1998) and medieval cosmology as a
117
concern with plenitude and perfection in worlds perceived as a scala naturae, or ladder
of nature, the Great Chain of Being emerges in Enlightenment mode in the possible
worlds of Leibniz. It persists into the Victorian period, flourishing in Darwinian
beliefs concerning 'missing links' in the Chain, and again in the nanotechnology of
microscopy. It re-appears in the later twentieth century in cosmology, and in the neo-
scholastic philosophy of modal worlds. It adopts a philosophical style focusing on
logic, metaphysics, ontology, and conditionals, as opposed to the epistemological and
linguistic preoccupations of the dominant tradition in early twentieth philosophy
(Divers 1997, Lang 1990). 6 The many inhabited worlds emphasis of the Great
Chain of Being depicted by Lovejoy (1936) re-emerges as combinatorialism in
possible worlds and dispositional theory, when different rules apply for people than
for things (Armstrong 1986, 1995).
Interest in conditionals in the modem period originates in Kripke's (1963) attempt to
solve problems in formal linguistics. Kripke provides a technical foundation upon
which logicians and metaphysicians subsequently revive their interest in neglected
questions of ontology and modality in philosophy, or theodicy or cosmology in
philosophical theology (Plantinga 1974, Macintosh 1994, McKim 1984).
Most philosophers formulate their theory of conditionals by offering an account of the
truth conditions of a conditional, specifying the conditions under which 'if A then B'
is true, and those under which it is false. Some philosophers concentrate instead on
the conditions of acceptance or justified assertabiity of a conditional, offering some
account of the probability conditions under which 'if A then B' is wholly acceptable,
or acceptable to a certain degree. Although the two approaches are often seen as
opposed, as Jackson (1991: 1) points out the ideal would be a plausible account both
of the truth conditions and of the acceptance conditions of conditionals combined with
'a story which explains each in terms of the other'. Edgington (1991, 1995) having
considered the acceptance conditions put forward by others, considers however that
conditionals do not have truth conditions. 1
The most widely discussed problem concerns an indicative conditional's acceptance or
(justified-assertion) conditions. This identifies the acceptability of 'if A then B' with
the conditional probability of B given A. For instance, how reasonable it is to assert
that if Clinton does well in his first term then he will be re-elected, is decided by how
probable it is that Clinton will be re-elected given he does well in his first term?8
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Many philosophers have argued that there are indicative conditionals on the one hand,
and subjunctive or 'counter-factual' conditionals on the other hand. Indeed, one
formal description of a counter-factual conditional is that it is a 'subjunctive'
conditional. Adams (1965) defines the difference between the two in an example
much discussed in the philosophical literature. To say'if Oswald had not killed
Kennedy, then someone else would have', is to use a subjunctive or counter-factual
conditional. Someone using an indicative conditional, on the hand, says 'if Oswald
did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did'. Adams claims that the switch in mood
can make a great difference to our intuitive response: for, although many doubt
whether if Oswald had not killed Kennedy someone else would have done, everyone
agrees that if Oswald did not kill Kennedy, then someone else did (Adams 1965:166-
97). In the first case, no facts are established. In the second case, one part of the
equation is a known fact. One postulation deals with the facts, the other does not.
Some philosophers wish to offer truth conditions for both indicative and subjunctive
conditionals, but truth conditions which differ. Lewis gives possible-world truth
conditions for subjunctive conditionals and material truth conditions for indicative
conditionals (Lewis in Jackson 1991:7).
4. Modal realism: the position of Lewis
It is only Lewis (1986) who takes the philosophical position of full modal realism
known as possibilism (Tomberlin 1996). Most other philosophers of conditionals
take the position of actualism, that there are many possible worlds worth identifying
but only one which exists. Possible worlds are defined by Lewis as stipulative
situations or states of affairs which are free of internal inconsistency and which
therefore do or can exist. The term possible world is employed to denote a situation
or 'world' which, whether or not it in fact exists, nevertheless could do so. 9 Our
world, for instance, consists of us and all our surroundings, however remote in time
and space they may be. But there is a plurality of worlds, our world being but one
world among many other, countless other worlds, which are very inclusive things.
The worlds are many and vaiied. There are so many other worlds, in fat, that absolutely
eveiy way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is. And absolutely evey
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way that a part of a world could possibly be is a way that some part of some worlds is.
(Lewis 1986b: fl) 10
Lewis is radical then in proposing that all possible worlds can or do exist but his
position is seen as prohibitively costly in philosophical terms by his critics (Divers
1994, Felt 1996, Maudlin 1996).1
Lewis argues that of the various possible worlds which can or do exist, all are
indiscernible and inaccessible from our present world. He dismisses as ersatzism, the
notion that 'instead of an incredible plurality of concrete worlds, we can have one
world only, and countless abstract entities representing ways that this world might
have been', which is the position taken by most actualists. 12 Lewis claims that the
hypothesis of a plurality of worlds is serviceable in helping us to address problems, as
well as there being reason to think it is true (1986b). 13 Discussion as to whether a
possible world has material facticity thus parallels debates in traditional epistemology
over correspondence as opposed to coherence 'truth claims' for the existence of an
external world. 14
Lewis (1986b) concludes in On the Plurality of Worlds that modal realism needs
counter-part theory to make sense of our modal claims about ordinary individuals, an
idea which has been much discussed. For Lewis, individuals are world-bound in the
sense that they are in the actual world and no other, but a world-bound individual
typically has counterparts in other possible worlds. He argues against accepting
trans-world individuals either as: 1. individuals which exist at different worlds by
being wholly present at different worlds; or 2. as mereological sums which exists at
different worlds by having parts at different worlds. Each object exists in just one
world in his account. Hale (1991) and others claim that, on the contrary, trans-world
individuals taken as mereological sums can play the roles of ordinary individuals - and
so modal realism does not need counterpart theory to make sense of modal claims.
Lewis emphasises the link between conditionals and probability theory, a view which
is shared by other philosophers (Goodman 1965; and see Edgington in Thombury
1997a). Assertability goes in general by probability, because probability is
probability of truth and the speaker wants to be truthful. Probability, as seen in chaos
theory and stochastic process, is appealed to in attempts to apply the philosophy of
possible worlds to historical thinking (see sections 6-8 below). 15
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A rather different approach to indicative conditionals and subjunctive counter-factuals
is that of Stalknaker, who gives a similar 'possible worlds' account of both types of
conditionals, but asserts a difference in terms of pragmatics rather than semantics or
truth conditions (Stalnaker 1976, 1988, 1991a, 1991b). 16 Stalnaker makes an
innovative link between the semantics of conditionals and the probability theorists
notion of a conditional probability. He considers we should evaluate a conditional in
a particular way. 17 For Stalnaker, it is appropriate to make an indicative conditional
statement or supposition only in a context which is compatible with the antecedent.
So he defines counter-factual conditionals as conditionals whose antecedents are
assumed by the speaker to be false. He suggests the following rule for constructing a
counter-factual conditional:
Firsi add the antecedent (hypothetically) to your stock of beliefs; second, make whatevei
adjustments are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the hypothetical belief
in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true. (142-3)
This amounts to saying that all counter-factual conditionals must be expressed in the
subjunctive since, if indicative conditionals are also those which must conform to the
constraint, those which cannot will, by defmition, become counter-factuals. 18
Stalnaker' s rule concerning the antecedent proves relevant to the study of counter-
factual history (see sections 6 & 7 below).
The distance between the actual world, with its indicative conditionals, and the world
of the subjunctive, counter-factual may be very great indeed: some philosophers
therefore argue that attention should be confined to close possible worlds. There has
been much discussion of whetherfictional modal worlds should be regarded as
theoretical or existent (Feagin 1983, Lewis 1983a). Ryan (1991) attempts to deal
with this question in the literaiy and linguistic sphere by designating particular
'accessibility relations' and criteria for genres within thinking and narrative.
The sections which follow demonstrate how possible worlds and counter-factual
thinking have been taken up by various disciplines. The implications for educational
theory, pedagogy and specific subjects in the curriculum are then drawn out.
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5. Possible worlds, cosmology and quantum physics
The debate among philosophers about counter-factual conditionals has direct relevance
to the transcendental realist world which science attempts to unveil (see again chapter
3). Possible worlds theory has an important application in the explanatory physics of
quantum mechanics and computing techniques (Deutsch 1997). Scientists seeking to
explain the indeterminacy of particle behaviour in quantum theory have educed the
notion of parallel universes to explain empirical phenomena (Deutsch 1997, Rees
1996, Wolf 1988). 19 Arguments for the existence of possible worlds and parallel
universes appear to be substantiated by the findings of quantum physics particularly in
relation to cosmology. Rees (1997) and Deutsch (1997), for example, describe how
cosmologists, having identified a series of 'big bangs', conclude that there is a multi-
universe or nudri verse of many existing worlds. Deutsch argues that justification for
such a view is based on the practical requirements and consequences of quantum
computing and theory. 20
We exist in multiple versions, in universes called 'moments'. Each version of us is not
directly aware of the others, but has evidence of their existence because physical laws link
contents of different universes. It is tempting to suppose that the moment of which we are
aware is the only real one, or is at least a little more real than the others. But that is just
solipsism. All moments are physically real. The whole of the multi-verse is physically
real. Nothing else is. (287)
The claims of main-stream quantum physicists, mathematicians and cosmologists have
an interesting relationship with the philosophical standing of Lewis' work. 21
 They
raise the question of whether Lewis's ontological position is far stronger than
philosophical sceptics, who find it 'fantastical' and a 'Jules Vernoscope', have given
him credit for. The evidence from quantum physics and mathematics (Squires 1992)
can also be seen as relevant to other disciplines.
However, philosophical difficulties still remain over Lewis's account. Some worlds
will remain ineffable, or even completely unknowable: either because only in some
universes would the fundamental physical laws be such as to permit intelligent beings,
as observers, to exist (the so-called anthropic principle); or because the presence of a
conscious observer would be required to bring a world into being (the participative
principle) (Rees 1997: 256-7, Ferguson 1997:74).
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The problem also arises could impossible worlds exist? (Perszyk 1989), a question
which relates to the notions of the ineffable and aporia discussed in chapters 1 and 2.
What accessibility criteria should be applied to those who wish to push out the
boundaries of conjectural thinking? l'hinkers such as Feyerabend (1975) and Lakatos
(1971), who argue within the new philosophies of science that no hypothesis can be
too fanciful, implicitly adopt Lewis's view of possible worlds. But how new,
fanciful or incommensurable hypotheses, particularly in science, are to be tested in
relation to the rubrics of Popper or Kuhn has been extensively and inconclusively
debated (Phillips 1987, Powers 1985). The problem of where 'the line is to be
drawn' can be seen in the evolving response of other scientists to Sheidrake's (1988)
claim for morphic resonance or Lovelock's Gaia theory (Lemon 1998).
6. Hawthorn and 'plausible historical worlds'
How counter-factual thinking or possible worlds thinking might be practised in a
particular discipline can be observed in the work of three historians, Hawthorn,
Ferguson and Fogel. Hawthorn (1991 specifically applies the philosophical work to
historical thinldng about plausible worlds. 23 In a series of case studies, he explores
how modal logic can be applied to particular historical problems along the lines
proposed by Lewis or Stalnaker.
Hawthorn claims that traditional historical method has given insufficient attention to
alternative historical explanation. Knowing what actors in history might alternatively
have done casts important light on what they actually did do. He follows Stalnaker in
asserting stringent conditions which require our staying close to the particular in
practical reasoning about plausible worlds in history. The consequences we draw
from these alternatives should initially fit with the other undisturbed runnings-on of
that world. Neither the alternative starting points nor the running-on we impute to
them should be fantastic. Hawthorn applies Stalnakefs procedure for forming
counter-factuals, adding only the antecedent to one's stock of beliefs only if it is
consistent with those beliefs.
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The departure from the actual present should not require us to unwind the past or appropriate
the future (164-5). Start with the world as it actually was, not with fantastic settings in
which Granada could have defeated Spain in 1492. (Hawthorn 1991:158)
He cautions against counter-factual explanations where 'too much else would have
had to be different, or which 'overestimate what could have been done'.
	 He
advocates the comparative historical method of contrasting actualities, the finding of
specific counter-examples to show what else could have happened; for example, how
counter-measures might have been effective if most Italian town governments had
followed the example of the few who defeated the plague by controlling population
movement. 25
 Hawthorn expresses doubts about attributing too much to alternative
human agency, how individuals might otherwise have behaved as inferred from their
mental states. Like Armstrong (1986), in his account of dispositional
combinatoria!ism, Hawthorn sees human agents as different from other causal factors
(see chapter 5). 26
Always ask, of any situation involving human agents, 'could these men (sic), in the
circumstances in which they found themselves, with the information that was available to
them, have acted other than they did?' (158)
He makes no mention of philosophical arguments offered by Quine (1990:68) cc
Davidson for empathy or charitableness. The important question of whether empathy
is a form of possible worlds thinking is not addressed.
Hawthorn's position is robustly anti-historicist and against 'grand theory'. He shares
with Ferguson (see below) and other contemporary historians an inclination to
discourage predictive or historicist claims (Evans 1997). 27 Historicist predictions
have proved false that nationalism would cease to be a potent force; that the working
classes under capitalism would embrace socialism; or that progressive 'secularisation'
or the decline of religion would be widespread. 28
 Hawthorn's arguments for the
importance of historical particularity resemble the hermeneutics of Maclntyre,
Nussbaum or Gadamer. However, he appears far more doubtful that historical
thinking gives rise to anything which is profitably meta-cognitive, or transferably
generalisable.
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7. Counter-factual history: the approach of Ferguson
Ferguson (1997), another counter-factual historian, at first follows Hawthorn in
asserting that a notion of closeness in what is plausible, is essential in deciding 'which
counter-factual to choose' in writing virtual history. The distinction between what did
happen and what could plausibly have happened is of critical importance (84).
Counter-factual plausibility is bound up with probability as the calculation of
possibilities (85). One should therefore narrow down the alternatives to the plausible
ones 'and then calculate their possibility'. Even then, only those alternatives should
be explored as counter-factual history 'that contemporaries can be shown to have
considered and committed to paper.'
The most historians can do is make tentative statements about causation with reference to
plausible counter-factuals (13).
Ferguson draws on chaos theory in explaining the unpredictable importance of
individual agency or accidental events in history, although he appears not to use chaos
in its scientific sense of variation which looks random but in fact is deterministic
(Lorenz 1993: 8).
Historical scholarship is seen by him as an encounter with the the chaotic, since the
world is not divinely ordered or governed by reason, the class struggle or deterministic
law. Historians experience a double uncertainty like that found in quantum physics.
The artefacts they neat as evidence have often survived only by chance; and by
identifying a particular artefact as historical evidence, the historian immediately distorts
its significance. For Ferguson the significance of chaos theory is that it can reconcile
the notions of causation and contingency (79). In this respect, although he does not
make the point, his account is classically existential (see chapter 8).
Ferguson attaches importance to unnoticed or undervalued antecedents; although this is
not consistent with his criterion of contemporaneous awareness (suppose no-one had
noticed or written down an under-valued antecedent?). He also appears to abandon
the principle, laid down by Hawthorn and Stalnaker, of parsimony in antecedents; that
only one antecedent should be falsified for the purposes of a counter-factual enquiry;
for he is prepared to allow a syllogistic chain of antecedents under certain
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circumstances. 30 Reductive explanations such as Cleopatra's nose being the
downfall of Anthony, or 'for want of a nail the kingdom was lost' can thus be seen
under some circumstances as serious formulations. However, he does concede the
risk that playful, 'post-modern reductive inference' could result in the humorous
trivialisation of historical questions.31
Unlike Hawthorn, Ferguson undertakes no philosophical examination of the
philosophy of conditionals or possible worlds. He thus provides an illustration of the
transcendental realist claim, that important, philosophical thoughts and assumptions
may be embedded, un-noticed in the professional practice of a discipline (see again
chapter 3).
8. Counter-intuitive, counter-factual thinking: the example of
Fogel
How would one successfully apply counter-factual or possible worlds thinldng in a
more challenging context; say one which deals with quantitative evidence and where
the discoveries waiting to be made are counter-intuitive? 32 A counter-factual
approach which uses rigorous quantitative methods to explore the counter-intuitive can
be found in the work of Fogel (1970), who can be seen to have undertaken 'the first
serious venture into quantitative, counter-factual argumentation' (Ferguson 1997). 33
In work in the 'New Economic History' Fogel has brought about major revisions to
the historical record in relation to US industrial expansion, slavery and the Civil War,
immigration, urbanisation and the westward movement. 34 By exhaustively re-
working economic history data he refutes conventional wisdoms such as, for example,
the claims that 'railroads were the indispensable driving force behind American,
domestic economic growth in the 19th century' (Fogel 1970: viii).
Fogel describes his technique as scientific as opposed to traditional history, since its
hypothetico-deductive method is strongly reliant on the gathering of detailed evidence.
He and his successors favour explicit, researched, analytical models over implicit
assumptions and frameworks and see an important role for computing (Fackler and
Rogers 1995). 35 Fogel believes that the mental model, or thought experiment
(Sorensen 1992), for testing of a particular counter-factual proposition will be highly
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technical and specific to that subject domain. His method therefore is to adopt the
Bhaskarian 'conception of discovery', of assiduity in eliminating alternative plausible
hypotheses, often including the most intuitively self-evident one. As McCloskey
(1987: 703) observes, 'counter-factuals are a way economists speak.' 36
The resource of computing enables Fogel to overcome the need to have a complete set
of data in order to explore a particular counter-factual hypothesis in economic history.
Fogel's computing methods of the 1970's interestingly pre-date the arrival of what is
now known as knowledge discovery or data mining (Angoss 1996, Berry and Linoff
1997, Jeffrey 1983), an approach by which unsuspected and counter-intuitive 'effects
within effects' can be automatically discovered by 'running the software'. 37 The
question arises, however: how does Fogel know which 'obvious truths' to attempt to
falsify? The empirical and philosophical answers which can be offered in responding
to this question are set out in section 16 below.
9. Psychology and counter-factual thinking
Psychology researchers have undertaken an important range and variety of
experimental studies of the perception of 'what if?' questions, the conditionals and
counter-factuals of philosophical theory. Counter-factual thinking is defined by
psychologists as the propensity to interpret reality by imagining alternative event
outcomes (Byrne 1997, Roese 1997, Roese and Olson 1996, 1997). Studies of these
alternative or counter-factual schema suggest that they depend on a 'mental simulation
heuristic' which provides the social perceiver with a framework, which is 'necessarily
relativistic', for interpreting and responding to events (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).
People draw upon their considerations of what might have happened, together with
their knowledge of what actually did happen, in their attempts to understand events.
Bias features strongly in conditional inference of this type, with considerable
implications for other specialisms such as computing, or work on mental models, as
Evans et al (1995) or Schul and Goren (1997) point out.
There are generalisable features of counter-factual thinking which are protocol-
governed, scripted and schematic, for the construction or generation of counter-factual
alternatives does not proceed in an unconstrained manner. 38
 As with counter-factual
127
history, estimations of probability are important. For example, normal people
underestimate their personal probability of encountering negative events, such as
getting cancer or having a heart attack. Contrary to conventional belief, it is well-
adjusted individuals who are more susceptible to unrealistic optimism and the illusion
of control concerning risk. Less well-adjusted, depressed individuals are less
susceptible to these illusions. The capacity to generate counter-factual alternatives to
events is affected by such factors as the time between the original event and the
envisaging of a counter-factual alternative; and whether routine or exceptional
circumstances precede one's thinking about the matter (Miller and McFarland 1986,
Macrae 1992, Macrae et al 1993, Sanna 1996, 1997).
Thinking counter-factually about 'what otherwise might have been' often results in
altered judgements of regret, happiness, blame, and causality: and it will be argued, in
chapter 5, that this empirical consideration has a crucial role to play in the fonnation of
dispositions and virtues. 39 Work on the counter-factual thinldng of young children,
in their perceptions of the magical, suggests that 'magic, whether sham or real, does
operate as an effective tool with which to discount apparent exceptions to one's
cherished beliefs' (Chandler and Lalonde 1994:93). Children 'quarantine' their
magical beliefs, being quite prepared to entertain the possibility that under special
circumstances the laws of nature and conservation could be suspended.
For Byrne (1997: 220) the era of counter-factual research represents 'the coming of
age of the psychology of thinking and learning'. She makes the persuasive claim that,
research in counter-factual thinking may lead to a unified theory of thinking, since 'an
account of the relation between cognition and emotion may emerge'. 40 A crucial
connection between counter-factual thinking and the dispositions is demonstrated in
chapter 5.
There are many implications if 'possible worlds' and counter-factual thinking are
applied in areas related to educational theory. Traditional conceptions need to be
modified concerning such topics as: nanative, imagination, the intangible, metaphor,
cross-domain thinking, connectionism and computing, stochastic process, play,
embodied thinking, multiple identity, and memory. Ethical, curricular and pedagogic
approaches will also be affected, and it to such these matters that I now turn.
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10. Narrative, fiction, and possible worlds
Ryan (1991) points out that the application of the concept of modal logic to the theory
of fiction receives its earliest expression by Aristotle. For Aristotle, it is not the poet's
business to tell what happened, but the kind of things that would happen - 'what is
possible according to possibility and necessity' (Poetics 9,20, quoted in Ryan 1991:
17). Philosophers of conditionals and possible worlds, literary theorists and
linguisticians have taken a special interest in 'fictional modal realism'. Lewis (1983a)
treats fiction as similar to counter-factual reasoning, in that the implications of one
provisional supposition are followed through. A proponent of linguistic ersaizism,
Jeffrey (1983) describes ersatz worlds as 'complete consistent novels', when such a
novel:
Describes a possible world in as much detail as is possible without exceeding the
resources of the agent's language. But if talk of possible worlds seems dangerously
metaphysical, we can focus attention on the novels themselves, and speak of a
complete, consistent novel as actualiy being a possible world. (12)
Other philosophers draw attention to the frequency with which philosophy occurs as
literature (Lawry 1980, Phillips Griffiths 1984). Literary theorists and linguists find
important links between possible worlds and literary theory (Margolin 1995, Peer
1996, Pollard 1995,Tambling 1997). These embrace the theatre (Sellar 1996),
theodicy in the comic novel (Robinson 1996) and even poetry (see Appendix 38).
McHale (1987) claims that the post-modern condition in poetics is quintessentially 'an
anarchic landscape of worlds in the plural' (1987: 33-7). Like Pave! (1975, 1982), he
has a conception of narrative domains as ontological landscapes which are possible
worlds informed by the ideas of modal logic. For McHale this 'jigsaw of sub-
universes of meaning' is remarkably similar to the theories of the social construction of
reality put forward by sociologists (Winch 1958). 41
In Possible Worlds, Artylcial Intelligence and Narrative Theory, Ryan (1991) argues
that the theory of possible worlds has two valuable concepts to offer that of the
metaphor of 'world' to describe the semantic domain projected by a text; and the
concept of modality to describe and classify the various ways of existing of objects,
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states and events that make up the semantic domain (3). She postulates a semantic
domain consisting of a plurality of worlds; and a theory of narrative, yielding plans,
plot units and story-generating programs, and built on techniques of computing and
artificial intelligence.42
Ryan explores what is literary, fictive, or narrative, three categories which 'remain
distinct, and do not presuppose each other', pointing out that other disciplines have
increasingly distinguished narrativity from fictionality (1991:1-2, Appendix 32). She
proposes a three-fold,'modal systems' definition of fictionality, founded upon three
distinct, actual worlds: the actual world (AW), the textual actual world (TAW), and the
textual reference world(TRW) (Appendix 24). 43
Eco (1979) following Kripke (1963), stipulates that texts analysed from possible
worlds perspectives must have manageable dimensions of possibility, accessibility
from our own world, their starting point (200-206). 	 Put in the discourse of
cosmology and quantum physics discussed earlier, such texts must be anthropic and
participative. Ryan meets this requirement with a taxonomy of accessibility criteria
(Appendix 28). 45 Her classification of narrative genres and accessibility criteria can,
for instance, be applied to The Alteration (Amis 1976), about how life in England
might have developed had the Reformation not occurred, or Milton in America
(Ackroyd 1996) which conveys the great writer into a country he never visited.
Ryan does not address the epistemological status of subject disciplines or discourses
other than English studies, or the ethical and moral domain, although her emphasis on
the metaphor of world has relevance to metaphorical moral worlds (Johnson 1993).
Her analysis confirms the findings of Donald (1992 & Appendix 29) that conceptual
thinking about possibility is given varying emphasis and treated differently in different
subjects. '7
11. The place of imagination
Educationists might wish to aslc What is the place of traditional notions of
imagination in all this talk of possible worlds and counter-factual thinking in
education? Philosophical aesthetics offers contested concepts or defmitions of
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imagination. 48 Scruton's (1983) claim, for example, that imagination is concerned
with temporary, or 'make believe' truths, identifies it with ersatzism, the notion that
imaginary worlds are in no sense reaL Kearney (1988: 16) sees imagination as
having four main meanings, all connected with absent objects and their capacity to
seem real, through representation in material or fictional fonm49
Warnock (1978: 202) speaks of educating imagination as part of intelligence, and how
this will entail the education of the feelings. Imagination exists for the purposes of
the 'application of thought or concepts to things' and is essentially rational. It
proceeds from an understanding of what is the case, and involves no confounding of
reality and unreality, as in delusions and hallucinations. In an important series of
studies, Egan (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997) shows how imaginativeness, especially
when linked with narrative and story-telling, can be stimulated in children.
Discussion of the status of 'ersatz' possible worlds seems analogous, therefore, to
debate about the nature of imagination, and whether literary characters can be said to
have real existence (Radford 1975, Bricker 1987). 50 Taking Lewis's position, that
fiction is similar to counter-factual reasoning, it is easy to see that a character such as
Anna Karenina, in the possible world context of a great work of fiction, has a
compelling, imaginative existence. We are deeply affected by Karenina's tragic
experiences. She is more real than many other people we know (Radford 1975) and
should not be seen as 'theoretical' (Feagin 1993). However, this may be different
from seeing her as a real person with her own historicity, claim others (Scruton 1974,
1983, Boruah 1988). Rosen (1993) offers a fictionalist interpretation of possible
worlds discourse which seeks imaginative benefits without incurring the ontological
cost of commitment to the existence of non-actual things (Divers 1994, 1995). 51
Some influential accounts of imagination which favour a coherence, or ersatzist
epistemology, are therefore opposed to Lewis, who gives a correspondence account
for imagined, possible worlds. His position resembles in some ways the mentalism
of Collingwood (1938: 285) who held that art proper is not an artefact or a perceptible
thing, but rather solely something that exists in the artist's mind. Related to this
point, Gottesman (1997) makes the interesting observation that possible worlds which
are utterly believable are found in the case of successful propaganda scenarios. This
issue is explored in depth by Proud (1997) in relation to children, narrative themes and
the politicisation of the fairy tale.52
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A possible worlds account of thinking would therefore involve a more prominent place
for the examination of indiscernible, including propaganda worlds than is at present
seen in critical thinking texts (Groake et a! 1997: 13-14). Such topics would be
addressed from a firmer philosophical foundation than hitherto.
12. Intangible worlds
That possible worlds may be indiscernible, intangible or transcendental is reflected in
folk p3ychology accounts of the nature of belief (Churchiand 1994). In particular,
worlds which are apprehended as ineffable or aporetic could be seen as what some
philosophers characterise as impossible worlds (Naylor 1986). Indiscernible or
intangible possible worlds have great practical importance at times. Medway (1997)
points out how intangible architecture, the 'unbuilt buildings' of famous and
innovative architects, have often been more influential than what has been built.53
Architecture and town planning have been much concerned with utopian possible
worlds which appear as rnanzfestoes of intent (l'afuri 1996). On the other hand,
tangible referents can also be aesthetically important For example, the inferred
possible world of the institutiona! theory of art rests heavily on tangible objects and
social practices (Danto 1981, Dickie 1984, Wollheim 1980b).
How spatial counter-factual and possible worlds can permeate the culture of a subject
discipline, transcendentally but inexplicitly, can be seen in the case of geography
education. Geographers do not draw on the philosophical work on possible worlds,
yet their subject is fecund with philosophical, especially phenomenological notions of
domains and worlds. The best-known of these, the concept of mental maps (Agnew
et al 1996, Gregory et al 1994, Johnston et al 1994), was described in chapter 3. An
inventory of possible worlds discernible in the current discourse of geographers would
also include: imagined communities (Anderson 1983); rhetorical cartography and
hyperspace, as 'a domain in which local experience no longer coincides with the place
in which it takes place' (Jameson 1991, McDowell 1994: 165), and its architectural
manifestations which are 'not spatially located or fixed'(159); the world as exhibition
(Gregory 1994: 84); the taken for granted or life world of humanistic geography (Ley
1977:498-512; Johnston et al 1994: 616); topophilia and fields of care (Tuan 1974,
132
1996); anticipatory utopias (Benhabib 1987); the concept city (De Certeau 1984); lfe-
worlds, Lebenswelt and genre de vie in Vidalian geography (Johnston et al 1994:
216); and orientialism (Said 1996). Spatial conceptions predominate in all this, as in
memoiytheoiy, but time-geography and stochastic simulation (Johnston et al 1994:
594; Agnew et al 1996: 636) also reflect temporal modal thinking in the subject.55
Similar curriculum evidence of intangible worlds can be found in English studies and
literaiy theoiy. The technique of deconstruction (Denida 1976), encourages the
playful seamh for counter-factual, indiscernible worlds. Unspoken or unformulated
propositions, gaps, supplements, and subtle internal self-contradictions show a text to
be saying something quite other than what it appears to be saying. A new text thus
gradually begins to emerge subtly at variance with itself, and the deconstruction
continues as a stochastic sequence of dialectical readings (see below). The reader must
exegetically pursue all of the possible worlds of meaning in a text. 56 There is a
emphasis on the ludic and the playful, as in Derrida's notion of the 'puncept' or
conceptual pun (Maumer 1996:459). A pedagogic example of 'playfulness' and
tentativeness in the deconstruction of texts by children is found in Goodman's (1972)
account of the reading process: he sees it as a psycho-linguistic guessing game in
which the child decodes a text in a series of attempts, using the context to puzzle out
likely meanings.
The extent to which intangible worlds pervade popular culture can be seen in the
theory of the the marketing of goods and services. According to Cowell (1990:48)
and Shostak (1977) the concept of intangibility is fundamental to the conceptual
framework of professional services marketing (Appendix 37). Marketing discourse
uses the vocabulary of ontological scholasticism, of entities, attributes, elements and
intangibles, to construct its consumer possible worlds. 57
13. The importance of metaphor
Ryan (1991) considers that the use and exploitation of metaphor is central to the
concept of modal realism about possible worlds. She is puzzled that metaphor, along
with tropes in general, has never been openly regarded as fiction, since metaphorical
expression is clearly a kind of possible world creating activity.
133
Discussion of metaphor, analogy and models has been extensively carried on by
philosophers of science. Rorty (1979), Cooper (1986) and others have traced the
way in which all science is the literalisation of metaphor, when philosophers can easily
become captive to metaphors, such as that which suggests philosophy is 'the mirror of
nature'. Metaphor is seen as central to the way that scientists think (Sutton 1992).
MaShhadi (1997b) points out how quantum physicists have created a language in
which the fundamentals of the world can no longer directly be observed, and how
metaphor and figurative thinking are now inherent in the nature of the subject.
Philosophers see metaphor as a challenging philosophical problem and their accounts
of what it is vaiy. Quine (1978: 60) defines metaphor in terms of childhood
development, as a series of 'playful exegeses in personal growth'. 58 His view is
that the originating, first metaphor is always innovative and fresh but that its impact,
following what Scheffler (1991) would call the cognitive emotion of'intellectual
surprise', tapers off into ordinary, non-emotivist usage. For Swanson (in Sachs
1996: 163) also, the emphasis is on metaphor as innovative, conjectural and playful.
A metaphor works as an erroneous conjecture, 'a peremptory invitation to discovery'
conflicting with our expectations. 59
 Does a metaphor both have a life of its own and
also stand in a surrogate relationship to something else? Wittgenstein (1958) argues
in the Philosophical Investigations that 'we speak of understanding a sentence in the
sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same, but also in the sense
in which it cannot be replaced by any other' (81). Davidson (1978) takes the view
that there is a central mistake in the idea that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal
sense or meaning, another sense or meaning.60
The linguist, Lakoff (1993: 203), argues that locus of metaphor is not in language at
all, but rather in the way one mental domain is conceptualised in terms of another.
Thus metaphor is cross-domain thinking, while metonymy is a trope in which a part
stands for the whole, while operating in one domain only. Lakoff sees mental life as
being founded on underlying, archetypal 'conventional' metaphors, or 'mappings
across conceptual domains' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 245). 61 This formulation
accords with the philosophical analysis offered by Hintikka (1990), who speaks of
meaning lines drawn using ideas of similarity and continuity and connecting different
possible worlds. Meaning lines in metaphor have to be anchored in one world of
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literal reference, while another is mentioned which need not be the actual world.
Hence metaphor is not a matter of truth or of a special kind of language act.
Ryan (1991) in fact concludes that metaphor does not involve relocation to a new
system of reality, since any meaning that originates in the metaphor world is reflected
back towards the Actual World; and that, therefore, 'this return to the Actual World
excludes metaphor from the realm of fiction' (Ryan 1991: 82, Appendix 32). This
position is puzzling, since extended metaphorical narratives especially those with
complex systems of thought, such as the utopian novel, allegory or fantasy, have an
exiguous relationship to the Actual World. We enter them for some considerable
time, and they continue to exist fictionally in our minds in their own right62
Nussbaum's (1986, 1990) hermeneutic account of the Greek morality and drama
depicts the play as a form of metaphorical statement whose primary message cannot be
experienced in any other way. Fox (1990) makes metaphor central to her account of
how children's thinking develops from its origins in narrative (see Appendix 16). But
it is Ryan (1991, 1995abc, 1996, 1997) who offers the most coherent taxonomy for
the place of metaphor in thinldng about possibility.
14. Cross-domain thinking
Cross-domain thinking has been central to ideas of the metaphorical exploration of
possible worlds, but those concerned with the theories of multiple intelligence have
also taken a particular interest in its relationship with creativity (Perkins 1984,
Sternberg 1988b). It has an important link with theories of humour (Koestler 1964).
Conjectural thinking involves cross-domain and cross-intelligence thinking according
to some writers. Kornahaber and Gardner (1991: 161) claim to identify various
thinkers who 'working across their multiple intelligences' have come up with
innovative thinking in science concerning dinosaurs, or empathetic writing in history.
63 Innovative individuals contribute to the changing the definition of genres as, say,
in the case of the appearance of the 'psychological western'. Gardner (1995) follows
Kuhn (1970) in acknowledging the importance of incommensurability and 'paradigm
shift' in this process:
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Indeed the individuals we consider the most creative actually change the nature of the
domain. (Gardner 15)64
Bresson (1991) claims that transfers between specific kinds of intelligence result when
relationships established in various fields are analysed in 'an absiractive system'. A
new kind of knowledge may arise, as when Pauling crossed sub-disciplines in science
in his discovezy that sickle cell anaemia was a 'molecular' disease (Hager 1995). 65
However, Bresson believes that it is not possible to teach creative thinking, since there
is no certainty that transfer will occur even when the processes gone through are
identical. 66
 Others claim that a modest capacity for flexible, cross-domain thinldng
can be taught, by employing 'transferring' skills and good subject knowledge (Bailin
1994, Bridges 1994, 1996).
15. Connectionism and computing
Various conceptions of worlds, as models, domains, schema, frames, micro-worlds
and so forth, have special importance in connectionist accounts of computing theory
and human learning (Eysenck and Keane 1997:249). The links between creativity,
artificial intelligence and computing are stressed by Boden (1992: 129) who sees the
brain as a 'workshop of the possible' and envisages that connectionist research,
although in its infancy, will provide important break-throughs (131). Caillot (1991)
stresses the possibiist uses of computing which can put students in situations which
launch them on a process of exploration with minimal guidance.
The interesting fact about microworids is that exploration can lead directly to model
building and it reflects that consiructivist view that We understand the world we live in by
building up mental pictures for ourselves.' (98)
A similar claim for microworlds as a form of connectionist 'mental modelling' is
advanced by Papert (1980). 67 MacClure (1991) and Caillot (1991:95-101)
specifically identify the area of information technology as offering an exemplification
of the 'infusion' approach to the teaching of thinking. There are also close links
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between connnectionist computing and stochastic process, as will now be
demonstrated.
16. Stochastic thought
The question was raised earlier, in relation to Fogel's work, of how a successful
counter-intuitive conditional hypothesis, challenging an established and 'self-evident'
fact, gets to be chosen from what appear to be innumerable options. The role of
stochastic process and thin/dng, it can be argued, is central to what is going on.
Stochastic process is a mathematic-statistical model describing sequences of outcomes.
It occurs especially where there is thought to be a random element - one which usually
is found to subsume a large number of (often minor) causal influences - 'the net effect
of which is a quasi-random disturbance of outcomes' (Johnston et al 1994: 594).
'Random' in such accounts has a technical meaning contrary to normal usage, namely
that a result is expected in which a pattern, or logical form or order will be discovered.
if the probability of being in a state at a particular time is wholly dependent upon the
states at some previous time(s) it is said to be a Markov process, and can be
represented by a transition probability matrLr.
Stochastic thinking will not be confined to one or two subjects in the curriculum which
deal with complex probability theory, chaos theory and calculations as does
mathematics (Hoel et al 1972). It is applied in virtual history as has been described,
in the geography of land-use (Collins et a! 1974), in physical education, science,
geography and economics. The specialised form of the stochastic known as Markov
process is required by all subjects in the curriculum which, like music, involve
improvisation or creativity in responding to a developing scenario (Budd 1985). 68
Its manifestation is especially clearly seen in musical thinking. Budd draws heavily
on the stochastic concept from Meyer (1956, 1969) in his philosophical analysis of
musicological theory.
In the first place, a musical work is not only a stochastic process - a system that produces a
sequence of elements according to certain probabilities - it is a Markoff process - a
stochastic process in which the probabilities depend upon the previous elements. (68)
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The connectionist psychologists, Garnham and Oakhill (1994:251) and Johnson-Laird
(1986, 1988, 1993), give a similar account of stochastic expertise and creativity within
the jazz field. Berliner (1995), in his epistemological study of the thinking of jazz
musicians, claims jazz improvisation to be the complex, musicological equivalent of
canonical, improvised oral story-telling (see chapter 5). 69
17. Play
A further aspect of the stochastic concerns wit and ready-witted.ness, which can be
viewed as specialised forms of stochastic improvisation, similar to play, for
construing cross-domain, possible worlds (Koestler 1964, Thornbury 1998). 70
'Ready-wittedness' is regarded by Aristotle as an important disposition within the
virtues of social intercourse (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: 103).
Wit has similarities with play as defined by Huizinga (1995) in the worlds it explores:
play is not ordinary or real life. It is a free activity standing outside of ordinary life,
in which a distinctive order reigns. Such post-modem notions of play and
improvisation, Gallagher (1992:47) argues, are essential to hermeneutic activity in the
educational process. Play is what allows the student to undertake self-narrative, in
the Gadamerian sense of relinquishing old meaning and capturing new meaning. The
pedagogical importance of play is that 'it bestows reality on the unreal and gives
weight to that which is possible or fanciful'. The post-modernist emphasis on
'intertextuality' and 'bricolage' fits such a model of stochastic improvisation and play.
Damasio (1994) identifies the stochastic neurological mechanism which undertakes the
'winnowing of a large mass of possible structures to leave the one best conjecture'.
In Descartes' Error, he shows how an emotional response, the 'somatic marker', is
learned unconsciously which enables subjects to direct their choices consciously and
correctly. 71 The critical relevance of wit to notions of causal disposition and virtue
ethics will be discussed in chapter 5.	 However, from these and other sources we
can derive an account of how stochastic and possible worlds thinldng might inter-act
in the classroom.
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18. Embodied thinking
Are the possible worlds of philosophical thinking and sensibility restricted to language
and speech? Pinker (1994) argues, in The Language Instinct, that thinking is largely
free of linguistic constraints; it may take place in other ways than language, and it is
not necessary for people to use a particular language in order to think. Damasio's
(1997) empirical finding, that the basic neural device which instantiates the sense of a
thinking self does not require language, is similar:
The meta-self I envision is purely non-verbal. ....Humans have available second order
narrative capacities, provided by language, which can engender verbal narratives Out of non-
verbal ones. (243)
Damasio attacks what he characterises as the Cartesian error; the assumption of a
disembodied mind, res cogirans or the thinking thing, as an activity separate from the
non-thinking body. 73 He points out that in anosognosic patients, who are unable to
acknowledge their disease as the result of an inability to sense physical defect after a
stroke, there is no evidence of emotion and feeling (62-9). Damasio thus moves a
philosophical debate forward onto more secure empirical ground, supportive of
previous inter-disciplinary attempts at Explaining Emotions (Rorty 1980).
A related empirical area, bearing on the body-self question in philosophy, concerns the
possibility of the transfer of thought (and emotion) through synaesthesia (Baron-
Cohen and Harrison 1997, Cytowic 1995, Gardner 1993). Cytowic (1995) shows
empirically how both cognition and affect can be translated into other sensory
modalities. His explanation for this is that researchers have in the past placed too little
emphasis on the contribution of the limbic or 'emotional' brain. 74
 For example, the
virtuoso thinker and physicist Feynman relied on synaesthetic 'thinking' for some of
his most complex, creative insights (Gleick 1992). The neuro-biological and
psychological evidence (Clark 1997, Cytowic 1995), taken with the arguments of
phenomenological philosophers, can be developed to support the case for thinking of
the person as a body-self concerned with the 'felt meaning of the world' and a
'metaphysics of feeling (Wilshire 1991: 237-244).
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Bryan and Assiter (1993) argue a similar philosophical case that in the 17th and 18th
century 'physical education' became devalued. Enlightenment commitment to
universal, context independent knowledge and reasons elevated the mind over the
body (25). They urge that this inbalance should be redressed in the approach to
thinking in education. Forms of philosophical and other thinking should take place in
'Aristotelian dress' in which 'the knower is transformed in the process of gaining
knowledge in the way that a craft worker is changed as he gains understanding and
skill in the practice of his craft' (39).
The argument that philosophical and transferable thinking involves the full physical
person and self is further argued by Dreyfus (1995), Macann (1993) and aark
(1997), in relation to the ontology of Merleau-Ponty (1962). 75 Merleau-Ponty
proposes that synthaesthesia is the central device in the shaping of the body-self as a
person.
Since the body is a unity, each of the senses operates as a unity, unifying the world in its
own distinctive fashion. More, beneath the discrimination of the several worlds opened by
the different senses we fmd an intersensory unity, a synaesthesia which is the sensory
counterpart of the synthesis of the body. (quoted in Macann 1993: 182)76
Mclaren (1986, 1989, 1996) makes the educational case that thought is conveyed
through the preoccupation with the body-self, ritual performance, symbols and gesture
found in the 'political economy' of student, youth and school cultures. Egan (1997:
5) asserts that of the five core aspects of children's educational development asserts:
'our body is the most fundamental mediating tool that shapes our understanding.'
19. Multiple identity
Can possible worlds and counter-factual thinking occur in the form of more than one
identity or intelligence? Conceptions of multiple intelligence, multi sensory and
synaesthetic 'thinldng' may be linked with the phenomenon of multiple personality or
identity. Empathetic ubiquity in conjuring up counter-factual identity can be seen as
the obverse side to the pathological forms of depression, depersonalisation, and
dissociative identity disorder recognised in abnormal psychiatry.
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This can best be seen through a literary example. Fernando Pessoa (1974, 1992), a
major Portuguese poet and novelist of the twentieth century now seen as the successor
to Camoes, wrote poems under four names and different identities. Pessoa's novel
The Book of Disquiet exemplifies the theme of metaphysical ubiquity in authorship
based on positive moods of the depersonalisation of self and empathy with characters
(Pontiero 1992). 78 Pessoa's oeuvre exemplifies, in literary practice, what
philosophers of possible worlds Parfit (1988) and Kaplan (1979) describe as 'trans-
world heir lines', and computing theorists as 'ubiquitous teleembodiment' (Paulos
and Canny 1997). It is the afflimative aspect of the depersonalisation suffered by Mill
(see chapter 8); and at a higher level of afflatus it may appear as mystical apprehension
and writing along Blakean lines. It may also manifest as an unacceptable denial of
responsibility for the deconstructed, multiple self (see section 21 below).
Further neurological and psychological research into multiple intelligence,
synaesthesia, and multiple personality, may provide philosophical possible worlds
with an increasingly firm, empirical foundation. Such developments as those already
described do however, underline the argument of Dennett (1996: 148), cited in chapter
1, that philosophers need to take much more interest in empirical links between the
philosophy of identity and the findings of neuro-science.
Post-modernist and feminist claims for a different way of exploring identity through
the possible worlds of computing in 'hyperspace' are advanced by Turkie (1996),
Harraway (1991), and Plant (1997). Turkie, in her dual role as a practicing psycho-
analyst and Professor of the Sociology of Science at MiT, approves the fact that
multiple, possible worlds of identity are now available through the medium of the
Web, as a 'parallel world'(45). She claims that 'raptures of multiplicitous being' and
multiple identity can be achieved through computing on the multi-user domains
(MUDS) of the World-Wide Web (257). This phenomenon in literature and
computing is described by Ryan (1995a, 1995b, 1997) as the post-modernist 'doctrine
of pan-fictionality'. 80
 However, the computing perspectives display an important
shortcoming - in that they do not address the important question of how the
Aristotelian and neuroscientific requirements for embodiment are to be met.
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20. Memory as previous knowledge
Memory as a form of possible world has a very important part to play in conceptions
of continuous personal identity, multiple selves and narrative. Notions of conditional,
counter-factual or possible worlds are especially evident in medieval theories of mind
and memory drawn from Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy. The 'art of memory'
is uniquely dependent on the manufacture of interior possible worlds, which are
spatially conceived as Yates (1966) shows in her portrayal of medieval memory
systems. Bloom (1994) argues that a literary canon, the remembering and ordering of
a lifetime's reading, is a form of memory 'theatre' system. 81
Research in psychological and reading development demonstrates that memory and
previous knowledge are crucial in the making of inferences (Casteel and Simpson
1991, Fincher-Kiefer 1992). The presence of remembered facts and previous
knowledge recalled from another subject area, is crucial for creative cross-domain
thinking, as Hager (1995) shows for the case of Linus Pauling. Neisser (1989)
identifies the narrative importance of memory in creating autobiographical worlds.
Hacking (1995), in a philosophical analysis of multiple personality and dissociative
identity disorder, argues that there is a sense in which the past can be changed by new
interpretations of it: and so there can be truths about the past which were not true in the
past (249). 82 If Hacking is correct, memory is more central to epistemic counter-
factual thinking and the formation of ethical dispositions than has been traditionally
thought. The role of recovered memory, in restoring past worlds or constructing new
worlds from them, emerges as a significantly ambiguous form of conditional thinking
in this context (Garry et a! 1996). Luria (1987) also shows, in his study of a
synaesthetic mnemonist, how cross-sensory interference or the inability to forget or to
organise one's memory, can create the severest personal difficulties. Memory needs
to be given more careful attention in relation to possible worlds and counter-factual
thinking than has so far been the case.
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21. Ethical pitfalls
There are pitfalls for educators and philosophers, in uncritical acceptance of talk about
possible worlds, multiple being and memory, previous knowledge and identity. The
case can certainly be made out that the pathological model of multiple personality, of
dissociative identity disorder has been too prominent, and that normal people should
regard themselves as having 'draft identities'- in a phrase of Dennett's (1996).
However, the relativistic weakening o notions of personal identity, in favour of multi-
identity accounts, may be unhelpful in the educational setting. There is a danger that a
young child's grasp of reality, of jurisprudential, ethical or moral accountability, could
be weakened by a pedagogic style which takes such a relativist viewpoint (Davison
and Neale 1996: 184-5). 83
Evans (1997) points up this problem in relation to the study of history. An over-
commitment of receptivity to 'multiple voices' in post-modern history, Evans points
out, could result in a vulnerability to hoax and propaganda claims such as an
alternative historj of Holocaust denial (291-3). While welcoming the extension of
historical technique, Evans sees epistemological dangers which can arise from
acquiescence in the notion of self as multiple identity. Paul de Man's exposure as a
Nazi sympathiser raises the issue in an acute form. Dc Man invoked a post-modem
'deconstructionist' truth claim to justify his former identity as a war-time
collaborationist:
'And it is never possible to decide which of the two possibilities is the right one. The
indecision makes it possible to excuse the bleakest of crimes because, as a fiction, it
escapes from the constraints of guilt and innocence. The experience always exists
simultaneously as fictional discourse and empirical event' (Dc man quoted in Evans 234).
A pressing and difficult question for educators, therefore, will concern guide-rules for
approaching the 'wilder shores' of conjecture or discourse in teaching a particular
school subject. How ispossibilism to be translated into pedagogy while avoiding the
encouragement of febrile, 'inauthentic' or relativistic speculation? Are elegance and
rhetoric, as in the case of Baroque or Rococo art, to be valued as much in aesthetic
possible worlds as conciseness and brevity? The potential for being facile or over-
elaborate, cannot be disarmed by simply adducing the principle of Occam's Razor, as
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Forrest (1982: 456-464) argues. For if, as can be shown, this actual world contains
'redundancy', so therefore must the many other possible worlds.
The chapter concludes by discussing the pedagogic and curricular implications of
implementing an approach which lays stress on possibiistic thinking within a
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum.
22. Implications for the philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum
What are the implications for those devising and teaching a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curricuiwn? Possible worlds and counter-factual thinking have proved
highly relevant to the curriculum and pedagogy of philosophy teaching at the
university level (Appendix 30). In Possible Worlds, Bradley and Swartz (1979)
show how some philosophical problems can, uniquely, be solved by the application of
the possible worlds approach. For example they offer a proof using modal logic to
solve the traditional problem of whether justified belief in a true proposition constitutes
knowledge (Appendix 3).
Edgington (in Thombury 1997a) takes the view that this type of heuristic is of central
importance in philosophical pedagogy, and relevant to all pedagogy. However, while
its presence can be seen in science, mathematics, history and philosophy teaching at
the university level, philosophical work on conditionals and possible worlds has not
yet influenced work in schools and colleges. Examination of the standard critical
thinking texts for schools and colleges reveals only rare and cursory mention of
counter-factuals (Hughes 1996). There is considerable scope for a shift in
professional practice.
There are particular implications to be drawn out for the approach to the pre-
philosophical curriculum in a school or college. 85 As Gilbert and Swift (1985: 681-
696) argue, any complex, coherent and self-consistent set of beliefs and classroom
practices will require considerable attention to alternative conceptions. So that while a
canonical approach to pedagogy will be advocated (see chapter 6), it will need to be
based on the flexible, 'provisional dogmas' of transcendental realism (see chapter 3).
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Conjecture can be linked with the classroom notions of imagination or inventiveness,
and contingent post-formal thinking involving metaphor, playfulness and irony. 86 It
will generate a new view of creativity. 87
 Traditional accounts of memory will be
amended. 88
Using modal realism as an underpinning for a pedagogic model allows an improved
philosophical explanation of the role of play in education. The role of play or
playfulness, speculation, and whimsy in formulating possible worlds of modal logic
and imagination can be seen as closely similar to the 'play' of child development
theory. 89 Post-modern 'playfulness' in stochastic thinking will be as important in
the secondary school or college as in the primary classroom, where it is presumed to
occur 'naturally'. Kincheloe and Sternberg (1993) argue for a teaching disposition in
which such 'playful' post-formal thinking features prominently. 90
Some cun-iculum theory and research has begun to attend to this need. Marton
(1992), in transferring his phenomenographic method to English studies, found
'reflective variation' and 'elaborative' variations developing as ways of understanding
a Kafka parable. Brezina (1996) uses counter-factual thinking in teaching Rawlsian
and other notions of equality as a sociological topic. A pedagogy for history teaching
offered by Leinhardt (1995) is discussed in chapter 8, in which post-modem
tentativeness, ludic uncertainty, and ostensive definition are empirically combined.91
Implications arise for subject teachers when possibiist thinking is given more
prominence. The ground rules for thinking counter-factually are set by the
professionality, social practices, intellectual traditions and forms of knowledge of
individual subject disciplines. The refming of one's approach to possible worlds,
'stochastic', hypothetical and conjectural thinking is therefore most likely to be worked
out within the social and professional practices of a particular subject tradition, as
argued in their different ways by Hirst (1993), Kuhn (1970), Nussbaum (1990),
Maclntyre (1981) and Rorty et al (1984).
All curriculum subjects will need to be rigorous and systematic in their approach to the
genres of thinking or discourse in the subject specialism; and especially in encouraging
speculation about, or in confronting the ineffable and intractable. For example,
aesthetic aspects of the art curriculum involving conditionals will, for instance, be
emphasised (see chapter 5).	 Talk among children, in science lessons about the
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possible worlds envisaged in cosmology or uncovered by nano-technologies, in
geography about the 'provisionality of explanation', or in health education about
personal identity, will all be encouraged (see chapter 6).
Different emphases will arise, however, in different subject areas in a possible worlds
approach to constructivist practice and pedagogy. The 'strong version' will be more
phenomenographic and incline to prescription in the form of 'right next steps' or
answers. It would pertain to topics where progression in children's understanding
has already been well-documented and shown, subject to individual variations in
'cognitive' or learning style, to follow a universal pattern. Midway would come
subjects like history where fairly stringent guidelines for possibilist and other thinking
in the subject area are laid down through canonical procedures - for example,
following the 'rules' for historical speculation set out by Hawthorn. Guidelines for
values education in the dispositions, for example, might emphasise more the
possibility of transformative, utopian change in societies (Morton 1969, Rees 1996).
93 The teacher will often deal with both phenomenographically fmite solutions, and
textual deconsiruction justifying a plurality of response, in the same lesson. Children
will be encouraged both to generate their own 'spontaneous' conjectures and to apply
phenomenographic rules as it were. The two approaches are not incompatible but
complementary.	 Science education, for instance, contrary to popular expectation,
abounds with dilemma and uncertainty (Fensham 1988).
Pedagogic practice will reflect the notion that personal identity is realised through the
body-self; synaesthetically, through multiple intelligence, and the exercise of
'cognitive emotions' such as empathy. The concept of the embodied mind entails a
more important place for the arts subjects, technology and physical education and sport
(Hyland 1990, 1998, Weiss 1969,Varela et al 1991). The narivist perspective on
body-self in psychology (Donald 1991, Ohman 1997:253), in which certain concepts
are thought to be modally and genetically endogenous, as in the case of speech or
parenting, will affect the approach to personal and social education.
Any assumption that subjects are divided into two domains, cognitive subjects and
affective subjects, should be eschewed. Bruner (1986) is mistaken about there being
two different ways of approaching reality: the scientific responding to thinking about
cause and effect, and the literary which is concerned with making 'possible worlds'
(see chapter 3). All subject study will involve cognitive and affective counter-factual
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thinking, and the dispositions (see chapter 5). A subject specialist 	 a cross-
curricular strategy will be required (see chapter 6).
23. Curriculum resources
There are considerable implications for the type of curriculum resources which are
used if a more possibilistic teaching approach is introduced. Teachers and lecturers
will need draw up guidelines as to how speculation concerning possibiia is to proceed
in the study of their specialism, its forms of internal discourse and genres (see chapter
7). Such curriculum resources will include examination syllabuses, intervention
materials and classroom texts, together with sources from the general and popular
culture. This will involve re-appraisal of curriculum and departmental documents,
and of one's pedagogic and subject stance and the type of teaching resource which is
chosen (chapter 7). 95 For example, Seier's (1994) argument that young children's
syllogistic reasoning is superior when undertaken in the context of a 'fantasy' text
supports those who like Egan (1994), Lowe (1994), Matthews (1978, 1980), Murris
(1992) or Nussbaum (1990, 1994), favour the use of 'real books' in approaching
philosophical topics.
The Appendices to this study have been designed as resources in philosophical and
pedagogic thinking which help in such a review process. Hawthorn's (1991)
approach is, for example compatible with the Cambridge History Pilot Scheme (1992)
'assessment domains' (Appendix 14). Shemilt's (1998) schema for empathetic
thinking sets counter-factual criteria (Appendix 21). Newmann's (1990) account of
'classroom thoughtfulness' will encourage counter-factual thinking in the form of
'original and unconventional ideas, explanations and hypotheses' in social studies (see
Appendix 10). Berrill has a special place for the hypothetical in her typology for the
assessment of thought in written English (Appendix 8).
	 'Alternative theories' and
'frameworks' in generating hypotheses in science and technology teaching feature in
the social constructivism of Driver (1983, Appendix 13).
Curriculum resources for the younger children in particular should be multi-sensory.
As Murns (1993c and 1993d) shows, the visual presentation of fictional stories
stimulates imaginative philosophical apprehension in young children. 97
 Any
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approach should draw from a variety of media. However, it should be borne in mind
that the selection and design of curriculum materials for the teaching of philosophical
thinking introduces a new dimension into curriculum theory and studies. It is likely to
require much work and cannot be lightly undertaken (see chapters 6-8). 98
24. Valued possibilities
The importance of a metaphysic of possibility for educators reflects not just the ideas
of philosophers working in the field of conditionals, but also the transcendental
realism of Bhaskar (chapter 3), and the praxis of many teachers. Ontologically, it
resonates with Sartre's notion of personal 'becoming' and 'facticity'; and with
Heidegger's central theses in Being and Time.	 As Kekes claims: 'the greater the
plurality of valued possibilities, the better it is for us', since their pursuit will be linked
with the value of traditions and the good lives we may live by adhering to them (1993:
29). Wittgenstein's mistake' of not entertaining a sufficient plurality of possible
worlds can thus be avoided. The ethical aspects of dispositional possibility will then
emerge as having great importance. It is that implication which is pursued in the
chapter which follows.
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Notes to chapter 4
1 The term stochostic is used by various thinkers discussed in this study, among them
being Budd (1985), Fogel (1970, 1983), Ferguson (1997), Hager (1995), Hoe! et al
(1972) and Pool (1996). Usage varies. Fogel, for example, uses the notion
metaphorically as simple 'randomness'. Technically, there are two types of stochastic
process which arise in mathematics, computing, economics, geography, musicology,
and other domains. These are the Bernoulli sequence, a sequence of trials in which all
trials are probabilistic and independent of one another, and the Markov process, when
the probabilities for a trial may depend conditionally on the outcome of the previous
trial. Techniques of 'fuzzy logic' (Kosko 1994) may be required to deal with such
data. Conjecture in mathematics is a formal technique involving thought within a
deductive system (Honderich 1995: 852).
2 There are numerous instances among recent films and literary fiction, for instance
the films Jurassic Park (the return of pre-historic animals) and Groundhog Day (in
which the same day keeps repeating itself). See Nixon and Logue (1994) History in
Action: Hypotheticals for an example of a school television History Programme; and
Hypotheticals (Millson 1994) for a transcript of an adult TV broadcast 'hypothetical'
on medical ethics.
3 In an interview with David Benedict (1996) Jonathan Miller observes: 'I've always
felt there is something deeply serious about playfulness. Science itself has a ludic
element. You are tinkering around, setting up hypotheses..Science and theatre are
both what you would call counter-factual enterprises. What you do is set up a
hypothetical situation and say: what would it be like if this, that or the other were the
case?' An early literary provenance is found in Edgar Allan Poe, and a scientific one
in the work of Giordano Bruno.
4 Clark (1995: 200-11) provides a valuable classified bibliography separately listing
science, poetry and philosophical works. Ayckbourn has written plays with branching
plots featuring a different ending according to the day of performance. Dramatists and
performers discussed by Counsell (1996) reflect such 'possible worlds' topics as the
brealdng of the empathic link between actor and spectator through distanciation or
alienation, the use of two contradictory discourses in Brecht (102-5); the question of a
universal language in Brook's Orghast (156-7); the notion of a timeless world in
Robert Wilson's Theatre of Visions (187-196); serial discontinuity of identity in
Beckett (127); and 'random' performance art (220-22).
5 Dudman in Jackson ed. (1991: 204). Work of an empirical nature on counter-
factuals has also been undertaken on an increasing scale, and reported in a growing
literature by cognitive psychologists. One can also link the idea of thinking modally
with new psychological theories, such as that of Gardner (1993) that intelligence
appears in different forms, sites or sensory modalities. This study argues for the
application of advances in this philosophical specialism to the broader sphere of
philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum.
6 l'his is significant change in 'philosophical style', the notion portrayed by Lang
(1990). I am grateful to John Divers, of the Philosophy Department, University of
Leeds, for a picture of the social movement and intellectual aspects of this renascent
scholasticism. Curiously, the contribution of Catholic philosophers is not dominant as
might have been expected.
7 Edgington's (1995: 235-33 1) State of the Art review, On Conditionals, is
comprehensive. See also O'Leary-Hawthorne (1996).
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8 A positive feature of this account is said to be that it explains why we count someone
who asserts that if A then B as disagreeing with someone who asserts that if A not B.
For we can say that, if the conditional probability of B given A is one minus the
conditional probability of not B given A, it means that 'if A then B' is highly assertable if
and only if 'if A then not-B' is less assertable.
9 Some other philosophers and critics, such as Naylor (1986) and Perszyk (1989)
claim that Lewis's argument could apply equally to 'impossible worlds'.
10 The worlds are something like remote planets; except that most of them are much
bigger than mere planets. They are not remote; neither are they nearby...They are not
at any spatial distance whatever from here. They are not far in the past or future, nor
for that matter neal; they are not at any temporal distance whatever from now' (22).
Lewis goes on to claim that these worlds are isolated; there are no spatio-temporal
relations at all between things that belong to different worlds. Nor does anything that
happens at one world cause anything to happen at another. 'They do not overlap,
having no parts in common, with the exception, perhaps, of immanent universals
exercising their characteristic privilege of repeated occurrence' (22).
11 Maudlin (1996: 669-682) argues that Lewis's conception of possible worlds as
concrete particulars isolated by lack of spatio-temporal connectedness cannot be
maintained. No matter how many copies of such indiscernible worlds there are, there
could be more, a possibility which Lewis's theory cannot represent.
12 See Lewis (1986: 136).
13 Lewis points out that in the last two decades philosophers have offered a great
many more analyses that make reference to possible worlds, or to possible individuals
that inhabit possible worlds: 'I think it is clear that talk of possibilia has clarified
questions in many parts of the philosophy of logic, of mind, of language, and of
science - not to mention metaphysics itself. Just as the realm of sets is for
mathematicians, so logical space is a paradise...! would wish to argue, for
philosophers' (Lewis 1986: 3).
14 The pedagogic response to this question is a critical matter in relation to the
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriczdwn: both for the primary teacher, in relation
to young children's approach to logical thinking, and for the specialist subject teacher
in defining the ground-rules for thinking in a particular subject or discourse.
15 Many thinkers have identified probabilities through a stochastic process which may
be unconscious and intuitive. Poincare, for instance, dreamt solutions in mathematics
after drinking coffee. Damasio (1994: 188-189) offers a neurological explanation for
the phenomenon in Descartes' Error.
16 Stalnaker's approach is remarkably similar to the hypothetico-deductive method of
Fogel (1970, 1983, 1989), whose work is discussed below. Fogel was working
before the development of conditionals and possible worlds theory in philosophy and
can be seen as an empirical precursor of what Jackson (1991:7) and Stalnaker (1976:
65-75) prescribe.
17 'I take it that the subjunctive mood in English and some other languages is a
conventional device for indicating that pre-suppositions are being suspended, which
means in the case of subjective conditional statements, that the selection function is one
that may reach outside of the context set' (Stalnaker in Jackson 1991: 145). This is an
exact model of what can be seen in Fogel's quantitative, and Hawthorn's qualitative
work in history, as is shown below.
18 However, an important question, addressed by Ferguson (1997) and Ryan (1991),
then arises as to how many prior antecedents can reasonably be introduced, especially
in the context of particular forms of knowledge, discourse or genre.
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19 'Parallel universes have existed in the fantasies of science fiction writers probably
ever since the genre began. Parallel or distorted duplication of what already exists is
indeed an important feature of parallel universes according to the way some physicists
view them' (Wolf 1988:27). Deutsch (1997) in The Fabric of Reality makes the
same case from the point of view of theoretical quantum physics, and the research
discipline of quantum computing. According to Deutsch we do not need other deep
theories to tell that parallel universes exist, since single particle interference phenomena
in quantum physics tells us that: 'The quantum theoiy of parallel universes is not the
problem, it is the solution. It is not some troublesome, optional interpretation
emerging from arcane theoretical considerations. It is the explanation - the only one
that it is tenable - of a remarkable and counter-intuitive reality' (Deutsch 51). See also
De Witt, Biyce and Neill (1973) in The Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics.
20 'Let me sum up the elements of the quantum concept of time. Time is not a
sequence of moments, nor does it flow. Yet our intuitions about the properties of time
are broadly true. Certain events are indeed causes and effects of one another. Relative
to an observer, the future is indeed open and the past fixed, and possibilities do
become actualities. The reason why our traditional theories of time are nonsense is
that they try to express these true intuitions within the framework of a false classical
physics. In quantum physics they made sense, because time was a quantum concept
all along' (Rees: 287). The physicist's claim is one of transcendental realism; for, as
Rees observes, the idea of 'eternal inflation' in cosmology which informs such
thinking may be speculative, but it is highly pragmatic. Quantum theory undoubtedly
works for physicists, who apply it confidently but unreflectively: 'the average
quantum mechanic is no more philosophical than the average motor mechanic'(256).
21 As Edgington points out, Lewis has no school of followers who accept his claim
that all possible worlds exist. Yet the new claim of mainstream quantum physics,
mathematics and cosmology amounts to just that. I am grateful to Dr Azam
Mashhadi, of Oxford University, for correspondence and insights into the
mathematical and scientific literature on this topic.
22 Reporting on the results of experiments to test Sheldrake's ideas, Tudge (1994:
42) points out the difficulty that 'results have been mixed: some are promising, some
not,.
23 Hawthorn's approach is innovative in terms of critical thinking and history.
Compare Karras's (1987) more traditional approach. Ferguson's (1997) anthology of
professional historians' attempts at counter-factual history illustrates the strengths of
the approach, and the weaknesses that arise when insufficient rigour or inauthenticity
are allowed expression.
24 'Don't alter so much as to require a wholly different world unrolling itself from the
start. Don't pretend that the future could have been foreseen at the time of the event.
Always ask, of any situation involving human agents, 'could these men, in the
circumstances in which they found themselves, with the information that was available
to them, have acted other than they did?" (Hawthorn 1991: 158). See Strauss (1988)
for a discussion of Hawthorn's 'sensible rules'.
25 He shows, for instance, that Braudel was mistaken in saying that the biological
regime in pre-modern Europe was fore-ordained; that fertility in 17th century France,
far from being 'natural', can be demonstrated to have been affected by particular sets
of social arrangements. He looks at the origins of US intervention in Vietnam in
similar terms.
Armstrong (1986) argues that possibilities are combinations of actually existing
elements, so that possibility is dependent upon actuality. Exception is made,
however,for the possibility of further individuals: but not for further properties and
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relations. This argument has implications, in my view, for the anthropic account of
cosmologists. The Great Chain of Being theory (Lovejoy 1936) concentrated on
inhabited possible worlds. See Bacon et al (1993) concerning discussion of
combinatorialism.
27 Evans (1997) is critical, for instance, of Braudel's view of history as consisting of
slow-moving cycles; and wishes to say that history produces generalisations, not laws
which are predictive (60). Evans cites, as an example of the dangers of historicist
prediction, his own failure in 1989 to predict the fail of the Berlin Wall and collapse of
the Soviet Union (Evans 1989: 105-6). Nevertheless, historicist but 'real' phenomena
such as the Kondrarieff Cycle, waves of economic development with a length of about
40-60 years, suggest that the scope for improved prediction, just as with weather
forecasting, will partly depend on the technology available (Johnston 1994: 305-6).
2 'Generalisable answers of what we conventionally think of as a causal kind have
ceased to be persuasive. The causal connections or runnings-on that we have been
able to detect in human states of affairs have turned out either to have to be phrased at a
level that is so general as to be insufficiently informative and not address our interests
in explanation; or to be so conditional as not to be general; or, when they have
generated testable predictions, to be false' (Hawthorn 1991: 160).
29 He cites Lewis concerning Aristotle's observation that practical wisdom is not
concerned with universals only; it must also recognise particulars, for it is practical and
practice concerns particulars. Practical reasoning is done by particular agents in the
light of their particular experiences and the particular circumstances in which they find
themselves.
30 Ferguson (13) cites as an example the popular attribution of Richard Ill's fall to a
lost nail: For want of a nail, the shoe was lost, For want of a shoes the horse was lost,
For want of a horse the rider was lost, For want of a rider the battle was lost, For want
of a battle the kingdom was lost. This nursery rhyme is based on a chain syllogism,
thus supporting the claim that anticipatory socialisation through play and informal logic
can prepare for later work in philosophy and logic. Leinhardt (1993) shows that such
teaching is most effective when woven subtly into the cwriculum using professional
artistzy and judgement.
31 Ferguson (12-13) characterises this as 'the case of Cleopatra's nose' in which
Anthony's passion for her proboscis determines the fate of Rome. In a chapter on
what might have occurred if Hitler had successfully invaded England, he gives as an
example, of the failure of Stuka bombers over three days of intensive bombing to
demolish a five-foot wide causeway, enabling a defence force of half a million soldiers
to escape to England (299). Ferguson is accused in turn, by Clarke (1997), of
engaging in attenuated and 'tedious whimsy' in drawing on many threads of 'virtual
history'.
32 Driver (1982) emphasises the importance of the counter-intuitive in science
education.
33 See also Fogel and Elton (1983) and Fogel and Engerman (1989).
Although not without its critics, Fogel's method which claimed a 'virtually
unassailable' level of objectivity, has been attacked both methodologically and on the
grounds that, like Popper, he offers no scope for Kuhnian post-empiricism and
paradigm (Evans 1997:42).
.5 Scientific history differs from traditional history in three ways. It prefers a
systematic rather than a stochastic (sic), or conjectural description, of the general
subject matter; it favours the collective and the general over the unique and the
particular; and it values quantitative over literary evidence. 'That the data of economic
history are often fragmentary, does not preclude the formation of effective empirical
tests of quantitative hypotheses...All warranted statements regarding the contribution
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of railroads to economic growth must be based on hypothetico-deductive systems.
These statements invariably imply or explicitly contain a comparison between actual
events and relations, some of which can be (and were) observed, and those events and
relationships that would have obtained in the absence of railroads' (Fogel 1970: 245)
Fogel prefers 'multi-authored, collaborative projects' to a solitaiy, individualistic work
style. See Berkhofer (1985) on Fogel's (1983) debate with Elton over the merits of
his approach in their Which Road to the Past? Two Views of History.
3 Fogel's general philosophical stance on criteria of verification and falsiflabiity is
therefore similar to Popper's scientific, 'hypothetico-deductive' method. Corson
(1990:41-24) offers a worked example of the approach that Bhaskar takes. See
Ojborn and Bliss (1994) for a similar approach in science education and computing.
31 For example, in a medical study using data mining (Angoss 1996), surprising facts
emerged about the correlation between survival rates, the time taken to perform a
kidney transplant operation, and the length of time kidneys were stored on ice prior to
transplant. A study of mortgagees produced the counter-intuitive finding that
frequently-late payers were less likely to default than those who suddenly made one
late payment.
38 For example: 'it is easier to replace an exceptional outcome with a more normal
counterfactua.l alternative than it is to replace a normal outcome with an exceptional
counterfactual alternative' (Macrae et al 1993:221).
39 Within the considerable literature on this subject see Gleicher et al (1990), Miller
and Gunasegarami (1990) and Miller and McFarland (1986).
40 Byrne (1997: 217) shows how the mechanisms developed by psychologists to
account for deductive inference can be applied to what she calls 'imaginary counter-
factual thinking'; and that understanding our 'counter-factual musings' may lead to a
better understanding of thinking in other domains, such as dreaming.
41 McHale (1987: 33-8) makes the case for the relevance of possible worlds theory to
poetics. His study is of particular interest for the range of fiction he is able to identify
and for links he makes with the work of Lewis (1983a) and Pavel (1975, 1982,
1986).
42 Our understanding of the dynamics of narrative action can be greatly enhanced by
the work performed in artificial intelligence on the logic of plans and the interaction of
competing schemes (7).
43 'The first is our native system, and its central world is the actually actual world (or
more simply, the actual world), to which I shall henceforth refer as AW. The second
system is the textual universe, the sum of the worlds projected by the text. At the
centre of this system is the textual actual world, abbreviated as TAW. As a
representation proposed by the text, the textual universe must be distinguished from
the system it represents, which I shall call the referential universe. And just as the
textual universe is offered as an image of the referential universe, the textual actual
world TAW is proposed as an accurate representation of an entity external to itself, the
textual reference world, abbreviated as TRW... axioms concerning the three types of
actual world provide the basis for a possible world definition of flctionality' (24).
44 If Kripke says that possible worlds are stipulated not discovered, Putnam (1983)
argues, this allows us to separate accidental from essential properties. This is the type
of thought experiment conducted by Descartes with the 'cogito' in his Meditations.
However, this in turn raises a problem over whether a world with redundant elements,
such as occurs in natural languages, can be a stipulated possible world.
45 See also Eco (1979: 200-266) and Ryan (1991).
46 She provides stipulative criteria which reflect a 'folk psychology' account of belief
(Churchland 1994: 308) that novels are not histories (Appendices 26,27 & 28).
153
Hawthorn (1991: 167) says: 'If we were to ignore the conditions for inserting an
alternative starting point into the actual world or those for judging how the alternative
world would have run on; if we were instead to impose a general theory; the
possibilities we would be entertaining would be possibilities not for an actual, but for
what would itself be merely a possible. And at that point, our History or social
science would have dissolved into a literature of the imagination.' However, I
disagree with Hawthorn about the degree of latitude historical or specialist thinkers
should be occasionally permitted. Post-modern, playfulness and latitude can be
permitted as a sub-genre of historical scholarship, as is the case with some
contributions to Ferguson's (1997) anthology. In science the oeuvres of Arthur C.
Qarke, Jules Verne, Lakaxos (1971) or Feyerabend (1975, 1978) have much in
common. The divisibility of ersatz from real worlds becomes less easy to defend in
light of the science fiction of Verne, Wells or Arthur C. Clarke, whose books
anticipate later scientific developments. Folk psychology is used here in the sense of
'the pre-scientific, commonsense conceptual framework' that all normally socialised
humans deploy when approaching novels (Churchiand 1994: 308).
47 Her taxonomy could be extended to show how individual subject disciplines
display a similar variety to genres in their relationship with possible worlds speculation
and thinking. That is an important analysis, in my view, for educators to develop in
their pedagogy. The application of Ryan's typology to subject specialist areas is, in
my view, a pressing research agenda.
It has been claimed that thinking typically involves believing. Scruton (1983) has
argued that there is an important exception, which is marked by the features of
voluntariness and freedom from belief. This is the sort of imagination which consists
in entertaining a thought while not accepting it as true. Scientists, for example, as well
as historians and philosophers, often 'play' with an idea in attempting to throw light
on a practical or theoretical problem, while nevertheless aware that such a thought
might be false, even that it is false. They construct possible worlds. Thus concepts
are used in a way that depends precisely on an awareness of freedom from belief. A
Coleridgean 'willing suspension of disbelief seems to be involved here.
49 Kearney's (1988) detailed philosophical, aesthetic and historical survey is of
considerable interest.
50 Bricker (1987) deals with the proposal that reducing possible worlds to language
can be refuted by the cardinality argument, that there are more possible worlds than
there are linguistic entities provided by the proposal. He provides a method for
circumventing such an argument.
51 Fictionalism about possible worlds, according to Rosen (1993), is the view that
talk about worlds in the analysis of modality is to be construed as 'ontologically
innocent' discourse about the content of a fiction. A version of this view is defended
by Armstrong in his combinatorial theory of possibility. However, both Rosen's and
Armstrong's fictionalist accounts fail to be innocent, since they imply that as a matter
of necessity there exist many worlds.
52 I am grateful to Les Gottesman, of Golden Gate University, San Francisco, for
observations on this topic. The ground covered by philosophers of education (Snook
1972) is similar but the issue of 'inauthenticity' comes up more strongly in
propaganda, as the alteration of dispositions by counter-factual means.
3 Personal communication. I am grateful to Professor Peter Medway, of Carleton
University, Ottawa, for this and other comments.
54 This topic does not appear to have been treated by literary theorists or philosophers
in terms of its possible worlds applications.
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55 The various conceptions of worlds, domains, genres and other 'set theory' notions
relevant to applied philosophy and education are suggested as a suitable topic for
future research (see Overview and Prospects, page 279 of this study).
56 The assumptions of the New criticism, post-war English teaching establishment
are thereby refuted. Meaning is not encased or contained in language, but is co-
extensive with the play of language itself. The link between text and meaning is cut.
Authorial intention dissolves; and there can be no notion of some mystical interior of
the text in which a non-linguistic essence or 'meaning' can ultimately be found. But
here we have a problem: for it is just that claim of a central meaning which is only
apprehensible through experience of the text, even though it might be experienced
through a deconstructive approach, that Nussbaum appears to make. Some writers
emphasise the possibilities of authorial intention rather more, while still seeing the text
as a starting point only. Olson (1990: 442), for example, sees the central problem of
academic literacy as being the fact that 'reading can be viewed as a series of attempt to
overcome what is represented in script, which is how the speaker intended the text
to be understood'.
Shostack (1977) describes marketing entities as combinations of discrete elements,
consisting of tangible and intangible attributes. Most products are combinations of the
tangible and the intangible, Shostack argues; but in the case of a pure service, such as
a massage, the object of sale is an entirely intangible item. The tangible or intangible
may be more dominant, as seen on a continuum from products to services (Appendix
36). A dominant discourse concerning the marketing of services can be seen as very
close here to the possible worlds, and ontological pre-occupations of traditional
metaphysics and scholastic philosophy as described in chapter 1. The tenns being
used - intangible, attribute, element - are the very stuff of metaphysics as traJitionally
practiced.
)8 'It is a mistake to think of linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body and
metaphorical in its trimming. Metaphor, or something like it, governs both the growth
of language and our acquisition of it. What comes as a subsequent refinement is rather
cognitive discourse, at its most dryly literal. The neatly worked inner stretches of
science are an open space in the tropical jungle, created by clearing tropes away'
(Quine in Sacks ed. 1978: 60)
59 
'Such pleasure perhaps owes its origin to, and is enhanced by an echo from, the
metaphorical playfulness of childhood' (Swanson in Sacks, ed. 1978: 163).
60 'I think metaphor belongs exclusively to the domain of use. It is something
brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends
entirely on the ordinary meanings of these words and hence on the ordinary meaning
of the sentences they comprise'(Davidson in Sacks 1978:31)
61 Lakoff relies on the twin notions of conventional metaphors, those habitual in the
sense that Quine describes, and novel metaphors which are much rarer. This leads
him into an incomplete exegesis, however, when he claims that the dominant metaphor
of the well-known poem The Road not Taken (Frost 1955: 78, Appendix 38)
concerns journeying for 'long-term purpose full activities'. Another reading is that it
is a 'metaphysical poem' about aporia, in its Greek sense of a pathway that gives out
and therefore about choice concerning 'possible worlds'. (See again chapter 2 for
discussion of aporia and the ineffable).
62 For example, most people have had the experience of encountering a young person
who has read Animal Farm or Gulliver's Travels without becoming aware of the
allegorical or satirical dimension which corresponds to the Actual World of Ryan
(1991).
63 'In Robert Bakker's work, the logical-mathematical is used in the service of
interpreting dinosaur strides and extrapolating from this the possibility that these
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creatures were warm-blooded. Bakker's spatial intelligence helped him to visualise the
structure of dinosaur anatomy and to hypothesise about their metabolic rates'
(Kornhaber and Gardner: 161). Their reference is to Bakker's (1986) book The
Dinosaur Heresies.
64 Gardner (1995: 15). For a case study treatment of creative individuals see
Gardner's (1994) Creating Minds: an Anatomy of Creativity.
65 Mackay (1995: 53) explains Pauling's approach to stochastic thinking: Pauling's
style was that of a conquistador in the realm of science, much as Freud had claimed to
be. He developed what he called his 'stochastic' method for solving problems,
particularly for predicting the way in which atoms might arrange themselves to give a
crystal structure... Unfortunately, the word 'stochastic' now has a different meaning
-namely, determined by a random distribution of probabilities - soit gives the wrong
impression of Pauling's method. A classical consultant told him that the Greek word
meant 'skilful in aiming at, divining the answer.' If you are allowed to make an
educated guess, then it has to be as good a guess as possible, in accordance with all
the other facts that you already know. With a huge assembly of facts, Pauling could
reduce the possibilities to a manageable number. He was very often right...The
peculiar characteristic of crystallography is that any method of arriving at a preliminary
arrangement of atoms is legitimate because it can be objectively confirmed or refuted
by measurement. This matched exactly Pauling's stochastic strategy...he solved
correctly perhaps 200 ciystal structures.'
66 'There is thus no form of direct learning which can develop critical intelligence.
One can only try to induce the spontaneous acquisitions of these ways of thinking.'
(Bresson in Maclure 1991: 174-5).
67 See for example the psychologists, Garnham and Oakhill (1994), Johnson-Laird
(1986, 1983, 1993) and Kaye (1994), and the neuroscientist, Clarke (1997).
68 Random' in chaos theory means that there is usually expected a result in which
pattern, or logical form or order, wifi be discovered.
69 It has the 'oral formulaic' characteristics noted by other writers in the demotic epic
form in poetry, just as the philosophical discussion has. The performer is influenced
by a canon of 'strong predecessors', whose work is counter-pointed in the player's
inner dialogue with her own idiosyncratic, or hermeneutic resources (see chapter 6).
See Morton (1995: 25) for an assessment of Berliner's account.
70 Wit and ready-wittedness may also be an important example of an unconscious
disposition and process in which a body-self instantiates thought which by-passes the
conscious mind. Wit combines the affective and emotion in two senses. It proceeds
directly from one's embodiment, in its origination often by-passing cognitive processes
along the lines adumbrated by Damasio (1994). Evans (in Honderich 1995: 464) points
out that for Aristotle a creature endowed with humour must be embodied. But since the
bodily postures and motions which are characteristic of laughter can occur in the absence
of amusement, laughter cannot be a simply physical occurrence. Aristotle uses these
considerations to support a theory of human nature according to which a person is not
identical with a body, yet does not exist without one. The argument can be applied to say
that thinking, and the formation of dispositions and virtues, also can only take place in an
embodied form (see chapter 5).
71 'The operation of somatic markers on unconscious thought processes would
explain correct intuitions: mathematicians tend to consider consciously only lines of
thought that might be fruitful; the others are unconsciously blocked by somatic
markers' (Sutherland 1994: 287). There is empirical evidence from the scientific
studies that stochastic hearing has implications for learning. It has been found that
listening which takes place against a background of some randomised noise rather than
156
absolute silence may result in neurologically better performance and perception (Pool
1996: 18)
72 The question of wit, humour and possible worlds has not been looked at in relation
to possible worlds, conditionals and counter-factuals. Publication in this area is
sparse, modern philosophical work on humour being rare: but see (Lauter 1964,
Monro 1951, Morreall 1983, 1987; Nelson 1990; Swabey 1961). Although laughter,
like language, is cited as one of the distinguishing features of human beings, the
philosophical literature on the subject is sparse. Evans (in Honderich 1995:464)
wishes to see the topic of laughter given more attention in the philosophy of mind.
73 'I am not saying the mind is in the body. But it contributes a context that is part
and parcel of the working of the normal mind' (Damasio 1994:226). Da.masio gives a
neuro-scientific demonstration 'that mind is probably not conceivable without some
sort of embodiment'; and that mind derives from the entire organism. The condition of
complete anosognosis (the inability to acknowledge disease in one-sell) is that
patients, unlike all other patients including temporaly anosognosics, never refer to the
self (237). This absence of emotion and feeling can break down or preclude
rationality, Damasio argues, because the current instantiation of the concept of self has
been 'irremediably perturbed' (241).
74 See Motluk's (1994: 33-37) discussion of the neurological evidence on
synaesthesia. Amid the renewed interest in synaesthesia and learning, one school of
thought follows Cytowic in arguing that the phenomenon is characteristic of normal
brain physiology: 'in most people, sensory crossovers occur as a normal part of
perception without their knowledge. In synaesthesia, perception itself is bared to
consciousness' (Motluk: 37). Others claim that the brains of synaesthetics harbour
unusual neural pathways; see Baron-Cohen's (1995) review of The Man Who Tasted
Shapes and Luria's (1987) study of a mnemonist. Gleick (1992: 131) gives instances
of the physicist, Feinman, seeing numbers in colour; and of his auditory and
kinaesthetic method of stimulating thought by 'rolling about on the floor as he worked
on a problem'.
75 Dreyfus (1995) points out that the Merleau-Pontian account written fifty years ago
postulates notions of 'intentional arc'; and 'the tendency to acquire a maximum grip' -
a tight connection between the body and the world, in which dispositions as skills are
subject to finer and finer adjustment through the active body's experience of changes
in the world.
76 'The body is that 'natural self which we each of us are before the opposition of
felt and world effects that dc-naturalization of experience which is then taken to be the
self-evident foundation of any reasonable understanding both of the self and the
world' (Merleau-Ponty in Macann 1993: 182). Macann asks: 'What is the distinctive
contribution made by Merleau-Ponty? In my estimate, it is the grounding of the being
of human being in its being a body - with all that follows therefrom. And a very great
deal does follow therefrom' (Macann: 200). There is a striking parallel here with
Eliot's (1953) account, as a literary critic, of the 'dissociation of sensibility' which is
alleged to have occurred around the 18th century (see chapter 5). The matter becomes
extremely important when we come to construct a curriculum for the plastic arts,
dance, drama, physical education, and technology, which are thereby given a higher
status.
Medway (1986) offers the more mentalist claim, that argument is 'social action'.
This is a view shared by Andrews (1992) who wishes to re-affirm the importance of
rhetoric; and by (Kuhn 1992) who believes that most higher order thinking occurs as
'argument' about action. However, I have suggested earlier, in relation to Sartre, that
such accounts are excessively cerebral. Egan's typology of educational development
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and understanding as consisting of the somatic, mythic, romantic, philosophic and
ironic is presented in The Educated Mind (1997).
78 'Pessoa argued that his three main pseudonyms (Alvaro de Campos, Alberto
Caeiro and Ricardo Reis) were not mere aliases, but evidence of the multiple
personalities we all possess, contrasting facets of our innurnerable...what Pessoa
defined as a constant and organic tendency towards de-personalization and make-
believe' (Pontiero 1992:5).
79 The epistemological status of multiple intelligence or personality would change if a
'scientific' or neurological basis were to be found for it.
80 Castells (1996: 372) discerns the rise of aflexible, global network and infor,nation
society, a virtual reality in which global power, employment and culture will be
increasingly based on the 'production and consumption of signs' predicted by Baudrillard(1988).
81 The 'greatest authors' take over the role of 'places' in the Canon's theater of
memory, and their masterworks occupy the position filled by 'images' in the art of
memory according to Bloom (1995: 39). Conversely, Luria's case study of the
'memory man' shows that for a canon to be established a special kind of forgetting, as
well as remembering must take place.
82 In relation to well-established clinical links between the pathologies of multiple
personality and child abuse, Hacking (1995) raises important questions concerning the
'ciystallisation of the presumption that there are fixed truths to be known about
personal history'. His argument has important implications, not least for
jurisprudence. See Davison and Neale's (1996: 634-5) discussion of 'Dissociative
Identity Disorder and the Insanity Defence'. Hacking (1995:7) demonstrates the new
'normalcy' of the concept as a widespread phenomenon which is not of itself
unwelcome or pathological, as the literary examples demonstrate. See also McKellar
(1979) for empirical accounts of fugue, automatic writing, and childhood 'imaginary
friends'.
83 For example, Davison and Neale (1996: 184) report studies supportive of the idea
that a person accused of murder might feign another personality in order to avoid
punishment.
4 He was able to dismiss his 'fugue' symptoms (as they would be seen
psychiatrically), by means of his distinctive intellectual and philosophical position on
deconstructionism.
85 i am grateful to Professor Edgington for an interview and discussion on this topic(Thornbury 1997, Appendix 30).
86 The argument of Scruton (1974, 1983), that aesthetic truth of literary narratives is
predicated on so-called temporary belief, is compatible with their being 'playfully'
derived, counter-factual conditionals - 'what ifs?' accepted temporarily for the
purposes of imaginative encounter.
7 Everard (1994) examines the question of modal realism and rule-governed counter-
factual thinking. Changed notions of creativity, including those among teachers are
reflected by Fryer and Collings (1991) and Baum (1994). For a coherent claim
concerning post-formal thinking see Kincheloe and Steinberg (1993). There has been
a range of views and revived interest among philosophers concerning the nature of
metaphor. For a fuller discussion of imagination in education see Egan and Nadaner(1988) and Egan and Gardner (1992).
88 See Torrance (1973) for a standard exposition of the earlier view. Memory and the
presence of previous knowledge require emphasis in classrooms if the best
possibilities are to be achieved. Any plan for a pre-philosophical curriculum in a
school or college would therefore need to give considerable thought to what is known
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about the role of memory in learning and thinking (Neisser 1982: 3-19, Garandiere
1991: 127-135).
89 Pretending 'as if is usually done with other children, or for the child who has no-
one with whom to play, with imaginary people or dolls. Fox's suggestion that early
thinking is a naimtive dialogue fits this thesis. Such an account places play in a much
more sensible context; and also gives us the capacity to justify playfulness at later ages
and stages of development - for example in whimsy, fantasy, poetry, the roman a
these, the utopian fiction drama and so forth. Piaget's early accounts of moral rule
making, and child development research on deceit (Gold 1993), endorse this point.
See chapter 8 concerning the use of vital lies by teachers.
90 MacLaren (1986, 1989) advocates a teaching disposition that encourages students
to think about their thinking in a post-formal manner. Students will learn to conduct
their identities in a new way that parodies the rigid conventions of modernism, he
claims, by assuming the role of post-modern stand-up comics and social satirists.
91 See Wittgenstein (1958:13-17) for an explanation of ostensive definition.
Wiugenstein observes: 'Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn
the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he
will often have to guess the meaning of these defmitions; and will guess sometimes
right, sometimes wrong (15)..In giving an ostensive definition for instance we often
point to the object names and say the name'(19). An example of the 'looser' version
in the approach to history teaching which is nevertheless fully conceptualised is
provided by Leinhardt (1993: 46-74). She shows how a historical concept can be
possibiistically sketched and built up over a period over time through a series of
lessons (see chapter 8). The resemblance to the 19th century Herbartian notion of
'apperception mass' (Gamo 1908) in her theoretical position is striking.
92 An Aesthetics paper was introduced into the AEB philosophy course in 1994.
93 Morton (1969) suggests that the plethora of English utopian texts arises from the
fact that its inhabitants begin by living on an island (i.e. m a conditionals thought
experiment). A modem English example would be Frayn's (1973) Sweet Dreams,
about living and working in heaven. Ryan (1991) provides a schema for classifying
such works (see Appendices 27 & 28).
94 If there are to be rules for thinking possibilistically within the subject discourse
areas, and classroom syllabuses creative thinking which is rule-bound but not narrow
will need to be encouraged. The National Curriculum Council cross-curricular
document, Curriculum Guidance No 6(1990), on Economic Awareness Education
suggests the idea of 'opportunity costs' where children consider other choices they
might have. This might seem to involve a finite set of possible choices. However,
one would want children's thinking about economics to be flexible and imaginative, as
well as their solution to be economically viable in more than the most immediately
close of possible, economic worlds.
95 Teachers of economics, for example, have moved away from their traditional
concept of 'economic rationality' which as proved inadequate in constructing
predictive models of economies. Similarly, the teacher of health education might
decide, on the evidence of the psychological research on counter-factual thinking, to
encourage unrealistic optimism and 'illusions of control' in students - as the basis for a
confident pursuit of the good life. Teachers of religious education or critical thinking,
adopting Lewis's position, could however find themselves pressed to tolerate
totalitarian viewpoints, or religious fundamentalism.
96 See again the discussion of transferability in chapter 3.
97 Murris' claim that any pre-phiosophical curriculum for children ought to include a
large amount of stimulus, humour, post-modernist 'playfulness' and irony supports
the post-modern viewpoint. Material for encouraging the disposition of playful ready-
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winedness can range from Mexican hat jokes with infants to deconstruction theory
with sixth form students. Murris (1993a: 30-31) makes a persuasive case for her
approach in the early years through picture books.
9 For example, Choose Your Own Adventure Series, in which the child is told
'You're the star of the story! Choose from 33 (or so) possible endings' were
published from the early 1980's: but had limited success. Three examples are given in
the bibliography (Brightfield 1985, Kushner 1985, Packard 1981). On the other
band, Ayckbourn's theatrical experiments with denouements which changed nightly,
achieved favourable public and critical reception.
99 'Human being (sic) exists as anticipation of its own possibilities: it exists in
advance of itself and grasp its situation as challenge to its own power or learning what
it may do, rather than what it must be. Human being is always reaching out beyond
itself; its very being consists in aiming at what it is not yet' (Heidegger quoted by(irene in Edwards 1967: Vol 3,460).
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CHAPTER 5
Dispositional claims for teaching
philosophy and pre-philosophy.
1. Dispositions as causal possible worlds
The account of transcendental and modal realism, conditionals, counter-factuals and
possible worlds advanced in chapters 3 and 4 leads also to a claim for causal and
ethical dispositions. This is of significance for any philosophy and re-philosophical
cuniculum in which ethical education is projected. This chapter discusses
philosophical conceptions of the dispositions, empathy, and cognitive emotion, and
traces an increasing emphasis on dispositions in the critical thinking tradition.
Interest in the dispositionalizy of causation is long-established and applies to both
physical causation in the non-human, material aspects of the world, and the theory and
the basis of ethical or moral dispositions within virtue ethics (Felt 1996) and
deontology. One school of thought sees all causal claims as implying hypothetical or
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conditional statements which are dispositionaL The concept of dispositionality can be
then identified as central to any theory of conditionals and, therefore, counter-factual
and possible moral worlds. Thus Pollock (1976), for instance, stipulates that
dispositions are subjunctive conditionals which can be subjected to a possible worlds
analysis.
Some philosophers have argued that there is no more to dispositions than their
associated conditionals. Nothing needs to be occurrent necessarily, and a disposition
can be unknown or unobservable (Ryle 1949). A disposition's basis is viewed as at
least partly the cause of its manifestation. However, Prior et al (1982) argue that of
three possible definitions of dispositions, two are seen as causal (even if the
foundation of the disposition is separate), while a third argues that dispositions are
'causally impotent'. Sober (1982) also disputes the claim of supervenience, that
dispositions are 'dormative virtues' and that dispositional properties are identical to
their physical basis - as when opium's 'dormative virtue', for instance, inheres in its
physical structure. He argues an 'equivalence thesis' which equates the existence of a
dispositional property only as far as the truth of a subjunctive conditional.
It is sometimes held that even the basis of dispositions is inherently categorical, and
pertains to the haeccity of the particular person possessing that disposition.
Armstrong (1968, 1996) claims that the bases of dispositions are both categorical and
transcendental, and combinatorial in that different accounts should be given for the
dispositions of persons as opposed to material things. (3ibbard (1990), for instance,
argues, drawing on evolutionary theory, that human beings have a categorial, and
therefore unconscious disposition towards the seeking of shared norms necessary for
biological survival - an example being reliability in ritualised, social arrangements.
Such arguments accord both with the Bhaskarian account of transcendental realism as
being categorially based, which was examined in chapter 3; and with the case, made in
chapter 4, that some modalities of thinking by-pass 'ordinary' consciousness.
Virtues are traditionally assumed to be conscious. However, Uoyd (1994) and
others argue that the unconscious can be seen by connectionists in computing theory
as a set of complex dispositions embodied in elements of conscious experience.1
Botterill (1994) defends the folk psychology assumption of a distinction between
beliefs as active, occurrent thoughts, and beliefs as dispositions, as resolving
problems of propositional theory found in computing. Belief a disposition in
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computational circumstances, similarly asserts Kaye (1994). Greco (1993) argues
that the concepts of virtue epistemology and close possible worlds can be brought
together. Cognitive virtues should be understood as emerging from the disposition
which will make us reliable in seeing relevant possibilities occurring in close possible
worlds rather than being concerned with the prospect of massive error in far-off
worlds. 2
2. Dispositions in ethical life and education
Interest in virtues and dispositions on the part of critical thinkers or those wishing to
see philosophy taught in schools has proceeded from two separate philosophical
traditions: these are concerned with moral philosop hy in the sense of right conduct, in
the deontological and Kantian tradition (O'Neill 1990, Maclntyre 1981); or virtue
ethics in the Aristotelian tradition (Mautner 1996:593). The distinction re-emerges in
the discussion of critical thinking approaches to dispositions where, for instance, the
notion of habit as a duty is invoked (see below). 3
Virtues in the ethical life are usually defined in Aristotelian tenns as settled
dispositions of the mind which determine choice (Mautner 1996: 592). The
importance of ethical dispositions is argued in relation to trust (Baler 1986), as half-
way houses between action and capacity by (Kenny 1992), in democratic life by
(White 1996, Arnstine 1995), in change in flourishing ethical life by (Williams 1987),
and in relation to courage (Maclntyre 1988, Rorty (1986). Williams (1987) argues
that since dispositions precede virtues they have more importance, for it is the
formation or changing of dispositions that determines what virtues or faults we finally
settle upon.
Virtue is seen as half-way between a capacity and an action in a somewhat similar way
by Kenny (1992: 84). The idea of a disposition as critical consciousness in the
preparation of virtuous action can be seen in the Sartrean account of choice in relation
to facticity and being. It is necessary, especially in the education of the young, to
deal with transitional 'becoming' between capacity and action. Hence, there is need
for a strong account of existential authenticity, as Bonnett (1994) urges for the
primary classroom. Issues of authentic choice arising in the volatile half-world
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between capacity and action assume considerable significance in the education of the
young.
Dispositionality in ethical or moral choice, and other more neutral processes of
planning to undertake tasks, can therefore be seen as being to do with prospective
action in relation to conditional or possible worlds, domains and schema. Such
planning appears to take place within sets or classes of activity, characterised by
psychologists as schemata,frames, scenes and scripts, for which they have
increasingly sought to give a connectionist account (Boden 1994, Eysenck and Keane
1995, Johnson-Laird 1993). These processes are mapped criterially in Ryan's (1991)
taxonomy of different types of narrative, literary and fictional discourse about possible
worlds. They emphasis dynamic memory and background knowledge theory
(Schank and Abelson 1977, Schank 1982), in a connectionist, explanation-based view
of concepts which replaces the attribute-based conception of theoretical knowledge
(Van Mechelen et al 1993, Lakoff 1993, Putnam 1975a, 1975b). Such processes can
also be seen as stochastic (see again chapter 4).
3. Dispositions in counter-factual thinking
The imagining of, and reflection concerning counter-factual 'possible worlds' of
conduct, can have a profound empirical effect; both on how choice is regarded, and the
way in which dispositions come to be sustained, changed or discarded. 4
 Counter-
factual research supports the case argued by Johnson (1993) that 'moral imagination'
is informed by metaphorical thinking, combined with memory, narrative and personal
reflection.
An extensive series of counter-factual studies has examined moral stance, in regret,
blame and 'other choices one might have made'. They show that moral insight can be
acquired through quite practical, self-reflective thinking through possible worlds talk
of 'how things might have been' in a variety of areas of life (Roese 1997). 5 For
example, studies have been made of counter-factual thinking in the ethical areas of:
regret and responsibility following decisions (Connolly et al 1997); regret and elation
following action or inaction (Landman 1988); the assignment of blame (Creyer and
Gurhan 1997); self-blame and 'perceived avoidability' following a traumatic event
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(Davis et al 1996, Fraser 1996); the rhetoric of torts in relation to how advocates help
jurors think about reasonableness and responsibility (Feigenson 1995); 'legal story-
telling' and argumentation (Scallen 1995); implications for blame in rape cases (Nario
and Branscombe 1992); and cause attribution in accident-related judgements (Williams
etal 1996).
Thinking about how one's life might otherwise be, and 'what might otherwise have
been done', has been extensively studied (Branscombe et al 1996, Ngbala and
Branscombe 1997). These studies have focused on causal attribution and hindsight
(Roese and Olson 1996,1997), remembering and regretting (Medvec and Savitsky
1997), thinking about personal decisions and 'what might have been' (Thompson
1997, Landman and Manis 1992), and the mid-life perceptions of women concerning
their 'missed opportunities' (Landman et al 1995)
The psychological studies tend to lead towards a phenomenological philosophical
perspective. For example, Macrae (1992:67), studying the judgements of those
awarding victim compensation, found that the more easily an alternative to an event
was imaginable, or presented, to panel members 'the more extreme their affective
reaction' was to that event. 6
 Thinicing about what might have happened if a careless
driver had been more prudent tended to result in more severe condemnation of his or
her action, and an increased 'sympathy' and award for the victim (Macrae, Mime and
Griffiths 1993). The relationship between counter-factual thinking, gender and the
dispositions featured in studies undertaken by Landman (1988), and Landman and
Maids (1992). Defming counter-factual thinking as 'the process of imagining
alternatives to reality - what might have been', half of a sample of young women
reported regret over various life choices and said that they would act differently if they
had their lives to live over again.
It is common to imagine states counter to the realities ci having married early, having
curtailed one's education, and having experienced wtisfactxy interpersonal
re!ationships....or that have prematurely closed off important life options ...(these) most
often generate counter-factual thinking. (Landman and Manis 1992: 477)
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4. The case for cognitive emotions
Byrne (1997: 220) as described in chapter 4, makes the important claim that counter-
factual thinking, as a distinctive and unusual blend of the cognitive and the affective
which bridges cognition and emotion, has ushered in a new era of research
representing 'the coming of age of the psychology of thinking and learning'.
Byrne's contention is supported from other sources. Growing empirical evidence of a
symbiosis between the cognitive and affective is provided by Damasio (1995) and by
Clarke (1997) who, from a neuroscience and computing perspective, argues that
'radical embodied cognition' (148) combines with emotion in the 'embedded mind'
(88). Maclure (1991) comments on a growing tendency among psychologists of
thinking to recognise the important role that attitudes and motivation play in thinking.
Boekaerts (1988) claims that the boundaries between cognition and affect are 'at long
last being pulled down', and reports increasing interest in classroom, curricular and
pedagogic approaches.
The proposal that a unified theory of thinking may emerge from research into counter-
factual thinking has particular relevance to ethical life. If counter-factual thinking is
central to the formation of dispositions and virtues in relation to possible moral
worlds, then any philosophy and pre-phiosophical curriculum will require a theory of
counter-factual dispositionality.8
New ground on the relationship between feeling and thought, cognition and emotion
or affect, has been explored philosophically by Scheffler (1991) in a significant
development. Scheffler seeks to unify cognition and emotion in an philosophical
account, by arguing that they are not mutually exclusive concepts and that there is
evidence for the existence of cognitive emotions (4-9).
The growth of cognition is thus, in fact, inseparable from the education of the emotions.
(15)
Scheffler identifies cognitive thought as being related to three general forms of
emotion, the rational passions, perceptive feelings and theoretical imagination, which
are the organising emotions of a rational character. There are, he claims, two
emotions which are specifically cognitive; the joy of verification and the feeling of
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surprise. The nature of cognitive emotions he sees as analogous to moral emotions
such as indignation and remorse. As Standish (1993: 117) observes, Schefflefs
account is not fully developed, but it clearly 'rejects the common assumption that
cognition and emotion are worlds apart' and 'illustrates coherently the ways in which
rationality and the passions are inter-twined'. There is a strilcing similarity between
Scheffler's proposal and the literary theory of Eliot, who argued that the metaphysical
poets 'incorporated their erudition into their sensibility' thus combining cognition and
emotion:
Their mode of feeling was directly and freshly altered by their reading and thought. In
Chapman especially there is a direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a re-creation of
thought into feeling, which is exactly what we fmd in Donne. A thought to Donne was an
experience; it modified his sensibility. (Eliot 1953: 115)
Andrews and Costello (1992), arguing for the revival of rhetoric and an important
place for feeling, in any model of argumentative ability, claim:
We are keen to emphasise the place of feeling in ow emergent model of the development of
argumentative ability. Argument has been associated with the cognitive because it appears to
operate via abstraction. We think that argument is as much to do with passion and feeling...
We see empathy, understanding others' points of view and sensitivity as important
ingredients in the development of argumentative skilL (Andrews and Costello 2 1-2)
The case for an emphasis on argument and rhetoric, involving feeling, as central to the
development of thinking has also been made by Kuhn (1991, 1992) and by Myerson
(1994). Such an argument can be empirically supported from the work of Ben-ill
(1990).
5. The caring disposition
Altered conceptions of caring in virtue ethics also have begun to conflate cognition and
emotion, in raising such issues as: What is the role of empathy as a form of caring in
the teaching of philosophy or critical thinking? These revised ethical conceptions
eschew the traditional emphasis on procedural, intellectual virtues in thinking, and
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stress the place of feeling and emotion as combined with cognition. A tradition in
virtue ethics has arisen in which women philosophers and critical thinkers have argued
for the importance of caring in relation to the dispositions (Gilligan 1982, Noddings
1978, Grimshaw 1986, 1991). Gilligan (1982) argues for a 'caring' re-interpretation
of Kohlberg's rule-based approach to the formation of the moral disposition of young
children. Grimshaw (1986, 1991) wishes to see concerns and activities which have
traditionally been regarded as female given equal status, when veiy different social
and moral priorities will be generated.
Kincheloe and Stemberg (1993) object to the way that thinkers in the 'Cartesian-
Newtonian lineage' have characteiised emotion as interfering with procedural
knowledge.
Indeed they see emotion as a pollutant in reason. Post-formal thinkers grounded in
feminist theory unite logic and emotion, making use of what the emotions can understand
that logic cannot. (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1993: 296-321).
What instead is needed, they claim, is a new description of post-formal thinking in
which playfulness, and the particularity of knowledge are emphasised. 10 Whearey
and Ennis (1995) claim that caring about good thinking is a disposition which
counters the tbias' of male rationality in critical thinking, and that 'caring' should
therefore be recognised as one of Scheffler's cognitive emotions. These
developments in virtue ethics are consistent with the case for principled charitableness
or empathy in argument advocated by Quine and Davidson, as discussed below.
They also produce a need to re-examine the philosophical and educational approach to
empathetic thinking.
6. Is empathy a form of possible worlds creation?
Is empathy a disposition and cognitive emotion concerned with caring about the
possible world of another mind? A type of counter-factual thinking involving both
cognition and feeling could be argued to arise when one thinks empathetically.
Traditional accounts of empathy, in aesthetics, distinguish between Einfh1ung,
'feeling into' when 'one loses oneself in the other', from sympathy in which one's
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identity is said to be preserved. Complete empathy is claimed to be aesthetic in giving
access to experiences of beauty (Audi 1995: 219). Contemporary philosophers and
critical thinkers have also been interested in more epistemological or cognitive
accounts. 11 Quine (1990:42) allocates an important place to empathy, for instance
in the role of parenting, when in his theory of knowledge he advocates the notion of a
principle of charity or intellectual forbearance in philosophical discussion. 12 He is
supported by similar request for charity concerning radical interpretation made by
Davidson, which Brueckner (1991) sees as resting on modal knowledge. 13
Empathy is distinguished from other characteristics of children's thinking or use of
language by child development theorists. Tough (1976) includes 'predicting and
projecting' but not empathy, in her taxonomy of seven characteristics of children's
language in primary school classrooms (Appendix 4). Interest in empathy is reflected
within the various subject disciplines of the school curriculum. The leading US
critical thinker, Richard Paul (1982) argues that empathy, a disposition to be
empathetic to the point of view of others, is essential for all 'substantial' thinking,
using social studies curricula to illustrate his position. Historians and history
teachers have taken a particularly close interest in empathy. Coffingwood (1946), for
example, thought that history writing is primarily concerned with the 'sympathetic re-
enactment' of events. Hawthorn's account of historical plausible worlds, it will be
remembered, imposed severe limits on any interpretative speculation concerning
human agency. 14 But other teachers, teacher educators, and critical thinkers
concerned with history teaching, take a stance closer to that of Collingwood (MacIsaac
1996). Jenkins and Brickley (1989), for example, claim that empathetic historians
explore areas counter-factually which would not otherwise be looked at.
They pnoritise, if not unasked, often 'unworked' questions, and in so doing, make the gaps
in the dominant discourse obvious; in this task of deconstructing what is given, new
possibles can emerge. (22) '
Cairns (1989) and Lee (1984), distinguish four ways of viewing empathy in relation to
history teaching. 16 They see it as a power, empathy being the ability to discern other
people's thoughts and feelings; as achievement, it being close to knowing what
someone or some group believed, valued, felt or tried to attain; as a process, when it is
concerned with discovering what someone believed by looking at the evidence; and as
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a disposition, when it is the ability or willingness to take into account other points of
view (Cairns 1989: 13-17).
Shemilt (1984) characterises empathy as that important form of thinking which
involves transfer of one's thoughts or emotions across time. He offers a taxonomy of
'hierarchically ordered objectives for teaching and assessing empathetic construction'
(Appendix 21). Historical explanation and description are differentiated by Shemilt in
several ways: through action explained in terms of motive; by the notion that the
actions and beliefs of predecessors are rational within their frame of reference and, at
the highest level, through the ability to recreate a sense of period in the round by the
'empathetic construction of perspective' involving the 'analysis of intentional action
within standards and assumptions' of the period and time (79). Shemilt emphasises
the cognitive over the affective aspect.
Empathetic instruction should be taught and assessed as a cognitive not an affective activity
more akin to the elaboration of and justification of hypotheses than to creative writing.
(79) 17
According to Kornhaber and Gardner (in Maclure 1991:161) empathy may involve the
use of more than one form of intelligence, as in the case of the historian Tuchman's
work. 18 Tuchman claims that sympathy is essential to the understanding of motive.
The question must then be asked, is empathy a cognitive emotion and disposition?
7. Dispositions as narrative, literary and embedded
Nussbaum (1986) addresses the question of empathy by means of a post-Aristotelian
perspective on philosophy and literature. She claims that thought and emotion, and
consequently ethical understanding, are 'jointly embedded' and originate from texts -
in a way which makes an experience of the text, rather than even the fullest description
of its content and meaning, indispensable to understanding. Nussbaum (1990: 139-
141) points out that Aristotle, being concerned that ethics must be directed to practical
as well as theoretical concerns, sought to provide a sketch for the good life by turning
to poey and tragic drama. She argues for approaching ethical questions via the
particular lives and complex predicaments of literaiy characters.
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Nussbaum puts a hermeneutic case for her point of view. In The Fragility of
Goodness, Nussbaum (1986:15) looks at the notion of 'moral luck' in Greek tragedy
and questions the distinction traditionally made by philosophers between intellect and
emotion. Her proposition is that moral luck, the notion of the tragic, and the nature
of and exercise of dispositions and virtues, can only be properly understood through
an actual reading of a tragedy; a process which incorporates responses of both thought
and feeling.
Our cognitive activity, as we explore the ethical conception embodied in the text, centrally
involves emotional response. We discover what we think about these events partly by
noticing how we feel; our investigation of our emotional geography is a major part of our
search for self-knowledge. (Nussbaum 1986: 15) '
Nussbaum makes a claim for the integrity of thought experienced as feeling and for an
ethical life pursued by such means. If Nussbaum's argument is accepted, values
education then becomes based on a philosophical and pedagogic foundation which is
at least in part narrative and literazy.
A conception of ethical understanding that involves emotional as well as intellectual
activity and gives a certain type of priority to the perception of particular people and
situations rather than abstract rule&..this conception, rather than being imprecise and
irrational, is actually superior in rationality and...fmds its most appropriate expression in
certain forms usually considered literary rather than philosophical. (ix)
One of her reasons for saying this is epistemologically procedural; an argument can
best be statedin theformin which adramaornovel proceeds,ratherthan froma
summaiy of the philosophical points it is said to present. 20
 It is an argued narrative,
in Siruever's (1985) sense. 21
Narrative, metaphor and imagination may be central to these processes of moral life
carried on by means of cognitive emotion. The case that moral imagination is based
on metaphor is argued by Johnson (1993) who wishes to replace a moral calculus
based on rational utility with one of 'imaginative rationality' in the classroom, using a
metaphorical moral grammar based on narrative sources. Johnson argues that it is our
moral imagination that permits us to rehearse various, projected courses of action
171
dramatically, so that we may investigate the morality of the options available to us
within particular circumstances' (Johnson 1993: 108). Schechtman (1996: 159)
argues, in a complementary perspective, that one needs a narrative self-conception 'in
order to be an agent at all'. Both Schechtman and Johnson see narrative as central to
the constitution of moral self, since no moral theory can be adequate that does not take
into account the narrative character of our experience. This matter is taken up again in
chapter 8, in relation to teachers' lives and autobiographies.
The second part of this chapter turns to trace the increasing emphasis in the critical
thinking tradition on the teaching of dispositions. The case for ready-wittedness and
authenticity in ethical thinking is made; and some problems are raised concerning
values education for dispositions within a philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum.
8. The proceduralist account
Interest in dispositions has another provenance which it is now necessary to identify
since it has had enormous consequences for educational practice. Early definitions of
critical thinldng, and reasons for teaching children philosophy, concentrated on
abilities and sidils rather than cognitive emotions or dispositions (Ennis 1962, Govier
1987, Scriven 1996, Thouless 1930, Toulmin 1958). One finds that criteria for good
thinking are thought to be founded on 'procedural' dispositions analogous to the
Aristotelian intellectual virtues. Critical thinkers do not at first claim to engender
broader virtues of character in children. They distinguish, implicitly, between
procedural-intellectual and substantive virtues. The question then arises: is this a
qualitative or a stipulative distinction between procedural and other dispositions?
The early procedural claim assumes that philosophising and critical thinking are purely
cognitive forms of thinking which have no affective component Any disposition to
think well is argued to emerge from a habit of thinking well procedurally which has
become established. In this the claim follows both Plato, who wished 'to deny or
avoid an affective dimension in philosophy, and Aristotle who distinguished between
intellectual and moral virtues:
Virtue, then, is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue owes both its
inception and its growth chiefly to insiruction...Moral goodness, on the othez hand, is the
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result of habiL..By dispositions I mean conditions in virtue by which we are well or ill-
disposed in respect of the feelings concerned.' (Ethics, ed. Thomson 1976:91 and 98)
The possibility that one might possess the abilities and capacities to be a good critical
thinker yet, waywardly, choose not to produce that behaviour appears not to have
occurred initially to the advocates of critical thinking, informal logic and philosophy
for children. They concentrate on arguments for procedural, intellectual dispositions,
when their affinity vith the perspectives of linguistic 'ordinary language' or analytic
philosophers is very apparent. This traditional, Humean journeyman view of critical
thinking and philosophy teaching as linguistic clarification was identified in chapter 2
as characteristic of much 20th century philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
Many of those teaching philosophy at A level having been trained in that tradition,
their enthusiasm for Austinian proceduralism is not surprising. Ward's (1983) broad
argument for A level philosophy is typical of the linguistic approach to ethical
questions. He argues as follows. One's philosophical convictions, general world-
view or weltanschauung are said to play a key part in one's political, aesthetic, moral,
jurisprudential, and other decisions. They influence how we act upon, and
personally change, the world. Philosophy is the subject which helps us to clarify our
thinking about ethical and other decisions, and which can thus provide systematic help
in the making of those decisions (Ward 1983: 253).
Theron (1978: 5) justifies the Austinian teaching of philosophy to older students on
the grounds of its contribution in procedural logic to the clearing up of muddled
thinking; for example, over the fact-value distinction, the is-ought controversy, or the
distinction between absolutist versus relativist theories of value. Govier (1987,
1988) and other proponents of infor,nal logic, influenced as philosophers by the same
tradition, place similar emphasis on correct inference procedures, the linguistic
clearing up or avoidance of
	 errors and solecisms, and the spotting of fallacies
(see also Fisher 1989a, 1996). Others see argumentation theory in a similar way, as
a clarifying tool (Van Eeemeren 1987).
In these approaches, a disposition towards thinking with care and fairness in relation
to the arguments of others is, simply and solely, intellectually procedural. Such
dispositions are qualitatively different from true moral virtues, in that they more
resemble the 'intellectual' virtues of Aristotelian ethics. Only indirect sympathy with
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the virtue ethic of care, as advanced by philosophers like Gilligan (1982), can be
discerned.
What philosophy for children can do is improve moral judgement by developing in children
the techniques involved in the making of such judgements, and by developing in them at the
same time the love and the care for such techniques. (Liprnan et al: 186-7)
That some moral education does occur is not denied, but it is said to appear as an
incidental by-product of philosophical education. 22
 Lipnian et a! specifically deny
that teaching philosophical thinking involves a programme of moral education or a
stance on any particular moral issue. They are neutral concerning any moral stance
apart from procedural correctness in thinking. 23
 However, as Andrews, Costello
and Clarke (1993: 7) point out, the distinction maintained by Lipman and his
colleagues between procedural and substantive values is inconsistent and therefore not
sustainable. For adherents of the IAPC programme claim elsewhere to develop
substantive democratic values such as 'mutual respect', within a pedagogy of a global
community of enquiry and aims of social reconstruction (Splitter and Sharp 1995,
McCall 1994, see again chapter 1).
9. Doubts over persistence
There seems to have been a point at which doubt arose over proceduralism.
Advocates of infonnal logic suddenly find it necessary to modify their 'linguistic'
claims for the central contribution of logic, or informal logic, to thinking well as a
critical thinker. The bouleversernent which occurs can be most clearly seen in the
influential change of definition offered by Ennis, a major figure in the social
movement of critical thinking. Ennis (1962: 81) originally defines critical thinking as
'reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to do or believe', but
later concludes that his definition is vulnerable to a serious criticism. It does not
provide an adequate account of how a disposition or tendency to persist in thinking
critically might come about
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Ennis therefore amends his Streamlined Conception of Critical Thinking (1991:8-9,
Appendix 7) to introduce a distinction between an ability to think well, and the
disposition to do so in a regular and reliable way.
critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding on what to
believe or do, and having a disposition to think in that way. (Ennis 1995) 24
Enms in effect rejects the Rylian view of the non-occurrent causality of dispositions,
that 'nothing need happen', in favour of the behavioural view that dispositions must
be episodes and states of observable behaviour. He proposes a revised schema
which separates the abilities from dispositions in characteiisation of the ideal critical
thinker. As Romano (1980) puts its, one must take a Thomist view of the need for
reliability of 'self' in any notion of what characterises a human habit, as for instance,
in facing new situations.
Ideal critical thinkers are now to be thought of as having authentic, self-reflective,
altruistic, and non-competitive dispositions. 25
 However, these dispositions are
largely procedural and cognitive in their nature; they are intellectual virtues in
Aristotelian terms. There is, for instance, no deontological insistence on the will or
duty, since for Ennis dispositions are cognitive habits involving equable persistence
arising from training, rather than being based on volition towards thinking critically.
They are in effect like the trained 'moral skills' described by Gotz (1989).
Nevertheless, Ennis's division of critical thinking into two parts - abilities and
dispositions, represents a watershed of considerable significance. Critical thinking is
henceforth to be linked with a broad and burgeoning interest among moral
philosophers, and philosophers of education, in virtues and dispositions. Ennis's
schema is influential in being taken-up and developed by others devising new, critical
thinking taxonomies and inventories (Facione and Facione 1993, 1994).
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10. Dispositions gather strength
Child development theorists (Katz 1993), psychologists (Perkins 1993), and teacher
educators (Newmann 1993) soon respond to the new, canonical importance of
dispositions in critical thinking as prescribed by Ennis; Perkins (1993), for instance,
identifying seven key dispositions of good thinking.
Growing recognition of the need to emphasise dispositions is particularly clearly
reflected in an ERIC Clearing House overview by Katz (1993: 3). Katz envisages
important implications for educational practice, believing that it would be 'timely' to
include dispositions in among 'important outcomes of education'. As a child
development theorist, she reviews and makes the case for the place of dispositions as
'educational goals' without drawing on the philosophical and critical thinking
literature.
Knowledge can be acquired, she warns, without a 'robust' disposition to use it:
namely the tendency to exhibit frequently, consciously and voluntarily a pattern of
behaviour that is directed to a broad goal which is an ethical purpose of the teacher.
Teachers should encourage desirable dispositions but children are less likely to acquire
them through didactic processes, than through exposure to people who model them
successfully. Katz takes a procedural stance, however, in that the modelling which
teachers are to undertake is to be of 'intellectual' dispositions. Nicoll (1996) argues
in a similar way that early childhood educators should attend to such dispositions in
their pupils as curiosity, fair-mindedness and flexibility.
The new strand in critical thinking exhibits a further emphasis, this being the need for
evidence of social habits and dispositions of 'good' critical thinking in the classroom.
Lipman et al (1980: 186-7) and Lindop (1990: 50-54) place classroom life in the
centre of their approach. They hold on to the cultivation of procedural, intellectual
virtues; but they also attach considerable importance to social dispositions, engendered
within the affective context of classroom life of a community of enquiry. Thus
Lindop (1990), having evaluated the Lipman program in the Australian setting, claims:
Not only reasoning skills are exercised but also the disposition to be reasonable, as well as
rational,, about the various perspectives elicited during the classroom enquiry. (Lindop 199th
54)
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Dispositions are seen as socially and intellectually mediated - and constructed in
classrooms. Social constructivism from a Vygotskian perspective is explicitly
invoked (Lipman 1991). Growth in children's thinking is seen as occurring through
'assisted performance' supported by one's teachers and peers (Splitter and Sharp
1995, Tharp and Gallimore 1991). Thus the Institute of Philosophy with Children
advocates an approach which could be characterised as procedural, communitarian,
social constructivism.
Newmann asserts a claim for teaching dispositions through group life in 'class room
thoughtfulness' through critical thinking (1990, 1993, Appendix 10). In doing so,
he moves the argument on a further stage. For he stipulates a key disposition for
children and teachers as good critical thinkers, namely meta-cognitive awareness.
Dispositions are to be sought, but these will feature self-reflexive, traits of character.
Among the traits sought, for example, is a tendency to be reflective - to take time to think
problems through for oneself, rather than acting impulsively or automatically accepting the
views of others.
He advocates a social epistemology, similar to the emphasis in the literature of teacher
education on the teacher as 'reflective practitioner', in which 'thoughtfulness' or meta-
cognitive reflectiveness are pre-eminent (see chapter 8). Newmann introduces the
idea of desirable traits, such as a curiosity to explore new questions and the flexibility
to entertain alternative and original solutions to problems. 27
11. Are dispositions traits?
Siegel (1988) perceives that a philosophical difficulty is faced by the critical thinking
movement in relation to traits. How can a procedural account of intellectual virtues or
dispositions towards rationality be retained, while assigning a strengthened role to
character formation and traits? Siegel is committed like Carr (1991,1993) to a
cognitive view of critical thinking as the educational cognate of rationality. But he
shares Carr's (1991) view that a utilitarian or problem-solving approach to 'trait
development' within the school curriculum simply will not be enough to help pupils
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solve many moral problems. He wishes to embrace traits while retaining a tight hold
on linguistic proceduralism.
This conception, which holds that the critical thinker is one who is appropriately moved by
reasons (henceforth 'the reasons conception'), emphasises the connection between critical
thinking and rationality, and also emphasises the importance of certain dispositions, habits
of mind and character traits in addition to reasoning skills, for a full conception of critical
thinking.., a fundamental education ideal, infusing and informing the entire range of
educational activities and affairs. (Siegel 1988:2)
There seems for Siegel to exist an assumption that reasoned argument possesses some
special affective quality, in that one is moved by, rather than merely consenting to
good argument Ideological rationality somehow carries intrinsic powers to
persuade, in a manner reminiscent of the perlocutionary proposition in speech act
theory (Austin 1962). Siegel thus comes near to the position of philosophers who
see reason as a 'rational passion' (Peters 1972: 226, Scheffler 1991: 4). It is not
clear, however, whether reason alone can create settled dispositions which might
become virtues.29
A further difficulty raised by Volimer (1993) concerns how dispositions might relate,
or not relate to traits. Voilmer translates the epistemological debate over dispositional
causality in the physical world into the ethical sphere. He argues that there may be
two kinds of traits, one based on actfrequency and the other on mental frequency
dispositions. Voilmer claims that mental frequency dispositions are different from
dispositional properties like abilities, capacities or powers based on beliefs and
desires.
Van Heerden et al (1989) agree that traits are usually treated as dispositions, but think
that this is problematic. Although four types of dispositionality can be identified,
only one of them can be convincingly justified as a trait. Butler (1988) sees traits of
character as complex states involving dispositions and, often, conditional desires
which are used inferentially to explain behaviour. Schaller (1990) points up a major
problem of connectivity in relation to the idea of critical thinldng as duty. He
observes that duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect are duties to cultivate
dispositions which cannot themselves be defined in terms of obligatozy acts.
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12. Thinking well as a duty.
A minor strand within these developments places emphasis on Kantian notions of duty
in thinicing correctly. As mentioned earlier, philosophers have been concerned with
right conduct and virtue ethics in two separate traditions, both of which appear in the
critical thinldng social movement (Mautner 1996:593). Some educators interested in
critical thinking urge character training and formation through the dispositions based
on deontological, or Kantian ideas in moral philosophy. Habits of good thinking can
be reinforced, they argue, by training which invokes notions of volition, will, duty
and obligation.
Resnick (1987), for instance, follows Aristotle in linking habit deontologically with
the dispositions. She asserts that the essential definition of a disposition involves the
establishment of a tendency, or habit, arising as a sense of duty. An obligation to
engage in thinking critically on the part of students needs therefore to be developed.
Like Newmann (1993), Resnick distinguishes between higher and lower order
thinking; and for her the disposition to engage in critical thinldng is a necessary and
prior condition for higher order thinking. 30
However, a disposition:
Should not be taken to imply a biological or inherited trait. As used here it is more akin to
a habit of thought, one that can be learned, and, therefore taught. Engaging in higher order
thinking with others seems likely to teach students that they have the ability, the
permission, and even the obligation to engage in a kmd of critical analysis that does not
always accept problem formulations as presented or that may challenge an accepted position.
We have good reason to believe that shaping this diposiuon to critical thought is central to
developing higher order cognitive abilities in students. (Resnick 1987:41)
Resnick envisages that such training will produce moral autonomy through
encouraging students to be iconoclastic. Boekaerts (1988) distinguishes between will
and meta-cognitive awareness in relation to obligation. For instance, a student may
be aware of the strategy to use but unwilling to make the effort required.31
Knowledge about effective thinking is not enough; we also need to have 'the will' to
use that knowledge and to develop the habit of thought. McGuinness and Nisbet
(1991) also advance a deontological requirement for dutifulness in dispositional habits
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of good thinking. A thinking cuniculum is not to be interpreted as a matter of
inculcating skills. Rather, it concerns will and volition for which motivation needs to
be fostered in relation to attitudes, habits and dispositions.32
These accounts of will or duty raise questions about forms of failure of dutifulness,
and assessment, as well as choice and personal autonomy. In relation to assessment,
there would be a problem for Norris (1992b), for example, who wishes to say that the
disposition to think critically can count for assessment only when it arises as a
spontaneous behaviour. But how can thinldng which is pursued out of duty be
authentic or spontaneous? There is also the question of what is to be the teacher's
stance towards inauthenticity, sophism or contumacity. What is to be done, for
example, when a student whom one knows could have chosen to do so, refuses to
think well? (see chapter 8). Although a deontological strand and emphasis on duty,
can be detected in the critical thinking literature concerning moral education it should
be said, however, that its significance is not great: few writers advocate the approach.
13. The problem of inauthentic dispositions.
One of the major problems about introducing the teaching of dispositions concerns the
hancifing of 'inauthenticity'. Insistence on criteria of reflexivity, or self-reflectiveness
in any thinking, but especially in relation to the dispositions, raises the question of
how personal authenticity and 'good faith' in philosophical or critical thinking are to
be identified. From Plato onwards, doubt has been expressed as to whether young
people can be expected to undertake higher order thinking or philosophising reliably,
in view of the immaturity of their feelings and emotions (see again chapter 2).
In The Republic Plato claims that the emotional immaturity of young children prevents
them from being capable of undertaking philosophical activity in a serious manner,
since they easily succumb to sophistiy. It is not within the affective capacity of the
young to think seriously, and to introduce philosophy at an earlier age is a mistake:
And there's one great precaution you can take, which is to stop their geuing a taste of
[philosophical discussions] too young. You must have noticed how young men, after their
first taste of argument, are always contradicting people just for the fun of it, they imitate
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those whom they hear cross-examining each other, and themselves cross-examine other
people, like puppies who love to pull and Lear at anyone within reach. (Republic 539)
He therefore concludes that philosophy is a subject for adults rather than children and
that dialectic (philosophy) can be introduced only to those who, having reached the
age of thirty years, have completed many years of training and study (537). Putnam
(1985) argues, on the other hand, that ethical counter-factuals can arise only from
Platonic attitudes or dispositions, and that to wait for adulthood would not be practical
if students are to receive an ethical education.
The notion of ironism, which Rorty (1989) sees as essential to the act of and
profession of philosophising, raises a similar issue to that of sophistry in that, in some
way one is not being serious (see chapter 8). 33 Conley (1993: 1) fears that critical
thinldng can easily foster scepticism in the student. Shemilt (1988: 78) urges that
empathetic thinking in history should be seen as cognitive hypothesising, since
'adolescents cannot be taught to empathise authentically'. 34
 As the essentialist claim
reveals (see chapter 2), such objections can be under-pinned by arguments taken from
Piagetian child development theory. These hold that teaching children of school age
to philosophise is 'psycho-genetically' impossible, since they are not sufficiently
mature, or developed in the capacity for meta-cognitive thought (Kitchener 1990). 35
A rather different approach to 'inauthenticity' in thinking is found in the existential
approach of Bonnett (1994). Bonnett sees the existentialist stand-point, with its
notions of facticity, good faith, autonomy and growth of the person, as the essence of
child-centred primary education and teaching (see also Bonnett and Doddington 1990,
and chapter 8, section 7).
Not least of the problems over authenticity relates to the philosophical concept of vital
lies (see chapter 8). People need to go forward with reasonable confidence in their
lives on an optimism based on 'life-lies, pious illusion or holy fictions' (Martin 1995:
842); as the counter-factual research reveals, they profit from persisting in mistaken
estimates of the possibility of encountering personal adversity (Sanna 1996, 1997). 36
However, teachers and students using vital lies also run some risk of falling into the
pitfalls of 'bad faith' and inauthentic dispositions.
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14. Paul and substantial, authentic dispositions.
Paul (1982), one of the most influential thinkers and practitioners in the critical
thinking movement, sees the need to address substantial issues which engage the
emotions and intellect of students. Having observed how the teaching of informal
logic has simply not proved efficacious, Paul expresses reservations about any
teaching of critical thinking which does not form authentic dispositions. By teaching
critical thinking as techniques of argument, students are often encouraged to become
'more sophistic rather than less so, more skilled in rationalising and intellectualising
the biases they already have' (3). 37 Paul therefore distinguishes between two,
contrasting conceptions of critical thinking. One is weak and based on 'informal
logic'; while in the other strong form of critical thinking, substantial dispositions are
brought into play:
One focuses on argument networks (world views); in place of conceiving of arguments as
susceptible of atomic evaluation one takes a more dialectical/dialogical approach. In this
'real' world, whether that of 'ordinary' or 'philosophical' discourse, argument exchanges are
means by which contesting point of view are brought into rational conflict, and in which
fundamental lines of reascing are 'refuted' by an individual charge of fallacy. (3)
Paul sees strong critical thinking as 'ultimately intrinsic to the character of the person'
(5). His account is close to the principled charitableness favoured by Quine and
Davidson in one's response to the arguments of others, and to Shemilt's (1984)
account of empathy (see above). Paul asserts the importance of reciprocity in
sympathetically entering into the world-view of one's opponent. One's sense of
being a person will be enhanced by a strong form of critical thinking taught in this
way. 38
Such a view is consonant with the linguistic theory of Bahktin (1981), widely
accepted by educationists, that interior dialogic thinking 'carries with it a mental act
which requires the listener to understand the word from the speakefs point of view
before approaching it from his own point of view' (Berrill 1990: 85). However,
Paul's excessive reliance on 'error correction' and 'manipulation through Socratic
method' in his general approach has been criticised as not being consonant with liberal
criteria for hermeneutic enquiry, and may be therefore lacking in empathy (Gottesman
1997: 8).
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15. A 'passion for critical thinking', values education, and
transferability
A claim to be able to engender and assess a passion for critical thinking in a teaching
program and system of assessment introduced state-wide for all Californian children is
made by Facione and Facione (1992, Appendices 18, 19). They set out the cognitive
skills and the dispositions which are to be sought universally, taught and assessed in
all schools. 39 In their Teaching and Testing the Passion for Critical Thinking and
their Dispositions Inventory, they claim that the dispositions of 'truth-seeking',
'analyticity', 'open-mindedness', 'systematicity', 'self confidence' and 'maturity' can
be taught (Facione and Facione 1994). They distinguish their approach radically
from other assessment tools, which 'tend to focus on cognitive skills' (Facione and
Facione 1993: 20).
Voices also begin to be raised in favour of developing the dispositions within schools,
colleges and vocational educational provision in the United Kingdom. Those
considering the design of a philosophy and pre-philosophical curricuiwn become
faced with the prospect of having to provide values education in response to a state
requirement (Haydon 1997). The case for a full-blown programme of values and
moral education in schools and colleges begins to be argued (Starratt 1994).
The argument for training transferable dispositions of character is made by those
working in the UK with professional and older students in vocational education.
Bridges (1994), for instance, asserts that thinking and transferable thinking skills are
needed for any 'enterprise' cuniculum relevant to both liberal and 'new vocational'
educational aims. He wishes to develop meta-competences which enable one to
select, adapt, adjust and apply one's other skills to different situations across different
social contexts and cognitive domains. An empathetic disposition in the 'sensitive
and intelligent discernment of similarities and differences between one society and
another', and practical moral virtues such as 'confidence' or 'enterprise' should be
sought (Bridges 1994: 13).
Winter (1994), working within the same tradition of the 'new vocationalism', also
claims to develop virtues of character through the transferable teaching of thinking.
He seeks to cultivate a repertoire of transferable, professional skills and character
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virtues in health professionals, such as cheerfulness, compassion, empathy,
resourcefulness and 'hegemonic awareness' which can be intellectually discussed and
developed. 40
 Benner (1984, 1994) makes a similar approach to good practice in
public sector nursing education, and the critical thinking movement in the US also has
strong links with the business sector (Senge 1994). A feminist and Aristotelian
approach to the 'new vocationalism' in the education of dispositions, is also put
forward by Assiter (1994) and Bryan and Assiter (1993, 1995). They argue the
merits of craft guild approach to the development of 'thinking at work' (chapter 2). 41
These substantial moral virtues of confidence and enterprise are very different from
the intellectual virtues of correct, procedural etiquette in thinking with which critical
and transferable thinking began as a social movement. Critical thinkers and those
teaching philosophy to children can be seen as progressively replacing cognitive
proceduralism, with a new, dual emphasis on character training and rneta-cognitive
reflectiveness. Cart's (1993: 15) view that moral education and 'our ideas of right
are related - non-accidentally - to our ideas of character' can be seen as having
concrete expression in the Californian experiment (Resnick 1987, 1989, Californian
Department of Education 1992), and in moves in the UK towards a transferable
'thinking curriculum' featuring vocational dispositions.
16. Flexibility and ready-wittedness
It can be further argued that the notion of transferability involves the traits of flexibility
and ready-wittedness. Newmann (1990) for social studies and Nicoll (1996) for early
childhood education argue that critical thinking should engenderflexible dispositions,
such as curiosity and the offering of alternative solutions to problems. 42
 Flexibility in
this context can be seen as similar to Aristotle's virtue of ready-wittedness mentioned in
chapter 4. Aristotle conceives ready-wiz'tedness, the 'readiness to turn this way and
that', as a virtue of social intercourse associated with pleasantness, virtue being a settled
disposition of the mind (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics: 103).
Ready-wittedness is, however, to be seen as something more than an intellectual,
moral virtue. Jonathan (1993) criticises Carr's (1991) account of dispositional
morality for its inattention to the contingency in post-modem life, in effect asking for
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'ready-wittedness'. 43
 Counter-factual thinking combining affect and cognition in
ready-wittedness, closely resembles Scheffler's cognitive emotion of 'surprise
conceived as an intellectual process'. There is thus a broader conception of ready-
wittedness in ethical and cognitive life which can be described as the aim of keeping
all the possibilities of the world in play (Thombury 1998). It will be recalled that
perfection and plenitude were seen to be important attributes of the best of all possible
ethical worlds in the various formulations of the Great Chain of Being (Lovejoy 1936,
chapter 1). Ready-wittedness will involve flexible counter-factual thinking, narrative
self-conception, imagination, metaphor and cross-domain conceptions, improvisation,
and post-modern playfulness in the envisaging of an appropriate plenitude of moral
possibility (Kekes 1993). One would expect it to be reflected in the utopian
dimension of the curriculum (Walsh 1993) and in one's theory of moral imagination
(Johnson 1993).
17. Proceduralism also remains
How those concerned with philosophy with children and critical thinking
progressively broadened the extent of their claims as providers of moral or ethical
education has been identified and its progression traced.
The Aristotelian account of thinldng as concerned with procedural intellectual virtues
largely falls away in these new accounts. It seems that, once the genie of procedural
dispositions is released into the world of critical thinking and philosophy with
children, its metamorphosis into a pursuit of substantial virtue is inevitable. Modest
interest in a disposition of persistence in critical thinking converts into a quest for
major virtues. Notions of the person, character formation, authenticity, reflectiveness
and autonomy consolidate into a 'grand narrative' for moral and values education. It
is claimed, for example, that literary experience, and philosophical discussion of ideas
about death, promotes virtuous behaviour in the world of dying children (Bluebond-
Langner 1980: 98-100, Matthews 1994).
However, one tradition within the broad movement for critical thinking and
philosophy with children continues to emphasise the procedural, Humean, or
cognitive approach. Evidence that many philosophers persisted in taking the
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procedural view can be seen in a collective definition of critical thinking gathered in
1990. Asked to define an 'ideal critical thinker', on the Delphi principle, of corning
up with a definition without consulting others, American Philosophical Association
(1990), members were conservatively inclined:
The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trusthil of reason, open-
minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in
making judgements, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters,
diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in
inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the
circumstances of inquiry permit. (2)
A procedural commitment to intellectual virtue and rationality rather than the teaching
of major, moral virtues still predominates here. The same emphasis on proceduralism
can be found in the widely-used critical thinking texts of Halpern (1997), Hughes
(1996) and Groake et al (1997). Hughes, for example, sees critical thinking as based
on three types of skills, the interpretative, the verificatory and reasoning skills (21).
Dispositions are not mentioned but instead qualities of 'moral maturity, what we
would expect a morally mature individual to exemplify' are sought. These are
procedural, intellectual habits of mind, such as independence of judgement,
justification by appeal to principles, generalisation of moral judgements, consistency,
awareness of complexity and 'getting the facts straight', recognition of one's own
fallibility, and tolerance (226).
18. Democratic forms of life
Within such a changing climate of thought concerning the teaching of the dispositions,
significant questions in the philosophy of education have now to be revisited. For
when feelings, passions, the formation of character and of the person, rather than just
correct procedural habits of thought, become prominent in one's teaching aims, there
are major curricular and pedagogic implications. For instance, what is to be the place
of values education, can the education of the dispositions ever be effective, is transfer
possible? Should one be hesitant about the use of philosophy with children, and the
teaching of dispositions and values education?
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Newmann's (1990, 1993) broad aim in introducing the idea of dispositions and traits
is the formation of democratic character. He wishes all students to be hegemonically
prepared for democratic forms of life, including the economic, personal autonomy
which is its pre-requisite. He therefore specifies disposition and qualities of character
which are compatible with the democratic idea of teaching of higher order, critical
thinking and philosophy to all, not just the cleverest children. This universalist
approach is also found in the idea of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy
of an increasing global community of enquiry (Splitter and Sharp 1995).
Democratic dispositions are also sought by other philosophers with broad educational
concerns. Baier (1986) and Applebaum (1995) wish to see an atmosphere of trust in
the classroom. Standish (1996) wishes to locate moral education within a
communicative ethic which engenders 'emotional dispositions' along Habermassian
principles. Macedo (1996) argues that the health of a liberal order, along the lines
conceived by Adam Smith and others, requires civic education to produce individuals
with the right dispositions and virtues, while respecting individual freedom. Cladis
(1995) makes a link between dispositions and democracy in a flourishing liberal
society, drawing on Durkheim's conception of public education balanced between
communitarianism and liberalism. Gauthier (1993) claims that a sense of justice is a
genuine, moral disposition which is central to all moral deliberation and evaluation.
Chapman (1995), Bottery (1990), Chamberlin (1989) and Starratt (1994) each set out
requirements for democratic dispositions in approaches which see the whole school as
an institution modelling the social virtues (see chapter 7).
Some philosophers of education, although sympathetic, advise caution. John White
(1990) advocates modest aims, such as the teaching of altruism as a system of
dispositions concerned with attentiveness to the well-being of others, with an
emphasis on arts education rather than moral codes. Patricia White (1989b) wishes to
see 'courageous citizens'; and a new approach in the area of educational policy to the
development of democratic dispositions, through moral and citizenship education in
the schools. " She warns, however, against the tendency to see such teaching as
unproblematic (89). It will require lime for teachers to undertake such tasks, together
with 'understanding of these issues and careful judgement about how to create a
school and classroom environment in which democratic dispositions can be
fostered'(89).47
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It is not difficult to see that the quest for dispositions and virtues could all too easily
convert into programmes of indoctrinatory and 'ideological' moral training. After all,
disconcertingly often as chapters 1 and 2 demonstrated, the teaching of philosophical
thinking has been used for undesirable ends. 48
Various other implications arise for the broader philosophy and pre-phi losophical
curriculum. For example, the crucial relationship between thought and feeling in the
formation of the dispositions, and in thinking itself, has been shown to be of central
importance. The traditional dualism of our approach to teaching and learning in
schools and colleges between 'scientific' and other thinking may need to be re-
appraised (Mashaddi 1997a, 1997b). As Morgan (1998: 822-4) argues, for example,
the fuzzy logic world-view in science, which has led to the impressive, complex
systems in mathematical approximation and control engineering, can be seen as having
roots more in Eastern philosophy than in 'bi-valent' Western thinking.
Any notion that the pre-philosophical curriculum within an over-arching National
Curriculum can be taught either as 'just thinldng skills', or as 'just character training',
should therefore be eschewed. Transfer claims are notably difficult to demonstrate,
as Witkin (1974) argues in relation to 'improving literature' in the arts curriculum. It
is notoriously difficult to ensure that directly-taught moral education, or citizenship
education, achieves the required results.
Educators will be engaged in the development of cognitive emotions and affective
cognition as the pychological research on counter-factual thinking clearly illustrates.
The pursuit of 'valued possibilities', in a phrase of Kekes (1993), will be seen as
central to personal, ethical flourishing. This will involve having some conception of
what those valued possibilities might be, in terms of one's obligations to both present
and future generations (De-Shalit 1998). As chapter 4 and 5 have shown, that can
occur when one engages in 'ready-witted' thoughtfulness about possible and more
perfect worlds. Care, empathy, and charitableness in listening to the point of view of
others, together with the development of the cognitive emotions and dispositions, will
have an important place in the resulting philosophical and pre-philosophical
curriculum. For this to happen, the school or college will need to arrive at an agreed
canon and an institutional policy, a task which is explored in chapters 6 and 7.
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Notes to chapter 5
1 Connectionism is the theoretical stance which informs parallel distributed processing
and neural network modelling in computing and has promise as a framework for
uniting clinical, psycho-analytical and cognitive psychology. Lloyd (1994) sees the
Freudian unconscious within connectionist theory, as a set of complex dispositions
embodied in connections between elements of conscious experience. Wit, as
discussed below, is partly involuntary.
2 Felt (1996) argues against the usual conception of modally real possible worlds (as
in Lewis), or the world-story or world-book worlds of Adams and Plantinga, all of
which involve neo-Platonic metaphysics. He proposes an alternative metaphysical
conception of the relationship of becoming to being within the virtues.
3 However, the contrasted terminology of 'moral philosophy' versus 'virtue ethics' is
not employed here.
4 There is rarely reference in the psychological studies to the philosophical literature,
or that of other subject disciplines. These studies, however, show dispositions in the
process of formation and review and they make clear the importance of self-
constitutive narrative, memory and metacognitive reflection.
5 Here again the problem of the separation of disciplines, and the need to bring to
bear an inter-disciplinary perspective is evident. Cognate work in other disciplines
tends not to be mentioned. Thus counter-factual history does not feature in counter-
factual psychological discussions. No links are made, for example, between
Kuhnianism and reference group theory (Stouffer et al 1949), relative deprivation
theory (Runciman 1966); or attribution theory (Eysenck and Keane 1995) in social
psychology, sociology, and child development.
6 An example is given by Macrae et al (1993: 222). When counter-factual alternatives
to an outcome were readily available, subjects 1. punished the perpetrators more
severely, 2. considered the incident to be more serious; 3. felt greater sympathy
towards the victim.
7 Some procedures within the judicial systems of the UK and the US allow jurors
and judges can take greater account of the counter-factual perceptions of victims by
means of an additional witness 'impact' statement.
8 These arguments for a more unified view of cognition and emotion have in fact an
earlier provenance in psychology. De Sousa (in Rorty 1980: 284) draws attention to a
'little known paper' in which C. D. Broad suggested 'that emotions might be construed
as cogmtions.'
9 Eagleton (1983), on the other hand, describes the same position thus: 'In the early
seventeenth century, when the absolute monarchy and the Anglican church still
flourished, poets like John Donne and George Herbert (both conservative Anglicans)
displayed a unity of sensibility, an easy fusion of thought and feeling. Language was
in direct touch with sensory experience, the intellect was 'at the tip of the senses', and
to have a thought was as physical as smelling a rose..From about Andrew Marvell
onwards, then, it was downhill all the way. Somewhere in the seventeenth century,
though Eliot is unsure of the precise date, a 'dissociation of sensibility' set in: thinking
was no longer like smelling, language drifted loose from experience, and the upshot
was the literary disasters of John Milton, who anaesthetised the English language into
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an arid ritual' (38). However, Eagleton in my view, illustrates how much we have
lost sympathy with the Aristotelian perspective.
10 In their emphasis on particularity, Kincheloe and Sternberg illustrate the
hermeneutic claim, also variously advanced by others such as Nussbaum, Hawthorn,
Gallagher or Atkins.
11 Hence mention of empathy by teachers of English literature is rare, and the notion
does not appear as canonical in the assessment criteria for English in the National
Curriculum (see chapter 6). See Medley (1988) on the concept of cause.
12 Quine (1990: 68) claims, in relation to belief ascriptions: 'Empathy is why we
ascribe a propositional attitude by a content clause.' He argues that we feel our way in
another's language and belief through trying to make sense, empathetically, of their
projects and their cognitive position. Parents induct children into this process.
13 Davidson argues that radical interpretation has to be constrained by the principle of
charity, so that massive error in one's belief system is not possible. According to
Brueckner (1991) this either commits him to theism or begs the question against the
sceptic. The problem can be solved by conceiving the omniscient interpreter as being
in possession of perfect modal knowledge.
14 'For those starting points where considerations of agency rather than cause are at
issue, what is more and less admissible is less easy to judge. This is because the line
which divides the two lines at the point at which the agents in question would cease to
recognise or to acknowledge themselves as the agents they were. Actual agents have
dispositions and abilities, kinds of knowledge and states of mind which preclude their
considering some alternatives for themselves, and thereby preclude us from
considering those alternatives as alternatives for them' (Hawthorn 199 1:166).
Hawthorn errs on the side of cautiousness in arguing that we can better understand
what happened knowing what might have happened. This must entail a more extended
view of human agency than, in my view, Hawthorn is willing to give. An imaginative
'sympathetic re-enactment' historian, to use Collingwood's (1946) notion, can surely
enlarge our historical understanding and should be encouraged to do so.
15 It is only history and the arts that appear to take an analytic interest in empathy.
This is a striking example of thinking distinctive to an originating discipline or
discourse which is, apparently, not susceptible to transfer (see again chapter 2).
However, a prima facie case could be made Out that empathy as a concept occurs just
as much, if not under that name, in other subjects such as English.
16 See Cairns (1989: 13). So far as the cognitive benefits of teaching history through
empathy are concerned, the verdict of Cairns is that 'until there is more research into
the adolescent's perception, and effective ways of developing empathy within the
whole curriculum, much of what is said about the teaching and assessment of empathy
must remain tentative.' Jenkins and Bricldey (1989:22) argue that 'the empathy
debate keeps crucial questions' on the agenda such as: What is history, what is its
epistemological status, how far can we 'historically know' the past, how are history
discourses produced, legitimated and related to power, who knows? It also keeps the
question of ideology visible in such questions as whose history? what heritage? in
whose interests? See also Ashby and Lee (1987), Low-Beer (1989), Natale (1972)
and Portal (1990) concerning concepts of empathy and Dray (1980) on general
questions of historiography.
17 Shemilt cautions: 'This is not to argue against an 'affective' component of
historical empathy...but is rather to contend that affective empathy cannot be taught
without degenerating into indoctrination'. One could argue that empathy has a major
cognitive dimension, but also involves the feelings and dispositions. It could thus
qualify as a 'cognitive emotion' with the criteria set out by Scheffler (1991). Dilthey's
distinction between human understanding, which requires all one's mental powers and
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is reflective (or metacognitive), and empathy which is pre-reflective would then need
to be abandoned (Audi 1995:219).
18 'In Barbara Tuchman's work as a historian it is clear that linguistic intelligence,
though essential, would have been insufficient. In her reflections on history, we see
the importance of interpersonal intelligence in interpreting the often conflicting written
records' (Maclure 1991: 161).
19 'Our Anglo-American philosophical tradition has tended to assume that the ethical
text should, in the process of inquizy, converse with the intellect alone; it should not
make its appeal to the emotions, feelings, and sensory responses. Plato explicitly
argues that ethical learning must proceed by separating the intellect from our other
merely human parts; many other writers proceed on this assumption, with or without
sharing Plato's intellectualistic ethical conception. The conversation we have with a
work of tragic poetry is not like this' (Nussbaum 1986: 15).
20 'We can say...that a whole tragic drama, unlike a schematic philosophical example
making use of a similar story, is capable of tracing the history of a complex pattern of
deliberation, showing its roots in a way of life and looking forward to its consequence
in that life. As it does all of this, it lays open to view the complexity, the
indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of human deliberation' (Nussbaum 1986: 14).
21 See again chapter 3. It may have a fictional element, or it could take the form of a
literal historical reconstruction. This is what seems to occur in the case of new forms of
legal discourse. Ryan's taxonomy offers a method of classifying these elements (see
below).
22 'It would be very difficult to construct a philosophy programme for children
without a moral education component, since questions of value are so frequently
encountered in other aspects of philosophy and are of such importance to
children...philosophy without ethics cannot be readily taught' (Lipman and Sharp
1978a: 89-90).
23 'Students must not only be encouraged to express their beliefs as to what they
consider important, but to discuss and analyse them, considering the reasons for and
against holding them, until they can arrive at reflective value judgements which are
more firmly founded and defensible than their original preferences may have been.
Such enquiry necessarily will involve students in examining the criteria employed in
favouring one value over another' (Lipman and Sharp 1978a: 89).
24 Ennis (1994), personal communication.
25 They will have the following dispositions. They will: 'Care that their beliefs be
true, and that their decisions be justified; this is a care to 'get it right' to the extent
possible. This includes the inter-related dispositions to: Seek alternatives
(hypotheses, explanations, conclusions, plans, sources), and be open to them;
Endorse a position to the extent that, but only to the extent that, it is justified by the
information that is available; Be well-informed; and Consider seriously other points of
view than their own. Represent a position honestly and clearly, theirs as well as
others'. This includes the dispositions to: Be clear about the intended meaning of
what is said, written, or otherwise communicated, seeldng as much precision as the
situation requires; Determine, and maintain focus on, the conclusion or question, Seek
and offer reasons; Take into account the total situation, and Be reflectively aware of
their own basic beliefs. Care about the dignity and worth of every person. This
includes the dispositions to: Discover and listen to others view and reasons; Avoid
intimidating or confusing others with their Critical thinking prowess, taking into
account others feelings and level of understanding; and Be concerned about others'
welfare' (Ennis 1995). This account of the dispositions was presented in August
1994 at the Sixth Iiuernational Conference on Thinking, MiT, Cambridge Ma. and
revised for the University of East Anglia Conference on Critical Thinking, April 1995.
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'Thoughtfulness thereby involves attitudes, personality or character traits, general
values and beliefs or epistemologies about the nature of knowledge (e.g. that
rationality is desirable; that knowledge itself is socially constructed, subject to revision
and often indeterminate; and that thinldng can lead to the understanding and solution
of problems) ...without dispositions of thoughtfulness, content and skills can be
taught and applied mechanistically and nonsensically. Thus, thoughtfulness must also
be reinforced in the curriculum as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for
higher order thinking' (47). At best, much classroom activity fails to challenge
students to use their minds in any valuable way; at worst, much classroom activity is
nonsensical or mindless. The more serious problem, therefore, is not the failure to
teach some specific aspect of thinking, but the profound absence of thoughtfulness inUS classrooms. A more general conception of thinking can address the problem that
even programmes designed to teach thinking skills can fail to promote
thoughtfulness.' (Newmann 1990: 44, author's italics). Newmann suggests that
programmes consistent with this emphasis include those described by Lipman et al
(1980).
27 Newmann (1990: 47). See also Cornbleth (1985), Norris (1985), and Schrag(1987, 1988) for a similar approach.
28 'The truth is that in genuine circumstances of moral dilemma there is, more often
than not, no right solution and it is simply up to us to do the best we can in the light of
what we are able to recognise as most honest, decent, kind or courageous' (Carr
1993: 16). Jonathan (1993), however, feels that Carr's (1991) general account of the
virtues takes insufficient account of the volatile conditions of particularity and
contingency, which operating within 'modernity', provide extra possibilities for the
formation of dispositions.
29 It is this model of 'enlightenment male rationality' which Assiter (1994), Haynes
(1991), Thayer-Bacon (1992, 1993) and others wish to criticise. Siegel's assumption
that there is one form of rationality rather than 'competing rationalities', and the view
that rationality exists without historical location is also unacceptable to hermeneuticists
(Atkins 1988).
The distinction between higher order and lower order thinking was discussed in
chapter 1. Newmann (1993: 8-12) makes use of the distinction, but most other
writers do not. The Barrett taxonomy (Appendix 9) gives an idea, in its first two
categories of reading comprehension, of what might be involved.
31 Reported in McGuinness and Nisbet (1991: 18 1-2). The implied need for
reflexivity is not identified.
32 The authors, who are psychologists, do not discuss the philosophical literature.
33 Conley (1993: 1). See the fuller discussion of the problem of 'ironism' as faced
by teachers in chapter 8. Rorty wishes to avoid 'ironism' being taken up by others
than philosophers.
See Shemilt (1988: 78). Chapter 4 showed how such an emphasis links with
recent developments in counter-factual thinldng in the disciplines of history,
philosophy, and psychology. See also Appendix 21. Empathy remains a contested
concept among historians: lJntil there is more research into the adolescent's
perception, and effective ways of developing empathy within the whole curriculum,
much of what is said about the teaching and assessment of empathy must remain
tentative' (Cairns 1989: 17). Nevertheless, it seems that most historians in schools or
colleges would be in favour of some empathetic teaching.
35 However, Donaldson (1979), Meadows (1982), Levine (1983) and critics of
CASE have robustly challenged aspects of Piagetian theory. The debate is one which
the individual teacher must address with colleagues when approaching the whole
school or college policy, as a 'contested' area, with arguments on both sides.
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Concerning the general question of introducing philosophy, it is not advisable or
desirable to pursue technical philosophy with most students (although there will be
precocious exceptions) before the age of 16 years (the commencement of the A level
course). Philosophy teaching, in that form, requires sustained teaching and
performance in philosophising. The point at which this can be undertaken, Kitchener
(1990) and the post-Piagetians argue, does not arise before mid-adolescence. Their
case is underlined by the lack of early virtuosity among philosophers, compared with
youthful genius and precocity often found in mathematicians. Nevertheless, a pre-
philosophical curriculum can meet some of the criteria of philosophy teaching.
Evidence of early pre-philosophical 'cognitive emotions' among those who have later
become philosophers shows that some students need early help.
36 Psychologists claim that these illusions confer advantages in certain
circumstances. Exaggerated beliefs in control and unrealistic optimism are associated
with higher motivation and greater persistence in situations of objectively poor
probabilities of success.
7 This point was explained briefly in chapter 2.
38 'To teach critical thinking in the strong sense is to help the student to develop
reasoning skills precisely in those areas where he is most likely to have egocentric and
socio-centric biases. Such biases exist most profoundly in the area of his identity and
vested interests. His identity and interests are linked in turn to his unarticulated and
articulated world view(s). His un-articulated world view represents the person that he
is (the view implicit in the principles he uses in guiding his action). His articulated
view represents the person that he thin/cs he is (the view implicit in the principles he
uses in justifying his action)' (Paul 1982: 5).
39 For philosophical discussion of 'passion' in relation to the emotions see Solomon
(1993) and Facione and Facione (1992: 2). Emphasis on tolerant pluralism while
pursuing rational passions and character virtues of liberal education could be seen here
as part of the US national debate - for instance, between the evangelical and the liberal
establishments.
40 This is values education with ambitious specifications. For example, hegemonic
reflectiveness is sought in which there is 'awareness of the need to counteract one's
own tendency (both as a person and as a professional worker endowed with specific
powers) to behave oppressively' (Winter 1992: 109).
41 See again chapter 2.
42 Newmann (1990: 47), Cornbleth (1985), Norris (1985), and Schrag (1987,
1988) all of whom have a similar approach.
43 Jonathan (1993: 115-124) argues that any contemporary account of the
dispositions needs to give prominence to particularity and contingency in a way which
is dialectical between the individual and society.
Possibilities may be ideal - as in the case of architecture (Jencks and Kopf 1997,
Tafuri 1976), or satiric and ambiguous (Rees 1996: 3). They may be feminist,
domestic, political, scientific, based on the 'oriental' or 'philosophical tale' (241), or
peculiarly nationalistic (Morton 1969). They are close in conception to the medieval
pre-occupation with plenitude, perfection and the marvellous, with the city as a perfect
civilisation, with islands and deserts, or the Occident as perfect locations; and with
Never-Never Land, the moral location of the refrigerium interim and Purgatory, the
Golden Age and Paradise Regained and even oenirology (Le Goff 1985). Le Goff
describes a catalogue of possible worlds of the Marvellous in the Medieval West (34-
40). Thomas (1971) shows how utopianism flourished in relation to magic and
alchemy (271). Clark (1995) shows how ethical and other philosophical topics are
extensively explored in utopias in science. Both Thomas and Le Goff demonstrate the
progressive christianisation of witchcraft and other beliefs. Thomas shows that many
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philosophers and intellectuals held firm beliefs in actualist possible worlds in which
astrological supervenience, prophecy, alchemy, white witchcraft and worlds in which
witches could be punished, and crime detection through oneirology all feature. The
dilemma is presented: should one welcome emancipated thinking about a plenitude of
valued possible worlds, some of which will be very far-off rather than close? Or
should one beware the pitfalls of inauthentic glibness, febrile wit and ultimately
unfounded speculation, and instead develop an advanced sense of irony?
45 Hughes'(1996) textbook attempts to integrate critical thinking approaches with
discussion of key questions in the philosophy of language and in epistemology.
Halpem (1997) offers as the core skills of critical thinking across the cuthculum:
'determining cause; assessing likelihood and uncertainty; comprehending complex
text; solving novel problems; making good decisions; evaluating claims and evidence;
and thinking creatively'.
' See also White's (1983) Beyond Domination for a depiction of schools which
could accommodate the notions of both 'classroom thoughtfulness' and the
'community of inquiry'.
47 'Teachers need time to reflect on these issues and the delicate matter of applying
them to the educational situations in which they find themselves' (White 1996: 89).
48 See again chapter 2 for arguments concerning the hegemonic use of philosophy
teaching. We should perhaps be especially wary of implementing a political or
governmental curriculum for such purposes but the pursuit of a 'plurality of valued
possibilities' as urged by Kekes (1993:26) could be a suitable aim. As De-Shalit
(1998: 819) reminds us, there is also the question of our obligation to future
generations in any notion of a community of philosophical enquiry: 'obligations rest
on a sense of community which extends into the future.'
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CHAPTER 6
The canonical curriculum: specialist philosophy
and the National Curriculum.
1. The question of a philosophical canon
If whatever is discovered by the transcendental realist becomes provisional dogma, the
temporary agreed reality, to what extent should it be allowed to carry canonical status
as a body of discourse or knowledge which can be taught to others? In chapter 3, it
was argued that Bhaskar's account of transcendental realism led towards a demand for
pedagogy. The style of teaching, in which transcendental modal realism was to be
translated into classroom practice, was to feature an unremitting drive towards
exploring possibility, requiring a full repertoire of interventionist approaches on the
part of the teacher. It would involve the teaching of social practices and forms of
discourse or knowledge over which there was contestedness. However, despite
these circumstances of curriculum territoriality, contestedness and pluralism, the
distillation of apre-philosophical and philosophy curriculum could be achieved.
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l'his chapter examines the notion of the canonical, first as seen within the subject by
philosophers themselves, and then in relation to the teaching of philosophy, pre-
philosophy and critical thinking. It looks in turn at philosophy teaching in France,
philosophy for children in the US, the A level in philosophy, the National Curriculum
for England and Wales, and the concept of an inferred canon.
The question of whether there could be a canon of literary philosophical works which
all could agree upon, as a basis for teaching in a plural society, has been of great
interest to public intellectuals (Bloom 1994, Brann 1993). The literary canon can, for
example, be seen as aesthetic experience processed by life-time memory (Bloom 39).
1 Pragmatically, 'what is the canon?' is the question addressed by an examination
board in considering the principles of selection for a syllabus, say in A level
Philosophy. The same question, asked in relation to an entire philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum which is compulsory or prescribed, turns into an exercise of
political as well as educational power.
For Rorty (1984) the 'canonical' embraces a larger question: what is to be the place of
the history of philosophy when we are deciding how or what philosophy is to be
taught? Discussion by Rorty of what might constitute a philosophical canon, when
taken together with other sources, leads to a deeper reading of what might be involved
in a larger national or compulsory cuthculum for pre-phiosophy and the teaching of
philosophy. 2 Rorty wishes to revive interest in the view that careful and scholarly
attention should be given to the history of philosophy and the notion of a canon, or
canons, of key texts, ideas and philosophers. In Philosophy and History (1984) he
urges:
The more intellectual history we can get, of the kind which does not worry about what
questions are philosophical and who counts as a philosopher, the better our chances of
having a suitably large list of candidates for a canon. The more various the canons we
adopt - the more competing Geistesgeschichten we have at hand - the more likely we are to
reconsuct, first rationally and then historically, interesting thinkers. (74)
He suggests that we can discernfour genres in the treatment of the history of
philosophy. Firstly, there are rational reconstrucrions of the arguments of dead
philosophers, necessary to help present day philosophers think through problems.
These might be in the form of possibilia, for instance conversations with the 're-
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educated dead' answering questions like 'what would Locke have said about, say,
labour unions or Rawis on justice? (51). Secondly, there are historical
reconstructions of 'what unre-educated dead thinkers would have said to their
contemporaries'. For example, if the question is what Locke would be likely to have
said to a Hobbes who had lived and retained his faculties for a few more decades,
there is no reason why historians should not arrive at a consensus (53). 3 Rorty's
categories of rational and historical re-construction envisage guideluies and rules for
proceeding in these two different cases of historical thinking about 'what if?' events.
Thirdly, there is Geistesgeschichte in canon formation: the idea that some one can
count as a great, dead philosopher who identifies problems in such a way as 'to justify
our belief that we are better off than those ancestors by virtue of having become aware
of those problems'. Here, Rorty suggests, we should also ensure the inclusion of
edifying philosophers. These are philosophers who may have made no major,
original contribution to the corpus of philosophical thought but who can be held to
have performed a particular role which is worth recording, or have contributed to the
dissemination of a technique (1984:56). 4
A fourth genre, doxography, Rorty wishes to discard replacing it with the term
'intellectual history' for a much more diffuse and rich genre which does not fit into the
above categories (1984: 68). 5 Within this area, it becomes much less important that
a thinker is called, formally, a philosopher. The question, for instance, of whether
Weber was a sociologist or a philosopher, or Arnold a literary critic or a philosopher,
are matters to be settled after we have written our intellectual history rather than
before.
Kress (1994), working in linguistics and English studies, makes a different set of
distinctions. He wishes to define the idea of a canon in terms of three categories of
text the aesthetically valued - and valuable text, the culturally salient text, and the
mundane text.
The culturally salient text is not measured by the cnteria of the aesthetically valued text -
even in the culture in which it originates. It is measured against criteria ofsgn#Icance:
what significance does this text have in its own cultural domain: what significance does it
have therefore for members of cultural groups in this multi-cultural society? What are the
features and charaeteristics which give it salience in its culture of origin and therefore lend
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it particular force and significance as a means of understanding a cultural group in the
society of which it is a part? Aesthetically valuable texts may be among these: but that is
not a relevant or telling criteria (sic) from that point of view. (103)
Parallels can be seen between Kress's first two categories of text and the
distinguishing characteristics of texts within a philosophical canon and tradition (Lang
1990: 232). 6 For instance, Rorty's notion of the 'edifying' text resembles the
'aesthetically valuable' one proposed by Kress.
In After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Maclntyre (1981:205) argues a somewhat
similar case to that of Rorty, Kress or Hirst; that any canon inevitably, and desirably
must be derived from a public tradition of social practices. His particular argument,
as described already in chapter 3, claims that one inherits a specific past which is
active in one's present; and that this makes one the bearer, and transmitter, of
practices which have histories and traditions. Maclntyre, furthermore, allocates an
important place to the dispositions; since they sustain the re1ationhips required for
practices within the larger social traditions, through which particular practices are
transmitted and reshaped.
Implications arise here for the role of the individual teacher of philosophy and pre-
philosophical thinking which link with the discussion of the importance of the
dispositions (chapter 5). The hermeneutic claim can, for instance, be discerned when
Kress speaks of the 'culturally salient' text which has significance in its cultural
domain; and in the idea, present in the work of Maclntyre, Nussbaum, Gadamer and
Rorty, that one philosophises Out of a singular location in space, time and tradition:
Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes through
many generations. Hence the individual's search for his or her good is generally and
characteristically conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which ibe
individual'slifeisapart,andthisistruebothofthosegoodswhich areinternal topractices
and of the goods of a single life. (Maclntyre 1981: 206)
That such a philosophical canon can vary widely even Within the lifetime of a
philosopher, is evident in the very great differences between major dictionaries of
philosophy and their subsequent revisions, or editions, as Monk (1998: 25-6) spells
out (see also Borchert 1996, Craig 1998, Edwards 1967).
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2. A curriculum canon
Suggestions for a canonical approach to the curriculum, and particularly forms of
knowledge or practice in relation to it, have arisen frequently within the field of the
philosophy of education. Hirst (1974, 1983, 1993), Phenix (1964), White (1973,
1982, 1990) and others have claimed that a 'canonical' epistemology can be
discovered in, or should under-pin our curriculum arrangements.
White and White (1985), for instance, suggest classifying the teacher education
curriculum, and particularly in relation to INSET (inservice education and training) in
terms of the main, traditional areas of philosophical investigation. They propose an
approach which, taking the curriculum as a given, involves systematic mapping and
analysis of that curriculum, its core and foundation subjects, attainment targets,
schemes of work, and task assessments, in terms of their philosophical content and
assumptions (40-47).
The chief interest of the schema they offer is that, although designed for teacher
education, it identifies the various areas of the 'transcendental' curriculum and
pedagogy which might be covered. It begins with a range of epistemological beliefs
which would be covered, including the provisionality of belief itself. There would be
considerable emphasis on the procedures for thinking - analysing, synthesising,
distinguishing, predicting, hypothesising, judging, reasoning, and persuading.
Social beliefs such as the possibilities of negotiation and consensus would be covered,
as would psychological beliefs concerning the nature of awe, wonder, mystery and
feelings of transcendence. Political beliefs are less prominent, although there is
reference to consensus, negotiation and agreeing to differ. Ethical beliefs about the
cultural relativity or objectivity of values, or priorities in human well-being, including
the response to ethical dilemmas and scientific controversies, are fairly prominently
covered. The need for a personal interest in metaphysics, for instance in cosmogony
in relation to religious education, is specifically mentioned together with 'hypothesis'
in its more metaphysical sense. To these would need to be added, in my view, the
aesthetic domain and its associated ideas.
This approach could also accommodate variations between subject disciplines such as
those identified by Donald (1992). She asked an international panel of professors to
identify the 'epistemological status of one's own discipline' by prioritising the order
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of six thinking processes or metacognitive variables (Appendix 29). Disciplines
varied in the kinds of thinking to which they gave most prominence, thus supporting
the Kuhnian (1970) thesis that particular paradigms or canonical perspectives achieve
dominance among communities of scholars through processes which are both
sociological and subject-related.
3. Selection is inevitable
There has to be selection for a canon to be formed, although the approach to this task
may vary according to whether we are acting as philosophers or curriculum designers.
Selection is inevitable, and takes place de facto, in any practical preparation of a
course for school or college students, through the selection of texts to be studied.
The problem of selecting a canon of approved works in teaching philosophy often
proves, however, to be a complex and exacting task. 7 Agreement on criteria is
difficult to achieve, and the epistemological frameworks described above give only
general guidance.
Taking up Rorty's account of the ingredients for a philosophical canon, for instance,
is the main task for A level philosophy to be the selecting of historically significant
philosophers whose work has some contemporary relevance; or philosophers who
have tackled important topics; or those who, like Hume, Ayer or Russell, write with
edifying lucidity? As Maclntyre, Brann (1993) and others point out, a pluralist
Western society will have different and sometimes competing views on the definitions
and criteria to be used. 8
 Should criteria of balance, celebrity, past influence, quality
of writing or its difficulty be adopted in compiling a canonical list of texts? What
should be the particular contribution of medieval, Buddhist, women, or black
philosophers (Gill 1992, McGary 1984)? 9 Should contemporaneity, relevance or
thequalityofwritingbeaccordedmoreimportancethanothercriteria? Whoistoset
the standard of rationality: should it be the examining body or eminent philosophers?
What should be the influence of universities and examination boards? Should
syllabuses reflect, for example, the renewed interest and catholicity of university
courses in changing their attitudes towards Continental European philosophy? 10
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Similar arguments apply to the sub-domains of philosophy for children, transferable
and critical thinldng, which were shown in chapter 2 to be part of a fissiparous social
movement. How are the 'contested' claims of interested parties to be taken account
of? To what extent should pedagogic, linguistic or educational theories, as described
in earlier chapters, bear on the process of selection? 11 What significance should be
attached to the 'ideological' critiques of Haynes (1991), Thayer-Bacon (1992, 1993),
and Weinstein (1993a, 1993b) who criticise the philosophical assumptions of the
critical thinking movement, as being based on post-Enlightenment rationality?
How these questions are answered will vary widely, as can be seen in case study
examples taken from the three different national settings of France, the United States
of America and the United Kingdom.
4. The case of France
Much can be learned from the historical evidence, as Rorty argues, about the nature of
the philosophical canon; and especially from the curriculum traditions of nation states
and their cultures. The notion of the canon offers a procedure for what Lawton
(1973, 1983, 1989) calls 'maldng selections from the culture'. 12 Even if one does
not take a narrowly transmissionist view of curriculum, it is evident that both in its
elitist or democratic modes, the teaching of philosophy can be seen to be concerned
with power relations in any given society. In that sense, arrangements for the
teaching of philosophy (and notions of critical thinking) are susceptible to a political,
'critical theory' or Marxist interpretation, as discussed in chapter 2.
The history of philosophy teaching in France shows how a canon can emerge which
relates to the training and selection of elites, thus raising the sociological question of
the relationship between philosophical education, hegemony and power (Montefiore
1983). Howard (1994), indeed argues that the teaching of philosophy in high
school, the 'classe terminale', has been a crucial factor in shaping what is unique
about the public intellectual tradition in France. Philosophy in schools in France was
originally taught by the Jesuits. But after their colleges were closed down in 1762,
control was assumed by the universities, who took over the training of teachers in
addition to their existing direction of the Baccalaureate examinations. There was thus
always a connection between secondary school philosophy and the universities, and
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close attention to the notion of a canon since all teachers of philosophy were involved
in the development of the subject.
Cuthculum re-organisation in France under the Napoleonic Code led to the detailed
specification of a philosophy syllabus (Griffiths 1979). An emphasis on independent
thinking did not mean the neglect of a nominated canon of philosophical texts which
included edifying texts and the history of philosophy. The compulsory element of
philosophy within the final year of the Baccalaureate course featured a list of topics
designated by the Minister of Education. Suggestions on teaching methods were
issued in the 1970's by the Ministry, when the need was emphasised for teachers to
develop an individual approach, engaging in dialogue with the students while drawing
on the academic authority of textbooks.
5. Philosophy for Children in the US
Lipman and colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy with
Children (IAPC) in the United States have pursued a quite different view of the Canon.
It is one which affects to be ahistorical but which, nevertheless, arises from a
particular, Anglo-Saxon tradition in the teaching of linguistic philosophy. 13 For
example, the advocates of philosophy for children place emphasis on oral
philosophising and eschew mention of the names or ideas of particular philosophers
when worldng with school age students. The training of teachers in the IAPC
programmes, and the programmes themselves, place great emphasis on avoiding what
Rorty calls the pitfall of doxography, studying a list of 'philosophers of the past'.
The IAPC philosophers therefore assert a formal separation, through their pedagogic
practice, between the pre-philosophical curriculum and the more academic or technical
study of philosophy.
Lipman and his colleagues have been anxious, however, to enlist the support of great
philosophers of the past, in seeking canonical justification for their practice, as
adumbrated in chapter 2. Lipman and Sharpe (1978b) argue that there are historical
anticipations of philosophical thinking among children, drawing attention to the work
of particular philosophers Locke, Vico, Pestalozzi, Tolstoy, Groethuysen, Jaspers
and Dewey - as supporting their arguments for the teaching of the subject. For
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example, they cite Locke's advice that we should treat the child as a rational creature in
teaching matters 'level to their thoughts', and appropriate to the age and inclinations of
particular children, which engage them in practices that involve reasoning behaviour.
Vico's argument that children can develop their logical powers through re-enactment
of their experience of the world is adduced as evidence. Pestalozzi's advice is called
upon that the child needs to be made to think as 'an agent in intellectual education'.
Evidence of philosophical apprehension in the childhoods of philosophers such as
Sarire and Tolstoy is brought forward, as part of a case for teaching the subject from
an early age. Jaspers' essentialist claim that children's interest in philosophy is innate
is cited, together with Dewey's argument that 'all thinking is original' and his stress
on the need to stimulate its practice frequently (Lipman and Sharp 1978b). 14
6. A level Philosophy in the UK
Whatever the state of the contemporary philosophical debate about the notion, revival
and adoption of a philosophical canon, those about to commence teaching philosophy
as a separate subject in schools or colleges in England and Wales in 1986, found
themselves designing syllabi and setting examinations; and thereby force majeure
proposing a philosophical canon (Ward 1983). The inception of the A level in
England and Wales was a phenomenon of professional interest among philosophers
and educationists, and among the general public. Claims for and counter-arguments
against teaching the subject were professionally aired in subject journals and, more
controversially, in the popular press.
The debate provided a unusual opportunity for philosophers to act as a public
intellectuals concerned with education policy (see chapter 8). Much was revealed
about what various protagonists considered to be appropriate claims concerning the
philosophical canon. 15 The issue of which works were to be studied was discussed
by the professional, philosophical community. What was to be included and what
left Out? By what method of teaching would candidates and their teachers proceed?
These questions were solved in the event by getting down to the job of designing an
examination course, when a curriculum emerged as described in chapter 3, responding
to professional circumstances rather than some larger intellectual debate. Any notion
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of a philosophical canon as in the account developed by Rorty was more implicit than
publicly discussed, even in the professional literature. However, the philosophical
canon which emerged did in fact reflect the categories offered by Rorty, Kress or
Maclntyre.
The aims of the Associated Examining Board syllabus, the more widely adopted of the
two syllabuses on offer, were for instance stated as being: to enable the student to gain
an understanding of some important philosophical ideas, their historical development
and their present-day relevance; and to strengthen the capacity of students for analysis,
reasoning and judgement, and their ability to express themselves in these modes. The
AEB Syllabus consisted of twop. One part concentrated on the history of
philosophy; and the other part covered various philosophical themes. The syllabus
indicated not only the desirability, but also the difficulties in selecting a canon from
which to teach. 16 It used texts qua texts and specified the study of particular
philosophers. 17 Emphasis was placed on the selection of texts and philosophers
congenial to the professional stance of the ordinary language or linguistic philosopher.
No 'great philosophers' were presented as such; although in general the selected texts
promoted 'great thinkers' in the European and Anglo-Saxon linguistic tradition. In
reviewing the proposal from the Associated Examining Board for an A level course,
Ward (1983) pointed out that the study of the history of philosophy was being
justified in the way the A level had been developed. The examining body had drawn
up a well thought-out A level philosophy syllabus that encouraged a critical awareness
of the work of a few famous philosophers of the past, and 'the ability to discuss some
of the problems faced by recent and contemporary philosophers', and had thus met the
twin aims of the syllabus (254). 18
7. The National Curriculum of England and Wales
The third case study addresses the question, in rather more detail: To what extent has
the National Curri culum for England and Wales dealt with, or conceptualised the issue
of a canon? Is a canonical pre-phiosophical curriculum highly visible, or a 'hidden'
curriculum and invisible pedagogy presented, within the structure of the National
Curriculum, its curriculum orders, circulars and guidelines? Teachers wanting to
introduce a whole school policy on philosophy, pre-philosophy and higher order
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thinking would want, on the argument of chapter 3, to answer such questions by
scrutinising the philosophical claims and assumptions to be found in the National
Curriculum documentation.
Some philosophers have taken a favourable view of the opportunities for
philosophical education which would be offered by the introduction of a National
Curriculum. Macdonald (1988), for instance, argued that such a curriculum could be
interpreted as being sympathetic towails philosophical concerns.
Other philosophers of education have evinced an especial interest in the ethical or
'values' dimension of a prescribed state curriculum. Haydon (1990, 1997) wishes to
approach philosophical issues in ethics and values education within the context of the
National Curriculum. He offers a selection of representative, 'values' teaching
prescriptions from the National Curriculum, including such statements as that pupils
should: 'discuss moral values and explore those held by different cultures and
groups', 'be taught to...use factual information and value judgements'; 'be taught to
recognise potential conflicts between the needs of individuals and society'; and to have
'concern for human rights'. Haydon argues the largely proceduralist stance, that:
Learning how to wrestle with value judgements, how to priontise, compromise and,
hopefully, resolve value conflicts is central., it benefits from the skills of using language to
negotiate with other, to elicit what lies behind conflicting points of view and to achieve co-
ordination of and consensus on practical action. (1990:2) 19
Value issues should be explored in a way which is not compartmentalised by subject
matter. A unified tradition of discourse within which the rational settlement of value
claims is not needed, but there should be a language of discussion which is
sufficiently differentiated and precise to make the exploration of values more than a
mere comparison of feelings on specific issues.
	 Myerson (1994) argues for a
concept of dialogic rationality along rather similar lines; and others provide curriculum
resources which might do this (McCulloch and Mathieson 1995).
205
8. A cross-curricular entitlement
Craft (1991) puts forward the case for a canonical 'entitlement' curriculum of thinking
skills within the National Curriculum framework. Craft shares the view of those
philosophers who claim that it is only in the area of thematic concepts that 'philosophy
meets literature' and other subjects (Olsen 1984). A general thinking, argument, or
pre-phiosophical curriculum cannot simply be assembled by the ad hoc adoption of
the individual insights, methods and favoured procedures of each subject discipline.
A broader account of 'thinking about thinldng', or 'thinking or arguing' pre-
philosophically in the general curriculum will be necessary.21
Craft argues that the National Curriculum innovation offers a chance to introduce an
entitlement curricuiwn in thinldng skills through its cross-curricular skills, themes and
dimensions (Appendix 33).
The whole curriculum in English schools, as defined by the National Curriculum Council,
which comprises the subjects of the statutory curriculum, the five named cross-curncular
themes, cross-curricular skills and cross-curricular dimensions, can be seen as an entitlement
curriculum. (1991: 183)
She also sees an important place for thinking within the subject areas:
Identifying named thinking skills in the core and foundation subjects and relating these to an
agreed whole school policy in skill development is therefore a first step in teaching children
to learn to think. For primary teachers this means being aware of what skills are appropriate
to each subject in the curriculum. How is thinking in geography different from that in
English or technology? For secondary teachers, it means subject specialists exploring
thinking skills in their own subjects and sharing knowledge with specialists in other
subjects. (196)
The circumstances in which a 'welfare right' of a curriculum entitlement to be taught
philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum might arise from a combination of
strong claims was identified at the conclusion of chapter 2. Despite having a
somewhat restricted perspective in its emphasis on thinking skills, Craft's argument
for a whole school or college approach provides a persuasive foundation for the case
of that 'welfare right'.22
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9. The subject context
Accounts by critical thinkers, like McPeck (1981), who claim that any canon of good
thinking will be domain and subject-specific can be seen as compatible with the claims
of Nussbaum in literary hermeneutics (1986), and of Atkins (1998) or Leinhardt
(1993) in curriculum theory and pedagogy. For McPeck (1981, 1990), it will be
recalled from chapter 2, it was a matter of conceptual truth that thinldng could never be
about 'everything in general' but was always about something in particular. 23 The
language of the disciplines provides a very powerful set of analytic lenses through
which students can come to understand problems, as McPeck (1990) asserts:
Since critical thinking is, in my view, parasitic upon the disciplines, it follows that you
should not introduce it until students know something about the disciplines. Anything
worthy of the name 'critical thinking' cannot exist in a subject vacuum. (McPeck 1990:43)
Siegel (1988) argues for the teaching of philosophical content within the subject
disciplines as one goes along.
In history, literature, mathematics, and so on, familiarity with the philosophy of that
subject may reasonably be expected to enhance students' critical thinking in that subject,
since the philosophies of the subjects all take as part of their domain the proper analysis of
reasons in that subject. (114)
These arguments of cognitive proceduralism do not address the affective dimension,
however. Hermeneutic and neo-Aristotelian accounts, which suggest that thought
and feeling may not in fact be separate epistemological or ontological categories offer a
more complete account. Nussbaum (1986, 1988), for instance, offers a refined,
canonical case for thinking occurring in subject domains. The specificity of context
found in subject teaching is essential where thought, feeling and understanding are to
combine in the formation of dispositions (see again chapters 3 and 5).
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10. The 'inferred' canon and the National Curriculum
One method of approach to the construction of a philosophy and pre-phiosophical
curriculum is therefore to identify the inferred canon of assumpticiis, pedagogy and
content which pervade an existing curriculum. This is to put into practical operation
the transcendental claim made in chapters 2 and 3. Taxonomies of description or
assessment often reflect the canonical criteria to which those in a given field are
working, and can thus be used to infer the canon itself (see Appendices 8,9,11, 14,
21, and 29). The inferred canon can scrutinised for its consistency and internal
coherence; although it is worth re-stating the point that there will always be canonical
plurality in a democratic society (see again chapter 2).
An attempt to construct an inferred canon for the pre-phiosophicai curriculum to be
found within the National Curriculum was undertaken for the purposes of this study.
The method involved scrutiny of a range of statements and assumptions concerning
levels and criteria for assessment in thinldng, found in the Consultative Proposals of
the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority on the National Curriculum for
England (1994, Appendix 17). 24 The criteria for assessing thinking, argument, or
philosophical coverage within each of eight subject areas were classified in four
categories (Thornbury 1995b, Appendix 17).
The Consultative Proposals put forward amendments to the existing assessment of the
National Curriculum. The Proposals covered every subject in the curriculum. The
documents were prepared by a series of separate committees and co-ordination of
effort and approach was claimed. These were examined together with a model
syllabus and targets for Religious Education, a subject not formally included in the
National Curriculum. A revealing picture of the current national state of 'thinking
about thinking' subsequently emerged. The vocabulary used and the ideas which
recur provide a picture of the received opinion of the time among tbe subject
specialists. Their diversity reveals the disparate assumptions, as well as continuities,
concerning thinking within different subject traditions which Donald's (1985, 1988,
1992) research suggested are likely to occur.
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11. Results of the analysis
The English criteria came nearest to setting out a coherent teaching programme which
would move students towards the levels of thinking argued by Kitchener (1990) as
pre-requisite to the fonnal study of philosophy. The English rubric mixed a high
level of generality with pragmatic prescription. For instance, in specifying how
intellectual enquiry and thinking were to be assessed, students were to:
Take different views into account, sift, summarise and use salient points, cite evidence and
construct persuasive argument. In taking different roles in group discussion pupils should
where appropriate, negotiate consensus or agree to differ... be taught to identify the major
elements of what is being said and also to distinguish tone, undertone, implications and
other indicators of the speake?s intentions. In discussion, pupils should listen and respond,
making contributions which clarify and synthesise others ideas, taking them forward, and
building on them to reach a conclusion, as well as modifying ideas in the light of those of
others (6) 25
Assessment criteria for the writing of non-fiction should encourage 'distinctive ways
of organising and expressing ideas and information in discursive, argumentative,
persuasive and other types of non-fiction writing' (8). There was tension and
differences of emphasis between different English criteria. For example, a
requirement that the making of inference should be taught was stressed in relation to
reading, whereas 'making out one's argument' more broadly was emphasised in the
iting criteria. Pupils at the highest levels in reading were expected to:
Sustain and develop interpretations of texts, supporting their views by references to them
..analyse argument and opinion, identifying implications and recognising inconsistencies.
respond cogently to a range of texts, making appropriate connections between them. (33)
Their reading was to be specific and rigorous.
Pupils sustain their responses to texts, developing their ideas and referring in detail to
aspects of language, structure and presentation. They make apt and careful comparison
between texts. They identify and analyse argument and opinion, making cross-references
where appropriate. (33)
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They should be able to follow the thread of an argument, identifying implications and
recognising inconsistencies'(15). English criteria also included 'the ability to sustain
and develop interpretations of text' and specific discourse markers such as 'well' and
'then'. Students were to 'sustain their response to texts, developing their ideas and
referring in detail to aspects of language, siructure and presentation', and to
demonstrate 'the ability to follow the thread of an argument, identifying implications
and recognising inconsistencies'.
Leadership and hegemonic claims by English specialists that their subject is best suited
for teaching argument, moral and controversial issues were identified in chapter 3.26
However, the primacy claim of Kress (1994), that English is 'the only site in the
curriculum which can deal with questions of individuality in a moral, ethical, public
social sense', was not reflected in the English assessment criteria. The English
document rather more conveyed the linguistic claim of ordinaiy language usage and
clarification. It was the development of correct argument and procedural thinking
which were emphasised, rather than a 'grand nanative' in subject aims in which major
philosophical and human issues were to be addressed. The 'development of
thinking' was stressed, however, in requirements for narrative, persuasive, discursive
and explanatory writing, suggesting that some theory of progression such as that of
Berrill (1990) might be in mind. 27
While any expectation that English in the National Curriculum would be the lead
subject in tackling pre-phiosophical education turned out to be unfounded, some other
subjects were prepared to take up the task. Science wished to encourage student
engagement with speculative metaphysics by raising questions concerning
cosmogony. Geography wished to assess the awareness of a major philosophical
question; the provisionality of explanation and 'the tentative and incomplete nature of
some explanations' (7). 28 Religious education put forward assessment criteria
which required teaching some of the major traditional areas of metaphysics. Students
were to be encouraged to evince some fundamental categories of philosophical
interest, such as 'a desire to search for the meaning of life' (teleology, eschaxology);
'developing a personal interest in metaphysical questions'; and interest in
'transcendence' (ontology).
In general the assessment criteria did not reflect the growing public and professional
interest of the time in values education conceived as a task of the schools.29
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Nevertheless, moral philosophy, and ethical dilemmas were to be covered in Science
and Religious Education; and both Science and Geography sought evidence, that
students had engaged with the 'genuine and substantive' difficulties of balancing
environmental policy against scientific and other priorities.
In chapter 4, 'what if?' questions concerning counter-factua]s, conditionals and
possible worlds theory were argued to be, philosophically and pedagogically, the
keystone of any philosophy and pre-phiosophical curriculum. In relation to counter-
factual thinking, as broadly conceived, a number of subjects did relatively well;
Geography, for example, in its desire to emphasis the provisionality of all explanation;
English in asking for hypothesis and prediction of outcomes; and Design and
Technology, in wanting to look at the implications of decisions and assessments of
risk. Some subjects mentioned 'inference' but most did not. Inference was
specifically required in Mathematics, Modem Languages, and implicitly in History
where 'reasoned conclusions' were expected. Mathematics alone sought assessment
criteria for students having engaged specifically in their own forms of conjecture. It
also sought evidence that assessment criteria were in place showing that 'what if?'
questions and 'intuitive probability' had been studied (38, 46). In these respects
Mathematics emerged conspicuously and well.
Concerning creative thought and the aesthetic domain, most subjects were muted.
However, the Modern Languages document specifically announced that it would seek
assessment criteria which would develop students who were 'imaginative and
creative'. The Mathematics committee also specified creativity and the aesthetic in
their criterion of 'elegant proof (25). There was a single reference in the English
documents to pupils 'writing extensively for aesthetic and imaginative purposes',
when autobiography was among the range of types of writing specified. Art and
Religious Education emphasised the close relationship between thought and feeling in
the growth of argument and 	 30 It was the RE document, rather than the
History one, which specified an approach to the assessment of empathy. The Design
and Technology document wished to assess the abilities of students in 'generating
ideas'. Religious Education saw creativity as a form of private spirituality, it being
one's 'innermost thoughts expressed through a variety of media': and thus at least one
subject area addressed the notion of reflexive, personal identity.
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12. The need for an explicit canon
On the positive side, a philosopher looking for coverage of philosophy and the pre-
philosophical curriculum might be somewhat encouraged. Much emphasis in the
Consultative Proposals was placed on encouraging children to think, and on the
procedural dispositions necessaiy to its good practice. So far as higher order and
philosophical thinking were concerned, a number of subjects could be seen as having
made a start on such topics as counter-factual thinking, epistemological relativism,
ethical theory, and aesthetic aims. The disciplines of Geography, Religious
Education and Mathematics were epistemologically and aesthetically courageous by
comparison with others.
However, an overall judgement on the Consultative Proposals would have to be that
there was no consistent or coherent view of what a philosophical or pre-phiosophical
curriculum should look like. No formal canon, taxonomy or foundational pedagogy,
showed how progression in 'the development of thinking' over the whole range of
subjects might proceed. The criteria for assessment, designed by a series of subject
committees, did not appear co-ordinated. The Proposals were not internally
consistent or coherent across subject areas; and although there were tentative signs of
a theory of progression within some subject areas, theoretical claims and assumptions
relating to cognitive or child development theory were never made explicit.
Pedagogic under-pinning was not explained even where, for instance, social
constructivism in teaching method was strongly implied. The critique made at an
earlier time by those drawing up the Science National Curriculum appeared to be
endorsed. They had taken a firmly constructivist stance but found that the other core
subjects lacked a clear foundational perspective (Watts and Bentley 1991). 31
The Consultative Proposals did not respond to three key questions concerning the
philosophy or a pre-philosophical curriculum. These questions, to be addressed in
chapter 7, are: i. What is the formal plan of curriculum preparation and pedagogic
strategy for the upper school study of philosophy? ii. What is the pre -philosophical
curriculum in thinking and values education which is to be taught within the National
Curriculum, in particular subjects, or across the range of subjects? iii. How is the
whole school or college approach to be assessed and evaluated in terms of student
achievement and professional performance?
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The best that can be claimed is that, embedded within the various Consultative
Proposals, a pluralistic inferred canon could be discerned. Some components of
values education subsequently requested in the National Forum Report and
Consultation, for instance in relation to the environment, were already visible. The
various subject committees provided some encouragement for both procedural
intellectual virtues, and for social practices in thinking such as the notion of
community of enquiry and supportive respect for democratic forms of life. However,
the lack of coherence and consistency of the Consultative Proposals overall suggests
that a considerable amount of work would need to be done to achieve an explicit canon
and assessment criteria for a pre-philosophical cuniculum within the National
Curriculum. 32
13. Identifying sources for an explicit canon
The general approach to the identification of the transcendental curriculum was
examined in detail in chapter 3; and this chapter has developed the concept of the
inferred canon. As O'Loughlin and Campbell (1988) argue, critical pedagogy must
begin with the pre-existing beliefs of the prospective teachers and it is the practices of
existing teachers which embody many of those beliefs. There are many intellectual
resources available which can yield an inferred canon while meeting National
Curriculum and other requirements.
The Appendices (1-38) to this study offer a range of core ideas and criteria, in the
form of resources, by means of which an emerging canon for the pre-philosophical
curriculum can be identified. Assessment instruments are found in Ennis' (1991)
Ideal Critical Thinker, Appendix 7); in Facione and Facione's (1992, 1994)
characterisation of the Critical Thinking Skills, Sub-Skills and Dispositions,
Appendices 18 & 19; in Berrill's (1990) modelling of The Multi-Dimensional
Development of Written Argument, Appendix 8; and in Barrett's (1972) Taxonomy
for the Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Reading, Appendix 9. The Lipman
Teaching Approach to Questioning (1980) is pedagogically helpful.
Epistemological stances and classifications of Teacher's Ideologies are represented by
Morrison and Ridley (1989), Appendix 2; by Donald's (1992) taxonomy of How
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Teachers in Higher Education Classify Thinking, Appendix 29; by Pope's (1993)
analysis of Theoretical Concepts on Teacher Thinking, Appendix 23; and by
Goodson's (1992) portrayal of the Levels of Biography of Teachers, Appendix 5.
Approaches to specific subjects are found in: Driver's (1988) Characterisation of
Constructivist Thinking (science), Appendix 13; Newmann's (1990) Indicators of
Classroom Thoughtfulness (social studies), Appendix 10; Shemilt's (1984)
Classfication of Forms of Empathy (history), Appendix 21; and The Cambridge
History Project Assessment Domains (1992) for A level history, Appendix
Teachers reviewing their practice with a view to formulating policy would fmd
detailed examination and discussion of many of these resources of value in coming to
their own view (see chapters 7 and 8). The outline for a master's degree in critical
thinldng has particular relevance for those planning courses in higher education
(Appendix 31). A larger range of documents than the Consultative Proposals (which
themselves were ephemeral and superseded within the policy process), and the
Appendices to this study, would need scrutiny by teachers planning a curriculum in
philosophy and pre-philosophy for a particular institution. Many of these will be
practical working documents, such as LEA policies, individual school policies, or
examination board guidelines. One key exercise, in terms of the argument of chapters
4 and 5, will be to identify the various points in the curriculum at which opportunities
for possibilistic thinking are presented; and various instruments provided in the
Appendices cater for this need.
This chapter has sought to show that a philosophy and pre-phiosophical curriculum,
and pedagogy, arising from the philosophical position of transcendental, modal
realism, can be formulated in a canonical form. Such a canon may need to be
inferred. It will have its foundations in the work of philosophers, teachers and
examiners. It will be influenced by mixed societal demands, moving those revising
the National Curriculum to respond to agendas identified by the larger society in
which quite different conceptions of moral education are sometimes sought (SCAA
1996, QCA abed 1998). 	 In the case of the National Curriculum for England and
Wales, a great deal of clarification and curriculum development would be needed for a
coherent canon for the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum to be put in place.
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The philosophical and pre-philosophical curriculum, in values education and critical
thinking, is likely to be given continuing prominence and recognition by public policy
makers within the central and local government of education (as identified in chapter
5). However, as Clarke (1993) rightly asks, in discussing the teaching of argument
as a contribution to citizenship education within the National Curriculum:
How is it possible to introduce philosophical thinking into schools given that no mention is
made of this subject in the National Curriculum? ...Any adequate notion of education for
citizenship must include the explicit teaching of thinking and valuing. (Clarke in Andrews,
Costello and Clarke 1993: 23-4)
The preferred approach will put into place a philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum particular to each school or college, employing a local, moderate
hermeneutic - in Gallaghefs (1992) phrase. An incomplete pluralism is to be
preferred to the excesses of centralised systemic curricula, for the philosophical
reasons argued in earlier chapters. Chapter 6 will show how this can be done, while
Chapters 7 and 8 will argue that the indlividual school and college staff, and individual
teachers or lecturers as public 'transformative' intellectuals, must play a leading role in
the formation and implementation of institutional policy for the philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum.
Notes to chapter 6
1 'The Canon, once we review it as the relation of an individual reading and writer to
what has been preserved out of what has been written, and forget the canon as a list of
books for required study, will be seen as identical with the literary Art of
Memory.'(Bloom 1995: 17). 'Only recently, past the age of sixty, have I come to
understand that my literary memory has relied upon the Canon as a memory system'
(39).
2 The need to study philosophers and their ideas from the past was the reason that
Warnock (in Davies et al 1988) gave for not including the subject in the school
curriculum. She took the view that there was not time during schooling to do this (see
again chapter 2). See Dougherty (1979) on the uses of philosophy in teaching
history.
3 Rorty's first two genres are of considerable interest for this study since they are
forms of 'what if?' discussion and therefore relate to the topics of counter-factual
conditional theory, modal realism, possible and plausible worlds which were
discussed in chapter 4.
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4 The selection of Russell's (1912) Problems of Philosophy or Sartre's (1948)
&istentialLsm is a Humanism as A level texts, both exceedingly well-mitten in their
different ways, would be examples of 'edifying' texts. Further examples might
include the work of gifted iconoclasts, like Lakatos or Ayer, who challenge
philosophical orthodoxy or those who, like Plato, Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, Same
or Voltaire developed new literary forms - the dialogue, the notebook, the confession,
and the philosophical novel, for canying on philosophy. One could also include
philosophers like Averroes or Avicenna, who under the influence of Islamic
philosophy facilitated the emergence of scientific thought in the early Renaissance, and
who represent a particular minor tradition. See Leff (1958) and Price (1992) for
discussion in depth of this question.
5 However, this is an extraordinarily persistent approach. The success of general,
introductory works popularising Western philosophy in this way continues, Russell's
History of Western Philosophy (1922) being probably the best-known. Recent
attempts to vary the tradition include such works as: Driving to Ccl fornia by Cohn
Radford (1996), Looking at Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy
Made Lighter by Donald Palmer, Sophie's World: A Novel About the History of
Philosophy by Jostein Gaarder (1995), also available as a CD Rom; and Benjamin
Hoff's (1982) The Tao of Pooh, also available on audio tape.
6 Rorty's example of texts which do not advance philosophical theory much, but are
well written, meets the 'aesthetic' criterion for a canon put forward by Kress. Lang
(1990) follows Spinoza in linking the canonical with the sacred. If a secular reading
of a text 'evokes a response of piety' it may then be regarded as 'sacred' or canonical.
This is a helpful notion for teachers of religious education in teaching philosophy.
An example of an edifying text in practice can be seen in the A level course which uses
Russell's (1912) Problems of Philosophy, on the grounds of its pellucid style, thus
reflecting the notion of 'philosophy as literature' (Lawry 1980, Phillips Griffiths
1984).
7 This problem has been rehearsed in relation to the question of whether one can
identify a core canon of great works of English literature.
8 'By the canon I shall mean a list of books held in high, even reverent regard by a
stable community of readers; by the Western tradition, a sequence of books beginning
with the Homeric epics, that stand to each other in a dialectical tradition of mutual
response' (Brann 1993: 193).
9 Examples have appeared in Teaching Philosophy, the journal covering high school
philosophy in the US, and Cogito, a UK journal focusing on A level philosophy
tpics in the UK.
10 The rehabilitation of Hegel in phenomenology courses at Oxford (Taylor 1989);
and the launching of journals reflecting interest in modern European philosophy, such
as the European Journal of Philosophy and Philosophy Now, illustrate such trends
(Bowie 1993).
11 Work by linguisticians showing that differing forms of argument and genre have
developed for different cultures, is relevant to curriculum issues. See Swales (1990),
Mitchell (1992) in The Teaching and Learning of Argument in Sixth Forms and
Higher Education (18), and Appendix 15.
12 See Lawton (1983, 1989) for successive treatments of this question.
13 See again chapter 2 for a discussion of the IAPC approach.
14 Mitchell (1992: 99) in The Teaching and Learning of Argwnent in Sixth Forms
and Higher Edacation places it in relation to the 'world of the book': 'A literary text
can lay claim to the creation of a world, a fullness and wholeness, which, implicitly,
to some degree is unchallengeable. It is not a theory about the world; it is the
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world...Literary does in many ways refer to the 'real world' but it also constitutes a
real world in itself.' Ryan (1991) develops this idea more fully.
15 The first school course in A level philosophy was offered to older students in sixth
forms or colleges of further education in 1985. The subject was first offered, as a
separate examinable subject at A level, simultaneously by two English examination
boards. See Ward (1983), Ross (1988) and Guardian (1985) for contemporary
discussions. See again chapter 2 for arguments put forward by Scruton, Waniock
and others.
16 The first part comprised four historical periods: Greek Philosophy, 17th and 18th
century Philosophy, 19th century Philosophy and 20th century Philosophy. Each
period involved studying two, and in the case of the 20th century, three prescribed
texts; 1. Plato - The Republic, Aristotle - Nicornachean Ethics, 2. Descartes -
Meditations, Hume - An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; 3. Mill - On
Liberty; Marx and Engels - German Ideology, 4. Russell - Problems of Philosophy,
Sartre - Existentialism and Humanism, Ayer - Language, Truth and Logic. For their
philosophical themes students could choose from six possible areas; Our Perception of
the External World; Faith and the Existence of God; Mind and Body; Scientific
Method; Value Judgements; Freedom, Law and Authority. In the examination two
essay questions on each of the two chosen themes were required to be answered. An
alternative syllabus offered by the Joint Matriculation Board attempted a broader
approach, including a course work special study; and some coverage of issues such as
animal rights. Here one could detect signs of a claim for teaching philosophy based
on relevance. The prescribed texts and philosophers included those who had made
edifying contributions and those who were historically important in the development
of the subject.
17 See contemporary critiques such as those of Butler (1985), or Eaton (1984, 1987)
who wished to offer a joint English and Philosophy A level.
18 'The Board's proposal counts as philosophy,' Ward concluded (1983: 254).
19 This last requirement links with benefits claims for philosophy teaching which
relate to conflict studies and argumentation theory, critical and 'transferable' thinking
(chapter 2). The connection argued by Berrill, Dixon, Fox and others between
narrative, exposition and argument in the development of children's thought is also
relevant here (chapter 3).
20 See Haydon (1990: 2).
21 See again chapter 2, where claims concerning transfer and generalisability were
appraised. These arguments are of especial interest in relation to teaching philosophy,
the subject which deals epistemologically with the analysis of meta-thinking and its
practice. A systematic rationale for the place of metaphysics and aesthetics Within the
curriculum of schools and colleges would also be needed.
22 However the curriculum receives little in attention in works on rights in primary
schools; see Wringe (1981) or Chamberlin (1989: 87-8 & 98-100).
23 It is McPeck who is generally acknowledged to have raised to the status of a
central issue, the question of general as opposed to domain specific critical thinking
skills, the issue that became 'the Great Debate'. See Weinstein (1993a: 100).
See an earlier document of interest, the National Curriculum Task Group on
Ass ess,nent and Testing: A Report (DES 1989). The general UK context for a
National Curriculum was set out in the Education Reform Act (HMSO 1989).
25 Consultative Proposals of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority on
the National Curriculum for England. (1994).
26 See also Andrews, Costello and Clarke (1993), Clarke and Sinker (1992) and
McCulloch and Mathieson (1995).
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23 It is McPeck who is generally acknowledged to have raised to the status of a
central issue, the question of general as opposed to domain specific critical thinking
skills, the issue that became 'the Great Debate'. See Weinstein (1993a: 100).
24 See an earlier document of interest, the National Curriculum Task Group on
Assessment and Testing: A Report (DES 1989). The general UK context for a
National Cuniculum was set Out in the Education Reform Act (HMSO 1989).
25 Consultative Proposals of the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority on
the National Curricuiwn for England. (1994).
26 See also Andrews, Costello and Clarke (1993), Clarke and Sinker (1992) and
McCulloch and Mathieson (1995).
27 Berrill's (1990) thesis is that argument emerges via exposition and narrative. For
an account of 'persuading as storying' see Hesse (1989).
28 This is not surprising. Geographers operate within a phenomenological stance of
the theory of knowledge in relation to their subject. See again chapter 3 which
examines the extent of ideological assumptions as part of the 'transcendental claim'.
29 The growing interest in the training of dispositions within the US critical thinking
movement and within UK vocational education, for example, was traced in chapter 5.
30 See again chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of 'empathy' in relation to intellectual
and affective dispositions.
31 Watts and Bentley (1991: 17 1-9) found that while most schools showed evidence
of a minimum, 'convenience' or 'weak' form of constructivist practice, only science
was committed to such an approach in the formal National Curriculum. 'Thus, a
curriculum built upon the criteria for song constructivism would be very different
from the National Curriculum as it is organised and, indeed, would have far-reaching
implications for the structural and organisational features of schools as they are now.'
However, Matthews (1994) demonstrates that constructivism is a contested, plural
concept in the minds of educationists; and that there is ajob of philosophical
clarification to be done.
32 For instance, inspection procedures could be adapted to look at the quality of
thinking in classrooms as part of lesson assessment. That such an approach has been
lacking in current practice is clear in OFSTED's (1994) Framework for the Inspection
of Schools in the UK.
33 These taxonomic instruments are provided as Appendices. There appears to be no
literature of this type in relation to philosophy teaching in schools and colleges. An
inferred canon for pedagogy in the UK, can be gleaned from articles in the journals
for students, for example Cogito, Philosophy Now and Dialogue, from conference
contributions, and from the reports of A level examiners.
34 A new dimension to the debate arose in OFSTED's (1996) Report of the National
Forwn for Values in Education and Community. It proposed that a consensual canon
for values education should be arrived at for use by teachers in schools. However,
QCA research and consultation in 1998 revealed the further fact that parents have
some reservations about full-blown programmes of moral education, while for
instance being strongly in favour of specific teaching on health education. A proposal
for an AS level syllabus in critical thinking	 moral education within post-16 general
studies was also put forward by the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority,
and is in process of development; for a specimen proposed syllabus see Fisher
(1996).
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CHAPTER 7
Organising a whole school or college curriculum
in philosophy and pre-philosophy.
1. The need for a whole school or college policy
The most important questions with which chapter 1 concluded have now been
addressed. Chapter 7 will explain, using the argument of chapters 1-6 as a
foundation, how a 'strong version' of the philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum as a whole school or college policy can be put in place.
A 'strong', whole school or college policy will set out a strategy for philosophy and
re-philosophy teaching which covers curricular, pedagogic and management
approaches. This can be done by devising and implementing what Craft (1991) calls
'an entitlement curriculum'. Such an 'entitlement curriculum' will need to be
characterised by a pedagogy based on the principles of transcendental realism and
possibilist thinking, as put forward in chapters 3 and 4. It will give emphasis to each
of the traditional areas of philosophy; aesthetics, epistemology, ethics and
metaphysics.
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Putting a policy into place will involve a major programme of staff, curriculum and
pedagogic development within the institution (Thornbury 1994). 1 That process,
which sees teachers as collectively concerned with the 'development of liberal
learning' (Pring 1995: 179), is characterised in this chapter, for the sake of simplicity,
as a series of steps. However, the sequence in which these steps are actually pursued
will valy according to local circumstances; and drawing on the lessons of school
improvement research, it will be found possible to enter the cycle of innovation and
development at various points (Fullan 1992). 2
2. Making an action plan for putting a curriculum policy into
place (STEP 1)
There will need to be a very clear action plan and responsibility structure for the policy
of putting the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum into place. In a secondary
school, one deputy head or senior curriculum manager, supported by a working group
of staff, might co-ordinate implementation of a whole school policy. In a college, the
arrangements may be faculty-led, or focused on a department or unit specialising in
transferable learning in vocational education, or learning support. The education of
the dispositions and virtues, through some form of citizenship or 'values education' is
likely to be a prominent concern, as argued in chapter 5. The whole institutional plan
will be the subject of consultation and planning with the governing body of the school
or college. The roles of the leaders of subject departments, and the tasks they are to
undertake in curriculum mapping and subject leadership, will require clear guidelines.
The staff may also wish to seek training or advice from in-service advisers, or
inspectors, and the resident philosopher, if there is a philosophically trained teacher on
the staff, in the working-out of the whole school or college philosophy. Consultancy
and course provision from philosophers of education working within higher
education, especially the teacher education setting may be helpfuL3
The approach which sees the whole school or college as a democratic community of
enquiry should be adopted. 4 This will involve asking teachers, first individually,
then working in larger groups, and finally as a whole staff, to look together at key
questions which arise during the adoption of a whole school or college curriculum
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strategy for teaching philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum. Some
consultation should occur at each stage with other interested parties, including
students, their parents, local education authority staff, and the governing body.
That it is necessary to stress the role of the individual professional conceived as a
responsible public intellectual will be argued more fully in chapter 8. Each teacher
should first appraise the central arguments concerning a pre-philosophical curriculum
and decide on his or her own position. 5
 After that reflective stage, a debate
followed by consensual negotiation should take place among the departmental teams.
Only then should the third stage commence of whole staff discussion, in which an
institutional policy is decided upon. Account will need to be taken throughout of
national, local authority, professional or subject association, or diocesan viewpoints,
and regional or local policy structures beyond the individual school or college. In
England and Wales, developments in critical thinking, values and moral education are
likely to have a high profile and will require cautious assessment in relation to how
individual schools or colleges decide to respond. 6
3. Identifying philosophical leadership (STEP 2)
The provision of adequate philosophical leadership in developing a whole school
policy for the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum will be of great importance
(McArtney and Schrag 1990, Ryan 1992, Schrag 1987, 1988). The significance that
should be attached to philosophical leadership is argued philosophically by
Hodgkinson (1983, 1991). Hodgkinson asserts that there is a hierarchy of values
operating in a school which ranges from the good to the right, which he calls 'the
'value paradigm'. The highest order of these values is trans-rational, essentially
metaphysical, and based on the acceptance of a principle. At the opposite end of the
scale lie other values which, based on personal preference, are influenced by emotion
and feeling. 7
 Leadership will therefore involve the addressing of philosophical
assumptions, involving values, ideology, and the school's philosophy and ethos,
which are held by stafL Both Hodgkinson and Greenfield (1989), whose
phenomenological management perspective was discussed in chapter 3, envisage that
a pluralism of subjective views will be present.8
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Members of staff who teach philosophy, or who are philosophically trained, will have
a particular role to play in providing philosophical leadership. The availability of
such a person on the staff will vary. A large college or a secondary school is likely to
have, if not a specialist teacher of philosophy, a member of staff specialising in
cognate areas such as thinking skills, higher order thinking, transferable thinking or
study skills. Staff working in Special Needs, or Pastoral, Social and Health
Education curriculum might have such an interest. There is also the possibility that a
curriculum specialist, such as a member of the English or Science departments, would
be active in the areas of problem-solving or argument.
It will be relatively unusual to find a specialist philosopher on the staff of a primary
school, although it is not unknown. There will certainly be one or more members of
staff who have a conceptually sophisticated understanding of child development,
together with issues in teaching, learning and thinking which arise in the early
childhood and primary classroom. 9 If the argument of chapters 4 and 5 has been
accepted, the vision of philosophical leadership for the curriculum and pedagogic
programme can be expected to place emphasis on the need for counter-factual and
possibilistic thinking.
4. Establishing a shared notion of rationality (STEP 3)
A key problem for staff to face in philosophical terms will be the range of differing
view-points among staff, on a broad spectrum of questions relating to the curriculum,
pedagogic and organisational ideology within a pluralist, multi-faith society (Haydon
1987). What was characterised in chapter 1 as social movement 'contestedness', and
what Hoyle (in Bush 1989: 134) describes as 'conceptual pluralism', are likely to be
found in most schools and colleges.
It may not be possible therefore to make an assumption that the school or college
functions on a philosophy of shared rationality, along the lines argued by Siegel
(1988, 1993) or Maclntyre (1988). 10 Chapter 6 showed how finding a canon of
rationality may be less straightforward than at first envisaged. Maclntyre's
traditionalist hermeneuticism, or Siegel's Enlightenment view of rationality, for
instance, may have to be reconciled with the post-modern critiques first described in
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chapter 1. As Weinstein (1993ab) points out, the debate concerning the claims and
assumptions of traditional critical thinking and philosophy teaching has been
'reconfigured', in relation to issues of gender, literacy, and the under-class in urban
schools. Weinstein when reviewing the critiques of Baum (1995), Kincheloe and
Sternberg (1993), Haynes (1991), Assiter (1994), and Thayer-Bacon (1993), calls for
inclusion to be a major objective of the critical thinking movement, and of US national
educational policy.
It could be asked: If there is no agreement on the philosophical canon, how can a
common school policy be reached? How can agreement be reached in implementing a
whole school approach to claims concerning the dispositions and virtues, for example,
if there is no agreement on what the aims and purposes of the school are? The view
of Maclntyre that one should look for a canonical, shared rationality, or Siegel's
unapologetic demand for ideological rationality, are relevant here (see chapters 3 and
6). Such an approach can also be formulated in terms of the ideal speech situation of
Haberrnas (1970, 1981), or dialogic rationality and double arguabilizy about content
and the method of discussing it (Myerson 1994). Authenticity will also need to be
sought in the thinldng of both staff and students, in the sense discussed in chapter 5.
This will raise questions concerning whether the world is perceived in the Bhaskarian
mode (as discussed in chapter 3), the applications of counter-factual thinking (chapter
4), or the pedagogic and ethical issues faced by the individual teacher (chapter 8).
A considerable degree of pluralism will be inevitable in the range of responses which
staff will make. More than curricular and pedagogic approaches will be affected.
Managerial assumptions and practice will partly set the tone and context for discussion
concerning the philosophical and ideological purposes of both pedagogy and
curriculum. 11 Conceptual pluralism in the staffroom, and a range of contested or
competing rationalities among teachers or lecturers concerning aims, purposes and
content will arise from the variety of response to the claims advanced in chapter 2.
Consequently, there may not be agreement over how to implement claims within an
individual institution (Goldman 1975). Wright (1992), far example, shows how
there are different implications for curriculum policy in eadh of the four, dominant
conceptions of critical thinking, namely those of Ennis, McPeck, Paul and the
Philosophy for Children Programme.
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What might be hoped for is some commonly accepted framework for going forward
with the possibilistic claim, both as presented in chapters 4 and 5 and in Keke's
(1993) characterisation of pluralism in the good life:
The plurality of possibilities is important for good lives...not merely because the
possibilities are means to good lives but also because they are constituents of them. (29)
It is for these reasons that the present study is prescriptive about the need and the
broad framework for an individual institutional policy. The canon itself, as argued in
chapter 6, must be accepted as pluralistic on philosophical and empiiical grounds.
5. Forming a community of enquiry (STEP 4)
The strong version of the claim for a pre-phiosophical curriculum favours the need
for school or college life Gutman (1987), Kelly (1995), or White (1996) to be
envisaged as social democratic. 12 Where this is the case, there may be a shared,
communitarian view of rationality that extends across the institution. However, an
elitist approach with its own curricular and pedagogic arrangements will sometimes
arise (see chapter 2). Lipman's democratic argument for a community of enquiry
approach to philosophy teaching is not compatible, for instance, with the non-
egalitarian claims of those who see philosophy as an elitist form of study which only
the few are capable of undertaldng.
For example a school staff may wish to insist that A level philosophy is only to be
taught within the rubric of Religious Education. One may disagree with that position,
but it has a respectable philosophical provenance, philosophy having historically
emerged from theology, as chapter 1 demonstrated. Tensions will also arise in a
school or college where the pluralistic questioning of values is not acceptable, since
particular truth claims are espoused in relation to religious belief. The individual
teacher in an unsympathetic setting may find it necessary to take a personal,
hermeneutic position which is at philosophical vaiiance with, while not breaching the
practical consensus reached with colleagues.
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This study has broadly supported the constructive notion of the classroom as a
Habennassian community of enquiry where there is commitment to openness to
evidence and to reason, to dissent as a right, and to procedures of democratic
citizenship which are internalised and 'become the reflective habits' and dispositions
of the individual (Lipman and Sharp 1978a: 88). This does not, however, mean an
abdication from authoritativeness by the teacher.
It is the teacher's responsibility to ensure that proper procedures are being
followed...although manipulation of the discussion so as to Ixing the children to adopt the
teacher's personal convictions is 'reprehensible'. (88)
Such authoritativeness will require practical pedagogic strategies, such as question-
asking (Appendix 12), the ensuring of 'turn-taking' in conversation (Sacks et al
1974), and techniques for dealing with the demagogic, inauthentic or sophistical
student (Stenhouse 1973, Bonnett 1994).
6. Reconciling ideological claims (STEP 5)
A question which members of staff will want to discuss with great care concerns how
far an ideological or a value-free position is to be reflected in the practice of the
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. This will be especially true where
programmes of values education, or in the virtues and dispositions, are to be
embarked upon. 13 Humean journeyman' claims for the teaching of philosophy or
the improvement of thinking in a school as linguistic clarification may not arouse
controversy. They do not involve ideological questioning of the social foundations of
knowledge, of the nature of society, of authority and democracy in school life and so
forth. But the strong version of claims for a pre-phiosophical curriculum will
unquestionably extend to fundamental questioning of assumptions about school
organisation, pedagogy and even aspects of the teaching of individual subjects, such
as religious education. The teaching of students to question authority, or be
iconoclastic, could then be regarded as controversial.
The 'ideological' nature of the vocational claim concerning transferable thinking may,
for instance, arouse staifroom controversy (Wiener 1985, Bridges 1996). One may
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broadly agree with Siegel's claim in chapter 2, that thinking that is driven by
rationality cannot be said to be ideological in any pejorative sense. But thinkers like
Assiter (1994: 23), it will be recalled, argue for a radically different model of the
vocational dispositions, competency and embodiment in thinking. Unlike the
traditional approach, their model values the bodily domain; and its intellectual origins
employ a theoxy of knowledge which sees knowing subjects as historically and
contextually situated.
There are different consequences here for the teacher or lecturer. Education for the
dispositions within the 'new vocationalism' goes some way beyond a commitment to
rational ideology - towards the embodied, flexible ready-wittedness described in
chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, for some lecturers or teachers there would be a tension
between making potential workers more critical, and improving their acceptability as
compliant workers through training in transferable thinking. Many 'academic'
staifrooms would resist a further implication of the model, that greater importance on
the timetable should be given to physical education, the plastic arts, drama or craft
technology.
Equity issues will also need to be addressed in planning both curriculum content and
coverage, and pedagogic strategies. Some will argue the need for balance in the
schemes of work to be adopted, in relation to equal opportunities policy. For
instance, the representation of black or women thinkers or multi-faith perspectives,
may be urged, in the context of a hermeneutic claim set in the ethnic, cultural and
religious context and affiliations of the school or college. New and additional
curriculum resources will need to be identified and tried out (see below). There will
be continuing discussion and revision of the canon, as depicted in chapter 6.
7. Deciding on the approach to values education (STEP 6)
Pressures for values education within the pre-philosophical curriculum will reflect
staff pluralism and arise from other diverse sources, including curriculum bodies,
examination boards, governor, parent and student bodies, and funding agencies.
Issues of accountability which are partly cultural, philosophical, professional, political
will arise (Botteiy 1990, Starratt 1994, Scott 1989). 14 The staff will have to
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consider their response to the claims for the training of the dispositions and moral
education, education for democracy and citizenship (Amstine 1995, Schrag 1987),
economic life, or even the selection and training of a leadership elite within the
society. The case made by the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (1996)
in Report of the National Forwn for Values in Education and Community in England
and Wales for values education, including at A level, will need to be examined in the
context of the arguments of philosophers such as Haydon (1997).
Some teachers and lecturers will have strong professional as well as philosophical
views on the extent to which teaching values or 'transferable' thinking should aim to
develop dispositions, or traits of character (Bridges 1996). Katz (1993) wishes to
begin on dispositional training in early childhood. Winter (1994) wishes to see in the
older student vocational 'virtues' such as cheerfulness, compassion, empathy,
resourcefulness and 'awareness of the need to counteract one's own tendency (both as
a person and as a professional worker endowed with specific powers) to behave
oppressively' (Appendix 25). 15
There should therefore be a statement of professional ethics within the institutional
policy. Such statements are increasingly found in cognate professions, such as
nursing and social work, or business. 16 This should apply not only to the curricular
and pedagogic practice, but also to collective staifroom life where issues in
professional ethics such as'what is 'authentic' collegiality?' increasingly come to the
fore (Ihara 1988, Little 1985, 1990, Wallace 1989). White (1996: 89-96) argues that
consensus over such matters will require time. Teachers need opportunities to
discuss with colleagues how a school or college community can be modelled; 'in
which students can become hopeful, confident, courageous, honest, self-respecting
citizens with appropriate self-esteem, knowing how, when and whom to trust and
distrust and able to experience the rich pleasures of friendship.'
8. Clarifying philosophical issues In pedagogy (STEP 7)
It will be necessary for a whole school or college staff to take up a philosophical
position on a range of pedagogic issues in relation to the particular curriculum that is
proposed. There will be a need to decide what contribution particular theoretical
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accounts of child or human development are considered to make to learning and the
curriculum (see chapter 5). 17 Teachers will re-visit some critical questions about
how students learn, such as how domain-general and domain-specific knowledge
interact within 'alternative conceptual frameworks, the theory of teaching as 'assisted
performance', and relevant work done on adult learning (Donald 1985,1992) or
academic literacy (Entwistle 1987, Entwistle and Entwistle 1991).
They should consider the claims of social constructivism, and its variants such as the
phenomenographic account of learning, which have major implications for the
approach to possibilist and creative thinking - and preparation for teaching it. The
Vygotskian claim that thinking is socially constructed through language during a long
apprenticeship in the pre-philosophical curriculum will have direct implications for the
curriculum to be adopted, since it is supportive of teaching within a community of
enquiry.
A view will need to be taken on the genetic epistemological claim in relation to how
children's emotional and intellectual development and learning occurs (Adey and
Fairbrother 1995). Those agreeing with Kitchener's (1990) case that young children
are inherently, and developmentally incapable of undertaking philosophising in any
serious sense (see chapter 2) could rule out use of IAPC Philosophy with C]iildren as
an intervention programme. 18 Others will find the approach valuable (Nicol 1990).
Differences of perspective over child development will be less relevant in the
secondary school or college but will be replaced by other concerns. Pedagogic debate
is more likely to centre on whether generalisable higher-order thinking, critical and
creative skills exist; about whether they can be taught; about the extent to which each
subject or discourse has its own enclosed system of thought and feeling; and whether
specialist philosophy should be taught separately, or within the religious education
offer at A level 19
Chapters 2 and 4 sought to demonstrate that claims concerning different types of
intelligence, transfer, or teaching and learning styles, will shape one's approach to the
'thinking curriculum'. In this field, and that of the transfer of learning and cross-
domain thinking, while there is some empirical research evidence, mature research
conclusions are yet to be established. Those preparing apre-philosophical curricuiwn
can act only on a provisional assumption that conclusive evidence of transfer will be
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eventually forthcoming. But that is the stance which, in my view, should be taken
up. Armstrong (1994), for example, argues that the concept of multiple intelligence
has a special place in provision for those with learning difficulties.
The 'strong version' of the proposed curriculum also involves a particular view of
progression between early childhood and sixth form or further education. 20
 A
school or college staff may already have a whole school policy on progression, in
relation to various aspects of the National Curriculum or General National and
Vocational Qualifications (GNVQ's). However, this study raises the questions:
'How can progression be integrated within the teaching of thinldng and philosophy as
a cross-curricular theme?'; 'How does progression link with notions of school
democracy and the community of enquiry?'; and 'How does it relate to notions of
vocational and life-long education?' It will be appropriate to attempt certain kinds of
philosophical work or discussion at particular ages or stages of intellectual and
affective development.
The Appendices, the Bibliography and many authors cited in this study can be
usefully drawn upon in relation to progression. BerrIll's (1990) helpful account of
narrative as the bridge between exposition and argument was identified in chapter 3
(Appendix 8). Her taxonomy links in turn with a theory of narrative development of
young children's thinking by Fox (1989a, 1989b, 1990; Appendix 16). Computing
has a major contribution to make in the overall curriculum; and a particular
contribution to make to the development of skills in written argument (Snyder 1992).
The approach to progression should emphasise the multi-sensory nature of
philosophical apprehension and learning. This suggests the extended use of
children's literary and illustrated stories in pursuit of progression in children's
philosophical ideas, along the lines suggested by practitioners such as Cam (1994a,
1994b), Guttmansdottir (1991), Matthews (1976), Kruise (1987), Markie (1987) and
Murris (1992).
The position taken up on curricular and pedagogic progression in relation to students
also applies to staff development. The 'strong version' of claims for a philosophy
and pre-philosophical curriculum entails the need for life-long education permanente in
philosophical thinldng for both children and their teachers, for instance in re-shaping
the notion of thinldng as work (White 1997). Concepts of teacher's lives, personal
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and philosophical progression, stages of biographical transformation, and
professional reflection, then take on importance (as discussed in chapter 8).
9. Identifying the general curriculum contribution (STEP 8)
It will be important in secondary schools and colleges to assess how far colleagues or
departments specialising in transferable learning can contribute special expertise and
leadership to the institutional strategy. 2' This may be a political question in that
competing claims for 'ownership' or leadership of the development of the whole
school policy or canon have to be resolved (Appendix 22). One or more departments
may, for instance, bid for hegemony, arguing that they should be responsible for the
strategic, curricular approach to pre-phiosophy, transferable or higher order thinking.
Special needs teachers of language may claim that their work on argument and
thinking justifies their department having the principal responsibility for school policy
in the pre-philosophical curriculum and higher order thinking skills. 22
 Science
teachers who have been teaching programmes of problem solving and 'cognitive
acceleration' could claim a leading role in secondary school policy. Historians might
want to claim a special place for the teaching of empathy. The specialist philosopher
on the staff might want to have a 'voice' in monitoring the progress of the policy, and
such matters as the quality of the final documentation. Overlap between philosophical
content in A level Religious Education and the A level Philosophy, may need to be
adjudicated upon, thus affecting the academic counseffing and advice given to
students.
The approach to what Newmann (1990) calls 'classroom thoughtfulness' in their own
subject will, however, be uppermost in the minds of most teachers. A preoccupation
with the subject as the originating base for transferable thinking has been shown to be
persuasive (chapter 3). Thinking is always about something; and it is always about a
subject, even if that subject turns out to be meta-cognitive in its own right as in the
case of philosophy.	 It will be important to ensure, therefore, that a staff engage
together in a curriculum mapping exercise of what, and where philosophical questions
are presently covered in the various subject areas.
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Newmann's (1990) subject instrument could be profitably used by most heads of
subject departments concerned with curriculum development in the teaching of
thinking (Appendix 11). The need for adjudication between the claims of different
subject teachers, departments and approaches, to teach specific or the same
philosophical topics, can then be sensibly addressed in a way which pre-empts
staffroom conflict. 24
 Where access to certain philosophical concepts and
understanding can best be obtained through the teaching context of a particular
specialist subject, especially precise negotiation will be necessary.25
Curriculum mapping, sharing of information, negotiation and adjudication will
therefore be an extremely important aspect of policy implementation. It is also likely
to generate development and collaboration among teachers in further framing the pm-
philosophical curriculum. 26 For instance, as chapter 4 showed, the position on
'empathy' taken by history teachers requires to be more fully explored by other
subjects. 27 A cross-curricular approach, will therefore be essential (Appendix 6).
It is particularly important that primary teachers take both a general, and an individual
subject view on the approach to whole school policy. Primary teachers co-ordinating
or leading a particular curriculum area, and in their class-teaching role, will have to
work out the approach both to their own specialist subject, and a larger group of
subjects. As far as possible, a philosophy and pre-phi losophica7 curricuiwn should
be worked on by the whole group of staff, although aspects of the task may need be
delegated to an interested sub-group of staff convened for the purpose, or even
individuals.
10. Agreement on the distinctive contributions of individual
subjects (STEP 9)
Considerable emphasis has been placed in this study on 'thinking in the content
areas', on the ground that most, although not all philosophical content originates in
subject thinldng and that thinking is 'parasitic upon the disciplines' (McPeck (1990:
43). Chapter 3 showed how Nussbaum and others have identified the embedded
nature of the philosophical curriculum in each subject context. A key task for subject
teachers will be to decide which ideas cannot at all be meaningfully separated from the
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experience of the specialist subject, its content and processes; and which ideas and
content can be thus separated (Burden and Williams 1998: 19). They should also
form a view about which specialism should teach those ideas which, although
generalisable, should be first taught in a subject context.
The varying claims of the subject specialists have to be examined by those responsible
for curriculum co-ordination and a whole institutional strategy decided upon. For
example, with respect to history teaching through empathy, Portal (1990: 37) argues
that 'the place for greater complexity, more background knowledge is after some level
of active thought has been established.' Adey et al (1994) claim that inductive
thinking should be taught first in the context specffic setting of science, in order to
achieve maximum transferable benefits to other subjects.
How a philosophically- based pedagogy could underpin a strong version of the
teaching of philosophy and a pre-phiosophical curriculum, in its impact on
quantitative and qualitative stochastic, and conjectural thinking, was demonstrated in
chapters 4 and 5. There it was suggested that such thinking will extend across
domains, and involve different intelligences or cross-sensory modalities. Assiter
(1994), for example, argues that thinking is a form of craft work involving the senses.
In a whole school policy, such considerations would have a particular impact on the
curriculum in the expressive arts and physical education, especially in reflecting
cultural notions of the 'body-self (McLaren 1996).
That there is a growing need for subject teachers to review their approach to both the
content and methods of thinking, and especially the mind's relationship to the material
world, was argued in chapter 5. This issue, as well as being to do with the body-self
duality, is a pedogogic and curricular priority. Many science educators, for example,
wish to up-date the conceptual world of the science curriculum, replacing it with one
which is post-Newtonian, which recognises quantum theory, and which moves away
from the 'metaphysical presupposition of duality' underlying a Western scientific
world-view (Mashhadi 1997a).29
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11. Deciding on a cross-curricular approach (STEP 10)
The need for a cross-curricular approach, accommodating the pervasive presence of
philosophical content in the different subject areas, means that specialist subject
perspectives will dominate discussion of a policy for the secondary school or college.
Theories of child development and learning will generally play a more important role
in informing the approach taken in the primary school, since they are more explicitly
held and talked about there than in the secondary school or college. In either setting,
as Watts and Bentley (1991) claim, some variant of the constructivist approach is
likely be found, even if this will not always be explicitly formulated except in science
(see again chapter 6).
The cross-curricular offer should involve, wherever possible, some formal
philosophy teaching for those student interested in having a taste of the subject. This
could even be organised as an elective option, or even exira-murally. Some students
would like to learn about philosophers in history, to be introduced to some appropriate
technical distinctions in philosophy, or to learn more about critical thinking, problem-
solving or philosophy for children. The cross-curricular programme should allow for
the use of some separately-taught 'intervention' programmes, developing
generalisable thinking or 'transferring' meta-competences. Teachers will need to
consider whether or not they agree with Quinn (1991, 1994) and those who argue that
both critical thinking and philosophy should be taught as separate subjects. As
Nisbet (1991: 181) points out, this involves an important epistemologicaljudgement
concerning which aspects of a subject are 'content free' (see again chapter 2). 31
In thinking about which cross-curricular approach is needed, in forming one's own
canon, an analysis of the various kinds of thinking which are asked for in the National
Curriculum for England and Wales will be helpful (see again chapter 6). This will
include the examining of assessment criteria found in the documentation of external
bodies, both local and national, for instance with examination syllabuses, inspection
schedules, or vocational education criteria (Soden 1993). 32
Teachers who have accepted Craft's (1991) case for a cross-curricular approach to the
pre-philosophical 'thinking' cuniculuin will find that there are sometimes severe time
tabling constraints (see chapter 6). 33 Cross-curricular time tabling is already well-
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established in many further education colleges or secondary schools which are actively
engaged with transferable thinking and study skills in vocational education; or which
have flexible learning policies, departments or units. The picture in primary schools
is more fragmented, although often exhibiting features of good practice. Those who
offer a general rationale for 'teaching thinking', philosophy for children, or problem-
solving in primary education are not always helpful concerning cross-curricular
approaches. They tend to concentrate on narrow aspects of primary school
pedagogy, and the promotion of various forms of intervention programme (Dowson
1987, Fields 1995b, Fisher 1987, 1990, 1995). 34
Overall guidance in the National Curriculum literature for a whole school approach to
a canonical curriculum and assessment criteria has been distinctly lacking, as was
demonstrated in chapter 6. In general, therefore, in addressing cross-curricular
policy the adoption of a combination of five practical strategies - and especially the
first - as set out in the National Curriculum Council document, Curricuiwn Guidance
No. 6: Economic Awareness (1989), is recommended (Appendix 6). Seen in this
way, everything from A level philosophy to study skills can be integrated within the
curriculum and pedagogic policy. Institutional preparedness for accountability
through OFSTED inspections and achievement surveys should be thereby improved.
12. Selecting intervention programmes (STEP 11)
In arguing for a curriculum entitlement in relation to the National Curriculum, Craft
(1991) wishes to identify 'named thinking skills' in the core and foundation subjects
and address them partly through intervention programmes within an agreed whole-
school policy. Teachers should consider the claims and counter-claims made on
behalf of intervention programmes most carefully before deciding on their approach.
Different emphases will inevitably emerge among colleagues. Some staff will see the
teaching of thinking as strategic in tackling the under-achievement of less intellectually
able students, as in the approach of Feuerstein. Others may wish to use the
Philosophy for Children programmes for 'enrichmenf activity for a minority of
intellectually able or gifted children, rather than for engendering a whole school,
democratic community of enquiry. Yet others will argue for courses of an unusual or
specialised nature, such as a logic course at GCSE '0' level. 35
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Within the cross-curricular strategy there should be judicious use of intervention
programmes. Craft (1991) argues for a contribution from each of three thinking
skills schemes, or intervention programmes: the Lipman philosophy, the de Bono
CoRT (Cognitive Research Trust Method) and the Feuerstein Instrumental Enrichment
scheme as taught in the Oxfordshire Skills Project. 36
 The Lipman Philosophy for
Children programmes have been further extended across the age ranges, and can be
taught in primaiy and secondaiy school versions modified for U.K. and Australasian
use (Nicol 1990, Cam 1994).
To these can be added the 'cognitive acceleration' (CASE) programmes, now available
in both science and mathematics, which Shayer (1991) and Adey et al (1994) claim
should generally be used for children aged 11 to 13 years. The Feuerstein approach
can be used with the lower ranges of age and ability up until 11 years of age. Given
its disappointing outcomes with the less able children but demonstrated success with
clever and gifted children, the De Bono approach and materials should be only be used
at the upper end of the secondary school with 14-16 year old pupils. 37 Intervention
programmes in problem-solving, sensibly approached, have much to offer teachers
(Heaney and Watts 1988, Adey and Fairbrother 1995). However, it shouid be
recognised they are often afflicted with the limitation identified by Watts and Bentley
(1990), of a 'weak' constructivism concerned with limited short-term effects. They
should be seen as only a minor component of an institution-wide philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum in which subject teaching is accorded most prominence.
13. Formulating the approach to transferable thinking (STEP
12)
The case made by Bridges, Winter, Assiter and others working in the further
education sector for transferring skills was broadly accepted in chapter 2. The further
education sector has led in such approaches, a wide range of materials being available.
38 But how a school or college is to 'deliver' study skills as part of a pre-
philosophical curriculum is a major issue in institutional policy.
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The absence of a critical thinking or pre-philosophical curriculum in the UK setting
could be argued to have left study skills as an area of practice looking for a theoretical
foundation. The purview of study skills has been expanding, taking in the new
influences of 'academic literacy', rhetoric and argument, flexible and transferable
learning. Not just revision, library, reading, and homework time, but even the whole
of the approach to the reading curriculum may occasionally be included in a whole
school strategy (Waterhouse 1990). 39 However, as Adey and Fairbrother (1995)
point out, while many schools help students with study skills as examinations
approach few schools have programmes for teaching learning skills or strategies. 40
The challenge of teaching 'thinking skills' has been most often taken up by special
needs staff or departments who have been given a cross-school role. However, they
often work at a disadvantage in not having been trained in the areas of philosophical
pedagogy, psychology, critical thinldng or curriculum studies covered in masters
programmes (see Appendix 31). For example, a clear concept of various levels of
reading and writing comprehension is essential in knowing how to approach inference
in thinking and reading development (Barrett 1972, Berrill 1990). The 'whole
cuniculum' approach to meta-cognitive thinking can underpin and act as a foundation
for study skills. The case can be made for secondary schools using study skills as
their starting-point for critical thinking, and gradually extending its definition and
scope. Staff development and inservice education and training will help here.
In relation to the whole cun-iculum, the provision of a specialist philosophy course
will round off and consolidate the work on a pre-philosophical curriculum which has
been undertaken during school or college life. It may be begun before the sixth form
with those students or those teachers who evince an interest. Clarke (1992), it will be
recalled, argues for philosophy teaching in elaborating a claim that argument is the
'natural property of English teaching'.
There is still work to be done, I think, on a systematic experimentation of largely unexplored
possibilities to do with relationships between reading argwnent and writing, and with seeing
how speech can be drawn upon and extended. Let's try some philosophy in the secondary
school (Clarke in Andrews, Costello and Clarke: 233-4)
For those students not studying philosophy as a specialist subject in the sixth form or
college, the short course in Critical Thinking at Advanced Level as proposed by Fisher
236
(1996) will extended the range of school or college provision on offer. Finally,
teachers will wish to look closely at the question of how the specialist A level course
in philosophy relates to the pre-philosophical curriculum which has now been put in
place to precede it.
14. Codifying principles of entitlement and access (STEP 13)
Having inspected the claims and decided upon their institutional policy, the staff will
be ready to confirm exactly what the curriculum entitlement is to be for all the
students, and for particular children.
Where a 'strong' version of a claim for teaching philosophy is advanced and taken up
as a coherent school or college policy many individual claims will have been acceded
to. 41 Staff will subscribe to such propositions as that: philosophy has primacy as a
discipline above all others, or that it is the subject which provides the standard of
rationality for other subjects, and lies behind all subjects. Agreement with the various
dispositional and values claims will also tend to reinforce the case for whole school or
college policy.
The response to such claims will often result in both phiiosophical and pragmatic
decisions concerning curricula, pedagogy and management aspects of school or
college life For example, a considerable amount of embedded teaching of
philosophy topics, critical and transferable thinking will be undertaken with children
within each of the specialist subjects. Specialist philosophy teaching will increasingly
be available to children as they move up the school, together with the opportunities in
critical, transferable and creative thinking (Appendix 6). Possibiistic thinking will be
given emphasis throughout, both in subject areas and cross-curricular approaches.
If the 'strong version' of substantial claims for a philosophical and pre-philosophical
curriculum is conceded, the question of whether there should be a right to such a
curriculum, and an obligation to teach it, will arise. The educational importance of
such a range of provision will entail a curriculum entitlement to be taught a philosophy
and pre-philosophical curriculum on welfare grounds (see chapter 2). Issues of
access will arise sharply in any school which commits itself to a curriculum which is
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to be universally available. Provision for children with special needs, for instance the
'statemented' child who has been exempted from National Curriculum assessment,
will need to be decided upon with great care. Equally, the question of teaching for
the gifted child who is displaying signs of early philosophical apprehension will also
need sensitive handling.42
A rather different set of claims to those given priority in this study may prevail on the
other hand. A highly selective, academic secondaiy school, with a crowded
timetable, might see no case for introducing philosophy or critical thinking before the
upper school stage. The staff view may be that philosophy is a specialised discipline
not having any relationship or continuity with the rest of the curriculum or school
more generally. 43 Philosophy may then be taught only to a minority, of sixth form
students at A level: or, as is sometimes the case, taught within the curricular confines
of A level Religious Education. A whole school policy will not be seen appropriate
or relevant. This view-point is professionally defensible, but philosophically
mistaken as I have sought to show.
15. Reviewing the management philosophy (STEP 14)
The management of curriculum, pedagogy and resources will require regular review in
order to ensure a sound theoretical and practical implementation of the policy. This
can also be the stage of 'reflective practitioner' review and professional self-appraisal
(see chapter 8). Explicitly philosophical questions, as well as practical questions,
will need to be revisited such as: Is the new curriculum policy coherent, and consistent
with the management and leadership practices of the school or college? What are the
ideologies which have been found in the employment and management practices of the
institution? Is there a management ideology which is dominant but invisible? What
is the social philosophy that informs the running of the institution? Is the college or
school run as nearly on democratic lines as possible? Is the philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum designed to meet the needs of all students, or only those who
are prospective beneficiaries of higher education and leaders of society? What place
has the vocational notion of transferable thinking skills been given? These and other
questions raised in Appendices 1,2 and 24 will be of particular relevance in assisting
the review process.
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16. Selecting and organising curriculum resources (STEP 15)
The choice and organisation of the curricuiwn resources to be used in teaching,
monitoring, and assessing the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum will be of
central importance. That there is a profusion of resources available has been indicated
during the course of the study; and considerable care will be needed over their
selection.
Most schools and colleges will draw their main curriculum resources from the
specialist subject areas and their schemes of work. In schools in England and Wales
the requirements of the centrally prescribed National Curriculum will influence, even
dominate the choice of curriculum materials. In schools and colleges providing for
the older student, examination syllabuses and texts selected by boards will be an
important determinant of the subject approach. Bearing in mind the various
limitations laid down by examination and National Cuthculum requirements, material
relevant to the pastoral curriculum, and additional intervention programmes, cross-
curricular projects, study skills, flexible learning, and special needs learning can be
chosen. 5
Particular attention should be paid to the search for, and the selection of material of
good literaiy and philosophical quality. There is a considerable range of material
available, especially within subject areas, which can be exploited. Generic resources
for the philosophy or pre-phiosophical curriculum, such as intervention programmes,
or didactic fiction and popular philosophy primers, should however be subjected to
rigorous examination. Claims to 'cove? the primary National Curriculum (Lake
1996, Sprod 1993) or to teach older students, through a single series or course book
should be treated sceptically. Professional philosophers, for example, remain critical
of attempts to introduce their subject through doxography, as the reception of
Sophie's World (Ree 1995) demonstrated (see also chapter 3). 46
Catholicity in one's principles of selection will nevertheless be important, for reasons
argued in earlier chapters. For instance, the case for teaching philosophy with visual,
imaginative literature has been convincingly argued on pedagogic and philosophical
grounds (Deutscher 1987, Murris (1992, l993abcd). The 'graphic organisers' and
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visual methods recommended by Davidson and Worsham (1992), Lambiotte et al
(1994) and Swartz and Parks (1994) for lesson design and presentation, should have
an important place within any inventozy of resources.
	 Film, video, computing
software including CD Rom, and other multi-media resources, will also make a
valuable contribution; for example, where narrative is to be the starting-point, or
where a topic is to be consolidated through revision (Gaarder 1995, Hoff 1982,
Nixon and Logue 1994, Rubin and Ramis 1993).
17. Providing for Staff Development, In-service Education and
Training (STEP 16)
Each teacher individually, and the staff collectively, will need to reflect on the aims
and purposes of education. At a least a minimum professional background for each
teacher, in the philosophy of education, pedagqgy and the curriculum, should be in
place well before the business of formulating a whole school or college policy is
seriously commenced. 48 In providing philosophical leadership to the staff, the
head, senior staff, or the resident philosopher should undertake some preliminary
ground-work, by arranging a programme of courses or staff development which will
precede the main task. This is a matter which requires attention through INSET and
initial training over the whole period of a teach&s career (see chapter 8).
Undergraduate and initial training are increasingly recognised as crucial periods for
conceptual development, as a growing literature on academic literacy testifies; yet there
is a persisting problem that 'degree examinations do not test deep, conceptual
understanding' (Entwistle and Entwistle 1991: 205).
The position taken in chapters 2 and 8, on the centrality of philosophical
autobiography to the teacher as a person, professional and public intellectual, is of
considerable relevance at this point. As McCann and Yaxley (1992: 59) argue, it is
important for teachers to be able to 'articulate views of the current meta-assumptions
of professional practice' and evaluate crucial issues in professional practice,
'examining any proposal for its epistemological and moral implications.' Staff
development will be crucial in this process, and especially for subject teachers who
having identified the distinctiveness of their specialist approach, will need to place it
Within the wider questions of transfer, generalisability and meta-thinking. 49
 For
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instance, Swartz and Parkes (1994) show how a 'craft' approach to the shaping of
lessons through the infusion method can be undertaken. Cross-curricular strategies
can then emerge.
Teachers and lecturers preparing a whole school policy may therefore require a
programme of staff development and INSET at quite an early stage of the planning
and curriculum development cycle. A careful needs assessment should be made, and
members of staff encouraged to undertake training courses in particular areas of their
interest. Some teachers might wish to explore the introduction of philosophy
teaching, while others may be more interested in critical thinking, or programmes of
intervention. Others might want to review the approach in their subject to such topics
as empathy, argument and rhetoric, including pedagogic aspects involving child
development or learning theory. The nationally-prescribed curriculum gives little
credence to pedagogic theory in its assessment criteria, as chapter 6 showed, thus
further underlining the need for INSET support and course provision.
Some INSET work should be undertaken on the various claims for a curriculum, as
set out in chapters 1-5. A useful foundation will be an in-service course designed to
support the whole school staff, or some members of it, in introducing the main issues
which currently arise in the philosophy of education. A taught, modular Master's
course will be appropriate for those teachers who wish to assume full hegemony and
professional 'ownership' of the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum
(Appendix 31). 50 Through such a course teachers can study for themselves the
various claims for a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. They can look
more closely at the new knowledge in various fields such as computer-assisted
learning and mental modelling (Turkie 1996). They can review their ideas of child
development and learning, their approach to values education, and the conceptual
frameworks of their own thinking (Donald 1992, Pope 1993). There can be
supported opportunities to try out methods, approaches and resources in one's own
institution.
The strictures of Maclure (1991) concerning the paucity of high quality research on the
evaluation of critical thinking programmes should be borne in mind. Adey and
Fairbrother (1995), reviewing the status of research in Learning Styles and Strategies
(1995), conclude that many questions which teachers wish to ask have only been
partly answered. 51 It will important, therefore, to present teachers undertaking
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inservice courses, or taught higher degree study, with balanced accounts of current
research on philosophy and thinking, and especially where it is inconclusive or
contested. This will include such areas as pedagogy in relation to transferability,
dispositions and values, and learning theory; and the continuing developments in
philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and other disciplines which have been shown
by this study to have relevance for educational practice.
18. Publishing and circulating a written school or college policy
(STEP 17)
A small team or working party of staff, which includes at least one member of the
senior management group, should be responsible for writing and publishing the
curriculum policy document. A shortened version should be available to accompany
the institutional development plan, taking the form of a statement, action plan and
timetable for the introduction of the pre-philosophica! and thinking curriculum.
These papers will act as the foundation documents for the school or college staff
internally and as the basis for communication and guidance to various other audiences.
52 The institutional policy for pre-phiosophical education and specialist philosophy
will have been subject to consultation, and the resulting policy should be conveyed to
students, parents, the local education authority and others, through the medium of the
school or college prospectus, year meetings or course options evenings. 53
It seems possible that, in England and Wales, a statement of school policy on values
education may become a statutory requirement within the foreseeable future. The
section of the prospectus covering values education may arouse press and media, as
well as parental interest and should therefore be written with exceptional care. It
should present teachers as public intellectuals taking a local moderate her,neneuzic
stance (see chapter 8); for example in responding thoughtfully to the multi-faith
requirements of the local Agreed Religious Education Syllabus.
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19. Undertaking 'reflective practitioner' evaluation and review
(STEP 18)
As with any innovation, it will be important to conduct an assessment and evaluation
of progress as the implementation of the whole school or college policy gradually
proceeds. There is a large professional literature which can be drawn on in this area
as has been shown in preceding chapters. The notion of the teacher as both a
'reflective practitioner' and a philosophical, public intellectual should again underpin
the approach that is taken (see chapter 8).
Key questions relevant to staff development and INSET activity in fonnulating a
whole school or college policy, and its periodical review, are:
1. Where do we stand individually and collectively, as a staff and as 'public
intellectuals', on the 'strong version' of claims for teaching philosophy and a pre-
philosophical curriculum?
2. What are our existing philosophical assumptions in relation to the curriculum,
pedagogy and management of our institution?
3. What implications arise for us if we accept the transcendental claim that philosophy
pervades all curricular, pedagogic and organisational arrangements?
4. What importance do we attach to each of the curriculum aims which have been put
forward, e.g. possibilism, cognitive or the engendering of dispositions?
5. How, if we think we should, can we begin to build a whole school approach to
philosophy teaching which relates to school organisalion, pedagogy and curriculum?
6. What priorities emerge in relation to our individual and collective response to the
various claims and purposes that have been put forward in relation to a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum?
7. How do we respond to particular statutory or externally mounted claims such as
arise from National Curriculum, examination boards and a wide range of interest groups,
including minorities?
8. What equity and rights, equal opportunities, gender and special educational needs
issues do we need to address?
9. What rights and responsibilities do the various partners, students, teachers, parents
and governors, have in the enterprise of a whole school policy for philosophy, higher order
thinking and a pre-philosophical curriculum?
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10. How shall we communicate and consult over our policy on philosophy and the pie-
philosophical curnculum?
11. How shall we work together in developing the pie-philosophical curriculum in a
way which is consistent with the position we have taken up ideologically?
12. Can we therefore agree on a common framework, or canon, of rationality in our
approach?
13. Shall we proceed collegially as a community of enquiry (including the students), or
in some other way, in implementing our approach?
14. Who should assume leadership, institutionally and in particular areas of curriculum
application?
15. What is to be our approach to each of the separate strands in curriculum
development in this area, i.e. in the teaching of philosophy, critical, creative, and higher
order thinking; values education in the virtues and dispositions; or problem-solving,
thinking skills and study skills?
16. What is to be our approach to pedagogy in each of the content and specialist
subject areas, and more generally?
17. Should philosophy be separately taught for part of the school period, or for all of it,
and should there be a cross-curncular form of provision?
18. How shall we know when we have taught philosophy and the pie-philosophical
curriculum successfully?
19. How should we conduct assessment - what is to be our assessment policy?
20. How do we review our progress as a school in relation to the implementation of a
whole school policy?
21. What are the implication for teachers' own professional and personal development,
thinking and philosophical education?
22. What is our existing range of resources and strategies for undertaking these tasks?
23. What additional resources do we need? (Appendix 24; see also Appendix 1)
20. What kind of person will a philosophically educated student
be?
What kind of person will a philosophically educated student be when a philosophy
and pie-philosophical curriculum is fully in place? Following experience of a 'strong
version' of a pie-philosophical curriculum, a student will have had a wide range of
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philosophical and pre-phiosophical experiences. He or she will also have acquired
some particular capabilities and dispositions, such as a ready-wittedness free of
sophism and inauthenticity.
In their primary schools pupils will have engaged in a community of enquiry,
emphasising communicative competence and dialogic rationality in discussing
philosophical questions raised or arising within the normal curriculum, including
many questions asked by children themselves. All primary age children will have
received some teaching in informal logic, thinking skills, problem solving and critical
thinking, and possibly in philosophy itself. 55
 However, most of their important
experiences of the pre-philosophical will have occurred within the context of subject
specialisms within an 'embedded' curriculum. 56
Much of the pre-philosophical education of primary children will have been conducted
by other means than formal teaching, through play, improvisation, community and
peer-group processes, with relatively little teaching of formal technical philosophy.
Children will have engaged in speculative, stochastic and conjectural, imaginative
thought both within the broad curriculum and with the specialist subjects. They will
increasingly be 'possibilistic' thinkers.
The primary children will have developed some valuable dispositions; and some of the
personal intellectual autonomy sought by Facione and Facione (1994), Ennis (1991)
or Paul (1990). They will have been involved in lessons which addressed values
education, but we should not look for the acquisition of major moral virtues.
Procedural dispositions and 'rational authenticity' will be present to a greater extent
where school life has been constructed to enable teachers and children collaboratively
to engender them (Bonnett 1994).
At the secondary school there will be evidence of continuing development and
progress in all these aspects, with the teachers having a clear institutional plan,
programmes and forms of teaching and progression in mind. Students can be
expected to have acquired some philosophical understanding through their subject
specialisms. Older students will be capable of undertaking self-reflective,
possibilistic and creative thought of a 'rule bouncF, paradigmatic kind appropriate to
particular subject areas. Some at least of this thinking will take the form of
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transferring skills, including for example the approach to empathy or vocational
dispositions.
Most interested students, by the age of eighteen years, will have experienced a
repertoire of cross-curricular intervention, and subject-based teaching in the pre-
philosophical curriculum, together with some specialist teaching of philosophy. All
will have encountered some specific intervention programmes, such as the CASE,
Feuerstein and de Bono approaches, or in critical thinking, thinking skills, or study
skills, as part of the whole school or college cross-curricular strategy. Some students
will have studied Philosophy at A level, for the Baccalaureate or similar qualifications;
but all will have gained competence in higher order thinking and argument and some
access to the major topics in philosophy.
Progression in all the studies undertaken within the philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum will have been carefully designed, taught and recorded. In subject
teaching assessment will have been provided, formatively by those teaching the
subject using taxonomies of assessment of a general and a subject specific nature, and
summatively by both teachers and examination boards. In further and secondary
education, the development of transferable thinking and 'transferring skills' in relation
to vocational education will have received particular attention.57
Throughout these processes the role of the teacher will have remained centre stage. It
will now be argued, in chapter 8, that a conception of the individual teacher as a
philosophical and public intellectual is central to the enterprise of developing the
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum.
Notes to chapter 7
For the general picture see, for instance, Schrag (1987, 1988), Thornbury (1994).
For subject discussion of computing, for instance, see Papert (1980) and O'Reffly
(1994).
2 See Fullan (1992:21-28) and the extensive 'school improvement and effectiveness'
literature in which notions of teacher hegemony, ownership and empowerment feature
strongly; and Cowley and Williamson (1998) for an example of 'local' curriculum.
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3 The difficulty of the enterprise should not be under-estimated; for not only will
philosophical expertise be needed, but 'disempowered' teachers have begun to lose
confidence in their powers of curriculum development (Bottery and Wright 1996).
4 A useful, practical model and approach is offered by Ncwmann and Wehiage (1993: 8-
12) in their Standards of Authentic Instruction. (Appendix 35)
5 These were evaluated in chapter 2. See also chapter 8, which explores the concept of
the teacher as a philosophical intellectual.
6 There is a need to be explicit at the level of the individual institution, pragmatically,
because there can be organisational difficulties (Goldman 1975); and phiosophically,on
the grounds that a local herineneutic should be sought (Gallagher 1992). The resulting
policy can be represented as a public izuellectual stance in the school's prospectus and
institutional development plan (Thornbury 1994).
7 See Hodgkinson (1983: 205). Hodgkinson posits an antinomy involving two
principles. Whenever two levels of values are in conflict then the higher one should be
given priority; but also that values based on principle should give way to less values in
order to avoid conflict and reduce tension. He argues that little will be achieved in an
organisation if principle is constantly allowed to override considerations based on lower
values. Where conflict exists between values of equal standing, he proposes the
difficulty should be solved by either logical analysis or dialectic. Hodgkinson also
proposes that conflicts will produce 'affective tension' which will simply have to be lived
with if the problem cannot be fmally resolved. Ryan (1992) demonstrates how a conflict
between a school's own philosophy and the National Curriculum was resolved using
Hodgkinson's schema.
8 See Greenfleld (1989: 8 1-96) on the phenomenological stance in educational
management, and especially the importance of teachers' subjective perceptions.
9 The contribution that the member of staff who is a specialist philosopher, can make to
this process, as the external 'critical friend', consultant, or counsellor, will vary. The
philosopher could act as a tutor to INSET courses, for example, in relation to the value
curriculum, philosophy and ideology of the school policy. There is a consultant role that
the philosopher can perform as a professional ethicist (Thombury 1996). Philosophical
counseffing for staff wishing simply to clarify their philosophical assumptions could be
undertaken (McCann and Yaxley 1992, Rahav 1996). A professional audit, of staff
philosophical expertise in research and teaching would also be desirable (Thornbury
1997).
10 These philosophical perspectives accord with the findings of research on school
improvement. Fullan argues, for example, that institutional development cannot be
conducted with 'brute sanity' within the rational-bureaucratic tradition in sociology
derived from Weber (in Bush 1989: 144-153). For Greenfield (1989: 8 1-96)
'organisations are social inventions' based on individual subjectivities - hence the
responsibilities which may be laid as in chapter 8 on the individual teacher.
1 This effect will be enhanced where pedagogic is linked to similar curriculum theory,
as in the phenomenological approach to management or geography education. See again
chapter 3, and Greenfield (1989: 81).
12 See also Gutman (1980: 338-58), White (1983), and Archard (1993).
13 The complex range of developments was examined in chapter 5. See Haydon's(1996) Schools and Values.
14 Scott (1989) identifies four categories of educational accountability to which teachers
axe subject: the cultural, political, market and professional (1989: 11-23). A national
body to represent those interested in values education was formed in the UK in 1995.
See the Times Higher Educational Supplement, June 10th 1995.
247
15 See Winter (1992: 109) and in Bridges 1994: 61) for descriptions of the ASSET
programme approach to this question; and also Appendix 25.
16 See again chapter 8, Winter (1992: 109-11), Thombury (1996) and Appendix 25.
17 This proposal will find more immediate acceptance in the primary sector where
theories of child development, stage theory and play are important. The secondary
curriculum has more emphasised 'cognitivist' and 'phenomenographic' frameworks
which appear to play down notions of childhood and adolescence. For a discussion of
'transcendental' assumed theories of childhood see Mitterauer (1992) and Aries (1973).
18 i argue that philosophy should not normally be taught as a formal, technical subject
before the later years of secondary education: but that in circumstances of precocity or
prodigy, it becomes a 'curriculum entitlement' (Monk 1996, Radford 1996).
9 Lack of professional knowledge and understanding of pedagogy, of child
development and how learning occurs in young children, is especially evident among
PGCE trained secondary teachers. The ground is covered better in B.Ed. courses for
intending teachers (Entwistle 1987, Wood 1988).
20 See for instance Atkinson (1989) or Mitchell (1989a) concerning the particular issues
which arise post-16.
21 Curriculum specialists seek hegemony and ownership of the pre-phiosophical
curriculum in their role as 'curriculum barons' (Ball 1989: 195-209). Those concerned
with 'argument' in English, and 'cognitive acceleration' in science teaching, have been
epecially clamant.
22 'Philosophy in Australian schools has been a successful innovation because it has
been integrated into language programmes', the Victorian P hi losop hy for Children
Association Annual Seminar Programme Report (1991) claims. There is some evidence
that the special needs teachers and pastoral specialists, who lack a curricular discipline,
have been particularly attracted by critical thinking, philosophy for children, and
intervention programmes.
23 Weinstein (1993a) reviews the position taken up by each of the major protagonists.
An example would be the use of The Prisoner's Dilemma, an approach originally
designed for work in economic logic and game theory, but used by a range of different
subject disciplines.
25 For instance, subjects in which children are taught that all knowledge is provisional,
or think about cosmogony, or seek elegance of proofs should communicate with each
other.
26 A 'need to know' principle will need to be agreed upon between subject and other
departments, together with an agreed policy on 'who teaches what'.
27 An important principle for staff designing the pre-phiosophical curriculum would be
the need to work co-operatively with other colleagues while preserving a pluralistic
approach, thus allowing true differences of position to be conveyed to pupils.
See Merleau-Ponty (1962) in the Phenomenology of Perception: Part 1. For
Merleau-Ponty the starting point of a middle way between intellectualism and empiricism,
is a dialectical relationship in which the 'body subject' is neither a pure object nor a
transparent subject; it is ambiguous. Damasio (1994) and Clark (1997) provide
supportive evidence from neuro-science for such an account.
29 See also Mashhadi (1997b) and Mashhadi and Hahn (1997).
30 ' Clearly, then, the intention in science education is still that 'convenient tenets' of
constructivism should be a major framework for the National Curriculum, the central
governmental emphasis being on the acquisition of 'knowledge'; but that the situation
is much less clear in the other subjects' (Watts and Bentley 1991: 178).
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31 If the teacher decides to introduce a separate course of thinking, he or she must make
a choice between those subjects which are 'content free' and those which teach
procedures for dealing with practical problems' (Nisbet in Maclure and Davies: 180).
i2 ThisisataskwhichcanbetackledinanlNSETcourse,orwithintheframeworkof
an accredited master's course. See Appendix 31.
33 See the options and issues raised in The Sir Rene Descartes School Case Study
(Appendices 22, and see also Appendix 24).
34 Fisher (1990) caters practically for the context of the National Curriculum but
neglects analysis of its overall content and pedagogic assumptions in his discussion of
'Teaching for Thinking Across the Curriculum'. Fisher's (1995) Teaching Children to
Learn concentrates on a range of learning strategies rather than a coherent, whole school
approach and curriculum mapping of thinking within the National Curriculum. But he
does identify the need for any such programme to take account of school improvement
strategies (148-9). There is developing interest in the US, the UK, and Australia in
whole school and college strategy (Thornbury 1994b).
35 An example of such a syllabus is that of Plume School (1994).
36 Each of these schemes could have some contribution to make to whole school policy
although, as Craft (1991: 190) reminds us, evidence of the transferability from separate
courses is not particularly encouraging. See also Craft and Weller (1983) and Nisbet
(1989). One difficulty is that the measurement of cognitive benefit is not straightforward.
Adey (1989: 240-249) claims, for instance, that the transfer of generalised thinking
skills, through science lessons, to the broader curriculum only reaches its maximum
effect after some time has elapsed. Any contribution of cognitive acceleration to
philosophical thinking remains undemonstrated. Stimulus materials (Hofstadter 1985,
Smullyan 1978) in self-referential or logical thinking have great appeal for some students.
My own conclusion from classroom trials is that there is a place for the use of 'thought
experiments'. One can combine general work in logical puzzles, with a series of short
narratives or puzzle cases. Self-referring paradoxes such as 'The Statement in this Box is
a Lie', or 'I like her cooking' (from Chomsky's generative grammar), hich the children
examine for multiple meaning; or defining a chair (as a seat for one person to sit on) -
provoke thoughtfulness and creativity of response. The Dc Bono materials, the Science
Research Associates (1981) Think Labs Kits and other similar materials (such as Bicknell
1987, Lake 1996, Murris 1992, and Sprod 1993) make good starting points. See Coles
and Robinson (1992), Hunter-Grundin (1985), Lipman (1992) and Splitter and Sharp
(1995) for rationales of the various approaches.
37 Paper given by Shayer at the University of East Anglia 3rd Conference on Critical
Thinking, University of East Anglia, April 1994.
38 See Bryan and Assiter (1995), Annett (1989), and Winter (1994).
39 The approach to study skills and flexible learning has been seriously under-
conceptualised (Waterhouse 1990). The pre-philosophical curricuiwn as described in this
study could provide such pedagogic and conceptual foundations thus reducing the
isolated position occupied by study skills in curricular organisation.
40 Marton (1988) pin-points the need for a more adequate conceptual account when he
attempts to distinguish between learning skills and study skills on the grounds that the
former is concerned with the process of learning, and the latter simply with performance
within a unit of study.
41 Interest is likely to be motivated by national concern for improved critical and higher
order thinking to contribute to school effectiveness and improvement. The
commissioning by OFSTED of a study of Learning Styles and Strategies (Adey and
Fairbrother 1995) provided a hint that pedagogic as well as curriculum hegemony might
increasingly be sought by the educational agencies of central government.
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42 How exactly would one respond to a young Radford, Goethe or Russell raising
philosophical questions in one's classroom? Teachers should be prepared to 'scaffolcF a
teaching response to early virtuosity and precocity in the child prodigy, not least because
the neuro-scientific evidence suggests, and some philosophers think that philosophical
thoughts may initially occur as pre-cognitive feelings or emotions (Damasio 1993,
Scheffler 1991, chapter 5).
43 Many critics took such a view originally about the introduction of A level philosophy
into schools (Ward (1986).
Each of these questions relate to the claims for teaching philosophy, pre-philosophy
and higher order thinldng surveyed in chapter 2. See Waterhouse (1990) on flexible
learning; and Bryan and Assiter (1993, 1995), Winter (1992), and Winter and Masch
(1996) on 'the educative work-place'.
45 The previewing of resources, as part of the programme of staff development which
supports the working out of an institutional policy, has been found to work well at an
early stage of the task. See Thornbury (1994b).
'Gaarder is in the tradition of Enid Blyton. The whimsical twist in the plot does not
touch the solidified platitudes that make up the philosopher's gratuitous course. His
unthinking identification of philosophy with civiisation and his smooth cocoon of Euro-
mystical complacency emerge without a scratch' (Ree (1995:27). However,
doxographical classics such as Russell's (1946) History of Western Philosophy, or
Palmer's (1988) Looking at Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made
Lighter continue to flourish.
47 Murris (1993c, 1993d) is strongly critical of the IAPC for not employing pictorial
technique in their texts. The Canadian and US work on visual representation is more
advanced in the extent of its formalisation. See Lambiotte, Skaggs and Dansereau (1993)
on knowledge maps and co-operative strategies, and Davidson and Worsham (1992) on
visual aids and 'graphic organisers'.
48 For example, some familiarity with the arguments of John White in relation to the
aims of education and the good life both before and after the introduction of a compulsory
National Curriculum (White 1973, 1982, 1990), or the rather different neo-Thomist
perspective of Walsh (1993) in Education and Meaning: Philosophy in Practice.
49 Adey (1994: 157) argues that INSET with a strong theoretical base is crucial to giving
teachers 'ownership' of their methodology.
50 See Fullan (1989) for a formulation based on school improvement theory.
51 This was a short study and so omissions were inevitable; but the balance of coverage
is curious. Critical thinking and philosophy for children are not discussed in-depth,
while Gardner's theory of multiple intelligence is given generous, albeit sceptical
coverage. There is no treatment of theories of argument, empathy or phenomenography.
52 These would include other staff, non-teaching staff, governors, parents, students,
LEA advisers and OFSTED. In relation to secondary schools or colleges, some would
argue that local employers should be involved in view of the need for improved
transferable thinking in the workplace (Bridges 1994, 1996, Bryan and Assiter 1993,
1995).
53 Corson proposes that school policy could be based on Bhaskafs conception of
discovery (Corson 1990b: 267). Hodson (1988: 11) urges teachers to follow a Kuhnian
approach to curriculum development, as 'active constructors and reconstructors of their
own curriculum knowledge rather than as passive recipients of transmitted curriculum
wisdom.'
Appendix 1, it will be recalled from chapter 1, sets out the philosophically related
questions of principle which arise concerning the approach to a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum.
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55 Accounts of a range of primary work in this area reported by primary and secondary
schools can be found in Andrews and Costello (1992: 60-90). See Andrews 1989,
1993, 1997, and Andrews ed. 1997); Costello 1988b, 1989 and Costello ed.1988a; and
Mitchell 1992a and 1992b, for a fuller picture of work on 'argument and rhetoric' by
those in the English teaching tradition.
This was the transcendental philosophical position argued in detail in chapter 3.
57 See Bryan and Assiter (1993, 1995) on work-related 'thinking' in further education.
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CHAPTER 8
The teacher as a public, philosophical intellectual.
1. The case for a strong version of the philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum
A main argument of the thesis can be re-stated at this point as follows. A sarong
version of a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum should be adopted by each
individual school or college (chapter 6). The question of whether to teach such a
curriculum is made redundant by the transcendental claim that it is 'embedded' and
taught already (chapter 3). Each subject teacher is teaching philosophy, despite
themselves as it were, through their classroom practice. Part of a teacher's
professionalism and training is to work out a position on the aims of education, and
the place of philosophy and pre-phiosophy within the curriculum.
The importance of both subject and cross-curricular teaching in the primaiy and
secondary school, and college should be emphasised. Philosophical thinking is often
carried on in a way which is subject specific to the content areas but transferable
thinking approaches can be distilled out of that context. Whatever their personal or
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professional philosophical stance, all teachers should be encouraged to adopt the
philosophical pedagogy of 'possibilist thinking'.
A whole school or college policy for the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriczdwn
should therefore be devised which covers cross-curncular, specialist subject and
philosophy teaching. Each teacher should appraise the main claims for a philosophy
and pre-phiosophical curriculum and decide on his or her own position. l
 Following
debate and consensual negotiation at departmental level, a whole staff forum should
decide upon the institutional policy. This will involve a programme o staff and
curriculum development within the institution which sees the school or college as a
democratic community of enquiry. A philosophy and the pre-philosophical
curriculum seeks not just good thinking, but also values education engendering a
modest range of dispositions and virtues.
Greenfield's (1989) view of school organisations as 'social inventions' based on
individual subjectivities, and Hodgkinson's (1981, 1983) account of philosophical
leadership in schools put particular responsibilities on the individual teacher. The
preferred role of the individual teacher or lecturer, already identified as modelling
'classroom thoughtfulness', will be expanded in this chapter into that of professional,
public and philosophical intellectual. 2
2. Professional autonomy and liberal individualism
Despite the importance of communities of enquiry, social learning and the inevitability
of control of the canon by a scholarly community, it is the liberal individualism of each
teacher, in choosing how to approach the philosophical and pre-philosophical
curriculum, to which most significance should be attached. The conception of the
individual teacher as a responsible intellectual having personal and professional
continuities of identity is foundational. 3 Wollheim (1984), Radford (1996) and
Schechtman (1996) emphasise the importance of'living as a person' with an
'examined life' of 'self-constituted narrative', reflecting both notions of philosophical
autobiography and Kierkegaard's dictum that life must be understood backwards but
lived forwards.
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Woliheim's 'self concern' with possibility in the dispositions, Johnson's emphasis on
'moral imagination', and Keke's (1993) emphasis on 'valued possibilities' can each be
seen to echo the philosophical point 4
 It is for the individual teacher of philosophy
to take up his or her own individual stance on the question of whether specialist
philosophy is to be separately taught But each teacher, and especially the generalist,
will need to have an individual, including ethical understanding of how philosophical
topics are to be managed in a cross-curricular way, within the context of a prescribed
or national curriculum.
The role of the teacher will vaiy according to the philosophical position adopted
concerning the various claims for a philosophical, pre-phiosophical and thinking
curriculum. How the response of the individual teacher consolidates into a full picture
will also vary, according to the local context of 'self-constituted narrative'. 5
 Each
teacher, not just the specialist philosopher, will face a range of problems and
challenges as a public intellectual, as an individual professional, and as a person with
regard to the philosophy and pre-philosophical curricuiwn.
What is unquestionable, however, is that the individual teacher involved in any
'strong' version of the philosophy and pre-phiosophical curriculum will take up a
public role and stance. The individual teacher cannot decide alone what is to be done
in the classroom, because of the demands of various kinds of professional, political
and public accountability (Scott 1989, Starratt 1994). Account will have be taken of
national, local authority, professional or subject association, or diocesan viewpoints;
and of regional or local policy structures which extend beyond the individual school
(OFSTED 1994b; SCAA 1994, 1996).
A number of pedagogic and ethical issues relate to the proper, professional
implementation of the curriculum policy as it is translated into actual teaching practice
by the individual teacher. These may be to do with individual students, or they may
be to do with public policy in education. In England and Wales, for example,
developments in values and moral education will require cautious assessment in
response to whai schools and colleges are being asked to do. 6
 Each teacher
exercises a philosophical responsibility within the 'public' and 'ecological' life of the
teaching profession, not least in resisting the 'de-professionalisation' of one's role as a
professional public intellectual (Bottery and Wright 1996). These issues will now
be examined further.
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3. Professional autonomy and cultural pluralism: philosophical
Issues in pedagogy
The pervasive and embedded nature of teachers' assumptions presents a complex
pluralism and considerable problems of identification, as discussion of the
transcendent claim showed in chapter 3. As Elbaz (1991) argues, much of teacher
knowledge is the 'high-context', hermeneutically-located, tacit knowledge described
by Polanyi (1973); and there could be a danger in theorising, of turning it into
researchers' knowledge, 'colonising it and thus silencing the teacher' (11). Shils
(1995) points out that such tacit knowledge also possesses its own authority. Pope
(1993), Day et a! (1993), and Morrison and Ridley (1989) each show the extent to
which the teacher is located in a matrix of concerns and different ideological contexts,
which are reflected in practice in a range of dilemmas, intuitive theories, image, voice,
metaphors and beliefs (Appendices 29 & 2).
There are convincing grounds for encouraging such pluralism. First of all, given the
existence of 'contested' philosophical ideas (Gaulle 1964), pluralism is inevitable in the
approach to the philosophical or pre-philosophical canon, critical thinking or
philosophy for children (see again chapter 7). Secondly the research evidence, for
instance in relation to generalisability and transferability concerning philosophical and
other thinking, is susceptible to competing interpretations. Thirdly, specialist teachers
of subjects will contribute a particular perspective on philosophical understanding to
the general school policy. Their contributions are to be especially valued, since it is
from the subject areas that distinctive types of thinking, including the metacognitive
discourse of philosophy, are frequently first generated. It is within subject disciplines
that developments of value to others are often likely to occur (see again chapter 2). 8
The role of the subject specialist, and the importance of intellectual autonomy in
teaching that subject, therefore remain central to any policy or approach in pre-
philosophical or higher order thinldng. Cultural pluralism across subject departments,
offering 'contested', and hermeneutically shifting accounts of 'thoughtfulness' in the
specialisms is well worth maintaining, even at the cost of some occasional, minor
inconsistency in the institutional policy. Some teachers of specialist subjects will
want to develop only the particular philosophical expertise needed for teaching their
subject. They may not take a more general view of what the philosophical curriculum
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is or should be. Others will subscribe to some 'strong version' of philosophy
teaching based on the claims identified in chapter 2. However, specialist teachers
cannot expect to be absolved from the professional need to collaborate with others,
including fellow specialist teachers, on common, cross-curricular and pedagogic
frameworks. A coherent, institutional approach will make teaching, and the
experience of the students, much more comprehensible and effective.9
4. Pedagogy and technical philosophy
Some particular issues arise from the nature of philosophising as a shared, oral or
dialogic or group experience. For example, pedagogic opportunities arise for utilising
'teachable moments', teaching the subject by 'ordinary language' methods and speech
rather than as a formal, written subject. 10 Maclntyre (1984), taking the emergence
of Enlightenment philosophical tradition as an illustration, describes how an
unavoidable move towards technical phiosophising arises in the context of any
culture. Problems initially formulated in directly apprehended language are
reformulated in more sophisticated and complex discourse. Any such area of
expertise or connoisseurship, such as philosophical thought, typically acquires a
technicity, a history, and a canon (see chapter 6). We readily accept that the teaching
of technical concepts and language will occur with philosophy for older students at A
level, or in the Baccalaureate. However, a difficulty arises over how far technicity in
treating philosophical topics should be introduced within apre-philosophical
curriculum for children. 11
It is difficult to confine philosophical dialogue with older or able children in the
classroom to natural language or vernacular discourse. If the natural language rubric
is observed scrupulously, the point is invariably reached at which it proves an
impractical method of proceeding with a philosophical discussion in depth. At that
moment, which will vary according to the context of the individual children, group or
classroom setting, the teacher will feel impelled towards teaching in a specialist or
technical manner.
This can be illustrated by an example: the case of two teachers examining a moral
dilemma with students within one of the philosophy programmes of the Institute for
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the Advancement of Philosophy with Children? Suppose a first teacher, a trained
philosopher, is aware that students have begun to raise the technical questions in moral
philosophy of: 'which rights carry reciprocal obligations? and 'should moral conflicts
be treated as singular instances? 12 She could at this point teach the formal
distinction between 'act' and 'rule' utilitarianism, for she does possess the necessary
philosophical expertise. However, she does not intervene to teach that distinction,
since teachers trained by the IAPC method have to refrain from teaching informatively
or technically, their role being facilitative only. Consider a second teacher trained
solely by the IAPC method, who lacks a formal philosophical training and technical
knowledge of terms in moral philosophy. He would be unaware both of the
opportunity and the need for extending technical understanding. Here the position of
transcendental realism taken up in chapter 3 takes on renewed relevance: for there is
always a level of knowledge to which students will need access, which should not be
denied to them by our teaching stance or our lack of expertise.
The problem arises especially sharply in the primary classroom, where philosophical
topics can rarely be addressed at the adult, technical level, and the teacher must be
thinking along parallel and complementary philosophical lines to those of the child.
For example, Cam (1994a: 7), in following the IAPC approach, claims that the
provenance of a philosophical topic in his teaching materials (he gives the example of
Putnam's 'brain in a vat') will be 'readily identifiable' by primary teachers. There
must be doubt about such a claim, however, except where a teacher is known to be
already philosophically literate. 13 There is, then, an issue in pedagogic ethics about
how far teachers should be philosophically trained to give students technical access to
the philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. 14
5. The pastoral aspect of pedagogy
There is a further problem concerning the moral philosophical position of the
individual teacher in relation to professional ethics, pedagogic and curriculum policy.
15 Each teacher will have to consider carefully whether the educational, intellectual
and emotional welfare and flourishing of students will be promoted by a particular
intervention or set of interventions. 16 Transcendental modal realism claims that
many key things to be learned lie beyond immediate appearances and out of the reach
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of intuition or casual ratiocination. It will be the teacher's moral, as well as pedagogic
responsibility, to choose what to teach or reveal of what is not known or is hidden.
The curriculum, pedagogy and organisation of pre-phiosophy and philosophy in the
school or college will be the outcome of such choices.
For example, it may not be developmentally correct to introduce, or lead students into
certain understandings before a certain age. Mismanagement of one's ready-
wittedness in the quick-silver transformations between facticity and transcendence in a
philosophical conversation carries the constant hazard of 'inauthenticity'. For
instance one might respond with inappropriate ironism to a young person - or too
seriously!
The issue of whether children or students should have a right of access to all morally
or pedagogically accessible possible worlds is therefore an important one. It follows
from the transcendental claim that teachers should seek to initiate children into
philosophical understanding and speculation - and reaching those goals by themselves
through play, whimsicality and 'assisted performance' in their thinking. Yet this
technique may conflict with other rights and duties connected with open-ness in
declaring one's philosophical position, or relating to the vulnerability of young people.
Teachers will need to give regular thought about their philosophical and pedagogic
practice on this matter.
Pedagogically, it may be desirable to act as if there are rational moral, aesthetic or
epistemological curriculum claims which can be confidently asserted within classroom
life (Stenhouse 1977). One may feel obliged to praise particular set books as
constituting part of the literary canon (Bloom 1992, Brann 1993), in a view
professionally propounded but not held personally.
The point here is that in order for children and young people go forward with
reasonable confidence in their lives, they may need to be temporarily encouraged to
hold some mistaken beliefs. Psychological research has suggested that children
'telling lies' may even be essential to their moral development in having a sense of
separate identity (Gold 1993: 49). The teacher may also be involved in the invoking
of vital lies, as philosophically conceived by Schiller, Nietzsche or Kierkegaard.
Judgement on the part of the teacher concerning the use of vital lies raises issues both
of pedagogy and personal authenticity. 17 The form of pedagogic pretense needed
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will not always easily be distinguished from bad faith, inauthenticity or false
consciousness (Audi 1995: 852). Newmann (1990) and Katz (1993) argue that in
order to help students succeed with higher order challenges, teachers themselves
should model thoughtfulness as they teach. They therefore also have to make clear to
students who spot teacher 'inauthenticity' that the grounds for employing vital lies are
philosophical and educational.
Teachers with pastoral responsibility for groups of children, for instance form tutors
and pastoral year heads, may want to have a distinctive approach to teaching
dispositions; one based as much on relationships and group processes as much as on
philosophical content Values education in health or citizenship, raise particular
demands related to the links between thought and feeling, cognitive emotion and
personal embodiment in the formation of the dispositions (see chapter 5). Emphasis
can be naturally placed here on a curriculum which is, pastorally, neo-Aristotelian
(Assiter 1994), hermeneutic (Atkins 1988), post-modem (Kincheloe and Stemberg
1992) and multi-sensory (Merleau-Ponty 1962) in its approach to the 'body-self. 18
6. Cognitive emotion and the case of Mill
Among the original objections to the teaching of philosophy, it will be remembered,
was the idea that it might produce depression or tend to increase a state of mental
illness. 19 Child development theory, including counselling and perhaps psycho-
analytical theory, in relation to the pre-phiosophical cuniculum needs to take this
unusual risk into account. There will be a need to have thought out carefully one's
approach to the moral issues, such as the question of disclosure, surrounding the
heuristic aspect of the teaching role. At one extreme this might involve the teaching
technique for handling philosophical issues with, very sick or bereaved hospitalised
children (Bluebond-Langner 1980, Matthews 1994). Here a rush to provide
philosophical insights about death could be as tragically inappropriate as the officious
holding back of truth. Equally, within a conventional classrom, a teacher could make
the epistemogical misjudgement of assuming that logical insights can be conveyed on
the blackboard in five minutes of exposition, rather than by classroom dialogue and the
working through of examples. These principles of pedagogic ethics will be the
especial concern of a responsible teacher.
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Some philosophers argued at the time of the inception of the A level in Philosophy that
to introduce young people to philosophical thinking would lead to disillusion or
depression among them. It was doubted whether sixth formers were emotionally or
intellectually mature enough for the study of philosophy. Would not intellectual
doubts raised by Russell, Ayer, or Sartre about knowledge, understanding, or
standards, be confusing for young people still struggling to master the traditional
disciplines? Could belief in free will or religious belief be threatened in a way that
might leave a student 'bewildered, depressed or suicidal' ? (Ward 1983: 260). This is
not a trivial issue. Adolescent depression in many students, when it occurs, takes the
form of free-floating anxiety and de-personalisation. Concern about one's identity,
purposes, and 'the meaning of life' is especially prominent even among normal young
people, especially the well-educated who have encountered such ideas in their reading
and studies. Furthermore, the schizophrenias, which often have their onset in young
adulthood, are specifically described by the medical profession as forms of 'thought
disorder'. However, no clinical or epidemiological studies of adolescent depression
in relation to philosophy teaching have appeared so far in the psychiatric literature.20
The interaction between thought and feeling and argument can be seen at work
particularly clearly in the celebrated emotional and philosophical crisis suffered in
1826-7 by John Stuart Mill. What occurred to Mill (Mill 1964) would at first sight
appear to be a cautionary warning against philosophising in adolescence. However, it
should be argued that this well-documented episode of philosophical doubt was
engendered and cured by both intellect jj emotion. Mill experienced a crisis of
cognitive emotion. In A Crisis in My Mental History, One Stage Forward, Mill
records the 'melancholy winter' of 1826- 1827 as a period when he fell into a deep
depression, some months in duration, which originated from a realisation that he
would not achieve happiness, even if all his objects in life 'the changes in institutions
and opinions to which you are looking forward., as a reformer of the world..could be
completely effected at this instant' (106-7). Of his response to this realisation, and the
turbulent emotions which accompanied it, Mill wrote: 'I sought no comfort by
speaking to others of what I felt. If I had loved any one sufficiently to make confiding
my griefs a necessity, I should not have been in the condition I was' (108). 21
In discussing this episode, psychologists and psycho-analysts - and some
philosophers - have tended to emphasise the unhealthy dominance of an authoritarian
father-figure and a lack of education of the emotions. 22 Mill's problems and his
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solution, after all, closely fit classical psycho-analytical theory. There is an important
philosophical point here, however, which supports the notion of 'cognitive emotions'.
The evidence of Mill himself at the time of his crisis suggests that his 'thoughts' as
well as 'feelings' may have been intrinsic to his distress. His solution to his problem
was both intellectual thought, and feeling which accompanied or was released by it23
For unable to confide in his 'stem and unbending father', Mill in fact recovered after
reading a section in Marmontel's Menwires, in which Marmontel recounted his
ambivalent feelings upon the death of his father (Miii 1964: 111). He was deeply
engaged in, and had worked through a crisis of both thought and feeling - of cognitive
emotion.
The question of how far and when to introduce children or students to concepts in
philosophy is critical in such contexts. A sensitive interpretation and application of
the welfare right to be taught philosophy will have the especial vulnerabilities of two
kinds of pupils in mind. The distress of the philosophically depressed student can be
ameliorated by philosophical reflection, as in the case of Mill. But equally, there will
be a risk of exacerbating the condition. As Applebaum (1995) wisely reminds us,
trust in classrooms is paired with 'vulnerability'.
Sensitive teaching also needs to be available to help in reducing the isolation and
metaphysical bewilderment of children who show signs of philosophical precocity, in
the apprehension of the ineffable, or other 'cognitive emotions'. The philosopher,
Radford (1996) describes the 'dizziness' of an experience of metaphysical perplexity
which occurred to him at the age of five years. 2' Philosophically precocious
children experiencing these early metaphysical and existential apprehensions, which
illuminate possible but inexpressible worlds, may need technical 	 pastoral teaching
(Mohanty 1987, Moore 1992). For as Cooper (1992) points out, in discussing
Wittgenstein's notion of 'inexpressible background', these are times at which the
'security of everyday descriptions of the world evaporates' in the face of the ineffable.
A schema of professional ethics will therefore be required in one's relationship with
students, one which is personally chosen yet congruent with the broad policy of the
school or college in the philosophical and pre-philosophical curriculum. This should
also cover the approach to professional ethics in dealing with colleagues. Schemes of
professional ethics under development in the cognate professions of nursing, public
health, and social work, give some idea of how this can be done (Winter 1992, 1994,
261
Appendix 25). 25 Some concerns of professional ethics, for instance the approach to
collegi2lity as a professional virtue, are especially relevant to educational institutions
and require the growth of particular expertise and policies through staff development
(Little 1985,1990). There will be an important place here for leadership in the new
discipline of philosophical counselling as suggested earlier (Rahav 1996).
7. The question of authenticity
The objection to the teaching of philosophy because of its potential for abuse by
students offering facile or inauthentic views was discussed earlier in relation to the
ideas of Plato, Paul and Sartre.	 Each teacher will need to make a judgement about
the individual authenticity of students in their thinking and phiosophising, as to
whether they are sophistical or serious, facile or genuinely empathetic. The specialist
teacher of philosopher acting as consultant to the staff will also encounter similar
problems concerning authenticity or mauvaisefoi with colleagues. 27 One will need
rigorous ethical criteria, for instance, for judging what constitutes authentic collegiality
(Ihara 1988, Little 1990, Wallace 1989, Thornbury 1996); and for avoiding what has
been characterised as 'contrived collegiality' (Hargreaves and Dawe 1990). The same
considerations of ethical propriety will apply with colleagues as with students, in how
the philosophical concepts of vital lies and folk psychology are handled.
Philosophical insight and expertise concerning issues of professional ethics should
therefore be available to staff (Haydon 1996). The in-house philosopher should
expected to act both as professional ethicist (Thornbury 1996, Proefriedt 1985) and
philosophical counsellor (Rahav 1996). Sartre's (1958) phenomenology, and
particularly the notions of facticity and transcendence, provide a possibilist account of
how one might proceed over professional authenticity. The relationship that 'bad
faith' has to the self, mental health or psycho-pathology of the learner, is a pastoral
matter which must be borne sensitively in mind. Sartre's account matches closely that
given by some philosophers of education (Bonnett and Doddington 1994, Cooper
1983).
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While bad faith has some common elements with a lie, it is, Sante notes, fundamentally
differenL Bad faith is lying to one's self, and thus the vezy difficult thing to understand is
how, being conscious of our lies, we can believe them. (Caxalano 1985,79-198).
Dunlop (1984) draws attention to the need for authenticity, agreeing with Sartre and
Pfander (1922) that while the inauthentic person does not intend to deceive, inauthentic
thinking seems to be special temptation for the intellectual. The sophist does not
intend to deceive; but derives enjoyment, for example, from competing in argument.
However, Romano (1980) is right in saying that the problem does need addressing,
that Sartre's notion of spontaneous freedom would seem to rule out any continuity of
human action.
That the problem of authenticity frequentiy arises with students' thinking is apparent in
Fa.cione and Facione's (1994) insistence on a critical thinking measure for penalising
intentional bad faith, 'close-mindedness', 'superficiality' and pursuit of one's own
interests (Facione and Facione 1994, Appendix 19). 28 The temptation to elicit
inauthentic precocity, by the premature introduction of material at too high a level of
emotional or developmental difficulty, will also need to be avoided. Some argue that
an approach must begin early, in the child-centred primary school which incorporates
an existential approach to 'authentic rational thinking' (Bonneu 1994: 118-128).
The implications of these ethical considerations are important in relation to the rights
and responsibilities of the teacher. Teachers have to be responsible in organising and
pacing the introduction of philosophical ideas and content - if only to avoid that forcing
of the intellect at the expense of emotional development which proved so costly for the
young Mill There is a particular obligation in relation to the philosophically
precocious student. Cooper (1983: 12) and Bonnett (1994) argue for a connection
between self-expression and the pursuit of authenticity in pursuing this task. To
understand a situation is also to understand the action it calls for and thus, Bonnett
claims, to stress a form of education for free-will which will enable people to express
their nature.
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8. Accommodating reservations concerning 'ironism'
An important question, related to 'authenticity', is raised philosophically by Rorty
(1989, 1995) and Arendt (1971, 1978); and much discussed by teacher educators
(Quicke 1992, McNamara 1990). It concerns the sociological notion of professional
distance and the philosophical concept of ironism. Arendt (1978) argues that any
serious attempt to think entails stopping whatever else it is that we are doing. It
requires, necessarily, having recourse to concepts or categories which are removed
from direct sense perception. Thinking could, consequently, lead to paralysis or a
disinclination to act, as in the case of Hamlet or Mill, through thinking too much on the
event. Thinldng is 'out of order' not merely because it stops all the other activities so
necessary for the business of living and staying alive, but because it inverts all
ordinary relationships: what is near and appears directly to our senses is now far away
and what is distant is actually present. 29 Thinldng about thinking by teachers, for
example, would be likely to foster the ironic style of thought.
Rorty describes ironism as a generic trait and 'spectre which haunts the intellectuals'.
It involves the re-description of human activity in a way which thereby humiliates the
actors (Rorty 1989, 1995). The ironist is someone who has radical doubts
concerning the threatening power of her own vocabulary, and that of others, ironically
to re-describe the world. 30 The ironic re-description involved in serious thinldng
makes for a tension between the thinker and the professional practitioner, who must
always be seen as active and sympathetic. The professional and linguistic devices of
ironism used by medical and other professionals to distance themselves from human
distress in order to deal with it have, for example, been extensively described by
sociologists (Goffman 1961, 1970).
McNamara (1990) claims that the induction of teachers into theories, concepts and
language of the academic view of education, reflecting ironism, could impede
improvement in the quality of teachers' thoughts and practices. 31 A stance of
ironism on the part of the teacher or teacher educator could deny or delay hegemonic
action, thus working against the empowerment, skilling or professionalising of both
teachers and taught. In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty even argues against
encouraging the public dissemination of the ironist stance beyond the professional
circles of philosophers.
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However, Conway and Seery (1992), Depp (1995), Egan (1997) and Quicke (1992)
all perceive social and educational value in an ironist stance. Quicke argues, for
instance, that a variety of positive teaching responses is both possible and necessary;
and while ironic thought 'is not for the fainthearted', what could the alternative be?
We would not wish teachers to remain uncritical of finnly held views about teaching and
learning, for instance, just because others were committed to them as absolute truths; or to
be 'unconscious moralists and metaphysicians'. (315)
Egan (1997: 156-7) sees ironism as helping to keep in check an over-reliance on the
Enlightenment claim to provide a form of discourse in which knowledge, truth and
objectivity are given privilege. Self-awareness and reflection are essential to the
teaching role; and, as Morton (1969) shows, ironism can reflect and inspire moral
vision, commitment and utopianism. Possibiist thinking can be seen be an important
pedagogic technique in challenging unproductive ironism. Post-modem playfulness
and cognitive tentativeness, the dialectical encounter between engagement and ironism,
clarify 'situatedness' in relation to choice (chapters 4 and 5). The hermeneutic of
suspicion, which Conley (1993:22) claims has been the foundation of the critical
thinking approach, can then be replaced by the disposition and hermeneutic of
appreciation.
The importance of narrative, established in chapters 3,4, and 6 in relation to the
transcendental claim, the construction of counter-factual and possible worlds, and the
idea of a canon, now re-emerges in relation to the way the teacher or lecturer should
carry out their role as public intellectuals.
9. Narrative, reflexivity and teachers' lives
Implications for teacher education arise with the adoption of a philosophy and pre-
philosophical curriculum which merit serious consideration. As Adler (1991: 139)
points out, while the notion of teachers as reflective practitioners has permeated the
discourse of teacher education, 'an apparent unity of approach to this theme in fact
masks a diversity of meanings and approaches.' These reflect differences in, and
sometimes dilemmas over epistemological, ethical, and even metaphysical and
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aesthetic stances (Lyons 1990). This phenomenon, in the form of the inferred canon,
was traced in chapter 6.
Schon's (1983) influential notion of the reflective practitioner envisages one who can
rise to the challenges of pluralism and imnism. Such a teacher can think while acting,
and is able to respond to the uncertainty, uniqueness and conflict involved in the
situations in which professionals practice. Schon gives a transcendentalist account of
reflection.
Reflection-in-action is a more rationalised and more systematic form of thinking in action
which is necessary when the 'smoothness' of practical action is for some reason interrupted. It
involves making explicit the hidden assumptions which underpin practice and articulating the
tacit knowledge which enables participants to 'get by' in everyday life. In both the social
world of the academic and the teacher, reflection in action will be stimulated by enquiry or
research activity which is not just puzzle-solving (see Kuhn 1970) but challenges the
existing parameters of knowledge in action. (Schon in Quicke 1992: 317)
Schon (1983) like Quicke (1992) distinguishes between 'knowing in action' and
'reflection in action', 'knowing in action' being thinking as usual which deploys
knowledge which is not consciously reflected upon. Cruikshank (1987) also sees
'reflective teaching' as something of a pragmatic ability, the ability to analyse one's
own teaching practice. Smyth (1987) describes such a process as both ethical and
epistemological; the teacher being said to become aware of herself or himself, as an
agent having a 'sense of agency'. O'Loughlin and Campbell (1988) argue that any
'reflective' critical pedagogy must begin with examination of the pre-existing beliefs of
the prospective teachers (Appendices 23 & 29). Laird (1988) envisages a feminist,
critical pedagogy along such lines.
Some teacher educators place especial emphasis on the narrating of their own personal
and professional worlds by teachers, as an image of professional practice. Clandinin
and Connelly (1990:241) argue that teachers need to concentrate on personal
narrative, and the self-picturing of their professional lives, as opposed to the discourse
of'technical rationalism' which they have been compelled so often to use. For
Clandinin and Connelly, the importance of narrative is as the 'professional memory of
reflective practice'. It will be recalled that memory is seen by Bloom as the real
foundation of a canonical perspective (see chapter 6). 32 Schechtman (1996: 159)
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argues for what she calls 'narrative self-constitution', partly on the grounds that 'a
person needs a narrative self-conception in order to be an agent at all'. Schiffrin
(1996) and Johnson (1993) demonstrate notions of the conditional and counter-factual
to be central to both narrative self-portraiture and moral imagination (see again chapter
5).
The notion of 'voice' is prominent in discussion of how the emancipation of teachers
is to be achieved. Grumet (1989, 1990), in looking at the idea of women teachers as
philosophical intellectuals, identifies the concept of 'voice' as having a major
contribution to make to an evolving rhetoric of autobiographical praxis. Elbaz
(199 1:10) links this with the notion of 'audience'. Having 'voice' implies that one
has a language in which to give expression to one's authentic concerns to an audience
of significant others. Similar arguments are made for the reflexive dispositions
needed in caring professions. 33
 Winter (1994) and Winter and Masch (1996)
present a characterisation of good practice in the health service which features the
cultivation of reflective, professional and vocational dispositions (Appendix 25,
chapter 6). Benner's (1984, 1994) approach to nursing education in the U.S.
emphasises narrative, 'interpretive phenomenology' in critical thinking which models
good professional practice.34
Zeichner (1983) attempts to synthesise a taxonomy for developing or identifying
'teacher thoughtfulness' and reflectiveness from these broad sets of claims. He sees
the individual teacher as an intellectual possessing three different levels of reflection
(1983: 33-9). At a first, technical level of teacher reflection the emphasis is on the
efficient application of professional knowledge to given ends. A second level of
reflection places teaching within its social and institutional context, looking at why, for
instance, certain choices of practice are constrained or influenced by institutional,
social or historical facts; or identifying hidden curriculum which may be embedded in
practice. A third level of reflection introduces moral and ethical issues, when thinking
about teaching and learning is guided by concern for justice and equity, teachers
transcending eveiyday experience to become the 'transformative intellectuals' sought
by Giroux (1988). 35 Zeichn&s account of theory and praxis in teaching gives
support to the claims of those who, like Assiter (1994), assert that good thinking
consists partly in competency in practical knowledge.36
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10. The importance of philosophical autobiography
Should philosophical autobiography, as with Mill, be a central device in the student's
and the teacher's learning and teaching of thinking, argument and philosophy? For
Schechtman (1996) 'a seif-constitutive narrative of selfhood' is essential for each
person, since: 'to have an autobiographical narrative is thus to have an implicit
understanding of one's histoiy as unfolding according to the logic of the story of a
person's life' (113-114). Warner (1984) argues that the autobiographies of
philosophers confirm that the processes by which important thoughts are arrived at,
are illuminative of those thoughts themselves. The most interesting cases are the
confessions of St. Augustine or Rousseau, or the 'reflexive autobiographies' of Mill
or Sartre, in which:
Personal and philosophical development are presented together, with one mforming the
other, where the model of man is explicit, where the story covers the period up to and
including the adoption of the writez's perspective, and where it is intended both to enact that
model and thereby to lend some support to it. (194)
The case for the philosophical importance of biography has enjoyed strong support
among philosophers themselves, Warner claims. For example, Dilthey, progenitor of
the hermeneutic tradition in the writing of history, argues that in autobiography 'we
encounter the highest and most instructive form of the understanding of life' (189).
For Warner, the autobiography of John Stuart Mill provides the perfect exemplification
of Collingwood's case that 'the autobiography of a man whose business is thinking
should be the story of his thought' (201). 37
An implication is that a teacher would need to have a philosophical autobiography as
part of his or her professionalism, career and personal development Recent research
and literature on teachers' lives has emphasised notions of personal identity,
experience, and educational philosophy. Goodson (1992), for example, is convinced
that a more biographical focus on teachers' lives would 'reconceptualise our studies of
schooling and curriculum in quite basic ways' (1992: 241-3). He offers a model of
teacher role and 'biographical transformation' into which philosophical autobiography
would easily fit (Appendix 5). 'The narrated life of a teacher' will, as he sees it,
become a form of phiosophising for the reflective practitioner. Teachers will want to
take a mutual interest in and perhaps share their philosophical autobiographies. For
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Bonnett (1994) the simultaneous narrating of one's life and philosophy of teaching is
essential to the 'existential' process of being a teacher.
It is argued by Elbaz (1991) that the novice teacher will find that the discourse of
biography and narrative will help to formulate a scaffolding of 'temporary pedagogic
theory' from which one may build up to become more expert ( 8). On this view the
process of teaching an individual child or class may be reported to others, as the
narrated experience or 'autobiographic praxis' of teaching (Butt and Raymond 1987).
Grumet (1989: 13-17) asserts that such critical inquiry must begin with an examination
of the teacher's own heretofore unexamined assumptions, when 'autobiographical
writing invites those who would teach to recover the world within which they came to
be knowing subjects.' 38 McCann and Yaxley (1992) make an identical point
concerning the need to uncover professional assumptions.
Goodson (1992) and Knowles (1992) explore the notion of teachers having a career in
philosophical autobiography which is both hermeneutically-rooted and seeks to break
out into new worlds (Appendix 5). However, Goodson (Ball and Goodson 1985)
believes that the teacher should only take up a philosophical position after some years
of teaching. This advice in my view is mistaken, given the transcendental claim that
there is a pervasive and embedded set of philosophical beliefs and presumptions
present in classroom practice right from the start of one's career. It would be difficult
to be a good teacher without being a 'reflective practitioner' who addresses
philosophical questions, throughout one's professional life from initial teacher
education onwards. Many student teachers, furthermore, are demonstrably interested
in the philosophical basis of teaching, and the aims and purposes of education. Their
needs are underestimated in Goodson's proposal for a philosophy of education which
is first formulated midway through one's professional life.
What is required is a coherent programme of initial, in-service education and staff
development of an inter-disciplinary character which is supportive of philosophical
autobiography, as well as topics in psychology, neurology, curriculum theory,
educational evaluation and curriculum studies (Appendix 31). 39 However, there is
such a vast world of ideas and meanings, so many philosophical questions which
impinge on one's teaching and require 'teacher thoughtfulness', that there could be
another response. It would be that, wherever possible, a teacher should also acquire
some of the formal skills and training of the philosopher.
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11. The philosophy teacher as ethicist and counsellor
The specialist teacher of philosophy, acting in a consultancy role, has a quite specific
contribution to make in assisting colleagues to frame the whole school policy. This
should also be seen as a commitment of some professional importance. Gallagher
(1992) commends an approach employing a local moderate hermeneuric, when the
specialist teacher of philosopher can provide significant leadership. A philosopher on
the staff of a school or college can take on a key role in the individual institution. He
or she can act as a professional resource, as a curriculum leader, philosophical
counsellor, professional ethicist, in-service educator, committee member, contributor
to staff meetings, and writer of documents in the devising of the pre-philosophical and
thinking curriculum.40
The philosophy specialist in a school or college can help to assemble an overview, of
the coverage of philosophical topics across the whole curriculum, mapping those areas
in which philosophical topics could be most relevantly introduced. The resident
Humean journeyman, or Austinian consultant can help in clearing-up confusions,
together with the avoidance and misuse of philosophical ideas (Theron 1986). This
can be done, for instance, through contributions to the in-service training and staff
development programme (Appendix 6).
The philosopher can also provide individual counselling and advice in the 'conflict
resolution' of curriculum boundaiy disputes. Individual teachers can be assisted to
formulate more clearly their own philosophical positions (McCann and Yaxley 1992).
Members of staff, individual or in groups, can be facilitated in thinking through, and
formulating their philosophical answers to questions such as: 'What are the
philosophical grounds for teaching philosophy, pre-philosophy and higher order
thinking in a school or college?'; or 'Should philosophy or critical thinking be taught
as separate subjects?' (Quinn 1991, 1994). Personal training for the resident
philosopher in the new skills of philosophical counselling may be of relevance here
(Rahav 1996).
After a philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculwn is introduced the resident
philosopher should be prepared to make a continuing contribution as a teacher and as
consultant, for instance assisting with departmental approaches. In a school which
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wishes to develop a curriculum for the first time, the appointment of a teacher who is
philosophically trained is a desirable strategy. Arrangements should also be made for
one or more members of staff to acquire formal philosophical expertise through
INSET. Wherever possible, the specialist philosopher in the school providing
leadership in curriculum policy should possess a relevant higher degree in both
education and philosophy (Appendix 31). Internal leadership should be supplemented
by drawing on the expertise of other local institutions, such as university departments
of education, or LEA advisory and inspectorate teams.
12. Teachers as transformative public and philosophical
intellectuals
To what extent should teachers therefore see themselves as, or aspire to be
philosophical or even public intellectuals? A large professional literature in teacher
education, supported by a philosophical tradition which argues for a special role of the
intellectual in the culture, responds to this question. The intellectual is variously seen
as situated in the key institutions of society (Robbins 1990), as a mediating expert
(Kurczewski 1990), as a Foucaultian analyst (Blacker 1991, Peters 1996), as an
independent arbiter (Maclean 1990), as the opponent of dogma (Bayard 1990), as the
guarantor of probity in public life and student values in education (Collier 1997), as
the guardian of 'tacit knowledge' (Shils 1990, 1995), as the promulgator of a canon
(Brann 1993), as a member of a humanistic elite in the case of the French intellectual
(Druet 1987), and as a philosophical person (Lock 1990).
Said (1991) claims that public intellectuals who, like Chomsky, speak out, are the
contemporary equivalents of the role model prescribed by Benda (1928) in La
Trahison des Clercs. Teachers are 'organic intellectuals', in Gramsci's sense that they
can fall into the error of unconsciously legitimating the society they serve. Coser
(1970), Said (1991) and Shils (1990) each echo a Kuhnian notion also, in reminding
us that intellectuals can only function through regular contact with those fellow
intellectuals who constitute their community of enquiry. 41
These accounts agree with Zeichner's (1983) 'levels' which depict the teacher as
hermeneutically and contextually situated: as a person, as a practising professional,
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and as a committed public intellectual. The second and third levels of the Zeichner
taxonomy, in which the teacher takes up a moral and ethical positions, are the most
important from the point of view of philosophical and intellectual life. For they place
an obligation upon each teacher, as a person, to be active in the public domain.
Teachers are seen as public, philosophical intellectuals in their own right as persons,
as academics, and in respect of their responsibility as educators for the future of the
society.
This type of position is taken up by other educational thinkers. Kelly (1995), for
example, wishes to renew the 19th century vision of public schools as loci of public
knowledge and democracy, involving teachers as public intellectuals. Aronowitz and
Giroux (1991) and Kreisberg (1992)) similarly argue for the notion of teacher as a
public intellectual, as someone who will need to have a set of dispositions directed
towards self-empowerment
The emancipatory theme runs through much discussion. Giroux (1988,1994), for
example, perceives both teaching and education philosophically, as a source of
hegemonic power along Gramscian lines. 42
 Teachers are transfor,native intellectuals
who can illuminate the important idea that all human activity involves
some form of thinking. Flanagan (1993) similarly sees the teaching of critical
thinking for the South African teacher as part of the ideologically and pedagogically
liberating social construction necessary in an emerging democracy. 43 Scheffler
(1967) argues that teachers should be regarded as free men and women with a special
dedication to the values of the intellect and the enhancement of the critical powers of
the young. This position is also compatible with the neo-Aristotelian viewpoint of
Buchmann (1989) or Walsh (1993), who are concerned with the intrinsic worth of
thoughts and experiences and 'love of the world'.
It would be unhelpful to strive, officiously or prematurely, to press all teachers to
undertake large-scale, personal programmes of philosophical study and reflection.
For some the reservations of Rorty, Arendt or others might prove true and the capacity
for both thought and action might be diminished. For others, it would represent a
diversion from their subject specialist, pastoral and management responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the need for reflectiveness over the philosophical assumptions within
one's embedded daily practice as a teacher has emerged clearly in the present study.
As Montefiore (1998:289) argues, teachers as well as intellectuals bear a special
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responsibility for 'truth and validity'; and many teachers will be intellectuals 'even if
the two classes are not co-extensive, neither being wholly included in the other.'
What is being asked for involves a notion of the educated person, and the teacher as
intellectual, in accord with that set out in Dewey's (1916) Testament on Education and
Democracy. Teachers as philosophical intellectuals will want to give their pupils the
opportunity to acquire that special form of shared assent, rationality and philosophical
understanding that proper attention to the pre-philosophical curriculum, taken together
with philosophy teaching itself, can engender. This will involve Aristotelian,
hermeneutic, and existential perspectives, featuring an emphasis upon 'thoughtfulness'
and action in both the intellectual and bodily domains. It will require the teacher
flourishing philosophically at all the levels identified by Zeichner, including taking on
the role of public intellectual. As Bottery and Wright (1996), Boyles (1992) and
Giroux (1994) argue from different international contexts, 'mere professionalism will
not suffice' which is only focused on professional or technical rationality. Thornbury
(1995a & Appendix 37) provides instruments for teachers wishing to assess the extent
of their stance as professional and public intellectuals.
13. The individual teacher's approach to possibility
The teacher also needs to engage as an intellectual in public life in promoting a
canonical vision of what is possible (Berube and Cary 1995, Kelly 1995, Thornbury
1995a). Chapters 4,5 and 6 have argued for an approach to pedagogy and subject
knowledge based on possibilist thinking which is rigorous and well-worked out in
terms of a canon for each subject, and for each of the major dimensions of philosophy
of ethics, aesthetics, epistemology metaphysics.
Success in teaching will be dependent on the professional skill and artistry in
pedagogic technique. The best teaching will feature ready-witted, controlled
extemporisation using the strategies identified by Leinhardt (1993). Leinhardt
demonstrates that teachers have rigorous professional and academic criteria for
establishing conceptual possibility. For example, skilful history teaching exhibits
continuous dialogic and narrative activity similar to i/cat, a subtle method of weaving.
Teachers make indirect or passing reference to a concept or idea that is later extended
273
and used in an elaborated way. Early threads of an explanation, so diffuse, tentative
and ostensively defined that the first time they are mentioned they could go unnoticed,
are woven by the skilled teacher into a carefully designed and thoughtful progression.
This conceptualisation of what occurs in creative teaching is consonant with other
pictures such as Driver's (1988) 'alternative, constructivist frameworks', or
Newmann's (1990) 'classroom-thoughtfulness'. 45 It shows how the hermeneutic
quest, a dialogue with both oneself and one's pupils, can be combined in the 'teaching
connection' (Greene 1991b). "p6 The notion of a dialectic with a constantly changing
language and tradition and a commitment to a central metaphysic of possibility,
operating within the vehicle of a canonical curriculum, accords with other
perspectives. These can be combined to include the hermeneutics of Gadamer (1965),
the narrative continuities of tradition (Maclntyre 1984) and self (Schechtman 1997),
and the notion of 'dialogic rationality' (Myerson 1994).
Clearly, the paths of teaching creatively and possibilistically are diverse. They will
vary over time, and between subjects, and to a large extent they will be worked Out by
the individual teacher. Heroic notions of individual virtuosity and creativity in
teaching are neither appropriate or widely shared (Fryer and Collings 1991, Appendix
20). But innovation can be asked for. Kincheloe and Sternberg (1993), for
example, wish to see a new kind of post-formal thinking and 'teacher disposition'
which brings possibilistic playfulness and ironism into its repertoire. Each of
Gallagher's (1992) henneneutic modes, and each of Walsh's (1993) discourse modes,
including the utopian, can be found a place in the possibilist Canon.
Finally, our transcendencies are our possibilities in a phrase of Sartre's. Teachers
engage with facticity-transcendence in regard to the growing person; and students
should always be pursuing a synthesis of facticity and transcendence through the
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum. 47
 Teachers acting as transformative,
philosophical, public intellectuals in the philosophical education of the young can
provide leadership in the educational pursuit of possible worlds.
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Notes to chapter 8
1 For instance by looking at the claims and counter-claims for teaching philosophy
and a pre-philosophical curriculwn, which were set out in chapter 2.
2 Newmann (199th 52) argues that teachers, if they are to help students succeed with
higher order challenges, must themselves model classroom thoughtfulness as they
teach (see also Appendices 10 and 11). See Aronowitz and Giroux (1991: 87-88) for
a discussion of the notion of 'the public intellectual', and the authors' notion of
'border-pedagogy' based on 'difference', 'counter-memory' and 'remembrance'.
3 Wollheim (1984) in discussing 'living as a person', questions those philosophers
like Williams (1973, 1981) or Parfit (1988), who are more interested in questions of
personal discontinuity than continuity. However, the arguments of Parfit (1988) and
others concerning discontinuities in personal identity can be constructively drawn on,
for instance when prudential morality is being considered.. See also Taylor (1989) in
Sources of the Self.
4 'A person lives his life at a cross-roads; at the point where a past that has affected
him and a future that lies open meet in the present...To see why the posture of hanging
between the past and the future is so special for a person, we have to introduce another
interaction: that between a person's occurrent transient mental states and his underlying
persistent mental dispositions..beliefs, desires, emotions, fantasies' (Woliheim 1984:
31). Wollheim (1984) distinguishes between mental states, mental dispositions and
mental activities and also emphasises the dual role of methods of introspection and
interpretation in dealing with 'living as' and 'becoming a person' (30, 33 and 167).
Goodson's (1992, Appendix 3) schema asserts that teachers should come late to their
philosophical position as educationists. However, as argued in chapter 3, they will
have such a professional position whether they are aware of it or not, from their initial
teacher education onwards (McCann and Yaxley 1992).
5 This point was argued in detail in chapters 2,3 and 5.
6 An accessible account of this response should be presented in the school's
Prospectzs and in its Institutional Development Plan (see again chapter 7).
7 They complain about contemporary trends and that little in the education of the
teaching profession seems to transcend technical rationality, and deal with issues of a
cultural, social, philosophical, political or value base (96).
8 For example, the contribution that historical studies could make in defining the
criteria for teaching counter-factually was demonstrated in chapter 4. Another example
would be the approach to science teaching, where work on inductive thinking is
claimed to transfer by means of cognitive acceleration to achievement in other subject
areas (Adey 1991, 1994, Shayer 1991).
9 It is in this connection that the thinking taxonomies, content analysis and other
instruments take on a particular importance in the pre-philosophical curricuiwn. In
general, philosophy as a separate subject will not easily win a place in the formally
timetabled curriculum. Therefore most teachers and lecturers will find themselves
teaching the subject within their specialist subject time. It is difficult, however, to see
how the appropriate rigour and specialist skill with which the subject requires to be
taught can be provided without considerable INSET and other support. A whole
school policy will need to address this question along the lines suggested in chapter 7.
The relevance of subject taxonomies such as that, for instance, offered by Berrill
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(1990, see Appendix 8) for exposition and argument, or by Shemilt (1984) for
empathy (Appendix 21), to other subject areas also requires research.
10 The universalist, 'natural interest' claim made by Lipman was partly based on the
ideal that because philosophising is oral, all can have access from an early age (chapter
2).
11 In terms of the transcendental argument this is a supererogatory question, since a
great many philosophical issues are de facto being taught. The question here is about
the way in which we deal with technical philosophical matters explicitly rather than
implicitly.
12 The IAPC philosophical text Lisa, taught to secondary school students, deals with
the dilemma arising when a boy who pays for a girl's cinema visit expects romantic
favours in return (Lipman 1976, Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan 1997). The issue is
discussed by pupils in terms of whether they would apply a general rule or whether
they would judge each occasion separately. During a lengthy discussion (in a lesson I
observed), the JAPC teacher (who was herself a trained philosopher) could have
intervened to introduce, and teach the technical philosophical distinction between act
and rule utilitarianism, but chose not to do so. It could be argued that the students
were phiosophising in 'ordinary language' like philosophers, and that they had
improved their philosophical understanding of a key distinction in moral philosophy
without needing to use the technical language. But were these students trying to get to
grips with a difficult concept with insufficient teaching?
13 Cam (1994a: 7) claims in his Thinking Stories to target analogical reasoning,
conceputal (sic) analysis and other 'readily identifiable processes'. Yet only a
philosophically literate person would readily identify 'What Would it Be Like to Be a
Bat' as a much-debated 'thought experiment' originated by Nagel, or 'The Brain in a
Vat' as a problem set by Putnam. Further more the stance here, as with the IAPC
approach which Cam broadly follows, is anti-hermeneutical, ahistorical and heavily
influenced by the ideology of a particular philosophical tradition. One cannot really
claim, that such a stance is 'ideologically rational' in Siegel's sense (see chapter 3).
14 The individual teacher will need to use technical philosophical analysis as a
pedagogic as well as philosophical tool. This would be similar to the primary teacher
who consciously draws on Piagetian theory when teaching young children, but never
discusses such theory with them.
15 For instance, if the claim made by Bhaskar (1986) following Kant is accepted,
(chapter 3) one's position must be one of epistemological, endompassing moral
relativism. For if there is no noumenal, final epistemological truth to be attained, it
follows that no form of absolutism is tenable. If, on the other hand, the more
Hegelian position is taken up that the noumenal is some kind of final truth which can
be reached through the layers of transcendental investigation, moral absolutism could
be a consistent outcome.
16 Children do need appropriate epistemological security at different points of their
personal and philosophical growth development Teaching 'definite facts' will need
to be supplemented by questioning of the child's intellectual position, and the need to
move them on, in Vygotskian terminology, to the next zone ofproximal development.
17 Piaget's early work on the moral world of the child, and cheating in marbles,
suggested that this might be a necessary development stage in beginning to develop
moral autonomy. Recent research (Gold 1993:49) suggests that those, particularly
autistic children who do not pass through this phase at about four years of age will fail
to develop a 'theory of mind', the conscious knowledge that other people have
internalised thoughts which are perhaps different from one's own.
18 Mill's depression was partly concerned with the problem that we are not able to
throw off, in Merleau Ponty's phrase, 'our historically-conditioned self'.
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19 Early fears that the sixth form study of philosophy might trigger a rise in
adolescent mental breakdown appear unfounded. On the other hand, adolescent
depression in my experience is unquestionably associated with thoughts and feelings
of de-personalisation, which correspond close to philosophical concepts such as
solipsism or Sartrean 'angst', as chapter 5 demonstrated in relation to philosophical,
psychiatric and clinical literature.
As discussed in chapter 1, the medical and psychiatric literature has given little
attention to the depressive effects of study other than from work-load stress.
Psychiatric clinicians (Hodgman and McAnarney 1992, Stanley et al 1992) complain
that depression and suicidality remain 'widely undiagnosed and untreated' in the
adolescent population.
21 'My father, to whom it would have been natural to me to have recourse in any
practical difficulties, was the last person to whom, in such a case as this, I looked for
help. Everything convinced me that he had no knowledge of any such mental state as I
was suffering from, and that even if he could be made to understand it, he was not the
physician who could cure it. My education, which was wholly his work, had been
conducted without any regard to the possibility of its ending in this result; and I saw
no use in giving him the pain of thinking that his plans had failed, when the failure
was probably irremediable, and., at all events, beyond the powers of his remedies'(Mill: 108).
22 At least one philosopher takes a pyscho-analytical perspective; see Woliheim
(1980: 318).
23 Academic impainnent only becomes evident at severe levels of depression and so
Mill's ability to function cognitively would have remained intact (Heiligenstein et al
1996). Some clinical literature finds a correlation between two factors, of 'focusing
attention inwardly on the self and current symptoms of depression and anxiety (Oliver
et al 1995). Other studies have found that a cognitive triad of views of self, world and
future are associated with the degree of severity of childhood depression (Stark et al
1996).
Another child explained to Radlord that cows were timid because they had
'magnifying eyes'. 'As I hurried home, sneering at distant cows, pondering what
Cecil had said, I suddenly felt - dizzy. There was something wrong, something
terribly, profoundly, wrong, with what Cecil had said. This was the first occasion
that I can recall on which I was struck, seized almost literally, by a philosophical
problem' (Radford 1996: 4-5).
25 Winter (1992: 109) shows how the core professional values of social work
graduates, exhibited in the form of explicit argument in their examined, written work,
can be assessed as dispositions.
26 See again chapter 5.
27 For example, Ball's (1985) 'curriculum baron', the territorial claimant who wishes
to take over whole school responsibility for the teaching of thinking skills. Mauvaisefol is used here in Sartre's sense (see Catalano 1985).
28 One of the more visible by-products of an emphasis on facility in informal logic is
the public debate, a popular genre in US schools and colleges.
29 Arendt (1978: 85). Witkin (1974) has similar doubts about transfer in the arts.
30 Rorty (1989: 73) claims concerning the ironist: '1. She has radical and continuing
doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed
by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has
encountered 2. she realises that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can
neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; 3. insofar as she philosophises about her
situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is close to reality than others, that it is
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in touch with a power not herself'. He adds: 'Ironism...results from the power of re-
description. But most people do not want to be re-described. They want to be taken
on their own terms - taken seriously, just as they are and just as they talk' (Rorty(1989: 89).
31 McNamara (1990: 147-60). See Hager and Kaye (1991) for an opposing view on
transfer.
32 The importance of narrative was emphasised and the concept defined in chapter 3;
and discussed in chapter 6 in relation to the canonical. See also Schechtman's (1996:
96) discussion of the topic.
33 The case made in chapter 4 is relevant here, that multiple intelligence, sensotiness,
and identity may all be involved in possibilist thinking.
The importance of prior knowledge and experience, including the role of memory,
may be crucial to such a project as Boud (1993: 33-9) shows. Experience must be
remembered to be reflected upon in a manageable way as the sad histoiy of Luria's(1987) mnemonist demonstrates.
35 Zeichner (1983) classifies classroom practice in four paradigms. The behaviourist
views teaching in terms of a series of competences or technical skills that have to be
practices and learned by the student teacher. The personalistic views teaching as a
process of personal growth. The traditional craft views teaching as a body of craft
knowledge and skill that is acquired only through apprenticeship. The inquiry-
oriented views teaching in a wider social context of which the teacher must become
aware in order to make appropriate judgements concerning values and actions. It is at
the moral and ethical level that the arguments of moral philosophers, and philosophers
of education, would come into play. Current examples worth scrutiny within the
context of a taught Master's course could include: Haydon (1997), Kekes (1993),
Rawis (1971), Raz (1986) or White (1990, 1996). See Appendix 31.
36 See again discussions of this matter in chapters 2, 3, 5 and 7.
37 'Philosophers from Parmenides to Nietzsche have used the genres associated with
imaginative literature to articulate and support their theories. Similarly, 'literary'
authors as diverse as Dante and D. H. Lawrence have sought to enact and render
plausible philosophical theses in their imaginative works. There are many points of
contact between such endeavours and the efforts of philosophical autobiographers.
But in the latter case the generic requirement that a story be related to fact provides a
check on the imaginative impulse' (Warner 1984: 207).
38 See Grumet (1989: 15). How the autobiographical narrative of philosophers has
played an important role in the development, and even the actual format of their
published work can be seen in the case of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.
i9 For example, the core courses for the Boston University Master's Degree in
Creative and Critical Thinking include: Critical Thinking, Creative Thinldng,
Foundations of Philosophical Thought, Advanced Cognitive Psychology, Practicum in
Educational Intervention, and Educational Evaluation (Appendix 31).
40 This will also apply in a primary school fortunate enough to have a trained
philosopher on its staff.
41 Said (1991, 1989) discusses the rise of the intellectual from the late 18th century to
the present post-industrial period, an early precedent being the 'mastered irony of the
intellectual's true situation' displayed by Swift. The noun iruellectuel first came into
currency in France in 1898 during the Dreyfus affair.
42 See Giroux (1988, 1989). Entwistle (1979) provides an interesting critique of
Gramsci's 'conservative' philosophy.
43 'The challenge for the teacher-educator in these changing times in South Africa is
to teach student teachers to become flexible, critical and tolerant enough in their
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practices to provide the ground for action rather than acquiescence, to recognise that it
is they who will regulate and instruct the actions of their pupils. Cultivating the
disposition to think in South African children will require a vibrant pedagogic relation,
one that works against that which presents itself as finished and authoritarian'
(Flanagan 1993: 192).
See again chapter 2. However, not all teachers do, or want to function as
intellectuals. Jonathan Ree (1992) has drawn attention to that tension which still
impels philosophers to intervene in the world. Reviewing Politics of Irony: Essays in
Self-Betrayal (Conway and Seery 1992), he observes: Despite that ironism, then,
they are plagued by a sense of intellectual responsibility.'
45 It is an approach which has affinities in psychology with Herbartian 'apperception
mass' (Gamo 1908) and with Gestalt theory it is philosophically reminiscent of
Wiugenstein's notion of the 'ostensive definition' of meaning.
46 This form of pedagogic extemporisation is similar to the account given of thinking
in jazz given by Berliner (1995). See also Morton (1995) for a discussion of
Berliner's theory. It also has relevance to the notion of memorised narrative as
individual performance - not rote memory reproduced (Neisser 1987). It is also
consonant with reader reception theory (Ryan 1991).
47 Catalano (1985: 82-4).
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Over-view and prospects
A principal thesis of this study has been that a pre-philosophical curriculum and
pedagogy exists transcendentally; and is de facto taught in all schools and colleges.
Importance must be attached to teaching a philosophy and pre-philosophical
curriculum because one is teaching it already (chapters 2 and 3).
Such a curriculum will emphasise both the education of the intellect, and feelings,
dispositions, moral and intellectual virtues. It will pay considerable attention to
speculative, conditional and counter-factual thought about possible worlds (chapters 4
and 5). A present lack of formal curriculum or philosophical guidance as to how
teachers might proceed has been identified, together with the need for a coherent
canon in pre-philosophy within the National Curriculum (chapter 6). The case for a
formal institutional plan, providing a philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum in
each school and college, has therefore been put forward. The argument has also been
advanced that teachers should act as 'reflective practitioners' in the development and
review of such a curriculum; and, more generally in the society, as transformative
proftssional, philosophical and public intellectuals.
A number of tasks and lines of development for the future teaching of the philosophy
and the pre-philosophical curriculum can be identified. In particular, rigorous
programmes of research and scholarship are needed.
The field needs more self-criticism. It is a bit paradoxical that some developers of
programmes to teach critical thinking have had less than severely critical attitudes toward
their own work. (Nickerson 1988: 43) 1
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There is scope for a further study of the diversity of the field as it presents itself as
philosophy of education, in the fonn of critical thinking, informal logic, philosophy in
schools, transferable skills, problem-solving and intervention programmes.
Disparate strands in a pluralist soda! movement, of various schools of thought in
philosophy teaching and the pre-philosophical curriculum, have been identified.
Many of these could be brought together in a programme of philosophical and
empirical sociological enquiry. 2 A fuller understanding of the social movement
phenomenon would be particularly helpful in the management of public policy and
educational funding. 3 Those concerned with public policy in relation to the
curriculum, school effectiveness and improvement might look in particular at how
whole school and college approaches to the philosophy and pre-phiosophical
curriculum can be put in place. Such an examination could include not only the
National Curriculum, the years of statutory schooling, but also post-secondary and
vocational education, and teacher education.
Within these approaches, there would be a particular need to look at the role of ethical
education, where a number of important developments and trends have appeared.
The debate about dispositions in this study has bearing on the anticipated provision in
England and Wales of values education, based on a canon of public values as reflected
in the Report of the National Forum for Values in Education and Com,nunity (1996).
However, as was shown in chapter 5, the training of the dispositions and virtues is a
more philosophically complex, and subtle matter than much of the educational and
critical thinking literature presently recognises. There are a considerable number of
pitfalls to be avoided or solved, as consultations carried out by the Qualifications and
Curriculum Authority have confirmed (QCA l998abcd).
Among the future philosophical tasks will be the need to clarify further those particular
forms of thinking which are constitutively characteristic of individual subject
specialisms and their discourse. In this connection there is scope for exploring the
variety of conceptions of domains in philosophy and in other disciplines; as in the case
of the aesthetic notion of 'art-worlds' (Wollheim 1980b), or the 'Daisyworld' model
that has underpinned the significant reconciliation of evidence for a self-regulating
earth with natural selection theory (Lenton 1998). '
281
The further development of existing, and the eliciting of new taxonomies for both
subject specific and generalisable purposes is needed. 5 These would need to be
examined for their epistemological, aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical assumptions;
and from the point of view of their empirical effectiveness in the classroom.
Regarding curriculum and pedagogy, there is need for philosophical work scrutinising
phenomenographic and constructivist approaches (Baum 1977, Matthews 1994), and
in developing general pedagogy in the 'weaving of instructional explanation'
(Leinhardt 1993). 6 The proposals for an AS level syllabus in critical thinking within
the framework of general studies work during the A level years also offer an
opportunity for work on the philosophical curriculum.
Educationalists and philosophers should look more widely at developments in cognate
areas; for instance, in psychology and in the neurology of the brain, where research
and theory have begun to contribute to philosophical theory in illuminating the
problems that teachers face in teaching thinking. A number of these fields of
enquiry, especially those connected with counter-factual thinldng, personal identity,
cross-domain intelligence and sensory transfer, have been explored in this study. 8
It would be important for educators to continue to monitor and gain benefit from these
innovatory developments.
A special place has been argued for teachers' own philosophical perspectives on their
lives, thinking and careers as they proceed. This should be explored further. There
is considerable scope for further practitioner research and 'ownership' in the approach
to pre-phiosophical thinking. This can be based on the extensive, existing successful
practice which this study has described - and upon its recommendations.
Teachers of philosophy in schools and colleges have particular contributions to make
in their dual role as philosophers and educationists. They can do this by drawing
extensively on mainstream philosophical concerns. They can explore collegially the
subject territorialities of colleagues. They can act as consultants in devising and
supporting whole school policies for the philosophy and pre-philosophical
curricuiwn. Institutions of higher and teacher education have a particular
responsibility in carrying forward innovation in research policy and development.
They also can act as a resource and a partner in courses leading to the provision of
philosophical and pre-philosophical curricula. Teachers, lecturers, and especially
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philosophers in schools, colleges and higher education share important collective
responsibilities as professional, public intellectuals as argued in chapter 8.
It has been urged that schools and colleges should teach their own canonical and
'strong' version of the philosophy and pre-philosophy curriculum. In doing so they
will certainly find some place for the subsidiary, Austinian role of philosophy, of
helping students to think clearly and critically. But philosophy teachers in schools
and colleges, and those advising them, should not be diverted from philosophy's main
purpose; which is to provide the prior, unifying discipline upon which all others rest.
The marginalisation and tiivialisation of the main philosophical tradition must be
resisted.
Finally, there is an especially strong case for encouraging more conjectural, possibiist
and metaphysical speculation in the curricula of schools and colleges. Developments
in counter-factual and possibilist thinking need to be given serious attention by subject
teachers and within whole school or college policies. The extension of ethical,
aesthetic and metaphysical vision is the most challenging task in this connection; and it
can be best achieved by using the ontological pedagogy of possibilism, the philosophy
of 'if, described by (Edgington 1995) as having such great significance:
The study of conditionals raises hard questions - about truth, objectivity, propositions.
Who would have thought that one little word could disturb so much. (323)9
Notes to chapter 9
' See also the review of issues and trends in evaluation by Maclure and Davies (1991:
215-226) in Learning to Thin/c: Thinking to Learn.
2 Two examples would be the hermeneutic notion of empathy and the application of
possible and plausible worlds theory to fields other than history teaching and
scholarship. Work on memory and previous knowledge in relation to the teaching of
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philosophy and higher order thinking, seems to have been relatively neglected
(Alexander et al 1994, Fincher-Kiefer 1992).
3 See again chapter 1 and Giddens (1993: 642-7).
4 This task is especially relevant to cross-curriculum and cross-domain thinking,
ranging from the detailed treatment of the geography curriculum (as mentioned in
chapter 4), to problems such as trans-world depravity in religious and ethical education
as raised by philosophical theologians (Planlinga 1974), and transcendental aspects,
such as the philosophical 'underworld' or domain identified by (Honderich 1995:
678). The review by Lenton (1998) in Nature of the evidence for a self-regulating
earth, focusing on feed-back mechanisms that might generate such self-regulation -
and thus the reconciliation of natural selection with Gaia - is an impressive, current
example of domain theory. Kim (1998) sees the problem of reductionism in
philosophy as being essentially concerned with domains. Equal fertile ground is
offered by decision game theory (Bicchieri 1998) and through exploration of the
notion of the thought experiment. Commentators such as Gooding (1998) Kuhn
(1977) and Sorensen (1992) have pointed out that thought experiments, such as
Searle's Chinese Room or the Turing Test, can be seen as narrative simulated worlds,
mental models of domains which are initially non-propositional: 'logic is only used
afterwards to validate conclusions reached by thinking with models' (Gooding 1998:
396)
5 The Newmann, Barrett, Ennis and Berrill models (Appendices 11,12,7 & 8)
provide examples of starting-points. Burden and Williams (1998) make a useful
contribution in their dual stress on general cognitive strategies and skills and those
which are specific to subjects within the National Curriculum.
6 Leinhardt's (1993: 46-74) empirical findings were discussed in Chapter 8. More
generally, 'pedagogy remains a seriously under-researched topic' in relation to both
the National Curriculum and life-long learning (QCA 1998b: 9). In the matter of
classroom processes, for example, we are told that 'teachers have difficulty in
implementing problem-solving, enquiry and investigative aspects of the curriculum'(12).
I have in mind, particularly, the work of Lewis and Hawthorn on plausible worlds
(chapter 4), that of Bhaskar on the philosophy of science (chapter 3), and Nussbaum
(chapter 5) in literary theory and philosophical aesthetics.
8 Here the importance of previous knowledge and memory should be stressed. Key
research questions such as whether 'natural' or 'strategic' memory operates more
strongly, in memory champions for example, remain unresolved (Wilding and
Valentine 1994).
9 Edgington (1997) emphasises the pedagogic importance of conditional thinking as a
heuristic device. Beyond the field of technical philosophy, some Masters Courses
address such a need. Liverpool University teaches an MA in Science Fiction Studies
in which philosophical topics are studied (Times Educational Supplement, April 29th,
1994). Leeds Metropolitan University offers a Masters in Future Studies, 'the first of
its kind in Europe' (Independent, July 7th 1995). Interest among philosophers in
counter-factual and conditional philosophy continues, the present 'state of the art'
being comprehensively reviewed by Edgington (1995) and Divers (1997).
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Appendix 1
Philosophically related questions of principle
concerning the approach to a philosophy and
pre-philosophical curriculum: Thornbury (1996).
The following range of questions can be asked at various stages, including
those of review and reflection, of teachers or lecturers taking a course at
Master's level which looks at what is involved in teaching philosophy and a
pre-philosophical curriculum.
1. Does philosophy enjoy primacy as the pre-eminent and unifying form of meta-
cognitive discourse which is de facto taught, and should be taught in schools and
colleges?
2. Is not pre-philosophical preparation for its study, in the form of a pre-
philosophical curriculum, both worthwhile and justifiable?
3. To what extent can the teaching of philosophy and a pre-philosophical
curriculum be seen as a method of bringing about various forms of empowerment and
hegemony?
4. Should the broad democratic claim be accepted, that the study of philosophy
can contribute to the flourishing of a democratic society?
5. Has philosophy and the pre-philosophical curriculum been sometimes used for
the training and formation of anti-democratic elites?
6. What is the scope for the abuse of the teaching of philosophy and the pre-
philosophical curriculum in terms of indoctrination?
7. Can the fact that children display wonder and the pre-philosophical beginnings
of metaphysical awe be characterised as philosophical behaviour?
8. Can the natural curiosity that children show in philosophical matters be
described justifiably as 'philosophical'?
9. Can the contemplation of ineffable or intractable problems provide children
with a pre-philosophical foundation for the beginnings of metaphysical thinking?
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10. Should the essentialist claim that children have a natural affinity for, enjoyment
of, and interest in philosophical questions, be accepted as evidence that they are
philosophising in the formal sense?
11. Is the transcendental argument persuasive, thai philosophical thinking lies
behind the appearance of things?
12. Would such acceptance entail acceptance of the further proposition that, at any
given time, the philosophical thinking which lies transcendentally behind our teaching
amounts to our, in effect, delivering a curriculum canon?
13. Should counter-factual and possibilist thinking be taught, on the grounds that it
can make a particular and distinctive contribution to the teaching of formal philosophy
and also a pre-philosophical curriculum?
14. Is a consequence of teaching philosophy, or a pre-philosophical curriculum,
that students acquire 'transferable' metacognitive skills of thinking and phiosophising?
15. How can a canon for teaching such meta-competences be identified?
16. How can they be more successfully taught than at present?
17. What kinds of philosophical thinking are not generalisable in the sense of being
separable from their originating forms of discourse or subject disciplines?
18. Does most philosophical thinking first occur pre-philosophically within an
originating and specialist form of discourse or knowledge?
19. Is the linguistic clarification of problems a main, or a subsidiary role of the
philosophical and the pre-philosophical 'thinking curriculum'?
20. Do some subject disciplines have a larger and justifiable claim than others that
they should to teach the pre-philosophical curriculum'
21. To what extent could the teaching of philosophy and a pre-philosophical
curriculum be claimed to bring cognitive and affective benefits related to the formation
of dispositions and virtues?
22. Should the potential of philosophical thinking for causing depression be
conceded?
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23. Is some philosophical account of the relationship between thought and feeling
necessary for any full pedagogic or curricular theory of the place of philosophy or pre-
philosophical teaching.
24. Does flourishing as a person, and one's personal autonomy, depend on access to
a philosophical and a pre-philosophical curriculum?
25. Is this also desirable for the teacher, including in his or her role as a public
intellectual?
26. How can a school or college develop its own policy in response to such
questions?
27. What is the best approach to planning and implementing a philosophy and a
pre-philosophical curriculum in an individual school or college?
28. What are the implications for the individual teacher or lecturer?
29. Is there any basis for a rights claim to be mounted, according to which the
students are entitled to be taught, and the teachers obliged to teach a philosophy and
the pre-philosophical curriculum?
30. What are the implications in terms of pedagogic and professional ethics?
31. What kind of support could higher education, and the philosophy of education
as a discipline, offer this process?
32. How do we know when we have taught philosophy and the pre-philosophical
curriculum well; what kind of person will the philosophically educated student be?
33. What are the implications for educational policy school improvement and
effectiveness?
34. What should be the focus of future work in this area, in research, curriculum
development, philosophical investigation and public education policy?
Source: Chapter 1, The Teaching of Philosophy and the Pre-Philosophical Curriculum
in Schools and Colleges: (Thornbury 1997).
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Appendix 2
Ideological Contexts of Curriculum Planning:
Morrison and Ridley (1989) and Skilbeck (1976)
ideology	 progressivism	 classical	 liberal	 instrumen	 reconstructionis
child-	 humanism	 humanism	 talism,	 m
centredness	 traditionalism	 revisionism	 democratic
romanticism	 academicism	 economic	 socialism
_____________ _____________ conservatism 	 _____________ renewal	 _____________
emphasis	 individual child knowledge -	 knowledge -	 society -	 society -
_____________ _____________ unequal access equal access 	 status quo	 changed
theoiy of	 empiricist,	 disciplines, non- common culture utilitarian, 	 revolutionary,
knowledge	 active,	 vocational,	 curriculum	 economically,	 problem-solving,
evolutionary,	 academic, high	 relevant,	 active, socially
subjective,	 culture,	 vocational,	 relevant.,
emphasis on	 emphasis on	 scientific,	 vocational
processes,	 products,	 technological
integrated	 rationalistic
_____________ curricula	 _____________ _____________ ______________ ______________
theory of	 experiential,	 obedience,	 induction into	 induction into	 apprentice-ship,
learning and of spontaneity, 	 passivity,	 key areas of	 vocationally	 practical,
the learner's role emphasis on	 conformity,	 experience,	 relevant areas co-operative,
skills and
	
uniformity	 active and co-	 problem- solving
processes, co-	 operative
operative,	 learning
intrinsic
_____________ motivation	 _____________ _____________ _____________ _____________
theory of	 guide, provider instructor, 	 guide, provider instructor,	 guide, catalyst of
teaching and of of multiples	 information	 of resources,	 trainer,	 social changes,
the teacher's role resources,	 transmitter,	 facilitator	 transmitter of	 disseminator of
facilitator,	 authoritative,	 vocationally	 centralist
catalyst of	 formal tutor	 relevant	 philosophy,
child's self-	 experiences	 instructor, traine
chosen
_____________ curriculum	 _____________ ______________ ______________ ______________
theory of	 first-hand,	 second-hand,	 first - and	 narrowly	 individual and
resources	 diverse,	 restricted	 second-hand,	 relevant to	 group work as
extensive	 multiple,	 content,	 relevant to task
extensive	 practical,
_____________ ______________ _____________ ______________ vocational
	 ______________
theory of	 diverse, flexible, class teaching, open, flexible, narrow, 	 individual and
organisation of informal, co-	 formal, uniform, diverse 	 practical,	 group work as
learning	 operative, group competitive 	 relevant to task, relevant to task
situations	 work, discovery	 class and
methods	 individual
teaching,
_____________ ______________ _____________ ______________ uniformity	 ______________
theory of	 diagnostic,	 written, formal, diagnostic, norm formal, written flexible, formal
assessment	 multiple criteria, attainment	 and written,	 and oral,	 or written as
informal,	 testing,	 formal or	 practical	 appropriate,
profiling	 examinations	 informal	 attainment
_____________ ______________ _____________ ______________ ______________ testing
theory of aims, self-expression, received 	 equal access to extrinsic	 extrinsic
objectives and individuality,	 curricula, elitist, key areas of	 worthwhile-ness, worthwhile-ness,
outcomes	 creativity,	 non-	 knowledge,	 relevant to	 relevant to social
development of vocational, high egalitarian	 economic good, good,
whole	 culture	 efficient worker citizenship,
____________ personality	 ____________ ____________ ____________ common good
Source: Morrison, Keith, and Ken Ridley. 1989. Ideological contexts of curriculum
planning. In Approaches to Curriculum Management, ed. M. Preedy, 46-7. Milton
Keynes: Open University Press.
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Appendix 3
Possible Worlds: working examples:
Bradley and Swartz (1979)
In Possible Worlds, Bradley and Swartz(1979) provide narrative examples to
support their claim that counter-factuals can help in the solution of
philosophical problems (13).
Example 1
They offer, for instance, a possible worlds parable to respond to the thesis that persons
who lack a language cannot have reflective beliefs (122-5). In it they posit a creature,
Arthur, who never comes across any other animate creature and, not surprisingly, never
learns a language; but whose central nervous system, upon post-mortem, is revealed as
highly developed, and whose behaviours and problem solving with a bellows, forge and
malleable metal shows a veiy high level of inference drawing.
Example 2
A second example concerns the thesis that persons (creatures) who lack a language
cannot believe necessary truths - an attempt to question the No-Belief-In-Necessity-
Without-Language-Theory (125-6).
In this story it is postulated that neurophysiologists have located the specific locus
within the brain of neurones for particular beliefs. A child, Henry, is raised in a
laboratory with a plethora of development activities - except language. His highly
localised neurones are excited in the same way, especially in relation to particular
inferences, as with language possessors and so it is concluded that belief in necessity
can occur without language.
Example 3
A third example attempts to refute the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief.
We are asked to imagine a possible world in which a secretary has relied for years on
the electric clock hanging on his office wall. For all the forty years he has worked in
that office, the clock has never once been wrong. One morning a client works in the
door below the clock. Since her back is to the clock she doesn't see, and wishing to
know what times it is, she asks the secretary. He glances at the clock for the first time
that day, reads it correctly, and reports 'It is ten minutes past nine'. Now as it happens,
unknown to him, the hitherto trusty clock expired exactly twelve hours earlier. He
happened to glance at it at just the one moment during the morning when its unmoving
hands were pointing at the right time.
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Bradley and Swartz comment:
Three conditions are satisfied: (1) the propositions that the time is ten minutes
past nine, is true; (2) he believes that proposition to be true; and (3) he is
justified in believing that proposition to be true - after all, the clock has been
unerringly reliable for forty years. But does he know that it is ten minutes past
nine? We would hardly want to say so. Rather we would say that his was a
merely fortuitous belief, and this for the reason that one cannot what time it is
by reading a stopped clock (126-7).
The thesis which we are challenging may be stated, equivalently, in this
fashion: A person's justifiably believing a true proposition P implies that
person's knowing P. This thesis, of course, is readily paraphrased into a
possible-worlds idiom, viz., "Any possible worid in which both P is true and a
person, a, justifiably believes that P is also a world in which a knows that P."
Given this latter paraphrase, the strategy of attack becomes clear: we must try
to describe a possible world in which (1) a person justifiably believes a true
proposition, and (2) that person does now know that the proposition is true.
Can we tell such a parable? Although examples eluded philosophers for
centuries, it is now a trivial matter for tyros in philosophy to construct them
with ease.
In sum, then, we have our counter-example. There is a possible world in which
a person justifiably believes a proposition which is true and yet does not know
it. From a proposition's being true and being justifiably believed, it does not
follow that proposition is known to be true. Knowledge, in short, requires
something more than mere justified true belief (126-7).
Source: Bradley, Raymond and Norman Swartz. 1979. Possible Worlds: An
introduction to Logic and its Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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Appendix 4
Seven characteristics of children's
use of language: Tough (1987)
1. Self-maintaining
- referring to the needs and wants of the self or group, the use of language as a
competitive and critical instrument
2. Directing
- to guide and control one's own and others actions, to instruct, demonstrate or
demand
3. Reporting
- commenting on past or present experiences
4. Reasoning
- explaining events and actions, recognising problems and justifying solutions,
not just using words as labels
5. Predicting
- using past experience to anticipate and predict the future
6. Projecting
- imagining ourselves in other situations, with other experiences; or
empathising with the feelings and reactions of others.
7. Imagining
- inventing stories or imaginary situations.
Source: Tough, Jean. 1976. Talk for Teaching and Learning. London: Ward Lock.
Quoted in Robert Fisher, ed. 1987. Problem-Solving in Primary Schools. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell: 35.
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Appendix 5(i)
Levels of biography of teachers: Goodson (1992)
Goodson's argument
From teachers' own accounts, but also from more detached research studies, it is clear
that the teachers' previous ljfe experience and background help shape their view of
teaching and essential element in their practice.
The teacher's life style both in and outside school and his/her latent identities and
cultures impact on views of teaching and practice.
The teacher's life cycle is also an important aspect of professional life and
development. This is an unique feature of teaching. For the teacher essentially confronts
'ageless' cohorts; this intensifies the importance of the life cycle for perceptions and
practice.
The teacher's career stages are important research foci, for the researcher codes the
subjects' words according to certain phases or periods in his or her life; what many
qualitative researchers call a previous career.
Beyond major career stages there are critical incidents in teachers' lives and specifically
their work which may crucially affect their perceptions and practice.
Studies of teachers' lives might allow us to 'see the individual in relation 'to the history of his
time... The initial focus on the teachers' lives would therefore reconceptualise our studies of
schooling and curriculum in quite basic ways. (Goodson 1992: 243-4)
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Appendix 5 (ii)
Developing teacher role identity: a model linking stages of
development of teacher role identity with phases of the
Biographical Transformation Model
Phases of the BiographicalStages of de
of leacher ro
Family experiences as a child
Experiences with teachers
School experiences
Meaning of family experiences
Meaning of experiences with teachers
Meaning of school experiences
Family role models
Negative teacher role models and
Positive teacher role models
Development of educational philosophy
Ideals of adult-child relationships
Ideal instructional strategies
Ideal instructional environment
Significant recent experiences and people
Formative experiences
Interpretation
Schema
Framework for action
Teacher role identity	 Teacher role identity
Source: Goodson, Ivor ed. 1992. Studying Teachers' Lives. London: Routledge.
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Appendix 6
Five strategies for teaching thinking as
a cross-curricular theme: after National
Curriculum Council (1990)
1. Teach the themes by continuous infusion through the National Curricuiwn
and other subjects.
2. Have whole curriculum planning leading to blocks of activity: a series of
subject-based topics lasting in which the themes are embedded, or featuring
themes.
3. Have separately timetabled work on critical, creative and pre-philosophical
thinldng within subject timetables.
4. Have critical, creative and pre-philosophical thinking taught within a
separately rimetabled programme, e.g. in PSE.
5. Have long block timetabling, e.g discussion weeks on major and
controversial issues.
Source: National Curriculum Council. 1989. Curriculum Guidance No 6: Economic
Awareness. London: HMSO.
353
Appendix 7
A characterisation of the ideal
critical thinker: Ennis (1991)
Working definition
'critical thinking' means reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what
to believe or do.
Given this definition, the idea critical thinker can be roughly characterised by the
following interdependent and somewhat overlapping set of twelve dispositions and
sixteen abilities.
AU twelve dispositions and the first twelve abilities are offered as constitutive of the
ideal critical thinker. The last four abilities (here called auxiliary abilities) are helpful
and generally needed by the idea critical thinker.
Dispositions of the Ideal Critical Thinker
To be clear about the intended meaning of what is said, written or otherwise
communicated
to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question
to take into account the total situation
to seek and offer reasons
to try to be well informed
to look for alternatives
to seek as much precision as the situation requires
to try to be reflectively aware of one's own basic beliefs
to be open-minded; consider seriously other points of view than one's own
to withhold judgement when the evidence and reasons are insufficient
to take a position (and change a position) when the evidence and reasons are
sufficient to do so
to use one's critical thinking abilities
Abilities of the Ideal Critical Thinker
(l'he first five items involve clar4fication)
to identify the focus; the issue, question, or conclusion
to analyse arguments
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to ask and answer questions of clarification and/or challenge
to define terms, judge definitions, and deal with equivocation
to identify unstated assumptions
(l'he next two involve the basis for the decision)
to judge the credibility of a source
to observe, and judge observation reports
(The next three involve inference)
to deduce, and judge deductions
to induce, and judge inductions
to make generalisations
to make explanatory conclusions (including hypotheses)
to make and judge value judgements
(The next two are metacognitive abilities - involving supposition and integration)
to consider and reason from premises, reasons, assumptions, positions, and
other propositions with which one disagrees or about which one is in doubt -
without letting the disagreement or doubt interfere with one's thinking
(suppositional thinking)
to integrate the other abilities and dispositions in making and defending a
decision
to proceed in an orderly manner appropriate to the situation, for example:
to follow problem solving steps
to monitor one's own thinking
to employ a reasonable critical thinking checklist
to be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophistication
of others
to employ appropriate rhetorical strategies in discussion and presentation
(orally and in writing)
to employ and react to fallacy labels in an appropriate manner.
Source: Ennis, R. H. 1991. Critical Thinking: A Stream-lined Conception. Teaching
Philosophy, Vol 14, no. 1: 8-9.
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Appendix 8
A multi-dimensional model of the development
of written argument: Berrill (1990)
I. Thesis development
No Thesis: Empty assertions; unconnected opinions without developed support
Loose Focus: Ideas are still essentially independent There is a general sense that all
ideas relate to a topic but most often ideas are linked only to a single other idea in the
paper. There is no central thesis.
Emerging Thesis: There is an attempt to prove a thesis and an accompanying attempt to
define and support ideas presented. The relationship between ideas is apparent, although
sometimes implicitly, but the nature of that relationship varies. Items are not parallel in
type or in value. Inconsistent.
Restricted Thesis: Explicit statement of thesis which may or may not be an answer to a
question at issue. Ideas are adequately defined and supported. The relationship between
ideas is apparent with an attempt to maintain consistency in type or value or evidence.
There is no attempt to speculate or to apply the thesis to other situations.
Elaborated Thesis; The thesis is a probable answer to a question at issue: this answer
largely determines the selection of evidence (content considerations) as well as the
structure of the piece as a whole (rhetorical considerations). There may be an attempt to
apply the thesis to other situations.
Hypothesising Thesis: The whole piece is logically linked as for 'Elaborated thesis' but
now also includes speculation and/or application to other situations as an integral part of
the argument.
II Idea Development:
Cognitive level of idea chunks or of evidence within the paper (after Wilkinson et a!
1980).
Concrete Description: A recording or reporting of concrete statements about the here
and now.
Concrete Interpretation: Explanation (saying why a concrete statement is so) or
deduction (providing causal links between concrete statements).
Assertion: Generalised opinion with little or no support offered or reasons given.
Generalised description; Recording or reporting of generalised statements through use
of abstract terms.
Generalised Interpretation: Explanation of why a generalisation is applicable.
Generalisation based on other generalisations: An abstract statement based on or
supported by other generalisations.
Projection; Hypothesis about a possible future or possible scenario development in a
single section of the argument but not carried through the whole piece. The idea being
projected may or may not be abstract enough to be sustained through the whole
argument.
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Speculation: Sustained hypothesis developed through the piece to a conclusion. The
idea being put forward must be of sufficient abstraction to be sustainable through the
whole argument.
Ill External Validity
Audience Awareness: Awareness of the wider public views which have been critically
reviewed by the writer. Asswnptions: Writers address issues and construct arguments
which appeal to particular audiences. The audience may present additional validity
complications, whether through the degree of difference of opinion it holds in relation to
the writer or through the heterogeneity of its composition, wherein there is not only a
single different opinion but a number of different opinions.
Egocentric: Easiest argument to write. The writer assumes that the audience share the
same attitudes and knowledge based. (Aristotle did not recognise this as an argument.)
Cursory awareness of alternate point of view: Argument anticipates an opposing
position but does not deal with it.
Acknowledgement of alternate point of view: Argument recognises alternate point of
view but does not accept the validity of it.
Appreciation of alternate point of view: Argument recognises the validity of an
alternate point of view and qualifies initial position accordingly.
Accommodation of alternate point of view: Argument explicitly acknowledges
validity of alternate view and incorporates that view in the structure of the argument,
either through particular support and incorporation of that view or through some degree
of refutation of the alternate view which recognises the validity of the claim but which
posits a strong validity claim to the writer's view.
IV Content Validity
The degree of well-groundedness of evidence.
Within this dimension each item represents a different facet of being well grounded and
each is rate on a Poor-to-Excellent continuum on a I (Little or no attempt made) -5
(excellent) scale. A ranking of '3'3 represents adequacy within the feature.
Truthfulness of Evidence: Objectivity; authority of evidence
Selection of Evidence: The potential of the evidence chosen to support the thesis. (The
evidence may or may not be shown to be related to the thesis; this item, rather, indicates
the potential of the evidence chosen.)
Interpretation of evidence: Analysis or discussion of evidence. The more developed
this item is, the more explicitly will be the relation of evidence to thesis and the more
strong the evidence will be shown to be.
Normative correctness: Probability of statements; frequency of occurrence.
Source: Berrill, Deborah. 1990. What exposition has to do with argument:
argumentative writing of sixteen year olds. English in Education, Vol 24, Spring,
no. 1:77-92.
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Appendix 9
The Barrett taxonomy: cognitive and
affective dimensions of reading
comprehension: Barrett (1972)
Literal comprehension
Literal comprehension focuses on ideas and information which are explicitly stated in
the selection. Pumoses for readin g and teacher's questions designed to elicit responses at
reading selection. Purposes and questions at this level may have the following
characteristics.
Recognition requires the student to locate or identify ideas or information explicitly
stated in the reading selection itself or in exercises which use the explicit ideas and
information presented in the reading selection. Recognition tasks are:
Recognition of details. The student is required to locate or identify facts such as the
names of characters, the time of the story, or the place of the story.
Recognition of main ideas. The student is asked to locate or identify an explicit
statement in or from a selection which is a main idea of a paragraph or a large portion of
the selection.
Recognition of a sequence. The student is required to locate or identif' the order of
incidents or actions explicitly stated in the selection.
Recognition of comparison. The student is requested to locate or identify likenesses and
differences in characters, times and places that are explicitly in the selection.
Recognition of cause and effect relationships. The student in this instance may be
required to locate or identify the explicitly stated reasons for certain happenings or
actions in the selection.
Recognition of character traits. The student is required to identify or locate explicit
statements about a characters which helps to point up the type of person he is.
Recall requires the student to produce from memory ideas and information explicitly
stated in the reading selection. Recall tasks are:
Recall of details. The student is asked to produced from memory facts such as the name
of characters, the time of the story, or the place of the story.
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Recall of main ideas. The student is required to state a main idea of a paragraph or a
larger portion of the selection from memory when the main idea is explicitly stated in
the selection.
Recall of a sequence. The student is asked to provide from memory the order of
incidents or actions explicitly stated in the selection.
Recall of comparison. The student is required to call up from memory the likenesses
and differences in characters, times, and places that are explicitly stated in the selection.
Recall of cause and effect relationships. The student is requested to produced from
memory explicitly stated reasons for certain happening or actions in the selection.
Recall of character traits. The student is asked to call up from memory explicit
statements about characters which ifiustrate the type of persons they are.
Re-organisation
information exDlicitiy stated in the selection. To produce the desired thought product.
the reader may utilise the statements of the author verbatim or he may paraphrase or
translate the author's statements. Reorganisation tasks are:
Classifying. In this instance the student is required to place people, things, places,
and/or events into categories.
Outlining. The student is requested to organised the selection into outline form using
direct statements or paraphrased statements from the selection.
Summarising. The student is asked to condense the selection using direct statements or
paraphrased statements from the selection.
Synrhesising. In this instance, the student is requested to consolidate explicit ideas or
information from more than one source.
Inferential comprehension
Inferential comprehension is demonstrated by the student when he uses the ideas and
information explicitly stated in the selection, his intuition, and his personal experience
as a basis for conjectures and hypotheses. Inferences drawn by the student may be either
convergent or divergent in nature and the student may or may not be asked to verbalise
imagination that go beyond the printed page.
Inferring supporting details. In this instance the, student is ask to conjecture about
additional facts the author might have included in the selection which would have made
it more informative, interesting or appeal.
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Inferring main ideas. The student is required to provide the main idea, general
significance, theme, or moral which is not explicitly stated in the selection.
Inferring sequence. The student, in this case, may be requested to conjecture as to what
action or incident might have taken place between two explicitly stated actions or
incidents, or he may be asked to hypothesise about what would happen next if the
selection had not ended as it did but had been extended.
Inferring comparisons. The student is required to infer likenesses and differences in
characters, times, or place. Such inferential comparisons revolve around ideas such as;
'here and there', 'then and now', 'he and she', and 'she and he'.
Inferring cause and effect relationships. The student is required to hypothesise about
the motivations of characters and their inter-actions with time place. He may also be
required to conjecture as to what caused the author to include certain ideas, words,
characterisations, and actions in his writing.
Inferring character traits. In this case, the student is asked to hypothesise about the
nature of characters on the basis of explicit clues presented in the selection.
Predicting outcomes. The student is requested to read an initial portion of the selections
an don the basis of this reading he is required to conjecture about the outcome of the
selection.
Interpreting figurative language. The student, in this instance, is asked to infer literal
meaning from the author's figurative use of language.
Evaluation
Purposes for reading and teacher's questions. in this instance, require responses by the
student which indicate that he has made an evaluative judgement by comparing ideas
presented in the selection with external criteria provided by the teacher, other
authorities, or other written sources, or with internal criteria provided by the reader's
experiences, knowledge, or values. In essence evaluation deals with judgement and
focuses on qualities of accurac y. acceptability, desirability, worth, or probability of
occurrence.
Evaluative thinking may be demonstrated by asking the student to make the following
judgements.
Judgements of reality or fantasy. Could this really happen? Such a question calls for a
judgement by the reader based on his experience.
Judgements offact or opinion. Does the author provide adequate support for his
conclusions, is the author attempting to sway your thinking? Questions of this type
require the student to analyse and evaluate the writing on the basis of the knowledge he
has on the subject as well as to analyse and evaluate the intent of the author.
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Judgernents of adequacy and validity. Is the information presented here in keeping with
what you have read on the subject in other sources? Questions of this nature call for the
reader to compare written sources of information, with an eye toward agreement and
disagreement or completeness and incompleteness.
Judgements of appropriateness. What part of the story best describes the main
character? Such a question requires the read to make a judgement about the relative
adequacy of different parts of the selection to answer the question.
Judgements of worth, desirability and acceptability. Was the character right or wrong in
what he did? Was his behaviour good or bad? Questions of this nature call judgements
based on the reader's moral code or his value system.
Appreciation
Emotional response to the content. The student is required to verbalise his feelings
about the selection in terms of interest, excitement, boredom, fear, hate, amusement, etc.
It is concerned with the emotional impact of the total work on the reader.
Idenrfi cation with characters or incidents. Teachers' questions of this nature will elicit
a response from the reader which demonstrate his sensitivity to, sympathy for, and
empathy with characters and happenings portrayed by the author.
Reactions to the author's use of language. In this instance the student is required to
respond to the author's craftsmanship in terms of the semantic dimensions of the
selection, namely, connotations and denotations of words.
Imagery. In this instance, the reader is required to verbalise this feelings with regard to
the author's artistic ability to paint world pictures which cause the reader to visualise,
smell, taste, hear, or feel.
Source: Barrett, Thomas C. 1972. Taxonomy of the Cognitive and Affective
Dimensions of Reading Comprehension'. In Reading Today and Tomorrow, ed. A.
Melnik and J. Merritt: 55-61. London: University of London Press.
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Appendix 10
Proposed indicators of classroom
thoughtfulness: Newmann (1990)
General
There was sustained examination of afew topics rather than superficial coverage
of many: Mastery of higher challenges requires in-depth study and sustained
concentration on a limited number of topics or questions. Lessons that cover a
large number of topics give students only a vague familiarity or awareness and,
thereby, reduce the possibilities for building the complex knowledge skills and
dispositions.
The lesson displayed substantive coherence and continuity: Intelligent progress
on higher order challenges demands systematic inquiry that builds on relevant and
accurate substantive knowledge in the field and that works towards the logical
development and integration of ideas. In contrast, lessons that teach material as
unrelated fragments of knowledge, without pulling them together, undermine such
inquiry.
Students were given an appropriate amount of time to think, that is, to prepare
response to questions: Thinking takes time, but often recitation, discussion, and
written assignments pressure students to make responses before they have had
enough time to reflect. Promoting thoughtfulness, therefore, requires periods of
silence where students can ponder the validity of alternative response, develop
more elaborate reasoning and experience patient reflection.
Teacher behaviour
The teacher asked challenging questions and/or structured challenging tasks
(given the ability level and preparation of the students): By our definition higher
order thinking occurs only when students are faced with questions or tasks that
demand analysis, interpretation or manipulation of information; that is, non-
routine mental work. In short, students must be faced with the challenge of how to
use prior knowledge to gain new knowledge rather than the task of merely
retrieving prior knowledge.
The teacher carefully considered explanations and reasons for conclusions: The
resolution of higher order challenges often depends not simply upon offering
explanations and reasons, but upon the quality of explanations or reasoning given
to support conclusions. Rigorous analysis and evaluation of reasoning, therefore,
is central to the promotion of thoughtfulness.
The teacher pressed individual students to justify or to clarify their assertions in a
Socratic manner: Socratic interchanges probe an individual's level of
understanding. Such dialogue presses the student to consider the validity of
evidence and reasoning, to suggest alternative perspectives that may otherwise
escape attention, and to identify rather rigorously what one does and does not
know. These probes usually constitute their own higher order challenges as they
facilitate develop of knowledge on the topic in question.
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The teacher encouraged students to generate original and unconventional ideas,
explanations or solutions to problems: Higher order challenges can require
creative, intuitive insights and alternative perspectives that diverge from
conventional knowledge or from expected lines of reasoning. Promoting this sort
of mental flexibility will help students to cope not only with ill-structured
problems that may explicitly invite creativity, but also with well-structured one's
that may require unconventional thinking.
The teacher showed an awareness that not all assertions emanating from
authoritative sources are absolute or certain: Curiosity and scepticism about the
creation of knowledge and the nature of truth are dispositions of thoughtfulness
that help to sustain higher order thinking. For these dispositions to be promoted,
authoritative sources must not always be accepted uncritically. Instead, students
must be made aware that what may pass as fmal, conclusive knowledge may often
be problematic and subject to future revision and development
Students' personal experience (where relevant) was integrated in the lesson:
Student engagement with and comprehension of a problem can often be enhanced
if inquiry on the problem is related to students' actual life experiences.
The teacher was a model of thoughtfulness: To help students succeed with higher
order challenges, teachers themselves must model thoughtfulness as they teach.
Of course, a thoughtful teacher would demonstrated many of the behaviours
described above, but this dimension is intended to capture a cluster of additional
characteristics likely to be found in any thoughtful person. Key indicators include
showing interest in students' ideas and in alternative approaches to problems;
showing how he/she thought through a problem (rather than only the final
answer); and acknowledging the difficulty of gaining a definitive understanding
of problematic topics.
Student behaviour
Students offered explanations and reasons for the conclusions: The answers of
solutions to higher order challenges are rarely self-evident. Their validity often
rests on the quality of explanation or reasons given to support them. Therefore,
beyond offering answers, students must also be able to produce explanations and
reasons to support their conclusions.
Students generated original and unconventional ideas, explanations, hypothesis
or solutions to problems: this is a counterpart to dimension 8. Higher order
thinking is more evident in classrooms in which teacher not only encourage
original responses from students, but where students supply them.
Students assumed the roles of questioner and critic: As students work toward
answers for higher order challenges, they are more likely to succeed if they have
opportunities to ask questions about and to criticise proposed approaches and
answer. In contrast, if students act primarily as passive recipients of information,
they are not likely to develop the level of understanding needs to carry out useful
analyses and interpretations.
Student contributions were articulate, germane to the topic and connect to prior
discussion: In a formal sense, students may respond actively with assertions,
explanations, questions and creative ideas, but these may be inarticulate or
irrelevant to the topic being examined. Just as dimension 2 requires substantive
coherence and continuity in the lesson as a whole, student participation cannot be
considered thoughtful unless it is reasonably articulate and relevant.
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What proportion of students participated verbally in the lesson? To solve higher
order challenges, students must actively use their minds. This cannot be observed
directly, but one indicator is the extent to which they speak in class about the
subject being examined. That is, the more students who produce discourse on a
topic the greater the likelihood of higher order thinking by the class as a whole.
What proportion of time did students spend engaged in thoughtful discourse with
one another? Because of the importance of dialogue in promoting higher order
thinking, yet acknowledging the logistical difficulty of the teacher responding to
the ideas of each students, it can be useful students to talk with one another to test
and refine their ideas. The amount of thoughtful discourse among students can,
therefore, be seen as one indicator of thoughtful discourse in the class as a whole.
What proportion of students showed genuine involvement in the topics discussed?
To make progress on higher order challenges, students must give their attention,
concentration and mental effort. We summarise these dimensions of involvement
as student engagement. One indicator is observable verbal participation, but it is
also possible to become intensely involved while listening. This dimension
assesses the extent of student engagement based on cues other than the frequency
of spealdng. Principal dimensions, include raising hands, attentiveness manifested
by facial expression and body-language, interruptions in the discussion to raise a
substantive point or question, the length of student responses.
Source: Newmann, Fred M. 1990. Higher order thinking teaching social studies; a
rational for the assessment of classroom thoughtfulness. Journal of Educational Studies,
Vol 22, no 1: 41-56.
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Appendix 11
A suggested approach for the subject
teacher: Newmann (1990)
Newmann's proposal for a subject approach in social studies could very well be adopted
by heads of subject departments conducting curriculum audits, evolving policy, or
teacher-training colleagues.
Newrnann (1990:48) suggests that
To increase knowledge about how to promote higher order thinking, an approach to
research might follow steps such as the following:
1. Identify the main problems or challenges that students should be
competent to address (e.g. explanations of historical trends; developing
positions on social issues; estimating and forecasting with sociological,
economic or geographic data).
2. For each problem, identify the specific body of in-depth knowledge, the
cluster of analytic skills, and the main dispositions need for success in
addressing the problem.
3. Experiment with alternative methods for teaching the specific
knowledge, skills and dispositions relevant to each problem.
4. Codify the results to produce guidelines for curriculum and pedagogy
most likely to assist students in resolving the major cognitive challenges in
social studies.
5. The dimensions should be able to be observed in the teaching of a variety
of subject matter and skills within (the subject).
The dimensions should refer to teacher behaviour, to student behaviour and to
activities involving both teacher and student.
The exploratory scheme should contain many dimensions which, on the basis
of further theoretical and empirical analysis, might later be reduced to a small
number of essential 'scales'.
The dimensions should be conceptualised in ways that might later be used to
help teachers reflect on their practice.
Source: Newmann, Fred M. 1990. Higher order thinking teaching social studies; a
rational for the assessment of classroom thoughtfulness. Journal of Educational Studies,
Vol 22, no 1:48.
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Appendix 12
The Lipman teaching approach to
questioning: Lipman (1980)
Lipman (1980:16) suggests that questions to ask could include:
1. Why? - requests an explanation for the basis of a child's responses
2. If that is so. what follows? - asks pupils to elaborate, extrapolate, draw a
valid inference; hypothetical or causal
3. Aren't you assuming that? - asks for explanation of premises upon
which a statement or argument might be based.
4. How do you know that? - calls for more information, a source of
information or for a student to explain his or her line of reasoning.
5. Is the point you are making that? - requests confirmation of that
teacher's clarification, focusing on the main point of a pupil's response.
6. Can I summarise your point as? - asks for the pupil to confirm the
teacher's restatement or condensation of his or her statement.
7. Is what you mean to say that? - a rephrasing that allows the pupils to
interpret their statements and be certain of their meaning.
8. What is your reason for saying that? - a request for a rationale that offers
criteria for making the certain judgement and a justification for that rationale.
9. Doesn't what you say presuppose that? - the teacher points out
assumptions that might be hidden in a student's argument or point, requiring the
student to explain the validity of his or her assumptions.
10. What do you mean when using this word? - a request for precise
meaning and contextual usage.
11. Is it possible that? - the teacher offers possibilities and points out
possible contradictions and inconsistencies in the pupil's argument.
12. Are there other ways of looking at it? - a call for alternative
perspectives, connections. A check on objectivity and impartiality.
13. How else could we view this matter? - gives students a chance to be
creative. Stress flexibility and open-endedness.
Source: Lipman, Matthew, et al. 1980. Philosophical Enquiry: An Instructional Manual
to Accompany Harry S:ortlemeiers Discovery. 2nd ed. Upper Montclair NJ.: Montclair
State College & Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.
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Appendix 13
Six characteristics of constructivism: Driver (1988)
Driver (1988:138) offers these defining characteristics of constructivism:
1. Learners are not viewed as passive but are seen as purposive and ultimately
responsible for their own learning. They bring their own prior conceptions to
learning situations.
2. Learning is considered to involve an active process on the part of the
learning. It involves the construction of meaning and often takes place through
inter-personal negotiation.
3. Knowledge is not 'out there' but is personally and social constructed, its
status is problematic. It may be evaluated by the individual in terms of the
extent to which it 'fits' with their experience and is coherent with other aspects
of their knowledge.
4. Teachers also bring their prior conceptions to learning situations not only in
terms of their subject knowledge but also their views of teaching and learning.
These can influence their way of inter-acting in classrooms.
5. Teaching is not the transmission of knowledge but involves the organisation
of the situations in the classroom and the design of tasks in a way which
promote scientific learning.
6. The curriculum is not that which is to be learned, but a programme of
learning tasks, materials and resources from which students construct their
knowledge.
Source: Driver, R. 1988. Theory into Practice 11: A Constructivist Approach to
Curriculum Development. In Development and Dilemmas in Science Education, ed.
Peter J. Fensham: 12 1-133. London: Falmer Press.
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Appendix 14
Assessment Domains: The Cambridge History
Project (1992)
Domain 1: Historical Enquiry (Concept Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Demonstrates understanding that statements of historical fact should be tested
for consistence with the totality of available and relevant evidence.
Demonstrates understanding statements of historical fact rely upon
interpretations of evidence that should be congruent with what is known about
time and place, and about prior and subsequent events.
Demonstrates understanding that statements of historical fact are of many kinds
(about beliefs and about deeds, about single events and about general states of
affairs), and that the status and nature of these different claims to knowledge
may vary.
Domain 2: Using Sources as Evidence (Skill Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Can evaluate a given hypothesis by reference to reliable and relevant evidence
taken and inferred from a range of sources.
Can adjudicate between contradictory hypotheses by reference to reliable and
relevant evidence taken and inferred from a range of sources.
Can use sources as evidence in order to generate and arbitrate amongst
contradictory and/or contrary hypotheses.
Domain 3: Cause and Motive (Concept Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Demonstrates understanding that the phenomena historians seek to explain may
be variously characterised with reference to past events, to the actions of
predecessors and to past ideas and systems of belief.
Demonstrates understanding of the nature and status of three modes of
explanation - empathetic, intentional and causal - used to make sense of the
past.
Can use sources of evidence in order to generate and arbitrate amongst
contradictory and I or contrary hypotheses.
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Domain 4: Oftering Explanations (Skills Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Can propose and evaluate explanations by establishing connections obtaining
within or between patterns of ideas, actions and events.
Can propose and evaluate explanations of ideas, actions and events by
comparing them with similar phenomena or sequences of events.
Can propose and evaluate explanations of ideas, actions and events by
considering the 'actual' in relation to the 'possible'.
Domain 5: Change and Development (Concept Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Demonstrates understanding of the ways in which significance may be
attributed to even as trends and turning points, 'dead-ends' and 'false dawns'
within a line of development through time.
Demonstrates understanding that lines of development are theories about as
well as representations of the past, and thaI difference and competing lines of
development may be advanced in order to describe and make sense of any part
of it.
Demonstrates understanding of the reasons why and the ways in which
different and competing lines development may co-exist and be integrated
within a single historical account.
Domain 6: Constructing Accounts (Skill Domain)
Levels and Descriptors:
Can select and organise material so as to construct developmental narratives.
Can select, organise and interpret material so as to construct alternative
developmental narratives.
Can select, organise and interpret material so as to construct coherent narratives
that make reference to concurrent sequences of events and different lines of
development.
Source: Cambridge History Project. 1992. Pilot Scheme Syllabus. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Cited in MitchelL 1 992a. The Teaching and Learning of
Argument in Sixth Forms and Higher Education; Interim Report. Hull: University of
Hull.
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Appendix 15
Six defining characteristics of the discourse
community: Swales (1990)
1. A broadly agreed set of common public goals.
2. Mechanisms of intercommunication among its members.
3. Uses its participatory mechanism primarily to provide information and
feedback.
4. Utilises and hence possesses one or more genres in the communicative
furtherance of its aims.
5. In additional to owning genres, has acquired some specific lexis.
6. Has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content
and discoursal expertise.
Source: Swales, John. 1990. Genre Analysis: English in academic and research
settings: 24-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix 16
Five theses concerning narrative: Fox (1989)
1. Experience
Many of the stories these children have heard have become important
metaphors for their inner affective lives and for their outer social experiences.
2. Affect
The personal power of those metaphors is what has embedded the language and
rhetoric of story-telling so firmly in the children's competencies.
3. Culture
Having heard stories read aloud from an early age the children have
internalised highly literature and literary ways of telling.
4. Language
By practising maldng story metaphors for themselves the children re-invent the
rhetoric and language of story, generating verbal form they would normally
have no opportunity to bring forth.
S. Cognition
The rhetoric of narrating includes all the devices at the levels of word,
sentence, and story, which the children will need later on to conduct a reasoned
argument.
Source: Fox Carol. 1989a. Divine Dialogues: the role of argumenl in the narrative
discourse of a five-year-old storyteller. In Narrative and Argumera, ed. Richard
Andrews: 33-42. Milton Keynes & Philadelphia: Open University Press.
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Appendix 17.
Content analysis of the Schools Curriculum and
Assessment Authority Draft Proposals for the Review
of the National Curriculum : Thornbury (1995)
Content analysis by Thornbury (1995b) identified the pre-philosophical thinking
required by the National Curriculum, as reflected in its evidence criteria for assessment
purposes.
The analysis classified references to criteria of assessment in thinking, argument, or
philosophical topics in the eight subject areas, into four alphabetically-listed, syntactical
categories.
Nouns and noun phrases, gerunds:
ability to follow (the thread of) an argument, adequacy of evidence, anomalies, applying principles, argument,
autobiography, awe, bias, conditional probabilities, consideration (of ideas) (balance of feeling and thinking)
(feelings and emotions as valid responses), conjectures, controversy, cosmogony, criteria, cross-references
(making of), debate, description, desire (to search for the meaning of life) development of thinking, economy
with elegance; ethical dilemmas, empathy, explanation, exploration (and hypothesis), fact, feelings of
iranscendence, generating (ideas), innermost thoughts, interpretation, identifying (implications), judging,
meaning of life, meanings beyond the literal, mutually exclusive events, mystery, objectivity, opinion,
organising and expressing ideas (distinctive ways of), personal interest in metaphysical questions, persuasions,
predictions (and fair tests), provisionality of explanation, recognising (inconsistencies), reasons, reasoned
conclusions, reliability, reviewing, register, synthesise (others' ideas), wonder.
Verbs or verb phrases:
agree to differ, analyse (argument and opinion), check (for repetitions, vagueness, errors, omissions,
repetitions), cite evidence, clarify, develop (initial ideas), consider (an argument critically), distinguish
(between fact and opinion) (indicators of speaker's intentions), draft, evaluate, extend thinking, initiate and
sustain (conversations), justify, negotiate (consensus), plan, predict (outcomes, consequences of decisions,
consequences and implications), (pose) pertinent questions, proof-read, recognise inconsistencies, remove
ambiguity and vagueness (of texts), represent (information in different forms), structure, summarise (main
points), support opinions (by reference to text), sustain (and develop interpretations of texts), synthesise, think
and feel, identify (e.g. meanings beyond the literal), investigate, use range of discourse (markers), write
extensively for aesthetic and imaginative purposes.
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Adverbs:
assessing critically, (thinking) coherently, (examining) critically, making appropriate connections, modifying
ideas, persuasively, responding cogently (to a range of texts).
Adjectives:
apt and careful comparison (between texts), aesthetic and imaginative purposes (in writing); argumentative
(writing); (be) imaginative and creative, discursive (writing), elegant proof, intuitive probability, ethical
dilemma, persuasive (writing).
Source: Thornbury, Robert. 1995b. A Content analysis of the Schools Curriculum and
Assessment Authority Draft Proposals for the Review of the National Curriculum. Paper
given to the Conference of Teachers of A Level Philosophy, at Institute of Education,
University of London, November 12th 1995.
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Appendix 18
Measuring and Recording Critical Thinking Skills and
Sub-skills & Critical Thinking Dispositions: Facione
and Facione(1 992)
Critical Thinking: Cognitive skills and sub-skills
Interpretation:
Analysis:
Evaluation:
categorisation
decoding sentences
clarifying meaning
examining ideas
identifying arguments
analysing arguments
assessing claims
assessing arguments
Inference:	 querying evidence
conjecturing alternatives
drawing conclusions
Explanation:	 stating results
justifying procedures
presenting arguments
Self-regulation:	 self examination
self conection
Critical Thinking Dispositions
Truth seeking: a courageous desire for the best knowledge, even if such
knowledge fails to support or undermines one's preconceptions, beliefs or self
interests.
Open-mindedness: Tolerance to divergent views, self-monitoring for possible
bias.
Analyticity: Demanding the application of reason and evidence, alert to
problematic situations, inclined to anticipate consequences.
374
Systematicity: Valuing organisation, focus and diligence to approach
problems of all levels of complexity.
Self-confidence: Trusting of one's own reasoning skills and seeing oneself as a
good thinker
Inquisitiveness: Curious and eager to acquire knowledge and learn
explanations even when the applications of the knowledge are not immediately
apparent.
Maturity: Prudence in making, suspending, or revising judgement. An
awareness that multiple solutions can be acceptable. An appreciation of the
need to reach closure even in the absence of complete knowledge.
Source: Facione and Facione (1990): Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert
Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction: The Delphi Report
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Appendix 19
Holistic Critical Thinking Scoring Rubric:
Facione and Facione (1994).
Rate 4. Consistently does all of almost all of the following:
Accurately interprets evidence, statements, graphics, questions etc.
Identifies the salient arguments (reasons and claims) pro and con
Thoughtfully analyses and evaluates major alternative points of view
Draws warranted, judicious, non-fallacious conclusions
Justifies key results and procedures, explains assumptions and reasons
Rate 3. Does most or many of the following:
Accurately interprets evidence, statements, graphics, questions, etc.
Identifies relevant arguments (reasons and claims) pro and con
Offers analyses and evaluations of obvious alternative points of view
Draws warranted, non-fallacious conclusions
Justifies some results or procedures, explains reasons
Fair-mindedly follows where evidence and reasons lead
Rate 2. Does most or many of the following:
Misinterprets evidence, statements, graphics, questions etc.
Fails to identify strong, relevant counter-arguments
Ignores or superficially evaluates obvious alternative points of view
Draws unwarranted or fallacious conclusions
Justifies few results or procedures, seldom explains reasons
Regardless of the evidence or reasons, maintains or defends views based on self
interest or pre-conceptions
Rate 1. Consistently does all or almost all of the following:
Offers biased interpretations of evidence, statements, graphics, questions,
information or the point of view of others
Fails to identify or hastily dismisses strong, relevant counter-arguments
Ignores or superficially evaluates obvious alternative points of view
Argues using fallacious or irrelevant reasons, and unwarranted claims
Does not justify results or procedures, or explain reasons
Regardless of the evidence or reasons, maintains or defends views based on
self-interest or pre-conceptions
Exhibits close-mindedness or hostility to reason
Source Facione N.C. and PA Facione P.A. 1992. The California Critical Thinking
Dispositions Inventory:
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Appendix 20 (i)
Teachers' views about creativity:
Fryer and Collings (1991)
Factors mentioned in describing creativity in students
(1028 teachers and lecturers m England and Wales interviewed)
% of teachers mentioning particular factors:
Imagination	 88
Original ideas	 80
Self expression	 73
Discoveiy	 65
Seeing connections	 65
Invention	 61
Innovation	 59
Divergent thinking	 53
Thinking processes	 51
Awareness of beauty	 49
Combining ideas	 49
Inspiration	 46
Aesthetic products	 33
Valuable ideas	 32
Unconscious activities	 18
Convergent thinking	 10
Mysterious processes	 9
Tangible products	 9
Other aspects	 5
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Appendix 20 (ii)
Teachers' preferred criteria for assessing
the creative content of pupil's work
criteria
Imaginative
Original for the pupil
Showing initiative
Pleasing to the pupil
Expressing depth of feeling
Expressing an independent viewpoint
Demonstrating depth of thinking
Demonstrating idea progression
Qualitatively better than own previous work
Reflecting child's experiences
Using appropriate skills
Element of surprise
Using appropriate media
Unique
Pleasing to the teacher
Qualitatively better than would be expected for a child of that age
Pleasing to classmates
Attractive
Appropriate
Qualitatively better than peer performance
Useful
Complex
Accurate
Elegant
Other
Source: Fryer, Marilyn, and John A. Collings. 1991. Teachers' Views about creativity.
British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol 61: 207-219.
%
87
84
79
74
70
66
64
63
63
47
44
42
38
37
34
34
29
26
23
23
13
8
6
5
1
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Appendix 21
Hierarchically ordered objectives for teaching and
assessing empathetic construction: Shemilt (1984)
Objective 1
Differentiation of historical explanation and description
Objective 2
Explanation of behaviour and belief 'from the outside',
in terms of stereotypes or general factors
Objective 3 a. & b.
Assumption of a shared humanity
with predecessors
Objective 4 a. & b.
Explanation of behaviour and
belief 'from the inside' by means
everyday empathy - universal
or twentieth century empathising
Objective 5 a. & b.
Empathetic construction of
situation - people had different
ideas from us because their
situation differed from ours
Objective 6 a. & b.
Action explained in terms of
motive
Motives analysed in terms of
possibilities for action
Analysis of intentional action in
terms of the information available,
character, aspiration and
experience
Empathetic construction of
perspective - genuine historical
empathy
Analysis of intentional action
within period - standards and
assumptions of the time
Ideas and values, norms and mores of predecessors
likely to differ from those of contemporaries
Actions and beliefs of predecessors
are rational within their frame of reference
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Objective 7
Beliefs of predecessors consonant with their
social organisation and means of production
Objective 8
Contemporary Lebensform are genetically related to those of the past
Objective 9
Past Lebensform were structurally coherent. Ability
to recreate a sense of period in the round.
Source: Shemilt, D. 1984. Beauty and the Philosopher: Empathy in History and Class;
in Learning History, ed. A. K. Dickinson: 80. London: Heinemann
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Appendix 22
Issues arising within a whole school or college:
The Sir Rene Descartes Comprehensive School
Case Study: Thornbury (1994)
The curriculum and human resource management problem.
You are standing in for the management and 'whole curriculum planning' consultant to a
new school or college. It opens next year (January 1995). The consultant has returned
late from holiday - and cannot be contacted.
Most of the key staff have been appointed and the head of institution is already in post.
The senior management team, and most of the staff of the new school or college have
been appointed. They met recently for a day's planning and development work on 'The
Learning Institution'.
The governing body have had a presentation on the subject from a Critical Thinking
specialist (the same one as you had). Some of them are very keen on the contribution
that CT can make to learning in the work-place. They have gained funding support
from local industry which the main governing body have accepted. Half of this funding
is to be used to pay for one dept to act as the development base for CT work, with one
of its members seconded half-time.
Your TASK as the consultant.
The Governors want the Senior Management team to have in place from Day 1 a whole
institutional policy which incorporates the best of what is proposed.
You have been asked, at very short notice, to give the best advice you can on the limited
evidence available.
You have to write a paragraph which indicates that the institution has decided on a
single particular curriculum and management strate gy in some detail for CT innovation
- although you can reserve your right to change in response to circumstances.
The grant will automatically be available provided you meet the written criteria - and
the application is due in tomorrow afternoon. (The governors and staff have agreed to
go along with whatever you recommend).
Consider the main proposals and rank them in order of priority for implementation (in
your view). It seems that each of the Departments is prepared to nominate a strong
individual candidate to act as Project Co-ordinator, working to a senior management
and departmental steering group.
You have a number of papers from heads or department or staff responsible for
particular areas of work in front of you.
QUESTIONS you should address are:
Which department(s) should provide leadership?
What is the best human resource strategy?
What is the best curriculum planning strategy?
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What is the best institutional improvement strategy?
What is the most appropriate accountability strategy?
The EVIDENCE you should base your Judgement arises in the following
proposals:
1. The Special Needs Department considers that leadership in a CT policy for
the whole institution should be led by them. 'This is the equivalent of our
curriculum. We should lead, resource and set the teaching approaches.'
2. The ESOL Department considers that, since so much of their work overlaps
in this area that they should lead on policy and provision. But they wish to join
with the English Department.
3. The English Department have done some work in this area and point to the
University of Hull Project, in which staff participated, which concluded "the
curriculum leaders for any work on argument are of course the teachers of
English".
4. The Pastoral. Social and Health Ed Department point out that they have the
equivalent of one hour a week in which they already lead on study skills- and
CT is to some extent already included. 'We would expand our approach taking
on board the broader notion of thinking.'
5. The Science Department have been involved in the CASE (Cognitive
Acceleration in Science Education Programme) which provides extra teaching
in thinking as a foundation for later success in all subjects. 'Time spent on
thinking training in extra science periods can be coupled with de Bono and
Feuerstein's approaches in later years. Science should lead all this because it
understands what is involved.'
6. A group of enthusiasts on the staff want to regard CF as the pre-
philosophical curriculum and offer a special programme which some, or all,
students might take. The only teacher with experience in teaching A level
philosophy is proposed as the 'only person combining sufficient subject
expertise and strong personal leadership qualities' - and therefore the best
person to lead.
7. The Humanities Department support the cross-disciplinary group of staff
who see CT as the pre-philosophical curriculum and point out that the person
with philosophy expertise is a member of their department. Humanities would
build up the CT approach as the foundation for citizenship in a democracy.
They are very keen on 'flexible teaching and learning' and would set up a
schools council linked with the project. They would link the approach with
economic awareness work, linking with local firms.
8. The Computing Studies Department, jointly with the Library, points out that
any scheme should ideally be 'communication and informatic sciences' led.
They would be prepared to do this, working on a Flexible Teaching and
Learning Centre in conjunction with the library staff.
Source: (Thornbury 1994). Prepared for Summer School of the Open University
Management Education MA. and delivered at Royal Holloway College, August 14th
and 21st 1994.
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Appendix 23
Some Theoretical Concepts in
Research on Teacher Training: Pope (1993)
TEACHERS' UNDERSTANDINGS	 Bussis, Chittenden and Amarel, 1976
TEACHER CONSTRUCTS	 Olson, 1980
DECISION STRATEGIES
METAPHORS/BELIEFS
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
TEACHERS' VOICE
PERSONAL INTENTIONS
TEACHERS' COGNITION
TEACHERS' CONCEPTIONS
Borko and Caidwell, 1982
Munby, 1982
Elbaz, 1983
Butt, 1984
Day, 1984
Huber and Mandi, 1984
Larsson, 1984
INTUITIVE THEORIES 	 Pope and Denicolo, 1984
PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS	 Pope and Scott, 1984
KNOTS/IMPERATIVE COGNITION S Wagner, 1984
TEACHERS' COGNITIVE ACTIViTIES Bromine and Brophy, 1985
IMAGE	 Clandinin, 1985
PERSONAL PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE Connelly and Clandinin, 1985
TEACHERS' PERSPECTIVES	 Tabachnik and Zeichner, 1985
EXPERT PEDAGOGUE	 Berliner, 1986
PROFESSIONAL CRAFT KNOWLEDGE Brown and Maclntyre, 1986
SCRIPTS/SC}{EMA	 Clark and Peterson, 1986
SUBJECTIVE THEORIES
	
Krause, 1986
DILEMMAS	 Lampert, 1986
ROUTINES
	 Leinhardt and Greeno, 1986
PLANS
	 Clark and Yinger, 1987
Source: Pope, Maureen. 1993. Anticipating Teacher Thinking. In Research on Teacher
Thinking, Understanding Professional Development, ed. C. Day et aL: 19-34.
London: Falmer Press.
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Appendix 24
Key questions for a staff to ask themselves in
planning a philosophy
curriculum (Thornbury
1. Where do we stand individually and collectively, as a staff, on the 'strong
version' of claims for teaching philosophy and a pre-philosophical curriculum?
2. What are our existing philosophical assumptions in relation to the curriculum,
pedagogy and management of our institution?
3. What implications arise for us if we accept the transcendental claim that
philosophy pervades all curricular, pedagogic and organisational arrangements?
4. What importance do we attach to each of the other curriculum aims which have
been put forward, e.g. possibilism, cognitive or the engendering of dispositions?
5. How, if we think we should, can we begin to build a whole school approach to
philosophy teaching which relates to school organisation, pedagogy and curriculum?
6. What priorities emerge in relation to our individual and collective response to
these various claims and purposes that have been put forward in relation to a
philosophy and pre-philosophical curriculum?
7. How do we respond to particular statutory or externally mounted claims such
as arise from the National Curriculum, the QCA, OFSTED, the TEA, examination
boards and a wide range of local interest groups, including minorities?
8. What equity and rights, equal opportunities, gender and special educational
needs issues do we need to address?
9. What rights and responsibilities do the various partners, students, teachers,
parents and governors, have in the enterprise of a whole school policy for philosophy,
higher order thinking and a pre-philosophical curriculum?
10. How shall we communicate and consult over our policy on philosophy and the
pre-philosophical curriculum?
and pre-philosophical
1995)
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11. How shall we work together in developing the pre-philosophical curriculum in
a way which is consistent with the position we have taken up ideologically?
12. Can we therefore agree on a common framework, or canon, in our approach?
13. Shall we proceed collegially as a community of enquiry (including the
students) or in some other way in implementing our approach?
14. Who should assume leadership, institutionally and in particular areas of
curriculum application?
15. What is to be our approach to each of the separate strands in curriculum
development in this area, i.e. in the teaching of philosophy, critical, creative, and
higher order thinking, values education in virtues and dispositions, problem-solving,
thinking skills and study skills?
16. What is to be our approach to pedagogy in each of the content and specialist
subject areas, and more generally?
17. Should philosophy be separately taught for part of the school period, or for all
of it and should there be a cross-curricular form of provision?
18. How shall we know when we have taught philosophy and the pre-philosophical
curriculum successfully?
19. How should we conduct assessment - what is to be our assessment policy?
20. How do we review our progress as a school in relation to the implementation of
a whole school policy?
21. What are the implication for teachers' own professional and personal
development, thinking and philosophical education?
22. What is our existing range of resources and strategies for undertaking these
tasks?
23. What additional resources do we need?
Source: Thornbury (1995).
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Appendix 25
Professional Values in the ASSET Programme:
Core Assessment Criteria: (Winter 1992)
Criterion No. 1: 'Commitment to Professional Values'.
Demonstrates self-awareness and commitment in implementing professional values
in practice. This involves demonstrating:
1.ability to understand and to implement anti-discriminatory, anti-oppressive
and anti-racist principles;
2. awareness of the need to counteract one's own tendency (both as a person
and as a professional worker endowed with specific powers ) to behave
oppressively;
3. respect for clients' dignity, privacy, autonomy, and rights as service users;
4. ability to manage complex ethical relationships and value conflicts;
5. ability to empower others.
Source: Winter, Richard. 1992. 'Quality Management' or 'The Educative Work-Place':
Alternative Versions of Work-Based Education. Journal of Further and Higher
Education, Vol 16, no 3, Autumn: 109-110.
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Appendix 26
Genre and accessibility relations. (Ryan 1991)
A B C D E F G H
Accurate	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
non-fiction	 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
True fiction	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
Realistic and	 +	 -	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
historical fiction ____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ ____ _____
Historical	 -	 -	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +	 +
fabulation _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
Realistic fiction in - 	 -	 -	 +	 +	 ^	 +	 +	 +
'no-man's land'	 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
Anticipation	 +	 -	 +	 -	 +	 +	 +	 +	 ^
Science fiction	 +/* -	 +1-	 -	 +	 F+ +	 +	 +
_____________ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
F'- ____ ____ ____
Fairytale	 *	 -	 -	 +	 -	 -	 +	 +	 +
Legend	 -	 -	 +	 +	 -	 -	 +	 +	 +
Fantastic realism +1* -	 +/-	 +	 -	 +	 +	 +	 +
Nonsense rhymes	 -	 -1+	 &	 -	 -1+	 -	 +1-	 +
Jabberwockism	 *	 -	 -	 &	 -	 -	 ?	 +	 -$
Sound poetry	 *	 --	 -	 &	 —	 —	 —	 -	 -
*: non-applicable because of a - on C
&: non applicable because of a- or? on G
-$: incompatibility restricted to most nouns and verbs
A = identity of properties; B = identity of inventory; C = compatibility of inventory; D=
chronological compatibility; E= physical compatibility; F= taxonomic compatibility; F' =
taxonomic compatibility for both natural species and manufactured objects); G=logical
compatibility; H=analytical compatibility; 1= linguistic compatibility.
Source: Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1991. Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and
Narrative Theory: 34. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
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Appendix 27
A typology of mimetic discourse. (Ryan 1991)
TAW=AW	 AW=TRW	 TAW=TRW AS=IS
Non fictional	 +	 +	 +	 +
accurate
discourse
Errors	
-	 +	 -	 -
Lies	
-	 +	 -	 -
Accidentally	 +	 +	 +	 -
true lies
Standard	 -	
-	 +	 -fiction
Truefiction	 +	 -	 +	 -
Unreliable	 -	 -	 -	 -
narration in
fiction
Key.
AW= Actual World
TAW= Textual Actual World
TRW= Textual Reference World
Source: Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1991. Possible Worlds, ArrfIcial Intelligence and
Narrative Theory: 28. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
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Appendix 28
Relevant types of accessibility relations from
AW (Actual World) involved in the construction
of a lAW (Textual Actual World). (Ryan 1991)
(A) Identity of properties
(abbreviated A properties): TAW is accessible from AW if the objects common to
TAW and AW have the same properties
(B) Identity of inventory
(B/same inventory): TAW is accessible from AW if TAW and AW are furnished by
the same objects
(C) Compatibility of inventory
(C/expanded inventory): TAW is accessible from AW if TAW's inventory includes all
the members of AW, as well as some native members
(D) Chronological compatibility
(D/chronology) TAW is accessible from AW if it takes no temporal relocation for a
member of AW to contemplate the entire history of TAW. This condition means that
TAW is not older than AW, i.e., that its present is not posterior in absolute time to
AW's present. We can contemplate facts of the past from the viewpoint of the present,
but since the future holds no facts, only projections, it takes a relocation beyond the
time of their occurrence to regard as facts events located in the future
(E) Physical compatibility
(B/natural laws): TAW is accessible from AW if they share natural laws.
(F) Taxonomic compatibility
(F/taxonomy): AW is accessible from AW if both worlds contain the same species, and
the species are characterised by the same properties. Within F, it may be useful to
distinguish a narrower version F' stipulating the TAW must contain not only the same
inventory of natural species, but also the same types of manufactured objects as found
in AW up to the present
(G) Logical compatibility
(G/logic): TAW is accessible from AW if both worlds respect the principles of non-
contradiction and of excluded middle
(H) Analytical compatibility
(H/analytical): TAW is accessible from AW if the language if they share analytical
truths, i.e., if objects designated by the same words have the same essential properties
(I) Linguistic compatibility
(I/linguistic): TAW is accessible from AW if the language in which TAW is described
can be understood in AW
Source: Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1991. Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence and
Narrative Theory: 32-33. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
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Appendix 29
Encompassing definitions for the range of
thinking processes relevant to different
domains or disciplines. (Donald 1992)
DESCRIFFION	 Delineation or definition of a situation or a form
of a thing
identify context	 Establish surrounding environment to give a
total picture
list conditions	 List essential parts, prerequisites or
requirements
list facts	 List known information, events that have
occurred
list functions	 List normal or proper activity of a thing or
specific duties
state assumptions	 State suppositions, postulates or propositions
assumed
state goal	 State the ends, aims, objectives
SELECTION	 Choice in preference to another or others
choose relevant	 Select information that is pertinent to the issue
information	 in question
order information in 	 Rank, arrange in importance or according to its
importance	 significance
identify critical elements	 Determine units, parts, components which are
important
identify critical relations	 Determine connections between things that are
_________________ important
REPRESENTATION	 Depiction or portrayal through enactive, iconic
or symbolic means
recognise organising	 Identify laws, methods which arrange in
principles	 systematic whole
organise elements and	 Arrange parts, connections into systematic
relations	 whole
illustrate elements and	 Make clear by examples the connections
relations	 between things
modify elements and	 Change, qualify the parts, connections between
relations	 things
390
iNFERENCE	 Act or process of drawing conclusions from
premises or evidence
discover relations 	 Detect or expose connections between parts,
between elements 	 components
discover relations 	 Detect or expose connections between
between relations	 connections of things
discover equivalences	 Detect or expose equality in value, force or
significance
categorise	 Classify, arrange into parts
order	 Rank, sequence, arrange methodically
change perspective	 Alter view, vista, interrelations, significance of
facts or information
hypothesise	 Suppose or form a proposition as a basis for
_______________________________ reasoning
SYNTHESIS	 Composition of parts or elements into a complex
whole
combine parts to form a 	 Join, associate elements, components into a
whole	 system or pattern
elaborate	 Work out, complete with great detail, exactness
or complexity
generate missing links 	 Produce or create what is lacking in a sequence;
fill the gap
develop course of action 	 Work out or expand the path, route or direction
__________________________ to be taken
VERIFICATION	 Confirmation of accuracy, coherence,
consistency, con-espondence
compare alternative	 Examine similarities or differences of results,
outcomes	 consequences
compare outcome to	 Examine similarities or differences of results to
standard	 a criterion
judge validity	 Critically examine the soundness, effectiveness
by actual fact
use feed-back	 Employ results to regulate adjust, adapt
confirm results	 Establish or ratify conclusions, effects,
outcomes or products
Source: Janet Gail Donald. 1992. The development of thinking processes in post
secondary education: application of a working model. Higher Education, Vol
24: 413-430.
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Appendix 30
Interview on Conditionals, Counter-Factuals and
Possible Worlds with Professor Dorothy Edgington,
of University College, Oxford
The interview took place at Birkbeck College, on January 31st 1997.
Professor Edgingron had previous notice of the range of questions, together
with a short briefing paper on the areas of interest to be raised.
Q. Professor Edgington, what is the present position concerning the standing of
counter-factual theory and possible worlds within the philosophical profession?
A. The chief thing to say is that it has made us aware of the importance of possibility.
Q. How do you see the pattern of activity in this area as a tradition?
A. It began of course with Leibnitz. Wittgenstein who raised the idea of possible
worlds in the Tractatus. Kripke at what must have been a very young age used it to
word out a logic of language. X who died a tragic and violent death at Berkeley did
more interesting work. The dual initiative by Stalnaker and Lewis in the 1970's
onwards carried the whole area forward.
Q. What is the place of conditionals, counterfactual theory and possible worlds now in
philosophy teaching?
A. We use it all the time in undergraduate and other teaching, when we say 'Imagine a
possible world in which...' Only David Lewis maintains the position that all possible
worlds exist. His work is a source of great interest, but he does not have a school of
followers. Noone actually takes Lewis' position up, although it is given serious
attention. He says 'if only you could go along with me, it makes the answers to so
many other problems easier to work on.' Textbooks such as that of Swartz are helpful
at the simpler end of teaching.
The chief point about possible worlds, and conditionals, is their heuristic contribution.
I am currently having to teach Descartes again, and I am struck how in effect he
begins by creating a possible world in which nothing can be securely known - before
starting on his actual position. It is a devastatingly good, mind-clearing teaching
device.
Q. Would you agree therefore that 'possible worlds' can provide a useful underpinning,
philosophical pedagogy for the teaching of philosophy?
A. Very much so. Particularly as a heuristic.
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Q. What is your view of Hawthorn's attempt to apply possible worlds to the discipline
of historical study and scholarship, using rigorous criteria derived from Stalnaker and
Lewis?
A. I know of the book and it sounds an interesting exercise.
Q. Can I raise with you what appears to be a difficulty, affecting aesthetics? It has
been suggested that Occam's razor has to be applied - to avoid possible worlds
multiplying out of control, there being so many possible. However, elegant proofs in
mathematics may be less economical than other one's, for example - Occam's razor
would seem at first sight to rule out elegance of formulation. This would be a problem
for educationists in that, for example, formal elegance is a criterion of assessment for
children's mathematical conjecture within the National Curriculum.
A. I am glad to hear that it is. Lewis' notion of closeness would, I think,
accommodate the difficulty you have, concerning the appropriateness of particular
possible worlds to problems which have been raised and conjectured about.
Q. In relation to making us aware of possibility why is it, do you think, that the
Wittgenstein example is so strange, given that the philosopher was also a
mathematician, architect and engineer, who had designed houses, and even locks and
thought about these other disciplines?
A. It may be that his illness and tiredness played a part. Certainly in 1950 it was a
surprising example to offer of something not expected to happen.
Q. What do you think determines what happens when these cross-disciplinary, or
cross-domain, or even cross intelligence links are made; and do you agree that, as
some claim, one cannot teach this type of thinking directly? Furthermore, do you have
any idea about how one comes to decide, as in the case of Fogel and the American
Railways, which obvious truth to challenge counter-intuitively?
A. I think it is a matter of many things occurring to one, many of which one rejects
and some of which one goes on to consider further. However, at base I think it is a
question of judgement.
Q. Some continental philosophy, that of Heidegger concerning possibility, Sartre
concerning facticity and becoming, emphasise attention to counter-factual or possible
worlds - what place have they in your view of the subject?
A. We have people in the department who take an interest in this questions, and teach
those areas, but in the technical philosophy I do, we do not cover that area. That is not
necessarily a rejection of that approach, though.
Q. Do you have a view on the increased interest in, and the work on counter-factual
thinking which has been undertaken by psychologists in the last decade?
A. Yes, I am familiar with some of this work and think that it has been of interest to
philosophers.
Q. Has any philosophical work been done on those questions of modal logic and
'possible worlds' which theories of multiple intelligence, cross domain thinking, or
synaesthesia seem to raise?
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A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Are there any particular developments, publications or pieces of writing on the
area?
A. My own article in Mind (1995) surveys the state of the field and contains sources.
It is quite a large article, some one hundred pages, and therefore covers many of the
points which you have raised.
Q. Your own position, that counter-factuals do not need truth-conditions, seems to
suggest that probability takes an increased importance?
A. Yes, I agree. That is an important implication of the position I take. I think that is
the way we approach counter-factuals in ordinary life as well. Accessibility relations
are perhaps the second area I would stress.
Q. Philosophers have taken some interest in metaphor. Ryan in her book Possible
Worlds, ArtWcial Intelligence and Narrative Theory attempts to follow Jeffrey and
others in making literary categories based on 'possible worlds' theory? Do you have a
view on any of these developments?
A. It is not an area I have followed. Ryan's book sounds a surprising mix of
approaches.
Q. Have links been made between 'possible worlds' and the considerable interest in
metaphor, as a topic for philosophical discussion, in recent years?
A. No. This has not been an area which has aroused discussion in relation to
conditionals or possible worlds.
Robert Thombury: Thank you very much. Professor Edgington. for the time you have
given me.
Source: (Thornbury 1997) unpublished.
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Appendix 31
An Example of a Graduate Programme
Program in Critical and Creative Thinking: (University
of Massachusetts at Boston 1994)
The graduate Programme Program in Critical and Creative Thinking (CCT) is a
unique and innovate interdisciplinary program which blends philosophy,
psychology and education with other academic disciplines. It offers a master of
arts degree, a graduate certificate, and a number of non-degree courses, course
sequences, and workshops. The CCT program provides students with an
understanding of the processes of critical thinking and creativity, and with ways
of helping others develop these basis thinking skills in a variety of formal and
informal educational settings.
Master of Arts in Critical and Creative Thinking
Students must complete thirty graduate credits for the Master's Degree, including six
required core courses, three electives in a specialty content area, and a thesis. Specialty
content areas encourage students to become expert at applying critical and creative
thinking skills with a particular focus. The program provides three such areas:
1.Moral issues and Moral Education
2. Criticism and Creativity in Literature and the Arts
3. Critical and Creative Thinking in Mathematics, Science, and Technology
Students may also develop individual specialty areas. They may involve such fields as
business, developmental psychology, instructional design, language development,
dispute resolution and negotiation, and special education.
All Master's candidates complete a thesis under the guidance of an advisor and two
committee members. The thesis provides an opportunity for the student to integrate the
knowledge and skills gained in various components of the programme into a significant
original contribution. These may involve an implementation projects oriented towards
the development of thinking skills, an empirical study, a critique of materials or of a
programme, or a theoretical development of some major issue.
The Courses
The core courses, each carrying 3 graduate credits, are:
1. CRITICAL ThINKING
2. CREATIVE THINKING
3. FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ThOUGHT
4. ADVANCED COGNVE PSYCHOLOGY
5. PRACTICUM: EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTION
6. SEMINAR: ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION
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Electives, each carrying 3 graduate credits, are:
1. HOLISTIC AND INTERACTIVE TEACHING
2. THE DIALOGUE PROCESS
3. MORAL EDUCATION
4. ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES IN ANTIRACIST EDUCATION
5. CRITICISM AND CREATIVITY IN LITERATURE AND THE ARTS
6. CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
7. MATHEMATICS ThINKING SKILLS
8. CHILDREN AND SCIENCE
9. METACOGNITION
10. THINKING, LEARNING AND COMPUTERS
Seminars, each carrying 3 graduate credits, are:
1. SEMINAR IN CRITICAL THINKING
2. SEMINAR IN CREATIVITY
3. SEMINAR IN MORAL EDUCATION
4. SEMINAR IN CRITICISM AND CREATIVITY IN ART
5. SEMINAR ON ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION
Other courses are:
1. INDEPENDENT STUDY
2. SPECIAL TOPICS IN CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING
3. THESIS
Source: Graduate Programme Program in Critical and Creative Thinking Fact Sheet.
(University of Massachusetts at Boston, 1994)
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Appendix 32
The three features literary, narrative
and fiction: (Ryan 1991)
1. LITERARY NARRATWE FICTION 	 + + +.
examples: novels, short stories, drama, epic poetry
& in the 'low domain' jokes, romances, thrillers
2. LITERARY NARRATIVE NON FICTION	 + + -
examples: works of autobiography and history acknowledged
as literature, e.g. Rousseau's Confessions, Gibbon's Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire
3. LITERARY NON-NARRATIVE FICTION 	 + - +
example: post-modernist, anti-narrative texts
4. LITERARY NON-NARRATIVE NON-FICTION 	 + - -
examples: collections of aphorisms, the writings of Freud,
Rousseau, Pascal's Pensees. Lyric poetry belongs
in 3 or 4, depending one's definition of fiction
5. NON-LITERARY NARRATIVE FICTION 	 - + +
example: unusual, but as in a story re-written as an
advertisement, e.g. Rumpelstiltskin in which the frog
transforms from one Bank to another
6. NON-LITERARY NARRATIVE NON-FICTION	 - ± -
examples: news reports, works of history, narratives of
personal experience, live play by play broadcasts
7. NON-LITERARY NON-NARRATIVE FICTION	 - - +
example: difficult to illustrate. A story-math problem in
which a merchant buys some shoes etc.
8. NON-LITERARY NON-NARRATIVE NON-FICTION - - -
examples: advertisements (except for the case above); recipes,
interviews, textbooks, literary criticism, laws, organised debates,
sermons, conducting business, exchanging opinions
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'It may be true that most of literature belongs to the category fictions (sic), that the
prototypical examples of fiction are narrative texts, and that the fullest variety of
narrative techniques is displayed in fiction, the three features literary, narrative
and fictional remain distinct, and do not presuppose each other. Every one or
nearly every one of their combinations is represented in Western culture' (Ryan
1).
Source: Ryan, Marie-Laure. 1991. Possible Worlds, Artcial Intelligence and
Narrative Theory. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Appendix 33
National Forum for
Consultation Paper:
Authority 1996)
SOCIETY
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Values in Education and Community -
(School Curriculum and Assessment
Values
We value truth, human rights, the
law, justice and collective
endeavour for the common good of
society. In particular we value
families as sources of love and
support for all their members and as
the basis of a society in which
people care for others.
Principles for action
On the basis of these values,
we as a sociery should:
understand our
responsibilities as citizens;
be ready to challenge values
or actions which may be
harmful to individuals or
communities;
support families in raising
children and caring for
dependants;
help people to know about
the law and legal processes;
obey the law and encourage
others to do so;
accept diversity and respect
people's right to religious
and cultural differences;
provide opportunities to all;
support people who cannot
sustain a dignified life-style
by themselves;
promote participation in our
democracy;
contribute to, as well as
benefit fairly from,
economic and cultural
resources;
make truth and integrity
priorities in public life.
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RELATIONSHIPS
Values	 Principles for action
We value others for themselves, not
for what they have or what they can
do for us, and we value these
relationships as fundamental to our
development and the good of the
community
On the basis of these values,
we as a sociezy should:
respect the dignity of all
people;
tell others they are valued;
earn loyalty, trust and
confidence;
woik co-operatively with
others;
be mutually supportive;
respect the beliefs, life,
privacy and property of
others;
try to resolve disputes
peacefully.
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THE SELF
Values	 Principles for action
We value each person as a unique
being of intrinsic worth, with
potential for spiritual, moral,
intellectual and physical
development and change.
On the basis of these values,
we as a sociezy should:
try to understand our own
character, strengths and
weaknesses;
develop a sense of self-
worth;
try to discover meaning and
purpose in life and how life
ought to be lived;
try to live up a to shared
moral code;
make responsible use of our
rights and privileges;
strive for knowledge and
wisdom throughout life;
take responsibility for our
own lives within our
capacities.
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THE ENVIRONMENT
Values	 Principles for action
We value the natural world as a
source of wonder and inspiration,
and accept our duty to maintain a
sustainable environment for the
future.
On the basis of these values,
we as a society should:
preserve balance and
diversity in nature wherever
possible;
justify development in
terms of a sustainable
environment;
repair habits devastated by
human development
wherever possible;
preserve areas of beauty
wherever possible;
understand the place of
human beings within the
world.
Source: National Forum for Values in Education and Community - Consultation Paper:
(School Curriculum and Assessment Authority 1996)
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Appendix 34
Four types of hermeneutic thinking relevant to classroom
practice: (Thornbury after Gallagher 1992)
Definition:
Hermeneutics within the ancient Greek tradition was the traditional arts of interpretation
of the knowledge and wisdom of the gods and the exegetical training necessary for the
citizenry. (Gallagher 1992: 324)
The four main approaches to contemporary hermeneutics.
Conservative hermeneutics
The proponents of conservative herineneutics argue that through the development and
mastering of a correct methodology a reader is able to understand the objective and
universal truths found in a text.
Moderate hermeneutics
Those who advocate moderate her,neneutics believe that readers are unable to find
objective truths in texts because of the prejudices and limitations found in our language
and specific historical context. Instead the readers participates in a 'trusting, optimistic
and creative' procedure to produce 'localised meanings' from the text.
Radical hermeneutics
The view of radical her,neneutics is advanced by those who claim that original
meanings are unattainable and that interpretation is always contingent and relative.
Critical hermeneutics
Those who advocate critical hermeneutics assert that the reading of a text involves first,
critical reflection on the 'false consciousness' embedded in the text; and then, following
that, the promotion of the distortion-free, 'liberating' meaning of the text.
Source: Gallagher, Shaun. 1992. Hermeneuzics and Education. New York: State
University of New York Press and Schwartz.
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Appendix 35
The Five Standards of Authentic Instruction
(Newmann and Wehlage 1993)
1. Higher-order thinking
2. Depth of knowledge
3. Connectedness to the World
4. Substantive Conversation
5. Social Support for Student Achievement
1. Higher-order thinking
lower-order thinking only 1...2...3..4...5 higher-order thinking is central
2. Depth of knowledge
knowledge is shallow l...2...3..4...5 knowledge is deep
3. Connectedness to the World
no connection 1...2...3..4...5 connected
4. Substantive Conversation
no substantive conversation 1...2...3..4...5 high level substantive conversation
5. Social Support for Student Achievement
negative social support l...2...3..4...5 positive social support
Source: Newmann, Fred M. and Gary G. Wehiage. 1993. Standards of Authentic
Instruction. Educational Leadership. Vol 50, no 7:8-12.
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Appendix 36
36.	 A Goods-Services Continuum: Shostack (1977)
A goods service continuum
Soft drtnks
If	 •	 outlets
Detergents i CosmeticsTangible	 I 	
•	
AomobuI	 Fast•food	
Intangible
	
I	 Arire	 IFast food
	 •	 •	
Conult ng
oUtlets	 Adiertusing Investment
dominant	
agencp	
management Tea/ 
dominant
Figure 2.5
Source: Shostack 0. L., 'Breaking Free from Product Marketing', Journal of Marketing,
Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977, American Marketing Association, p. 77
Source: Shostak, 0. L. Breaking Free from Product Marketing. Journal of Marketing,
Vol 41, no 2, April 1977: 77.
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Appendix 37 (1)
Teachers as
(Thornbury
intellectuals: an assessment instrument
1993)
After Gouldner
Local
	 Cosmopolitan
Gouldner contrasts those who stay in one school, or locality, with those who spiral round the
system getting experience and promotions. What is the correct notion of a teaching career?
Intense loyalty to a limited setting and promotion within it? Or pursuit of a series of promote
posts which takes you round the country or to a variety of countries? Locals have their own
culture; of favoured staffroom chairs; 'golden ages' of the school; personal status with the loca]
community. Cosmopolitans have other characteristics you may have already observed in your
school or college.
After Hoyle
Restricted Professionals 	 Extended Professionals
Hoyle claims to identify two contrasting types of teacher. For example, two teachers. Teachei
A teaches her class only, only worries about her own immediate responsibilities, eg. the
geography dept. which she takes very seriously; but is not interested in wider school and
community matters. She doesn't read books on education. It's just ajob - which she does very
well - but she avoids talking about being a teacher or education when she goes out socially.
Teacher B is into curriculum working groups, community projects, unions, and is a local
councillor. She reads widely, including books on society education, and has many cultural
interests reflecting her 'committed stance'. Both are sometimes criticised by other
colleagues....in what ways do you think?
After Lieberman
Semi-Professional	 Professional
Professionals are recognised by about 14 criteria, some of which are: their professional body
(consisting of fellow professionals) controls entry to the job; as individual professionals they
have independence of judgement, and can refuse to do what senior professionals ask if their
professional judgement says no; they possess 'a body of arcane knowledge'- in A level physics
or their knowledge of the exams system which they choose to specialise in; they have rituals
and procedures, for instance updating courses which maintain their arcane knowledge; they
emphasis the acquisition of formal qualifications, and insist on access criteria -e.g. all deputy
heads must have an MA; their salaries and/or status in the society are relatively high - not
always both. They are difficult to sack. They do not unionise in the blue collar manner - or
strike, preferring more subtle sanctions through exercising their monopoly power. Semi-
professionals would lack many of these characteristics; and might unionise on a blue collar
basis more often than professionals.
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After Braverman
De- skilled
	
Professionalised/Empowered
Braverman suggests that we may make an occupational group, or jobs, more high tech but this
may involve actually 'de-skilling' the people concerned, for example as when typists acquire
word processors (with spelling checkers) and audio tapes and no longer need short-hand or
spelling. Health professionals (doctors and nurses) may find management rather than clinical
priorities taking over their traditional areas of control.
Teachers.... well, you can guess. Are they being empowered or proletarianised and de-skilled i
current developments? Where does the balance lie? Some argue that the extra technicities and
arcana of the National Curriculum and SATs have enhanced 'professional' knowledge and
sidlis: others say that what is being developed is a 'teacher-proof curriculum suited to non-
graduate, dc-skilled teachers of infants and so forth.
After Giroux and Grarnschi
'Transformative	 'Dirty worker'
intellectual'
Giroux and Gramschi would talk about the reconstructionist or even radical role of the teacher
The key institution for changing society, for Gramschi, was education and the school rather
than through the organisation of a proletarian or revolutionary movement through workers in
factories, or peasants in the countryside. Giroux wants teachers to be extended professionals;
intellectuals are the key force in any society - not just in the traditional Marxist-Leninist view
of revolution in which the revolutionary leaders come from the bourgeoisie rather than the
working class. Teachers are philosophical, public intellectuals (see Thornbury 1998 in Chaptei
8 of the present study).
But this would be to see teachers as empowered professionals: some occupational sociologists
would say that most teachers, with the sole exception of those who working in high-status
independent schools, are nearer to being de- or un-skilled, restricted semi-professionals doing
one of the low-status 'dirty jobs', e.g lavatory attendant, psychiatric nurse, that our society
wants done. This explains their low public esteem, the stress of the job and so forth.
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Appendix 37 (ii)
What kind of teacher are you? Ideologies of education?
Much curriculum theory can be discussed in terms of its underlying
philosophy or ideology. For instance, a typical curriculum studies
analysis (Skilbeck 1976) identifies four main ideologies: classical
humanism, progressivism, reconstructionism and instrumentalism
each of which represents a particular philosophical approach to the
structure and content of the curriculum.
Classical humanism is said to concentrate on a curriculum focusing
on cultural heritage and the passing on of the highest achievements
and products of the arts, sciences and other areas of human
endeavour.
Progressivism stresses 'student-centred' approaches, discovery
learning and the student's freedom to explore her own interests.
Reconstructionism sees education as a means of improving society,
as a force for planned progress and the development of a democratic
community.
Instrumentalism envisages the main purpose of the curriculum as
being to prepare children for adulthood - working life, leisure,
parenthood, citizenship.
Morrison and Ridley (1988) have added a fifth category of Liberal
Humanism which stresses co-operative learning, a common culture,
equal access to knowledge, flexible teaching styles; the egalitarian
emphasis of which would contrast with classical humanism.
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Appendix 37 (iii)
What kind of teacher are you?
(Put a cross on the line at the point which represents where your position falls.)
After Gouldner
Local
	
Cosmopolitan
After Hoyle
Restricted
	
Extended
After Lieberinan
Semi-Professional	 Professional
After Braverman
D e-skilling	 Empowerment
After Giroux
'Transformative 'Dirty worker'
intellectual'
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Appendix 38
The Road Not
'metaphysical'
theory.
Taken, by Robert Frost: A
poem seen in terms of possible worlds
ThE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood (aporia: multi-verse)
And sorry I could not travel both (aporia)
And be one traveller, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could (accessibility relations, supervenience)
To where it bent in the undergrowth
Then took the other, as just as fair
And perhaps having the better claim (best argument)
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same
And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day! (counter-part theory)
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, (Mar/wv stochastic process)
I doubted if I should ever come back.
I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I -
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made the difference.
Source: Frost, Robert. 1955. Selected Poems. London: Penguin Books.
